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Okonkwo was clearly cut out for great things. He was still 
young but he had won fame as the greatest wrestler in the 
nine villages. He was a wealthy farmer and had two barns full 
of yams, and had just married his third wife. To crown it all he 
had taken two titles and had shown incredible prowess in two 
inter-tribal wars. And so although Okonkwo was still young, he 
was already one of the greatest men of his time. Age was 
respected among his people, but achievement was revered. 
As the elders said, if a child washed his hands he could eat 
with kings. Okonkwo had clearly washed his hands and so he 
ate with kings and elders. (Achebe, 2001, p.6—7)
Above all, one should not wish to divest existence of its rich 
ambiguity (Nietzsche, 1974, p.335)
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Abstract
In the history of development policy making for Africa there have 
been many major changes between the themes and issues that have 
received the attention and budgets of governments and donors. Dif-
ferent approaches to development, swinging from structural adjust-
ments to market liberalisations, have focused, sequentially, on envi-
ronmental issues, democratisation, health (HIV/AIDS), and gender 
issues. Consecutively, new demographic, economic and political bot-
tlenecks have been identified, giving rise to new trends in develop-
ment policy making and budgeting—what I will refer to in this thesis 
as ‘development trends’.
Recently, the demographic boom on the African continent, and the 
consequent challenge of unemployment, has fuelled a focus on 
‘youth’. Given that the majority of the African population resides in 
rural areas, the emphasis of development policies for youth has 
focused on their employability in the agricultural sector. While the 
commercialisation of agriculture, as a development theme, has alter-
nated with a focus on food security for decades, the emphasis on 
youth in agribusiness has come to dominate development policy 
making and budgeting in the past five years (with country-specific 
variations). Yet, the ‘youthfulness’ and booming demography on the 
African continent have not come as a surprise. The mean age of the 
African population has been oscillating between 17 and 19 years 
since the ‘1950s2, while the sheer size of the population has steadily 
grown at a 2.0—2.8% rate in the same period. This thesis seeks to 
understand how these demographics have turned into a trend only 
recently despite the lingering youth problematique. 
The main research question of this dissertation is: How has the social 
category of youth been driving a new trend in development around 
agribusiness, and what has been its impact so far? This study 
attempts to answer this question for the case of Uganda. Reflecting 
the demographic trends on the African continent, Uganda has an 
exceptionally young population, which is mostly employed in agricul-
ture. Like in other countries throughout Africa, over the past few 
years, increasing attention and budgets have been placed on engaging 
2 Statistics accessed on 9/09/2018: http://www.worldometers.info/
world-population/africa-population/
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youths in agribusiness. Moreover, Uganda’s relation with the (interna-
tional) community has also followed rather average patterns. Thus, 
while unique in many ways, Uganda is a ‘typical case study’ both as an 
aid recipient and as a participant in the development trend focusing on 
youth in agribusiness. 
I studied the emergence of the development trend on youth in agri-
business from two angles: conducting ethnographic research with 
both development practitioners engaged in the field of agribusiness, 
and youths working both inside and outside of development 
schemes. In total, I interviewed 24 representatives of development 
agencies and 110 youths living in four regions of the country. I also 
engaged in participant observation, joining development practition-
ers for field visits, sitting in high-level meetings, and interacting with 
youths during their agribusiness activities at the markets, in the agri-
cultural fields and visiting their households. 
From my research, it became apparent that development partners 
have a range of ‘theories of change’ regarding youths in agribusiness. 
In particular, while some development agencies took a public-sector 
approach, others took a private-sector driven approach. Correspond-
ingly, the implementation and impact of these programmes was very 
diverse across the country and depended mainly on the geographi-
cal location and the approach adopted. From my interviews with 
youths, I also found that this socially constructed category was very 
heterogeneous. The diversity that characterises this group has strong 
impact on the implementation of the programmes. The most suc-
cessful programmes were those that took into account youths’ heter-
ogeneity and geographical specificities. 
Altogether, I find that the social category of youth is too vaguely 
defined to effectively guide development programmes. Development 
programmes considerably changed, from the elaboration of theories 
of change to the implementation of the programmes, and the politi-
cal agendas and incentives of the development organisations 
required strenuous negotiations and adaptations. In other words, 
besides the gap in development narratives and actual practices on 
the ground, there are gaps between and also within the narratives 
and practices of both groups of development actors (practitioners 
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and youths). There is contestation at all levels, which has consistent 
impact on the outcomes of the programmes. Theoretically, my 
research suggests that development, and the implementation of a 
development trend like youth in agribusiness, should be understood 
and studied as a complex process in which social actors enforce 
power mechanisms, rather than as the enactment of policies into 
practices. 
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Introduction 
YOUTH AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA24
Image 1. Dirt Road Leading up Mount Elegon, eastern Uganda, 2017. Picture 
taken by author.
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1.1 Introduction 
“‘Youth is just a word”, wrote Bourdieu (1993), referring to the arbitrary 
and contextual definitions of this social category. As a phase between 
childhood and adulthood, ‘youth’ is a condition of liminality,3 marginal 
and transient in nature. However, despite the apparent marginality of 
this social category, the concept of ‘youth’ has recently assumed a 
prominent role in public debates about development in Africa. With a 
median age that is half that of the European population, the African 
population is expected to double by 20504 - generating a ‘youth 
bulge’. With the majority of the population engaged in subsistence 
agriculture, youth unemployment has become a major concern 
across the continent. In the past few years, development agencies 
have brought African youths under the spotlight. Despite the uncer-
tainty and fuzziness that characterises its definitions (Sommers, 
2015), ‘youth’ has become the object of multi-million development 
programmes. Such demographic and economic concerns have 
fuelled a relatively new trend in development policy making, which 
aims at engaging youth in agribusiness. This study explores the 
unfolding of such trend in development, and its rationale and impact. 
How has the social category of youth been driving a new trend in 
development around agribusiness, and what has been its impact so 
far? 
This study focuses on the case of Uganda, one of the world’s 47 least-de-
veloped countries5, and the country with the second youngest population 
on the continent (in terms of median age). I have chosen the Ugandan 
context as a ‘typical case study’ (Gerring, 2008). As I will show below (sec-
tions 1.2.3 and 1.3), the political-economic history of the country, together 
with its experience as a donor darling, make it a representative case of 
how such trend in development is adopted in similar African contexts. 
3 ‘Liminality’ is a fundamental concept in anthropological research 
that refers to a phase ‘in between’ rites of passage, life stages, or anyway 
uncertainty and ambiguity of the social status of human beings in this 
stage. The main academic work on this theme is to be attributed to Arnold 
van Gennep, who, in 1909, published the founding manuscript ‘Rites of 
Passage’(van Gennep, 2006)
4 Data accessed on 2/10/2018 on: http://www.worldometers.info/
world-population/africa-population/
5 As of December 2018, according to UN’s Committee for 
Development Policy, accessed on 30/01/2018: https://www.un.org/devel-
opment/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf
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Since about 2015, with the second National Development Plan, ‘youth 
in agribusiness’ has entered the scene of development policy making in 
Uganda as a major subject. An increasing number of programmes and 
growing budgets by multilateral, bilateral and Ugandan governmental 
institutions have been targeting youths. ‘Youth in agribusiness’ has 
become a multi-million business: a new development trend. 
However, little is known as to what defines ‘youth’ in Uganda, and 
what youths’ capacities and constraints are for agribusiness. With 
78% of the population under 30 years of age, defining this social 
category is as arduous as necessary. Due to the heterogeneity that 
can be expected of a majoritarian social group, it remains unclear: 1) 
how have the Ugandan youths been targeted by development agen-
cies? 2) who are the Ugandan youths and what do they think of these 
programmes? 3) and what has been the socio-economic impact of 
the programmes? These three questions will be the main focus of 
the three empirical chapters that follow.
This chapter is structured as follows. In the following section (1.2) I intro-
duce the research problem that I am going to address with this study—
namely the rationale of addressing youth in agribusiness with develop-
ment programmes. First (sub-section 1.2.1), I problematise ‘youth’ as a 
contested social category. Second (sub-section 1.2.2), I contextualise the 
choice of engaging youth in agribusiness. Third (sub-section 1.2.3) I justi-
fy the choice of Uganda as case study for my research. In the following 
section (1.3), I give the reader and overview of the political-economic 
context of the study, by contextualising the history of development in 
Uganda and explaining the recent trend in development which targets 
youth in agribusiness (sub-section 1.3.1). Within the frame of the contex-
tualisation of this study, I dedicate section 1.3.2 to a brief political-eco-
nomic history of Uganda since independence, with particular attention to 
the agricultural sector (sub-section 1.3.2a). In the following section (1.4), I 
introduce the theoretical approach I have adopted to carry out this study, 
within the framework of Foucauldian development studies. In section 1.5 
I make an overview and justification of the methodological approach I 
adopted, combining anthropological methods to a Foucauldian 
approach. Subsequently (section 1.6), I briefly outline my findings and 
their scientific (1.6.2) and societal (1.6.3) relevance. I conclude this chap-
ter (section 1.7) with an overview of the structure of the manuscript. 
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1.2 Research problem: why youth in agribusiness?
The demographic and economic changes on the African continent 
over the past decades amount to a historical conjunction where the 
‘youth’ are about to become a major social and economic share of 
the population. Increasingly, political and development initiatives 
focus on those between ages 18 and 35 for programmes that aim at 
reducing unemployment and boosting economic growth. From being 
a marginal category of passage from childhood to adulthood, ‘youth’ 
has become the prominent subject (or object) of development policy 
making. In the past decades, youth have been the target of develop-
ment programmes concerned with education and health. Only 
recently, development programmes for youth have focused on their 
engagement in commercial agriculture (in opposition to subsistence 
agriculture)—or what is now called agribusiness. Programmes for 
youth in agribusiness in Africa are not new in development policy 
making, but have become, in the past five to ten years, a multi-mil-
lion business. Uganda, the nation with youngest population in east 
Africa, and one of the youngest on the continent—has followed this 
trend. As I will explain in more detail below (1.2.3), the history of 
Uganda’s relation with development aid make it a typical case study. 
Considering that the majority –78% (UBOS, 2017)– of the Ugandan 
population is under 30 years of age, it is hard to give an all-encom-
passing definition of youth, beyond an age bracket. The arbitrary 
choice of an age range defines the boundaries of a social category, 
while such category has little explanatory power of who the youths 
actually are. In the section (1.2.1) below, I problematise this definitional 
problem. Moreover, I question the choice of development organisa-
tions to seek employment for the Ugandan youth within the agribusi-
ness sector (sub-section 1.2.2). I conclude this section with an expla-
nation of my choice of Uganda as case study for my research on the 
adoption and implementation of this new trend in development policy 
making. 
1.2.1 Youth—a contested social category 
There is not a fixed moment in our lives when we stop being children to 
enter adulthood. Rather, this transition is determined culturally within 
our specific social environments (Aime & Pietropolli Charmet, 2014, 
p.11—20). Calculating age can be an arithmetical, quantitative 
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given—yet, it is the qualitative value that we culturally attribute to it that 
is functional to social status (ibid: 18—19). Africa is the continent with 
the youngest population: the median age is half that of the European 
continent. Like in the rest of the world stages in life are defined as 
social categories –childhood’, ‘youth’ and ‘adulthood’– within specific 
cultural environments. Yet, these categories are not static, but contin-
uously adapt and transform depending on changes in society, politics 
and economics. In Europe, the conceptualisation of ‘childhood’ dates 
back to the 19th and 20th centuries and goes hand in hand with the 
industrialisation, the high demand for child labour, and the rise of the 
bourgeoisie (Aime & Pietropolli Charmet, 2014, p.12—13). With the 
schooling (of the bourgeois) and the exploitation (of the working class) 
of the young, new ideas and rituals were created around passages 
between age-related social categories—for example the celebration 
of birthdays.
When I travelled to Uganda for the first time I was 27, young, and 
thus belonged to a minor segment of the aging European popula-
tion. I was beginning an extended ethnographic research on youth in 
agribusiness in Uganda, a country where the wide majority of the 
population is younger than me. In my home country, Italy, the mean 
age was almost 46 in 2015. Meanwhile in Uganda the mean age was 
almost 16.6 The same social category of youth, between 18 and 357, 
must mean different things in such extremely different demographic 
contexts—let alone the socio-cultural and economic differences 
that distinguished my experience of being young from that of my 
Ugandan peers. I was to find out that indeed being young meant 
different things throughout the country, and that indeed because of 
the heterogeneity it brought along, it was a social category with little 
explanatory power. Yet, the same category was the target of mul-
ti-millions development programmes. ‘Youth’ is a double, ambiguous, 
social category: on the one hand, it has elusive socio-cultural meaning, 
on the other hand it is the object of much development attention and 
resources.
6 Statistics accessed on 8/09/2018: https://www.statista.com/
statistics/447643/average-age-of-the-population-in-uganda/ 
7 This age bracket is the broadest possible bracket, accommodating 
the definitions of all development organisations I worked with.
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In fact, being young also refers to the effort towards adulthood and 
planning for a future of stability: youths in Europe study longer, enter 
the job market later, and marry even later. However, there are great 
differences in the socio-economic conditions of youths in Europe—
which are also reflected in the cultural conceptualisation of this 
social category (Aime & Pietropolli Charmet, 2014, p.60—63). Cultur-
al and socio-economic heterogeneity in the understanding of youth 
vary greatly also within one country. The use of the concept of ‘youth’ 
needs to be contextualised (in Europe as much as in Africa), and 
cannot be projected on diverse socio-cultural environments without 
problematisation. On the contrary, the definition of youth that is used 
by development programmes, is often limited to an age-range (Som-
mers, 2015).
In Uganda, ‘youth’ indicates the interval between childhood and 
adulthood. Like in Europe, there are countless reasons to imagine a 
heterogeneous group of people responding to the age range 
between 18 and 35. 43 languages are spoken8 across the country, 
which has strong regional disparities. In such diverse socio-cultural 
environment, it is hard to imagine that youth has one meaning. As 
Christiansen et al. (2006, p.10) explain:
Though all too many anthropological, sociological and psy-
chological studies have granted the concept of youth and a 
priori meaning, seeing it as a developmental or life stage, the 
transition from childhood to adulthood should not be consid-
ered fixed and stable. Generational categories will for most of 
us –layman and researcher alike– seem self-evident, but 
rather than being given naturally their meaning and manifes-
tations arise in relation to specific social processes, cultural 
understandings and historical influences (cf. Mannheim 1952). 
Youth is differently constituted and configured in different 
times and places. It may be an influential social category in 
one context, a marginal one in another and obsolete in a third.
During my time in Uganda, I found that in the northern and the 
south-western regions entering and leaving the category of ‘youth’ 
8 Ethnologue, visited on 3/08/2018 on: https://www.ethnologue.com/
country/UG
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is a generational process: youth is the liminal phase, which ideally is 
rather short, in which socio-economic status is accumulated in order 
to access adulthood—generally through marriage. On the other 
hand, in the eastern region, the social category of youth does not 
even have a term in the local language—one would suspect that 
‘youth’ does not exist. A direct passage from childhood to adulthood 
is marked by the initiation rites of passage of circumcision (for 
males), and with marriage (for females). As I was told (among others) 
by Alex9, a “young but adult” male from Mbale, in his twenties:
Me: When someone, before someone is circumcised, do you 
call that person a different name?
Alex: Of course! For me as I told you now, for me no one in our 
family can call me a “ka-boy”
Me: a Ka-boy?
Interpreter: It means “small boy”
Me: Ooh, small boy?
Alex: Yeah, they cannot call me that, now. They give me 
respect as a mature man.
Me: Ok. Because you were standing still while being 
circumcised?
Alex: Yeah. I am a mature man because I’m circumcised, I put 
my heart there to circumcise me [i.e. he showed he was brave 
and faced the pain of circumcision].
Interpreter: And you didn’t blink [i.e. didn’t show he was in 
pain]?
Alex: Yeah. Now, they give me respect, I am a man and they 
see me as a mature, yeah…and I can talk in front of the 
elderly.
Between being considered a ka-boy and being a respected, mature 
man, the young boy is tested on his achievements, economic status, 
and future planning. This phase of liminality, an in-between phase, 
does not even deserve a proper terminology and is shun away. Due 
to the lack of terminology in the local language –‘lugisu’– in the 
eastern region the English term ‘youth’ is used, when referring to 
this liminal phase. ‘Youth’ is associated with poverty, and the related 
9 This conversation took place in Kampala on 5/05/2017
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precarious condition of being unable to plan for the future. So I was 
told by Richard10, a 33 years old agricultural entrepreneur—or ‘agri-
preneur’, i.e. someone who moved from subsistence farming to com-
mercial agribusiness. “The youths plan for today —you know? The 
majority, they… they don’t know how tomorrow will end. What I’m 
seeing is that poverty is very hard, to fight poverty is hard but we are 
trying”—as Richard told me, youths are struggling with poverty and 
therefore are unable to settle and plan for their future, which is his 
definition of adulthood. 
As figure 1 demonstrates, the population of Uganda has been grow-
ing steadily in the past two decades, at a percent rate of 3.2 annum 
(UBOS, 2017). Currently, 78% of the population is under 30 years of 
age. Approaching 40 million, the Ugandan population faces a ‘youth 
bulge’—with nearly 50% of the population under 15 years of age. 
Census Population
 1963 1980 1991 2002 2014 2016 2017
9.5 12.7 16.7 24.2 34.6 36.6 37.7
Figure 1.Census population 1969-2017, millions inhabitants. 
Source: (UBOS, 2017, p.13)
The major concern regarding this rapid (and foreseen) population 
growth is unemployment. As Datzberger (2018, p.132) argues, this 
condition is not unique to Uganda—as much as the very definition of 
the issue of youth unemployment remains elusive: “As in many low-in-
come countries, youth unemployment is pervasive, though no accu-
rate figures are available on the exact percentage of how many youths 
are without a stable job. Depending on the definition of 
10 Richard, Mbale, 15/06/2017
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‘unemployment’ and what counts as ‘youth’ estimates on Uganda’s 
youth unemployment rates vary tremendously by source.” Defining 
unemployment as “individuals not working at all, actively looking for 
work and are available for work”, the Uganda Bureau of Statistics 
records a 4.9% of youth unemployment rate for 2017 (2017, p.33). On 
the other hand, the World Bank11, who focus on formal youth unem-
ployment, declared a youth unemployment rate of 63% in 2012 (down 
from 83% in 2009) (Datzberger, 2018, p.132). Despite the fuzziness of 
definitions and statistics, it is evident that youths are competing for lit-
tle employment opportunities. Reflecting the public discourse, the 
media have been talking of Ugandan youth (especially youth male 
unemployment, though young women are suffering from even higher 
unemployment rates) as a “ticking time bomb”12, threatening national 
security and political stability.
As a consequence, the social category of youth is extending 
because of the inability of men to achieve the socio-economic sta-
tus required to be considered an adult (Aime & Pietropolli Charmet, 
2014) (Sommers, 2015). The transition from one phase to another 
becomes diluted, while the rites that culturally demarcated the pas-
sage to adulthood lose their meaning (Aime & Pietropolli Charmet, 
2014). Eriasa13, a 33 years-old agripreneur from Mount Elgon in the 
east, stressed for instance, how the ritual of circumcision has lost its 
meaning in recent years. With disappointment, he told me, “Now 
even if a child is ten years they can circumcise and that does not 
mean the child has grown [into an adult]. In the past they used to 
circumcise at 20 years, then later it was 18 but at the moment they 
even circumcise children. But it is our ritual although it doesn’t 
define adulthood anymore.”
It seems that the category of youth is a consequence of modernity, 
as the number of young people grow competing for limited resources. 
At the same time, despite being a growing majority of the population, 
youth are a marginalized group in socio-economic terms. For these 
11 World bank survey 2008/2009, p.5, accessed on 15/09/2018: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSTATINAFR/Resources/ADI-
200809—essay-EN.pdf
12 Ugandan Monitor, article from 7/04/2012: http://www.monitor.
co.ug/SpecialReports/688342—1381200—ara4ho/index.html
13 Eriasa, Mbale, 14/06/2017
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reasons Sommers (2015, p.13) refers to youth in contexts of poverty, as 
‘failed adulthood’. As a consequence of “ “structural marginalisation”, 
which (…) has cultural, political, and economic roots: rigid cultural cri-
teria that stipulate the constituents of adulthood, a state that provides 
less and less to its citizens, and a weak economy” (Sommers, 2015, 
p.13). And therefore, while having outgrown the age of youth, they 
socially remain ‘youthmen’ (ibid). As described by Sommers, youth is a 
category of transition where there is little pride in being considered 
‘young’, and access to adulthood is frustrated by competition for 
scarce resources, among a growing number of youths.
1.2.2 Youth in agribusiness 
The most accessible way of providing income for youths, as for the 
rest of Ugandan population, is agriculture. Agriculture is the back-
bone of the Ugandan economy and the main source of (informal) 
employment. In fact, according to the World Bank (2013), 60% of the 
population is engaged in agriculture and 68% of the working popu-
lation are youths between 15—34 years old. However, the career 
perspectives of youths in agriculture are dependent on the elderly, 
who own most of the land. 
During my fieldwork, I have often been overwhelmed by the fact that 
while young people constituted the majority in most social contexts, 
their attitude towards elderly was reverential. More than a gerontoc-
racy,14 elderly in all regions of Uganda hold a normative power that is 
seldom questioned. They (mostly the eldest man in the family) decide 
on matters of marriage, education and inheritance. Therefore, they 
hold a crucial position of power in youths’ access to land, and ulti-
mately their entrance into adulthood.
Despite the rapid urbanisation, which has resulted in a three-fold 
growth in the Ugandan population from 2002 to 2014 (UBOS, 2017, 
p.14), the majority of the population lives in rural areas (Fan & Zhang, 
2012). For these reasons, development programmes targeting 
youths focus on their engagement in agriculture as a business 
14 The youngest populations seem to be led by the el-
dest leaders, particularly in Africa—the youngest continent. 
Uganda follows this trend: https://qz.com/africa/1162490/
the-youngest-continent-keeps-on-being-run-by-the-oldest-leaders/
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–agribusiness– or commercial agriculture. Moreover, agribusiness is 
also seen as a way of slowing rural-urban migration. Development 
cooperation has focused on the following major issues: yields produc-
tivity, commercialisation of agriculture, and infrastructures and trans-
port for the accessibility to agri-food markets. The general trend for 
rural development has been that of a neoliberal approach to agricul-
tural industrialization, with the goal of moving away from subsistence 
agriculture. Nonetheless, the latter remains the most dominant form of 
agricultural engagement (Gollin & Rogerson, 2010).
1.2.3 Country selection: why Uganda?
The trend in development supporting youth in agribusiness is wide-
spread on the African continent. The investments in this sector have 
been driven by policies from major multilateral and bilateral donors. 
One of the main multilateral programmes for youth in agribusiness is 
promoted by the African Development Bank (AfDB), the ENABLE 
Youth programme15; while one of the main bilateral organisations in this 
sector is USAID. Several African governments have taken up on the 
this trend, prioritising programmes for youth employment in agribusi-
ness—Uganda being one of them. The trend in development that pri-
oritises youth’s engagement in agribusiness is widespread across the 
continent, with homogeneous solutions for the various countries. 
One of the top-10 recipients of international development aid16, 
Uganda is a representative case of how aid is absorbed and spent 
(Aiyar, Berg, & Hussain, 2005). As I will show in more detail in the 
next section (1.3), Uganda has entertained an intense and rather stable 
relation with donors since the 1980s. Uganda has been considered 
‘development poster boy’ for development programmes (Cheeseman, 
2015, p.132). Like other developing countries in Africa, Uganda has 
undergone shifts in international development strategies—from struc-
tural adjustment to the post-Washington consensus liberalisation. In 
Uganda, the implementation of the development trends that followed 
15 Enable Youth programme, info accessed on 16/09/2018 on: 
https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/afdb-and-iita-invite-africa-to-
think-big-for-youth-and-agriculture-in-two-day-design-workshop-on-en-
able-youth-program-15587/
16 OECD data accessed on 16/09/2018 on: https://www.oecd.org/
dac/stats/documentupload/2%20Africa%20—%20Development%20
Aid%20at%20a%20Glance%202016.pdf
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one another in the past decades was quite typical in comparison to 
other countries (as I argue in chapter 3). 
Anywhere in Uganda, from the most remote rural area to the urban 
jungle of the capital city Kampala, a puzzling fact confronts the 
observer: everybody is so young! Uganda has the second youngest 
population, after Niger17—and the youngest of east Africa, the most 
populous region of the continent. 78% of the population is under 30, 
and nearly 23% of the total population is in the age group of 18—30 
(the Uganda constitutional definition of youth)—about twice the 
European average.18 The median age in Uganda is around 16—which 
seems exceptionally low against the European median age of 43 
years. However, considering that the median age of sub-Saharan 
countries is 18 years19, the Ugandan population is not far from the 
average. Most neighbouring countries in the east African region 
have a median age20 that is even lower than the sub-Saharan aver-
age. The fact that the majority of youths are employed in (subsist-
ence) agriculture –in Uganda as in most sub-Saharan countries– is 
also not unusual. Like in other sub-Saharan countries, the composi-
tion of the Ugandan population exacerbates the demographic 
dynamics (youth bulge and employment challenges) driving devel-
opment programmes to focus on youths. 
Certainly, there are specificities to the Ugandan case (for example, 
the strong regional disparities). These are bound to socio-cultural 
factors and affect the way in which the development trend looks in 
practice, when implemented on the ground. These socio-cultural 
specificities, however, can be expected also in other African coun-
tries where the development trend around youth in agribusiness is 
implemented. These peculiarities, which are different for each country 
(and can take different forms, from heterogeneity to resistance), are in 
fact a constant trait emerging from development studies (Scott J., 
1976) (Methorst, Roep, Verstegen, & Wiskerke, 2017) (Escobar, 2012) 
17 Statistics accessed on 16/09/2018 on: http://www.worldometers.
info/world-population/niger-population/
18 Statistics accessed on 16/09/2018 on: https://www.indexmundi.
com/it/unione_europea/distribuzione_di_eta.html
19 Statistics accessed on 27/10/2018 on:
http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/africa-population/
20 Statistics accessed on 27/10/2018 on http://www.worldometers.
info/world-population/burundi-population/
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(Murray Li, 2007). In my research, I pay close attention to these peculi-
arities, which I highlight as defining traits of youths’ identities, their 
capacity to engage in agribusiness and their relation to development 
programmes. Nonetheless, considering the ways in which pro-
grammes were implemented, Uganda is a typical case in many ways.
1.3 Development in Uganda
With this section I aim to put into historical perspective the recent 
development trend around youth in agribusiness by giving an over-
view of Uganda’s relation with development, since independence. 
Since the British left Uganda as colonisers in the 1960s, Uganda 
has received development aid from various multilateral and bilateral 
donors. As it is shown in the Figure 2 below, however, there has been 
a net increase in ODA (Official Development Assistance21) in the late 
1980s, with another spurt in aid in the early 2000s, around the time 
of the Millennium Development Goals. This phenomenon follows a 
rather consistent pattern in development financing. In fact, the two 
peaks in ODA disbursement are common to other African develop-
ing countries, as shown by Desrosiers and Swedlund (2018, p.8).
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Figure 2. Net official development assistance and official aid received 
(current US$). Source: World Bank Data22
21 Stein (Stein, 2009, p.13) explains that: “Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) generally includes grants and concessional loans (with 
a 25-percent grant component calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per-
cent) from government and other official sources for development/welfare 
purposes” 
22 Accessed on 16/09/2018 on: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD?locations=UG
CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION 37
In the spring of 1987, the Ugandan government launched an Economic 
Recovery Programme with the substantial support of multilateral 
financial institutions, principally the World Bank (WB), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and DAC23 members. Stein (2009, p.18) explains 
that: 
The initial program involved a 77 percent devaluation (43 per-
cent in real terms), an increase in all export crop prices, budg-
etary discipline, which improved through shifting access to 
bank credit for the private sector and parastatals rather than 
directly from the coffers of the government, foreign exchange 
controls that were to be replaced by an OGL (open general 
licensing) system, price control reductions and privatization of 
parastatals including the liberalisation of the crop marketing 
system.
Uganda was abundantly rewarded by donors, resulting in “one of the 
most rapid increases of debt of any country in the world, rising by 
571 percent between 1980 and 1998. Given the structural weaknesses 
of exports and their heavy reliance on cash crops like coffee, the debt/
export ratio rose (…)” (Stein, 2009, p.19). Despite the fact that aid 
began to slow down in the late 1990s, Uganda benefitted from the 
surge of budgeting for the Millennium Development Goals. In 2014, 
Uganda was in the top-10 ODA recipients in Africa.24 Nevertheless, 
Uganda remains in the United Nations (UN) list of Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs).25 Datzberger (2018, p.133—134) explains that:
Uganda is a low-income country with a GDP per capita equiva-
lent to 3 percent of the world’s average. Although Uganda’s GNI 
(Gross National Income) increased significantly, by about 125%, 
between 1985 and 2012, it continues to suffer from a 
23 The Development Assistance Committee (DAC), is part of the OECD 
–the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development– since 
1961, and is a forum of 30 aid donors. Accessed on 17/09/2018: http://
www.oecd.org/development/developmentassistancecommitteedac.htm.
24 OECD data accessed on 16/09/2018 on: https://www.oecd.org/
dac/stats/documentupload/2%20Africa%20—%20Development%20
Aid%20at%20a%20Glance%202016.pdf 
25 UN data accessed on 17/09/2018:
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/
sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf
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discriminatory global trading system with negative impacts on 
the national market due to USD 2.31 billions of exported goods 
alongside USD 5.52 billions of imported goods in 2015 alone. 
In Uganda, like in other ‘developing countries’, standards and criteria 
are set as to what still needs to be achieved for a country to be con-
sidered developed. This “subtraction approach” –a developing 
country’s inability to be more like a developed country– has been 
the lens for mainstream economics’ reading of Africa’s chronic fail-
ure of growth (Jerven M., 2015, p.2). With the National Development 
Plan (NDP) (GoU, 2015) and Vision 2040 (GoU, 2007), the Govern-
ment of Uganda has set the ambitious objective of achieving the 
middle-income status by 2020 (yet does not seem to be on track to 
meet this deadline26).
1.3.1 A new trend in development
With the second NDP (Government of Uganda, 2015, p.46), the 
Ugandan government committed to sustaining youth employment 
through various programmes of its ministries—mainly the Ministry of 
Gender, Labour and Social Development (MGLSD) with the Youth 
Livelihood Program (YLP). The curricula in the education sector had 
been renovated in 2008 with the purpose of strengthening the 
BTVET (business, technical, vocational education and training). 
Datzberger (2018, p.133) noted how the focus on youths’ education 
for technical and entrepreneurial skills strengthened an orientation 
towards entrepreneurship as a skill for self-employment of youth: 
“entrepreneurship was introduced as a subject at both lower levels 
of education and at university with a view of imparting practical 
knowledge and skills to enable youth to become job creators in an 
environment with limited employment prospects.” 
In 2012, the GoU launched the Uganda Youth Capital Venture Fund 
(UYCVF), which facilitated access to credit facilities to individual 
young entrepreneurs. This was succeeded by the Youth Livelihood 
Program (YLP), which ran from 2013 to 2018, and provided small 
loans to groups of youths with a business plan (mostly, in the agricul-
tural sector). By setting the guidelines for development focus and 
26 http://parliamentwatch.ug/will-uganda-become-a-middle-income-
country-by-2020/#.W7UE9BMzbOQ
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targets, the NDP also catalysed programmes from other development 
institutions. For example, the FAO has been collaborating with the 
Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture to develop a strategy for the employ-
ment of youth in agriculture27; the African Development Bank, which 
had funded the ENABLE Youth programme28 in West Africa, was pilot-
ing the programme in Uganda at the time of my fieldwork; CGIAR has 
been promoting research for development to engage youth in agricul-
tural entrepreneurship29, which in Uganda was mainly implemented by 
IITA. USAID30 through the programme ‘Feed the Future’ also invested 
in youth in agribusiness as a tool for rural development and poverty 
alleviation. 
However, (youth) agro-entrepreneurial initiatives in development 
countries remain underexplored by both academics and development 
practitioners (Leeuwis, et al., 2014). In particular, little is known about 
the role of factors such as gender, level of education, marital status, 
location (urban/rural) (in chapter 5 I will show how these factors are 
crucially important). The very definition of ‘youth’ remains vaguely 
defined in development policies, and mostly is reduced to an age 
bracket, which varies based on the development agency. Depending 
on the development agency, it can be 15—24 (UN (Sommers, 2015)), 
18—35 (AfDB31), and 18—30 (Ugandan Constitution (GoU, 2015)). 
Most programmes stress the component of entrepreneurship, which 
entails business and accountancy skills, next to the strictly agricultural 
techniques. Pushing youth to leave subsistence agriculture behind for 
a commercial, market-oriented type of agriculture, or a ‘agribusiness’. 
The entrepreneurial effort to enter agribusiness is described in devel-
opment jargon as ‘agripreneurship’—namely the “profitable marriage 
27 http://www.fao.org/rural-employment/resources/detail/
en/c/1069622/
28 http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/agribusi-
ness-seen-as-a-solution-to-high-youth-unemployment-on-the-conti-
nent-13293/
29 CGIAR Strategy and Results Framework 2016—2030: https://li-
brary.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10947/3865/CGIAR%20Strategy%20
and%20Results%20Framework.pdf?sequence=1
30 https://chemonics.com/projects/
creating-opportunities-youth-agriculture/
31 https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/afdb-announc-
es-new-youth-training-drive-to-promote-agricultural-industrializa-
tion-17334/
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of agriculture and entrepreneurship” (Bairwa, Lakra, Kushwaha, Mee-
na, & Kumar, 2014, p.1), of which youths would be ‘agripreneurs’. In this 
way, the approach resonates with James Scott’s analysis of develop-
ment more broadly, in which he argues that development policy fre-
quently transforms common villagers into “untrammelled Schumpete-
rian entrepreneurs and price and profit become the major standards” 
(1976, p.23). Price and profit become the major standards of success, 
stressing the neoliberal values inherent to agribusiness development 
programmes.
Moreover, there is a political component to the trend of targeting 
youth, which cannot be overlooked. 78% of the population is under 30 
years of age—and was thus born under the current government, since 
the current president, Museveni, has been in power since 1986. At the 
same time, youth between 18 and 30 constitute more than half Ugan-
da’s voters (Datzberger, 2018, p.135). In fact, as it was reported to me 
several times, off-record, by Ugandan civil servants who asked to 
remain anonymous, that programmes targeting youths have the addi-
tional function of satisfying the electorate and calming public unrest 
over unemployment. This perspective on the political function of pro-
grammes targeting youths was also confirmed by the most outspoken 
informants in the field. One of them in particular, a reverend32 on the 
slopes of Mount Elgon in the east, entertained me at length with his 
sceptical views of governmental interests in development programmes 
for youths—one afternoon in late June while we were stuck by a tor-
rential rain. He told me:
For me, I feel they [politicians] know the population of the youth 
is very high, and you convince the youth to rally [politically, for 
election purposes] behind you…you will go through [i.e. ‘you’ll 
be elected’]. And how do you convince these youths to rally 
behind you? is to talk big “we shall do this… we shall do this… 
we shall do this”. And I think that is the biggest problem with our 
government they talk big and they do very little. When it comes 
to talking of how they are going to help the youth…you just think 
life is going to change! But going down to the grass root, go 
down to the sub-county… can you find there a well-organised 
group with hope of developing?
32 Extract from an interview in the outskirts of Mbale on 22/06/2017
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In fact, politics and development, particularly in the agricultural sector, 
have long been interconnected. In a detailed analysis of the reform, 
initiated in 2001, of National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS), 
Kjær and Joughin (2012, p.329), describe how the programme was 
increasingly politicised by the government:
As the costs of staying in power increased, public policies were also 
increasingly affected by political concerns (Barkan, 2011; Mwenda & 
Tangri, 2005). NAADS became gradually politicised and this affect-
ed implementation especially as the February 2011 elections drew 
closer. Donors were not able to navigate in this process of 
politicisation. 
The process of reform of the NAADS was instrumental to the gov-
ernment, since this platform has the potential of reaching out to the 
majority of the electorate, which is involved in agriculture. While this 
is a recent example of politicisation of agricultural development, it is 
nothing new. In the following section, I will give an historical per-
spective of Uganda’s political economy, paying particular attention 
to the agricultural sector.
1.3.2 Brief political economic history of Uganda since 
Independence 
Uganda’s present political and economic situation is emblematic of 
issues faced by a number of Sub-Saharan African countries, yet at 
the same time has peculiar features that make it unique. In Uganda, 
95% of the poor live in rural areas (Fan & Zhang, 2012) and 60% of 
the population is engaged in agriculture33, unsettled rural develop-
ment issues (land tenure inequalities, poor infrastructure and gen-
der and generational inequalities) are rooted in a long history of eth-
nic tensions and regional disparities. 
The colonial past has left a legacy in the diversified administration of 
the various regions and districts in Uganda. Green (2015, p.492) 
explains that 
33 Data of the Government of Uganda, accessed on 15th May 2016: 
http://gov.ug/content/agriculture
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Under colonial rule most of Uganda was governed by a system 
of British district commissioners. Under these commissioners 
chiefs held powers over taxes, courts, local councils and gen-
eral law and order. In the eastern and northern parts of Uganda 
which had no tradition of kingdoms or hierarchical leadership, 
the imposition of chiefs was alien and, while ruling under “cus-
tomary” law, chiefs in such areas were actually closer to mod-
ern civil servants than traditional pre-colonial rulers. 
However, she explains (2015, p.492) that the situation was different 
for the traditional “five kingdoms of Ankole, Buganda, Busoga, 
Bunyoro and Toro in the southern and western part of the country, 
which had a long pre-colonial history of political hierarchy, in some 
cases dating back centuries”. In these contexts, the colonisers 
implemented a system of indirect rule—namely giving the kings the 
responsibility of administrating and ruling ‘their’ populations. The 
economic situation of the country, towards the end of colonisation, 
seemed promising: 
On the eve of decolonisation—that moment, in the early 1950s, 
between the hardships of the Second World War and the brave new 
world of sovereign statehood—the economic prospects of much of 
Africa were bright, or were at least cause of some optimistic projec-
tions. (…) For the colonial administration, the ‘pearl of Africa’ was 
becoming its little nugget of economic prosperity in the heart of the 
British east Africa. Indeed, Uganda’s annual GDP growth (depending 
on which source we believe) averaged 5.9 percent between 1962 
and 1971, anticipating more recent, much-celebrated rates. (Reid, 
2017, p.216)
However, after independence in 1962, Ugandans experienced sev-
eral repressive regimes and violent conflicts—to which economic 
decay followed(Isgren, 2018, p.3). Milton Obote was chosen as first 
leader of the newly independent Republic of Uganda—and he 
administered the first years of government with caution. Power was 
consolidated in his hands, as he gained control over the congress and 
the executive power. His socialist ideology, particularly privileging 
Ugandans from his region of origin (north-east), divided internal poli-
tics until the constitutional crisis in 1966. As Mutibwa (1992, p.33) 
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stresses, the tensions within the party verged on ethnically-loaded 
political interests:
The split soon polarised over ideology and ethnicity, for Obote’s fac-
tion assumed the mantle of a nationalistic and socialist movement 
championing the interests of the so-called ‘disadvantaged’ of the 
north and east, while Ibingira’s faction became identified with the 
conservative wing of the party which also served as an advocate for 
the position and interests of the Bantu people. (…) After the parlia-
ment had decided on the referendum, the Kabaka’s government too 
decided (…) to reassess its cooperation with Obote. 
One year later, Obote abolished kingships, and his politics became 
increasingly unpopular, generating discontent within the govern-
ment and army. In 1968, Obote announced he would adopt a social-
ist strategy, and with the implementation of the ‘Move to the Left’ he 
planned the move 60% of the means of production under govern-
mental ownership. However, by the time Obote was overthrown, this 
strategy was not yet fully implemented. Obote had trusted Colonel 
Idi Amin, Deputy Army Commander, with important operations in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (then Zaire)—but was rewarded 
with a coup: Idi Amin, interpreting the dissatisfaction of the army, 
overthrew him in 1971. Reid (2017, p.56) explains how the forceful 
instauration of Idi Amin was initially welcomed by crowds in Kampa-
la: “Obote was gone (he was in fact out of the country when the 
coup happened), and good riddance, said many—not least the Gan-
da, who despised Obote for his destruction of their kingdom and the 
exile of their king, and who were therefore among Amin’s most eager 
supporters, initially (…)”. 
In economic terms, there was substantial continuation between the 
first regime of Obote and that of Idi Amin (Reid, 2017, p.236): “A similar 
combination of economic patriotism and historical injustice informed 
Amin’s ‘war’ on parasites and foreign influences;”. In 1972, he ordered 
the expulsion of all non-citizen Asians “who owned too much and con-
tributed too little, who sent their savings abroad (or ‘home’, to India and 
Bangladesh), and had for too long stood haughtily apart from (even 
above) Ugandan Africans. As Maxwell (1995, p.1670) explains, espe-
cially in the central region, the Ugandan economy: 
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was severely damaged by the “war of economic independence” 
of the Amin regime (1971—79) that was initiated with the expul-
sion of the Indian minority in Uganda and rapidly gave rise to 
a highly informal magendo economy dominated by smuggling, 
illegal currency transactions and state appropriation of private 
property (Banugire, 1985). In the early to mid-1980s, a guer-
rilla war was centred on the outskirts of the city. (…) Jamal and 
Weeks (1993) note that wages in Kampala had been among 
the highest in east Africa in the 196Os, but fell dramatically in 
the 1970s. By the 198Os, the urban wage-earning class had 
shrunk markedly as city residents were forced to diversify their 
sources of income to compensate for the drastic drop in wage 
earnings (Bigsten and Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 1992). This resulted 
in the massive informalization of the city’s economy, and an in-
crease in urban agriculture. 
During the eight years in which Idi Amin remained in power, hundreds of 
thousands of Ugandans were persecuted, disappeared, and were killed. 
While the death tolls still remain unclear, the number of ethnically and 
politically motivated killings is estimated to range between 300.000 
and 500.000. In 1979, Tanzanian troops won a conflict over the border 
and forced him to flee. Before Obote was re-elected in 1980, power was 
briefly held by three other interim presidents. The second term of Obote 
was signed by atrocities that further divided the northerners from the 
rest of the country, fuelling regional tensions. During a long ‘guerrilla’ 
conflict between the troops of Obote and Yoweri Museveni’s National 
Resistance Army, 100.0000 to 500.000 people died. Obote was, again, 
overthrown in a military coup by General Tito Okello—but after a short, 
chaotic period, Museveni was sworn president in January 1986.
Ever since 1986, political power has been concentrated in the person 
of president Museveni, who has recognised kingships, promoted poli-
cies for regional integration and decentralization (Lindemann, 2011, 
p.389) (Gentili, 2008). The regime is considered an “hegemonic party 
regime, defined as one political party remaining continuously in power 
while holding regular multiparty elections (Reuter and Gandhi, 2011; 
Tripp, 2010), and is considered an electoral authoritarian regime.” 
(Raffler, 2016, p.12). In fact, despite the fact that in the last years 
Museveni has implemented a decentralizing policy, “77% of districts 
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are headed by a politician from the NRM (National Resistance Move-
ment, political party led by president Museveni), as are 71% of sub-
counties” (Raffler, 2016, p.13).
The regime hegemony of Yoweri Museveni has based its long hold 
on power on elite bargain and corruption, which have systematically 
excluded social groups based on ethnicity (Lindemann, 2011, 
p.388—9). Since 1986 Uganda has seen no less than seven civil 
wars, which mostly took place in the northern regions of the country 
(Lindemann, 2011, p.388). Since the late 1990s however, “territorial 
power has been shared more equitably since government’s decen-
tralization programme has gathered momentum” (ibid). This has on 
the one hand prevented more civil wars and eased tensions in the 
north, and on the other created a sort of ‘Pax Musevenica’ (Campbell, 
2007). In the past decade, elections were reportedly fraudulent34, and 
opposition leaders have been jailed multiple times. The majority of the 
population, being under 30 years of age, was born under Museveni—
and has recently started to demand political change. Demonstrations, 
mainly by youths, took over the capital city when the age limit for pres-
idency was scrapped in 2017.35 
While economic neo-liberalism has enthusiastically been embraced 
three decades ago –on the tide of post-Washington consensus devel-
opmental reforms promoted by the international community– national 
politics have increasingly disassociated from the liberal and demo-
cratic model that was envisioned by that same international communi-
ty. A process of decentralisation has originated a fragmentation of the 
country in 112 districts (from the original 39 when NRM came to pow-
er). The initial promise of a more democratic division of political power, 
has in fact served the (expensive) maintenance of corrupt, central 
power. As Green (2015, p.503—504) claims, “the problems of the 
Ugandan decentralization programme are rooted in its lack of inde-
pendence from Kampala both politically and economically, which has 
contributed to such issues as a lack of competent staff, corruption and 
an obsessive focus on creating new districts for political reasons.”
34 Accessed on 3/10/2018 on: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-election-idUSKCN0VT08A 
35 Accessed on 3/10/2018: 
https://africacenter.org/spotlight/
scrapping-presidential-age-limits-sets-uganda-on-course-of-instability/
YOUTH AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA46
Another important consequence of the enthusiastic liberalisation con-
ducted by Museveni, is the impact on grassroots organisations of farmers, 
and the copious entrance of NGOs in the interstices left by the govern-
ment. The economic liberalisation that “made Uganda a ‘poster child’ of 
structural adjustment” has, according to Isgren (2018, p.3),
far-reaching implications for agriculture, like the dismantling 
of marketing boards, slashed budgets for research and exten-
sion, and further collapse of the cooperative system (Flygare, 
2006). At the same time donors’ interest in NGOs exploded and 
there was a huge surge in NGOs present in Uganda, both do-
mestic and international; by 2000 there were over 4000 reg-
istered NGOs (Dicklitch and Lwanga, 2003). Mamdani (1995) 
described civil society as becoming ‘NGOized’ by organisations 
that filled gaps left by the state, but whose members received 
charity rather than rights and which were primarily accountable 
to donors.
But the impact of Museveni’s liberalisation on agriculture, is not a 
novelty in the relation between politics, agriculture and land tenure. 
As I will show below, since independence the political economy has 
been strictly intertwined with the agricultural sector—employing the 
wide majority of the population. 
1.3.2a Agriculture and land
Agricultural production and trade is a particular sensitive field in 
many African countries, where the post-independence history has 
deepened the socio-political distress inherited from colonialism. On 
this regard, “Uganda represents a good example of a country 
accepting the colonial legal arrangements of land tenure and continu-
ing them without any significant changes when independence was 
gained in October 1962.” (McAuslan, 2013, p.25). Distressed relations 
between the central government and the rural population have shaped 
the post-independence history of this country. Sjögren (2013, p.143) 
argues that “Patterns of production, trade and education tended to 
deepen regional socio-economic disparities, accentuated by divide-
and-rule politics”.
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Uganda has been seen as the food basket of east Africa, thanks to the 
climatic conditions that allowed for double-cropping: with two rainy 
seasons per year, Ugandan agriculture is particularly productive in the 
central and south-western regions, which are densely populated. 
Since colonial times, Uganda’s agricultural production has been ori-
ented as much towards local markets, with basic food crops, as 
towards international markets, with cash crops. The production, most-
ly smallholder, focuses on food crops such as plantains (matooke), 
cassava, maize, millet, sorghum, sweet potatoes, and beans; the main 
export crops are coffee, cotton, cocoa, and tobacco (Leliveld, Dietz, 
Foeken, & Klaver, 2013, p.10). 
However, food production does not necessarily translate in food 
security, and a slightly downward trend in dietary energy has been 
recorded in the past decades—remaining just above minimum 
standards of food security, albeit with regional disparities, and with 
climate-induced famines (ibid). Leliveld et al (2013, p.6—7) stress 
that agricultural productivity, which has been very promising since 
post-independence, has been frustrated not only by ecological and 
climatic factors, but also by the political vicissitudes: 
According to FAO data, in the 1960s agricultural production thrived: 
thanks mainly to area expansion, but also to yield improvements 
food production in Uganda increased more than population. In the 
1970s this process halted, and around 1980 the agricultural area 
decreased to a much lower level. After 1990 recovery started, visible 
in steady increase of cropping areas. However, Uganda has some of 
the highest population growth figures in Africa (around 3% per 
annum) and agricultural growth can hardly cope with population 
growth. (…) What happened after the initial good years in the 1960s? 
As is well-known, Uganda was plagued by violent regimes and conflict 
in the 1970s and 1980s. The regimes of first Idi Amin (1971—1979) and 
later Milton Obote II (1979—1985) resulted in a major economic crisis in 
Uganda that is also visible in the agricultural performance of a country 
that was long seen as a land of milk and honey.
As much as the political economy of the country influenced agricultur-
al productivity, so has land tenureship. With several land reforms over 
the years “the state and individuals grabbed and converted kibanja 
YOUTH AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA48
tenure [right of usufruct introduced in 1928] into landlord tenure of the 
lease and non-lease types. (…) The milder face of this conversion was 
the politics of “tribalism” (Bazaara, 1994, p.59). This process of land 
reform from 1928 –which resulted in the creation of this new land 
holding system called kibanja– left peasants without security of ten-
ureship, and many evictions were perpetrated. Again, women and 
youth were the most vulnerable social groups marginalized by these 
processes. Women in particular are still discriminated when it comes 
to land access, despite their legal claims to land (Butler & Kebba, 2014, 
p.18). In 1998 the Land Act (amended in 2010 without much changes) 
reintroduced security of occupancy reinforcing tenants’ rights, but the 
Act was never fully implemented and evictions still fuel conflicts over 
land (McAuslan, 2013). These “land-related conflicts inevitably have 
negative impact on productivity as well as equity” (ibid: 89). In spite of 
the troubled configuration of land ownership, ethnic tensions over land 
and discrimination of youth and women in land access, agriculture still 
employs the majority of the population and is seen as a source of gain-
ful employment from development organisations (Gollin & Rogerson, 
2010) (WB, World Bank, 2016). 
Moreover, old colonial laws and tenure systems continue to exert 
influence in rural development patterns (McAuslan, 2013, p.95). This 
leaves agriculture (and the majority of Ugandan population) in a 
stagnating condition, where “lower agricultural growth is the root 
cause of the recent increase in poverty” (Kappel, Lay, & Steiner, 
2005, p.1). As Sjögren (2013, p.147) puts it: “Uganda’s uneven region-
al development and fractured polity (…) followed from a combination 
of colonially imposed economic underdevelopment and indirect rule, 
reinforced by elite-controlled politics after independence”. 
In fact, as Mamdani (1996, p.21) argued, indirect rule established in 
Uganda was organized as an “ethnic power enforcing custom on 
tribespeople”. “Native” institutions (e.g. Native Authority) were estab-
lished to rule subjects, and this was the process in which ethnic 
identities were constructed. Not only, but ethnic identities were 
anchored through customary laws to the land: the “tribally”-individuat-
ed community was made customary proprietor of land while the 
appointed “tribal” political leaders were appointed as “holders and 
executors of that proprietorship” (Mamdani, 1996, p.140). If “Tribalism 
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then was the very form that colonial rule took within the local state […] 
the revolt against indirect rule also took a tribal form” (Mamdani, 1996, 
p.183).
1.4 Theoretical Approach
Development studies are multidisciplinary by nature, as they borrow 
from various schools of thought—and can be inclined more towards 
anthropology, political sciences, economics, international relations, 
or public administration. Varying with their theoretical paradigms, 
scholars have approached the study of development phenomena 
with different questions and perspectives. The measurement of the 
gap between policies and practices has been the focus of positivist 
scholarly studies, while post-modernist scholars have focused on 
the deconstruction of the rationales behind development policies 
and practices. The first body of studies focuses more on the effects 
of top-down policies implemented, more or less effectively, on the 
ground. On the other hand, the second body of studies focused on 
the bottom-up dynamics, forms of domination and resistance. Fou-
cault’s analytical framework of study of discourse and power, offered 
the possibility of going beyond a top-down versus bottom-up 
approach to development studies. As I approached the fieldwork 
research in Uganda, with this academic debate in mind, I chose to 
use anthropological methods to investigate how power relations 
were constructed through narratives, discourse and practices. In 
this section, I give a brief overview of the debate and how the theo-
retical approach I have adopted contributes with a new perspective 
on the study of a recent development trend.
Arturo Escobar (2012) analyses the invention and construction of 
development as “politics of poverty” (ibid: 23), from the very ‘discovery’ 
(and problematisation) of poverty in the early post-World War II. This 
‘discovery’ identified two/thirds of the world population as poor, and in 
a seemingly philanthropic burst poverty became the object of a pro-
ject of modernisation as much as “the poor became object of knowl-
edge and management” (ibid, p.23). “Not only poverty but health, edu-
cation, hygiene, employment, and the poor quality of life in towns and 
cities were constructed as social problems, requiring extensive knowl-
edge about the population and appropriate modes of social planning” 
(Escobar 1992a). In the 50s, ‘issues’ identified as social problems 
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became the object of professionalisation and institutionalisation of a 
“lucrative industry of development practitioners” (Escobar, 2012, p.46). 
Like the landing of the Allies in Normandy, the Third World 
witnessed a massive landing of experts, each in charge of in-
vestigating, measuring, and theorising about this or that little 
aspect of Third World societies (ibid, p.45).
According to Escobar (2012, p.38), the development discourse 
re-branded countries of the global south as “underdeveloped coun-
tries”. Within this discourse the knowledge (habits, goals, motivations 
and beliefs) and economic system of the people to be modernized and 
developed is homogenized as non-modern, under-developed and 
condemned as inferior.
As Escobar articulates, development as modernisation is the adoption 
of the “right” values, namely, those held by the white minority (…) those 
embodied in the ideal of the cultivated European” (Escobar, 2012, 
p.43). Development is a form of socio-economic engineering upon the 
tabula-rasa of non-places of a generic underdeveloped country—to 
be developed according to constructed systems of development 
knowledge. The ‘right values’ are systematized in truth regimes which 
“(…) represent the Third World as a child in need of adult guidance”—a 
sort of ‘secular theory of salvation’ (ibid, p.30) that infantilise the global 
south.
The modelling of the development discourse around the truth regimes of 
the global north is particularly evident in the field of agricultural and rural 
development. The classical agricultural question –namely the transition 
from feudal to capitalist industrial agriculture– is that growth in the agri-
cultural sector would lower rural poverty and at the same time boost the 
economy as a whole. This transition is modelled after the European 
experience of the industrial revolution, but has not been realized else-
where in the same way (Bernstein, 1996, p.24). In the past decades, var-
ious fads and trends have characterized the development discourse for 
agriculture, landing new fashions that continue to be modelled after the 
European experience of agricultural development. However, as Scott 
(1998, p.7) bluntly puts it: “formal schemes of order are untenable with-
out some elements of practical knowledge that they tend to dismiss”. In 
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other words, policy briefs tend to underestimate the ‘hidden transcripts’, 
that “discourse that takes place “offstage”, beyond direct observation by 
powerholders” of the rural population (Scott J. C., 1990, p.4).
For good reasons, the academic debate in critical development 
studies has focused its attention on different sets of issues in devel-
opment, its politics and power relations, effectiveness, ideology and 
mandates. These studies have operated with analytical categories 
that are supposedly borrowed from a Foucauldian study of power, 
yet have reproduced an interpretation of power relations in terms of 
domination/sovereignty that Foucault opposed (Foucault M., 1976). 
Most studies have framed the power relations within development 
as a relation of domination/resistance between groups of social 
actors at the top (i.e. development practitioners) and bottom (i.e. 
beneficiaries). On the one hand the development practitioners with 
their (supposedly dominant) discourse –produced and reproduced 
by those social actors working in the ‘development industry’; on the 
other hand, the development recipients with their own narratives 
and agency– more often than not contesting the dominant develop-
ment discourse enforced on them. 
Foucault (1976), on the other hand, opposed an interpretation of 
power in terms of domination and sovereignty. By insisting on the 
discursive nature of power, which is a constant process, produced 
and reproduced through narratives, knowledge is constructed by all 
social actors as foundation or justification of power relations. In fact, 
he showed how the mechanisms through which knowledge (broadly 
identified as the ensemble of oral and written narratives of social 
actors) is produced in everyday life, in every society, within specific 
historical, socio-cultural and economic contexts. It is this knowledge 
that sustains, resists and reinforces relations and structures of pow-
er—which in the field of development catalyses limited resources on 
the grounds of the constructed forms of development discourse. 
Therefore, he invites to focus on the tensions, discrepancies and 
resistance within as much as between groups of social actors. 
My own research has been developed within such a Foucauldian 
frame of analysis. In fact, considering the perspectives of Scott and 
Escobar on development as a discursive, historically-specific 
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construct—I question the motives and modalities by which the recent 
development trend around youth in agribusiness has been con-
structed. Combining the scholars’ theoretical framework with Fou-
cault’s analysis of how social actors’ narratives and practices con-
struct a discourse, I analyse how the development discourse around 
youth in agribusiness has been a mechanism of power in driving a 
new trend in development. By studying both development actors’ 
and youths’ perspectives, I bring together the study of top and bottom 
dimensions of this development trend in the analysis of development 
practices on the ground—to understand how the mismatch affects the 
development outcomes. 
The social category of youth, despite being the object of much gov-
ernmental and international development attention, remains a rather 
heterogeneous notion, which is defined in different ways in the vari-
ous socio-cultural contexts of Uganda. Yet, a discourse has been 
constructed around youth, based on demographic and economic 
facts (unemployed, bulging). Youths’ engagement in agribusiness is 
prescribed as a development formula to tackle such issues, and 
consequently development programmes have been implemented 
across the country—yet, still little is known about their impact so far. 
1.5 Methods
Robbins (2013a) highlights the role of anthropology in understand-
ing different systems of values and challenges anthropologists to 
act as mediators between cultural worlds facing each other in a glo-
balized world. An anthropological research approach seemed 
best-suited to carry out my study on development practitioners’ and 
youths’ narratives and practices on the recent trend in development. 
I carried out qualitative research using grounded theory, an inductive 
research method that infers conclusions from the analysis of ethno-
graphic data through coding: this analytical process highlights recur-
ring ideas and concepts, and thus allows to identify patterns –or nar-
ratives– in a body of texts or interviews.36 Grounded theory allowed 
me to identify the narratives of all development actors involved in the 
development trend around youth in agribusiness in Uganda—namely 
both development practitioners (including Ugandan civil servants) and 
36 I will explain in depth both the methods and the concepts in the ap-
propriate chapter on Methods. 
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young farmers (or agripreneurs). Moreover, I could observe how the 
development programmes implemented across the country had 
affected youths, in terms of social and economic impact. In fact, by 
combining the observations of perspectives of development practi-
tioners and youths, I could identify and analyse the mismatch between 
development policies, the practices of implementation and the out-
comes—according to both groups. 
In this way, I was able to recognise the narratives and practices that 
constructed the (Foucauldian) discourse sustaining the new trend in 
development. In fact, combining grounded theory for a Foucauldian 
analysis means to use ethnographic methods to collect empirical 
data on the narratives that construct the development discourse, but 
also to elaborate an analysis of the implementation of the pro-
grammes to evaluate their impact on the ground. However, my use of 
a Foucauldian theoretical framework is in line with his elaborated 
analytical tools (such as the concepts of power, discourse, knowl-
edge and narratives), and at the same time an adaptation of his the-
ories for the ethnographic analysis of the development trend around 
youth in agribusiness. Yet the very twisting of Foucault’s theory for 
my interpretative, inductive analysis, is in line with what he intended 
his work to be: a ‘toolbox’ to be pragmatically adapted to each study 
(Vallois, 2015, p.462).
Moreover, the use of ethnographic methods allowed me to shed 
light on ‘who’ the youths are. It allowed me to capture their hetero-
geneity and to record their perspectives on the programmes from 
which they should be benefitting. The effort of collecting ethnographic 
data across the country, has confronted me heterogeneous and some-
times contrasting perceptions and views (Mosse 2004). Anthropolog-
ical research methods have allowed me to investigate the systems of 
values and cultural worlds of both development practitioners and 
youths, besides collecting insights –through participant observa-
tions– on the flaws and strengths of the implementation of develop-
ment programmes for youths in agribusiness. 
The empirical results of my research are grounded in extensive ethno-
graphic fieldwork I have conducted in Uganda in 2016 (1 month), 2017 
(6 months) and 2018 (1 month). As exemplified in the table below, I have 
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conducted interviews across four different regions in Uganda, in order 
to account for the regional variety and disparity. The choice of the 
location reflected the focus of the development programmes that I 
have observed on the ground (see chapter 3).
 
Period Location Activity
July—August 2016 Kampala Pilot fieldtrip
22 interviews with development experts and 
practitioners
January—February 
2017
Kampala (capital city) 24 interviews with development practitioners
March—April 2017 Gulu (north Uganda) 29 interviews with young agro-entrepreneurs
March & May 2017 Kampala (capital city) 26 interviews with young agro-entrepreneurs
May—June 2017 Mbarara (south-west 
Uganda)
25 interviews with young agro-entrepreneurs
June 2017 Mbale (east Uganda) 30 interviews with young agro-entrepreneurs
May 2018 Kampala Follow-up fieldwork
13 interviews
Table 1. Field sites and research periods
1.6 Findings and Relevance 
1.6.1 Overview of findings
As argued in sections 1.4 and 1.5 above, I have used ethnographic 
research methods to a Foucauldian discourse analysis of how the 
trend in development around youth in agribusiness has been con-
structed. In this way, I was able to show that ‘youth’ does not have 
intrinsic explanatory power of which the youths actually are in Uganda 
and what their experience in engaging agribusiness entails. On the 
contrary, the narrative analysis of interviews with youths and devel-
opment practitioners has shown that there are heterogeneous 
understandings of what it means to be young in Uganda, in the agri-
cultural sector. In fact, these are contextual to the regional and 
socio-cultural environment, that are extremely diverse in this coun-
try. Such heterogeneity can be expected also for other developing 
countries in which youth is defined only as an age range. 
Moreover, heterogeneity has been found also in the theories of 
change of development actors in targeting youth unemployment 
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through the engagement in agribusiness. Furthermore, in the imple-
mentation of programmes with this goal, I have observed a diversified 
range of development strategies (from public to private-sector 
driven). 
Critical development studies (Escobar, 2012) (Scott J., 1976) denounced 
a tension between aspirations and objectives at the ‘top’ (on the side 
of development agencies), and at the ‘bottom’ (among young benefi-
ciaries of programmes). My study has confirmed such discrepancy, 
and has observed an additional tension within development actors 
at the ‘top’ and ‘bottom’. In fact, I found that development agencies 
have different interests and incentives, as much as youths have dif-
ferent capacities and constraints. This finding is particularly impor-
tant because it adds to the debate in development studies by stress-
ing that development as a process cannot be understood only as 
the enactment of policies (elaborated at the top) into practices (at 
the bottom). On the contrary, by going beyond this dualistic concep-
tualisation of development, it is possible to capture dynamics that 
reveal the heterogeneity in development. Focusing on dynamics 
between and within groups of development actors allows for an 
understanding of development that reflects the heterogeneity on 
the ground, as much as sheds light on important dynamics influenc-
ing development implementation. 
1.6.2 Scientific Relevance
Despite the growing interest among scholars in the study of youth in 
development, still little is known about the recent trend around youth 
in agribusiness—neither from the perspective of development 
organisations, nor from that of the beneficiaries. How has a new 
development trend developed around this topic? Certainly, there are 
pressing societal reasons to address issues of youth employability in 
agribusiness—but it is particularly important to have empirical evi-
dence on how a new trend in development is constructed and per-
ceived. This study, contributes to filling a knowledge gap on both the 
theoretical puzzle of why this trend developed as it did in Uganda, 
and the empirical question of its impact on the ground. I did this by 
combining ethnographic methods with a Foucauldian approach to 
development studies. 
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Moreover, this study adds to the understanding of the social category 
of youth in a context –the Ugandan one– in which youths are a major-
itarian share of the population. In fact, the heterogeneous nature of 
this social group needs to be systematised for ‘youth’ (as a category 
and concept) to have explanatory power and concreteness. 
This research has brought me to identify and analyse the gap 
between the intended development programmes and the actual 
outcomes on the ground, as perceived by the youths themselves. 
This study proposes an ethnographic account of the elaboration and 
implementation of a specific trend in development; it offers a per-
spective on how this trend in development is perceived, and how 
tensions and discrepancies are found between development ‘top’ 
and ‘bottom’, but also within these groups of development actors.
This study contributes to an understanding of how development 
works in Uganda, specifically in relation to a relatively new develop-
ment trend. As mentioned, studying heterogeneity is important since 
the reality I have observed was much more complex than a dualistic 
relation between groups of actors on a top-down vs bottom-up 
model. I analyse these interactions as development in action as 
negotiations and adaptation processes among the development 
actors—finding divergence not so much between development 
practitioners and youths, but rather within them. This finding rein-
forces the argument (elaborated in the first two chapters) that it is 
necessary to examine a development trend in its heterogeneity: the 
heterogeneity of development approaches, perceptions and experi-
ences of development beneficiaries, and heterogeneity of interac-
tions, negotiations and adaptations to the reality on the ground.
Moreover, this study offers a confrontation of heterogeneous per-
spectives on what it means to be young and engaged in develop-
ment, in Uganda. The mainstream understanding of entrepreneur-
ship is bound to a linear, productivist thinking (Seuneke, Lans, & 
Wiskerke, 2013) targeting an increase of income for the rural poor 
(Toenissen, Adesina, & DeVries, Building an Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa, 2008). However, research on street food entre-
preneurship shows how entrepreneurs escape this very linear and 
productivist business values, pursuing their own (Wegerif, 2014). 
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Remarkably little attention is paid to agripreneurs’ systems of values 
in developing countries: the negotiation of their identity as youth 
and agripreneurs, their understandings of agribusiness and devel-
opment, and their agency in navigating market values. In the context 
of the new development trend around youth in agribusiness, in which 
youth are invested of the responsibility of becoming agripreneurs, 
the knowledge gap on their identity, capacities, constraints and 
ambitions, is burning. 
Moreover, this study helps understand how development policies for 
youths in agribusiness respond to the political agendas of develop-
ment organisations. For instance, I have recorded in several instanc-
es how public organisations respond to the political need of keeping 
the young electorate loyal to the government (see chapter 5). 
1.6.3 Societal Relevance
The societal relevance of this study lays in the potential of this 
research to serve the improvement of development programmes 
and strategies for youths in Uganda. While my research is not 
designed to assess the effectiveness of individual programs, my 
findings suggest that programmes that responded to local, contex-
tual needs of youths were perceived as more successful by the 
youths themselves. To this end, I organised feedback sessions with 
the major development agencies, in Kampala, to explain and validate 
my results. These were held at the Embassy of the Netherlands, at 
the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, and at the 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture in 2017 and 2018. 
Moreover, understanding “public and hidden transcripts” (Scott J. C., 
1990) of policy-makers on the one hand and young agripreneurs on 
the other can produce the necessary knowledge to foster synergies 
between stakeholders and promote effectiveness for those rural 
development programmes investing in youth agripreneurship.37 It is 
important to understand the development potential of these 
37 Consistent investments have recently been made by the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) in collaboration with the International Institute for 
Tropical Agriculture (IITA). The ENABLE Youth Empowerment Agribusiness 
programme is the latest (agreement signed on 05.05.2015) example: http://
www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/innovative-programme-to-im-
prove-employment-and-income-outcomes-for-young-people-14217/
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programmes also by measuring the dynamic and engaged interaction 
of agripreneurs with the development institutions entitled to their 
development. For these reasons, this study pays particular attention to 
the implications of these development programmes for young agripre-
neurs within and outside development schemes, and their response to 
such programmes. It aims, indeed, at bringing the emic38 dimension 
into the policy enactment process, by showing the agency of agripre-
neurs and not only their role as recipients of development. The societal 
relevance of this research project, then, lays also in the chance the 
study gives young agripreneurs to report their feedback of capacities 
and constraints encountered in the unfolding this development trend 
focusing on them, also by highlighting their active interaction with 
development institutions targeting them. 
1.7 Structure of the thesis
The thesis is organized as follows. In chapter two, I provide an over-
view of the academic debate in critical development studies, sug-
gesting that in some instances his analysis of power has been 
mis-interpreted. By explaining some of the core concepts of Fou-
cault’s study of discourse, narratives and power, I aim to develop a 
theoretical frame of analysis that is more in line with Foucault’s orig-
inal intent. 
In chapter three, I explain the methodology that I have used to 
address the research question in great detail. In particular, I justify 
my use of grounded theory and provide an overview of the fieldwork 
and ethnographic data I have collected in Uganda. I conclude the 
chapter by introducing the major field sites and actors.
The first empirical chapter, chapter four, is an ‘aidnography’ that 
investigates the theories of change of several development actors. 
The goal of the chapter is to show how these different theories of 
change lead to different development approaches: one driven by 
the public-sector and one driven by the private sector. While nation-
al agencies are more concerned with the issue of youth unemploy-
ment and the socio-political instability that could derive from it, 
international agencies are more anxious about the ‘youth bulge’. In 
38 In anthropologic jargon, ‘emic’ refers to the perspective of the social 
group, while ‘etic’ is the perspective of the observer. 
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both cases, however, ‘youth’, as a phenomenon and as a concept, has 
become a distinct social, economic and political category, turning into 
a development and political project.
In chapter five, I examine youths’ definitions of youth and agribusiness, 
highlighting how from their narratives they emerge as a very heteroge-
neous social category. I systematize such heterogeneity by conceptu-
alizing the factors (e.g. ethnicity, gender, age) that contribute to their 
diversity. Moreover, I explore the relation between these factors by 
inscribing them in three dimensions that emerge from the narrative 
analysis as analytical categories: socio-cultural, territorial and value 
chain embedding. 
In chapter six, the final empirical chapter, I explore the practices 
through which development practitioners implement their develop-
ment programmes. I argue that the enactment of this development 
trend –from programme design, to implementation and outcomes– 
is a diverse and untidy process that relies on practices of negotia-
tions among many development actors. Through the analysis of 
negotiation practices among development actors in Kampala, I show 
how their relations and interactions shape the course of the pro-
gramme enactment. In fact, I argue that the outcome of these nego-
tiations is compromise between different incentives and stakes of 
the actors involved before the programme is even enforced on the 
ground. Moreover, as development actors are confronted with the 
heterogeneity of youths on the ground, they either fail to meet 
youths needs and capacities, or in some cases adapt their pro-
grammes. This process of adaptation is only possible for those pro-
grammes that preserve flexibility in spite of the negotiated compro-
mise with other development stakeholders. 
In chapter seven, I conclude the monograph, summing up the out-
comes outlined in each of the three empirical chapters and placing 
these findings within the larger context of the project’s theoretical 
framework and the academic debate in critical development studies 
more broadly. Moreover, in this chapter, I highlight the general (and 
generalizable) empirical and theoretical conclusions of this thesis. 
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Image 2. Foundations of a photo studio, eastern Uganda, 2017. 
Picture taken by author.

Chapter 2
Theoretical framework
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We have to study power outside the model of Leviathan, out-
side the field delineated by juridical sovereignty and the insti-
tution of the State. We have to analyse it by beginning with the 
techniques and tactics of domination. (Foucault M., 1976, p.34)
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I explore the academic debate in development stud-
ies and operationalise a theoretical approach for my analysis of the 
trend in development around youth in agribusiness in Uganda. I 
investigate the theories scholars have used and developed, showing 
how critical scholars have relied on a Foucauldian paradigm. I oper-
ationalise such paradigm to serve the purpose of answering the 
research question of this study: How has the social category of youth 
been driving a new trend in development around agribusiness, and 
what has been its impact so far? 
This research question lays the focus of the mechanisms through 
which a new trend in development has emerged, and on the impact 
it has had so far. As I have outlined in the previous chapter, there are 
demographic and economic issues around youth and agribusiness, 
which are at the root of concerns of development practitioners. As 
stressed by critical development studies –such as Scott, Escobar, 
Ferguson, Murray Li– there also are political agendas and interests 
in the construction and implementation of a new trend in develop-
ment. In their analysis, development and its outcomes is intertwined 
with structures of power and power relations. These scholars have 
studied power relations within development with reference to Fou-
cault’s analytical paradigm of power. In line with them, I also explore 
the recent development trend around youth in agribusiness in Ugan-
da by using a Foucauldian analytical framework. With Escobar (2012, 
p.10) I understand development as a historically contingent creation 
of a “domain of thought and action”, but also as a “category of prac-
tice” (Mosse, 2013, p.227). As a category of practice, development is 
produced and reproduced by social actors in particular historical 
circumstances, reiterating particular cultural knowledges. For these 
reasons, anthropological research methods were adopted to collect 
data on the mechanisms through which this trend was constructed 
and implemented in Uganda (see following chapter 3).
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In contrast to several critical scholars in development studies, how-
ever, I explore development as a process that is a more heterogene-
ous than the dualistic contraposition of development practitioners to 
their (supposed) beneficiaries. Scholars in critical development 
studies explored development as a more or less effective or con-
tested exercise of domination of the ‘development industry’ on local 
populations. In this study, I attempt an investigation of the develop-
ment trend ‘outside the model of the Leviathan’ that contraposes 
development efforts to its ‘beneficiaries’. As opposed to seeing 
power as centralized in an institution (e.g. the government, the devel-
opment agencies) or social category –the Leviathan– (e.g. civil serv-
ants, development practitioners) Foucault (1976, p.29—30) describes 
power as a function that cannot be localized:
Power must, I think, be analysed as something that circulates, 
or rather as something that functions only when it is part of a 
chain. It is never localized here or there, it is never in the hands 
of some, and it is never appropriated in the way that wealth or 
a commodity can be appropriated. Power functions. Power is 
exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply cir-
culate in those networks; they are in a position to both submit 
to and exercise this power. They are never the inert or con-
senting targets of power; they are always its relays. In other 
words, power passes through individuals. It is not applied to 
them.
While the model of the Leviathan assumes the logic of sovereignty 
between an institutionalised, centralized power and its subjugated—
Foucault argues that power is the omnipresent function that sus-
tains and structures networks and relations among citizens, between 
citizens and the state, and within the state itself. Power is, thus, a 
pervasive process that is embodied, contested and reshaped by all 
actors in society—and political institutions and authorities are a 
mere expression of the process. Within this framework, power is 
understood as a process that is constantly in the making, through 
the elaboration of knowledge structures and relations between 
social actors who, with their agency, enact and counteract power 
structures. 
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This process unfolds through the constant construction and contesta-
tion of knowledge structures: the stories and narratives that contrib-
ute to the development discourse. Social, political and economic val-
ues and norms underpinning specific development efforts (like the 
engagement of youth in agribusiness) are expressed through such 
knowledge structures. Power relations, development policies and pro-
grammes are justified and enforced through the development dis-
course. Foucault identifies specific yet diverse forms through which 
power is exercised on and by social actors and institutions and their 
narratives. In an interview, ‘The Confession of the Flesh’ (1980, p.194), 
Foucault defines and explains such mechanisms of power: an ‘appara-
tus’, or ensemble of devices (or dispositif) as a thoroughly heterogene-
ous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural 
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions - in 
short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the 
apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be 
established between these elements. Secondly, what I am trying to 
identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the connection that 
can exist between these heterogeneous elements. 
In the realm of development cooperation, thus, power is distributed 
and enforced and constructed by all social actors involved—both 
development practitioners and beneficiaries, who through spoken 
and unspoken devices sustain, contest or reshape power dynamics. 
Development itself, as stressed by development studies scholars, is 
a discourse –a device– that underpins power structures. 
To understand how a given development trend functions in the spe-
cific context of Uganda, means to study how power structures are 
constructed in the system of relations between the elements of its 
apparatus. Hence, I argue that it will be necessary to investigate the 
‘devices’ through which power structures operate and shape rela-
tions between and within the various groups of social actors involved. 
In this chapter I argue for a re-elaboration of the Foucauldian theo-
retical paradigm of power that escapes the logic of sovereignty and 
domination. Moreover, in the following I highlight how the use of 
qualitative research methods allowed to collect data on the study of 
this trend as a discourse—with concrete impact on the ground. 
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This chapter is structured as follows. First (section 2.2), I set the scene 
of the academic debate in development studies, narrowing down the 
broad field of development studies to the specific debate around agri-
business and youth. I start by reviewing how development has been 
defined (2.2.1) by some of the major scholars before coming to my 
working definition of development. I then restrict the overview to 
exploring the literature around agribusiness (2.2.2) and youth (2.2.3). 
Through this section I argue that this field of study can best be ana-
lysed through a Foucauldian development approach. In the following 
section (2.3) I move on to examining Foucault’s analytical paradigm of 
power, exploring his conceptualisations of knowledge and practices, 
and the devices underpinning power structures (discourse and narra-
tives). In section 2.4, I examine the academic debate around develop-
ment by scholars in critical development studies, showing how they 
relied on a Foucauldian paradigm. However, I show how most scholars 
have developed their analysis of power relations between groups of 
social actors in development, thereby reinforcing a narrative of domi-
nation—the model of the Leviathan. In section 2.5, I operationalise the 
Foucauldian paradigm in light of the ethnographic study I intend to 
make in the field of critical development studies. Here, I show the ana-
lytical tools I will use to study development practitioners’ and youths’ 
narratives and practices. I conclude this chapter (section 2.6) by argu-
ing how the approach I operationalised will allow to conduct my study 
outside of the model of the Leviathan, thereby contributing to the aca-
demic debate in critical development studies. 
2.2 Setting the scene of the academic debate 
2.2.1 Development studies
I refer to development as the economic and political effort exercised 
by various (inter)national agencies, governments and institutions to 
alleviate poverty and improving living conditions in the global south. 
Therefore, I focus on development as (inter)national cooperation for 
socio-economic change –also referred to as ‘aid’– that is distin-
guished from humanitarian aid or disaster relief. I find myself in line 
with Pallotti and Zamponi (2014, p.19), as they define development as 
a process aiming at the achievement of better life conditions 
and enhanced capacity for self-reliance in economies that are 
technically more complex and more dependent on processes 
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of global integration compared to the past (…); and it requires a 
long-term structural change of society 
This definition positions development as a historically grounded pro-
cess. In fact, not only the economic change is often result of political 
efforts of both national and international agencies, but it is also contex-
tual to the society for which structural change is envisioned. 
Arturo Escobar (2012) develops an analysis of what he refers to as the 
‘development industry’ from post-World War II until our decade, and 
stresses not only the historical contingency of development pro-
grammes, but also its political dimension. He argues that development 
was ‘invented’ in the post-war West and construction as “politics of pov-
erty” (ibid: 23): poverty was ‘discovered’ and problematised as a condi-
tion to be eradicated. This ‘discovery’ identified two/thirds of the world 
population as poor, and poverty became the object of a project of mod-
ernisation as much as “the poor became object of knowledge and man-
agement” (ibid: 23). In the 1950s, the identified social problems became 
the object of professionalisation and institutionalisation of a “lucrative 
industry of development practitioners” (Escobar 2012: 46). “Like the 
landing of the Allies in Normandy, the Third World witnessed a massive 
landing of experts, each in charge of investigating, measuring, and the-
orising about this or that little aspect of Third World societies” (ibid: 45).
Since the 1950s, development aid has taken different forms and strate-
gies—what Swedlund (2017, p.3) refers to as aid delivery mechanisms: 
From microfinance to results-based aid, from basket funding to 
general budget support, development aid is continuously rein-
venting itself, claiming to have finally found the next big idea that 
is going to make aid more effective. This relentless innovation—
what some call aid fads or fashions—leads to rapid paradigm 
shifts in development cooperation that are difficult, if not impos-
sible, for development practitioners to keep up with.
The reasons for the changes in paradigm shifts are several, ambiguous 
and contextual—but certainly should be read in a historical perspective. 
A development delivery mechanism that is considered to be valid and 
true in a specific moment in history will change even radically with time. 
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Together with the shifts in aid delivery mechanisms, development dis-
courses around poverty and Africa have also been fluctuating, as Jerven 
(2015, p.123) argues: “narratives on African economic development can 
switch from one extreme to the other so swiftly. Of course, the truth lies 
somewhere between the ‘miracles’ and ‘tragedies’. We went from a rhet-
oric of ‘Bottom Billion’ to ‘Africa Rising’ within half a decade.” These 
changes show both the political and cultural dimension of aid delivery—
also in the field of rural development: 
Any attempt to portray evolving ideas in rural development 
over the past half-century risks oversimplification. While it is 
superficially neat to characterise the 1960s as modernisation, 
the 1970s as state intervention, the 1980s as market liberali-
sation, and the 1990s as participation and empowerment, 
popular ideas and their practical effects on rural policies did 
not, indeed, undergo these transitions in such an uncluttered 
manner. (Ellis & Biggs, 2001, p.437)
Recently, development programmes have shifted attention from 
‘poverty’ to ‘the poor’ (Mosse 2010 in (Pallotti & Zamponi, 2014, 
p.45). According to Ferguson (2014, p.20—21), this shift is a process 
of depoliticisation of development which ‘pathologises’ the subject 
(the poor) ‘to be developed’. In the early post-World War II the ‘social 
problem’ “discovered” was poverty; today, it appears from develop-
ment narratives, the problem is people being poor rather than the 
(systemic, and thus political) causes producing poverty. Moreover, it 
is a generic ‘poor’ for which replicable development measures can 
be adopted. In his analysis of state simplification and legibility, Scott 
(1998: 81) argues:
First, the knowledge that an official needs must give him or 
her a synoptic view of the ensemble; it must be cast in terms 
that are replicable across many cases. In this respect, such 
facts must lose their particularity and reappear in schematic 
or simplified form as a member of a class of facts. Second, in 
a meaning closely related to the first, the grouping of synoptic 
facts necessarily entails collapsing or ignoring distinctions 
that might otherwise be relevant.
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In line with Scott’s analysis, international development ideology has 
been critiqued for proposing uniform, replicable and technocratic 
solutions. In fact, critical scholars (mainly Scott, Escobar, Ferguson, 
Mosse) identified a tension between development practitioners’ 
vision of change and ‘indigenous’ farmers. Such a gap has been 
recognised as being the main motive for farmers’ resistance to 
development programmes (Scott J., 1992). Lewis and Mosse (2006, 
p.2) have shown that in fact there is a disjuncture between the ideal 
development policy to be implemented and the reality on the ground, 
concluding even the best development practices cannot bridge this 
gap:
First, and most commonly within the technical and managerial 
framework that defines aid policy, “order” can be understood 
as the “ideal worlds” that development actors aim to bring 
about through the execution of proper policy and project 
design. Disjuncture comes from the gap between these ideal 
worlds and the social reality they have to relate to. This comes 
to be managed in one of two ways. On the one hand, the gap 
between intention and outcome must be narrowed through 
the pursuit of proper implementation and “best practice”—a 
continuing task of agency workers at all levels, and one corre-
sponding to the long-term academic anthropological concern 
with the contradictions between what is said and what is done 
in development. On the other hand, developers “try and see to 
it that the ‘ideal worlds’ [are] consistent with what we know 
about how real societies actually work, so that ‘development’ 
planning can set itself objectives capable of being realised” 
(…).
Considering the failures of development programmes due to this 
gap between the intended and the actual outcomes, Ferguson 
(2014) elaborates his theory of the anti-politics machine. He refers to 
development as an industry (ibid: 8), and “not a machine for eliminat-
ing poverty that is incidentally involved with the state bureaucracy; it 
is a machine for reinforcing and expanding the exercise of bureau-
cratic state power, which incidentally takes “poverty” as its point of 
entry (…)” (2014, p.255). While not managing to eradicate poverty, 
this machine does have (un)intended, concrete consequences: “By 
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uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by 
promising technical solutions to the suffering of powerless and 
oppressed people, the hegemonic problematic of “development” is 
the principal means through which the question of poverty is de-po-
liticized in the world today” (Ferguson, 2014, p.256).
According to Mosse (2013, p.229), this industry is a “historical system 
of thought to the interactions of various actors and systems of 
knowledge”. With Mosse, the analysis of development also takes in 
particular consideration the human dimension of those who make 
development: the “communities of development advisors, consult-
ants, policy makers, aid administrators and managers—those 
involved in the construction and transmission of knowledge about 
global poverty and its reduction.” (Mosse, 2011, p.1). The complex 
world surrounding development institutions, organisations, policy 
papers, and communities of physical development actors is referred 
to by Apthorpe (in Mosse, 2011, p.199) as ‘Aidland’—a concept that 
hints at the virtual, as much as real, nature of development. In fact, 
the author defines (Mosse, 2011, p.199) the concept of Aidland as “a 
macro construct, whose microapplications are interesting. Aidland 
has its own mental topographies, languages of discourse, lore and 
custom, and approaches to organisational knowledge and learning. 
(…) several aspects of these [expert knowledges] prove to be in 
some ways more virtual than real—hence the degree of virtual reali-
ty of Aidland”.
Therefore, it is important to study the ‘languages and discourses’ of 
development not only for the extent to which they have an impact on 
the local realities on the ground, but also because they sustain the 
development industry. It is through the historically-specific ‘systems 
of thought’ that the complex world within and around development 
institutions are sustained and justified. Beyond the evaluation of the 
actual impact and effectiveness of development programmes, the 
study of development as ‘domain of thought and action’ allows us to 
deconstruct relations of power. 
Interestingly in fact, development studies have ventured the investi-
gation of the rationale behind development ‘thought and action’. In 
particular Scott (2014, p.67) identifies the neoliberal agenda behind 
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development, and questions ‘the human product’ of capitalist labour 
schemes pushed forward by development and political agendas: 
What if we were to ask a different question of institutions and 
activities than the narrow neoclassical question of how effi-
cient they are in terms of costs (e.g., resources, labour, capital) 
per unit of a given, specified product? What if we were to ask 
what kind of people a given activity or institution fostered?
Along the same line of questions, if we consider the shift in the 
focus from agriculture to agribusiness we are then prone to ask: 
What type of rural development is envisioned by policy makers 
emphasizing the role of the private sector? Under this logic, it is cru-
cial to understand what types of expectations are projected on 
farmers when envisioning (youth) agripreneurship in development 
policies. 
2.2.2 Agricultural development and agribusiness
Swinging along the lines of development changes, agricultural 
development has also witnessed different fluctuations since the 
1960s. Such changes involved both the ideological politico-eco-
nomic frame of reference, as the consequent strategies for develop-
ment programmes. The interaction of the international development 
community with the rural world in developing countries gave over 
the years more importance to different stakeholders: in the 1960s 
emphasis was given to smallholders, in the 1970s to the state, in the 
1980s to NGOs, in the 1990s to the (liberalised) market and in the 
2000s again to family farming. The ‘historical pendulum’, as Cotula 
(Cotula, 2013, p.25) names it, shifted over the years between planta-
tion, contractualised agriculture and family farming. Lately, with the 
policy regime shifting from aid to trade increasing hopes and expec-
tations have been laid on private sector initiatives for the rural devel-
opment of emerging countries (Westen and Zoomers 2014). 
Agribusiness has come to assume an increasingly significant position 
in the development agenda in the last decades, pushing for a new 
wave of commercialisation. On this matter, some scholars (Collier & 
Dercon, 2013; Toenissen, Adesina, & DeVries, 2008) have been argu-
ing for a commercialisation of agriculture; pushing an agri-business 
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agenda that subordinates agriculture to the implementation of capital-
istic and industrial development processes (Pallotti & Zamponi, 2014, 
p.59). In this framework, rural development policies that focus on petty 
commodity producers become a tool for legitimizing neoliberal poli-
cies for rural development (Pallotti & Zamponi, 2014). As a new rural 
development fashion, development institutions and African govern-
ments are now increasingly investing in agribusiness, with a specific 
focus on youth. 
As part of the general shift from aid to trade, the private sector has 
made its way into the realm of development cooperation, for exam-
ple through private-public partnerships (PPP) (Mosse, 2013, p.238—
239). The private sector has become a development agent, while 
corporate agendas captured in the unintentionally revealing 
slogan “Make poverty business.” This goes to the heart of the 
wider institutional assemblage (Dolan 2012, p.4) labelled “bot-
tom of the pyramid” (BoP) capitalism (Prahalad 2005), through 
which, Dolan (2012) argues, development itself is outsourced 
to the “under-utilised poor” (…).
Along the same lines, in the field of rural and agricultural develop-
ment, the private sector has entered as an actor of change. On the 
edge between development and private sector, responsible supply 
chains (e.g. Fairtrade) have emerged under the increasing demands 
for sustainable products (Wiskerke, 2009). However the results of 
this type of for-profit development initiatives have delivered contro-
versial and sometimes counter effective outcomes (Blowfield & 
Dolan, 2010) (Dolan, 2001) (Freeman, 2009), leaving open the ques-
tion whether the private sector can indeed act as development 
agent (Westen van & Zoomers, 2014) (McMichael p., 2013). The com-
mercial agrifood sector itself has undergone important changes. In 
particular, due to the ‘supermarket revolution’ (Reardon, Timmer, & 
Minten, 2012) a process of restructuring the global food market 
changed pathways of procurement to comply with retailers’ rules. 
However, the private sector has entered the field of agricultural devel-
opment also as a paradigm for development programmes. Reflecting on 
these changes, some scholars (Toenissen, Adesina, & DeVries, 2008) 
YOUTH AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA74
(Collier & Dercon, 2013) have been arguing for a commercialisation of 
agriculture; pushing an agri-business agenda that subordinates agricul-
ture to the implementation of capitalistic and industrial development 
processes (Pallotti & Zamponi, 2014, p.59). 
The concept of ‘agripreneurship’ emerged in the context of the 
increased attention to agribusiness, as a tool for development. 
Including the element of entrepreneurship in the field of agricultural 
development, makes the task of agribusiness dependent on the 
entrepreneurial capacities of the farmer. In fact, the beneficiaries of 
agricultural development become the very implementers of the pro-
grammes—making their own success in agribusiness dependent on 
their personal qualities. As Mosse (2013, p.239) argues, 
Such “BoP [Bottom of the Piramid] entrepreneurs” are ana-
lysed as both instruments and beneficiaries of processes that 
change donor- recipient relationships, create “legibility” to 
global business, produce entrepreneurial subjectivities and 
recode products in ethical terms, while at the same time divid-
ing, differentiating, and depleting aspects of social life (Dolan 
2012). 
Investing in agribusiness as a development tool to be achieved 
through agripreneurship reduces agriculture to its business compo-
nent. At the same time, it also places the responsibility of success in 
the qualities of the farmer who, when engaging in an agribusiness 
enterprise—is referred as an ‘agripreneur’, in development jargon. 
New hopes have been recently laid on the new generations of ‘agri-
preneurs’—the youths. In the next section I will explore the academic 
debate around this social category as the new target of develop-
ment efforts. 
2.2.3 Youth in agribusiness: a new development trend 
Recently, the focus of development programmes on agribusiness 
and agripreneurship has been laid on youths—‘the future of agricul-
ture’. The justification for the increased interest in this social catego-
ry lays in the sheer dimension of the demographic phenomenon. 
The concerns attached to the ‘youth bulge’ are related to risks of 
social instability that could derive from widespread unemployment. 
CHAPTER 2—THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 75
The shift towards youth within the narrative of risk has been 
observed by Van Dijk et al (2011, p.2), among others:
Within this paradigm of the relation between youth and risk, 
instigated by the sheer size of the problem, an aid-industry 
has come to fruition. In its many NGO activities and initiatives, 
this aid-industry apparently has shifted policy-orientations 
from the ‘rural’, the ‘women’ or the ‘household’, to the ‘youth’ 
as the new developmental target and hope for the future.
From this analysis, the development focus on youths as a ‘risky’ 
demographic phenomenon emerges as a new trend sustaining the 
development industry. However, there is still light to be shed on the 
concept of youth. In fact, Sommers (2015, p.10) argues that it is pre-
cisely the vagueness of this concept that allows to keep youth an 
‘outcast’ social category: 
A fundamental reason why youth are so misunderstood and 
support for them is so underwhelming is that nobody seems 
entirely sure just who they are. The definitions that many 
experts have drummed up invite confusion because they con-
flict. Governments and international agencies typically rely on 
age ranges to determine who youth are. While that may seem 
simple enough, the result is a muddle. One problem arises 
from the fact that there is no agreement on what those ages 
should be. 
Besides defining youth as an age category, scholars have also con-
sidered other coordinates to accurately define and analyse this 
social category. As van Dijk et al (2011, p.5) argue, in fact, the ‘situa-
tional’ and ‘local’ dimension of youth is crucial in defining the con-
cept of youth:
As social science in Africa has moved away from conceptual-
ising youth only in terms of time –a passage through the gen-
erations– and has included the notion of space –not when 
one is youth but also where one is youth– the ‘situational’ 
exploration of youth has at least allowed for the possibility of 
looking at space and place as new modes of understanding. 
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In addition to the concept of youth as emphasising the ‘situ-
ational’ it has also turned into the ‘locational’ dimensions. (…) 
Redefining youth as an identity-project of ‘becoming some-
body’, this becoming is captured in navigating certain spaces 
and places—the bar, the disco, the funeral, the school, the 
church, the state, the house and so forth. 
Since youth has entered the realm of development’s thought and action, 
it has become an ‘identity-project of ‘becoming somebody’– where the 
development community defines the objectives of this process of 
becoming. In particular, development resources have been deployed for 
youths to venture agribusiness and become agripreneurs. In fact, the 
authors (van Dijk, de Bruijn, Cardoso, & Butter, 2011, p.7) stress that 
“Youth has become an ideological project because an arena of interests 
and scarce resources has been generated around it”.Interestingly, in the 
development shifts analysed above, emerges a pattern of framing of the 
development issues –from poverty to the poor, from agriculture to agri-
business and agripreneurship and the youths– that sustain a neoliberal 
ideology of development. Such shifts in the strategies and investments 
of development cooperation are supported by narratives that underpin 
and justify them. By studying these narratives, it is possible to shed light 
on the underlying assumptions and ideologies guiding development. 
From the sections above it becomes clear that development paradigm 
has recently shifted the attention of programmes towards commercial 
agriculture. In order to make the ‘markets work for the poor’, a develop-
ment discourse has been constructed that aims at shifting agriculture 
from subsistence towards agribusiness. At the same time, the social 
category of ‘youth’ has become the objective of such programmes for 
agribusiness. However, youth has not been defined other than as an age 
range—and is identified as ‘a project of becoming’ (van Dijk, de Bruijn, 
Cardoso, & Butter, 2011). In the following chapters I will analyse the ways 
in which such discourse has been constructed in Uganda. A Foucauld-
ian analytical approach allows us to frame the construction of the trend 
around youth and agribusiness in Uganda, in terms of narratives and 
practices. Within the Foucauldian approach, narratives and practices 
construct a discourse—and are seen as devices of power. In the section 
below, I will explore Foucault’s theorisation of power and the related 
functions and devices.
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2.3 A Foucauldian paradigm for development studies 
2.3.1 Power
Foucault’s understanding of power has often been endorsed (and 
adjusted) by scholars in development studies. Development studies 
is a very political arena for at least two reasons. First, often political 
strings (e.g. good governance) are attached to the delivery of devel-
opment aid (but this is not the focus of this study); and, second, 
because when resources are distributed economic relations are 
formed, causing a relationship of force. 
The relation between power and the economy are so strongly inter-
twined that their relation has been questioned by Foucault (1976, 
p.14, my italics), in these terms: 
First: Is power always secondary to the economy? Are its final-
ity and function always determined by the economy? Is pow-
er’s raison d’etre and purpose essentially to serve the econo-
my? Is it designed to establish, solidify, perpetuate, and 
reproduce relations that are characteristic of the economy and 
essential to its workings? (…) Or if we wish to analyse it, do we 
have to operate—on the contrary—with different instruments, 
even if power relations are deeply involved in and with eco-
nomic relations, even if power relations and economic relations 
always constitute a sort of network or loop? If that is the case, 
the indissociability of the economy and politics is not a matter 
of functional subordination, nor of formal isomorphism. It is of a 
different order, and it is precisely that order that we have to 
isolate. 
Clarifying the relation between economy, resources and power is 
particularly important in the field of development studies. In fact, 
while ‘indissociable’, one is not subordinate to the other: it is not that 
(development) resources cause or shape power relations. Instead, 
Foucault (1978, p.92) insists power is to be understood in other 
terms: 
It seems to me that power must be understood in the first 
instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the 
sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own 
YOUTH AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA78
organisation; as the process which, through ceaseless strug-
gles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses 
them; as the support which these force relations find in one 
another, thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, 
the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from 
one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take 
effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is 
embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, 
in the various social hegemonies.
Force (economic) relations, like institutional bodies and laws are 
expressions of hegemonic relations, but they do not embody pow-
er—like the state and its officials do not: Foucault identifies power in 
the system which relates these expressions of power to one another. 
In his view, power circulates and therefore is not concentrated in the 
hands of any entity (see paragraph 2.1).
This understanding of power as a function that passes through indi-
viduals is important to my analysis of development because it shifts 
the focus of the analysis. Instead of analysing power relations 
between development practitioners and youths, power should be 
explored as a function underpinning these relations. Contrary to the 
interpretation of some of the most prominent authors in develop-
ment studies (see next section 2.4) Foucault incites to the analysis of 
power beyond the relation of domination. 
2.3.1a Domination
Without denying the brutality of exercise of domination and sovereign-
ty, Foucault (1976, p.27) invites a broader understanding of domination 
as a function of power, deconstructing its functions: 
I have been trying to do the opposite, or in other words to 
stress the fact of domination in all its brutality and its secre-
cy, and then to show not only that right is an instrument of 
that domination—that is self-evident—but also how, to what 
extent, and in what form right (and when I say right, I am not 
thinking just of the law, but of all the apparatuses, institutions, 
and rules that apply it) serves as a vehicle for and implements 
relations that are not relations of sovereignty, but relations of 
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domination. And by domination I do not mean the brute fact 
of the domination of the one over the many, or of one group 
over another, but the multiple forms of domination that can 
be exercised in society; so, not the king in his central position, 
but subjects in their reciprocal relations; not sovereignty in its 
one edifice, but the multiple subjugations that take place and 
function within the social body. 
While subjugation of one or multiple subjects can be analysed as an 
expression of sovereignty, he stresses that it is in the procedures 
and relations of all social actors that power resides. And later in the 
same lecture at the College de France (Foucault M., 1976, p.29—30), 
he continues: 
It is therefore, I think, a mistake to think of the individual as a 
sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom or some multiple, 
inert matter to which power is applied, or which is struck by a 
power that subordinates or destroys individuals. In actual fact, 
one of the first effects of power is that it allows bodies, ges-
tures, discourses, and desires to be identified and constituted 
as something individual. The individual is not, in other words, 
power’s opposite number; the individual is one of power’s first 
effects. The individual is in fact a power-effect, and at the 
same time, and to the extent that he is a power-effect, the 
individual is a relay: power passes through the individuals it 
has constituted. 
Domination is thus not the effect of power on one person or group 
of individuals, but rather the expression of a system of power that 
constitutes individuals, and which they reinforce or resist. Domina-
tion does not contrapose groups of power-holders against those to 
whom power is applied. Rather there are power mechanisms in 
which individuals are embedded that allow for domination as an 
expression of power. In the next paragraph, I thus explore the con-
cept of resistance according to Foucault. 
2.3.1b Resistance
Resistance is a concept that emerges in the dialectic of domination, 
and like domination is an expression of power. In fact, within Foucault’s 
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understanding of power, individuals enforce as much as they counteract 
power structures: 
Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather con-
sequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in 
relation to power. Should it be said that one is always “inside” 
power, there is no “escaping” it, there is no absolute outside 
where it is concerned, because one is subject to the law in any 
case? Or that, history being the ruse of reason, power is the ruse 
of history, always emerging the winner? This would be to misun-
derstand the strictly relational character of power relationships. 
Their existence depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance: 
these play the role of the adversary, target, support, or handle in 
the power relationships. These points of resistance are present 
everywhere in the power network. (Foucault M., 1978, p.95)
Resistance is exercised by individuals as an expression of power. 
Moreover, the very existence of power relations is dependent on the 
points of resistance. In this way Foucault defines the ubiquitous and 
relational nature of power. The way in which power functions through 
power devices, is explained in the next paragraph. 
2.3.2 Narratives and discourse
According to Foucault there is an intricate and diverse range of devices 
through which power functions—what he calls the apparatuses, or dis-
positive. Foucault refers to apparatuses as knowledges, truths, norms, 
and discourses. Devices such as discourses and knowledge are crucial 
in the functioning of power: through stories people tell, they express a 
narrative which reflects a discourse. A narrative is the logic within which 
a certain story makes sense, while a discourse is a broader meta-narra-
tive that comprises and underpins (individual) narratives. 
Such dispositives sustain the power structures and relations, by con-
stantly reshaping them in the actions and narratives of individuals. 
According to Foucault (1976, p.25), the way in which power functions is 
by systematizing relations, knowledge, actions and resources according 
to specific discourses: 
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Power constantly asks questions and questions us; it constantly 
investigates and records; it institutionalises the search for the 
truth, professionalises it, and rewards it. We have to produce the 
truth in the same way, really, that we have to produce wealth, and 
we have to produce the truth in order to be able to produce 
wealth. In a different sense, we are also subject to the truth in the 
sense that truth lays down the law: it is the discourse of truth that 
decides, at least in part; it conveys and propels truth-effects. 
After all, we are judged, condemned, forced to perform tasks, 
and destined to live and die in certain ways by discourses that are 
true, and which bring with them specific power-effects. 
The function of discourses is thus to normalise and institutionalise 
regimes of truth which sustain power relations. The consequences of 
such devices are very concrete as they shape the actions and decisions 
of individuals in a society dominated by a given system of truth. At the 
same time, individuals are themselves the actors who create and there-
fore can resist the same system of truth. In fact, there is nothing stable 
and deterministic in this conceptualisation of the functioning of power 
through its devices. On the contrary, Foucault (1978, p.101) stresses how 
this is a continuous and instable process: 
We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process 
whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of 
power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resist-
ance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse 
transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also under-
mines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to 
thwart it. In like manner, silence and secrecy are a shelter for 
power, anchoring its prohibitions; (…). 
Interestingly, Foucault stresses how active engagement with power, 
through discourses, establishes systems of truth. Moreover, silence and 
secrecy are also functional to anchoring truths, crystalizing norms of action. 
2.4 Literature review of development studies using a 
Foucauldian approach
Arturo Escobar is one of the most prominent authors in development 
studies, who has examined the power relations in development 
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cooperation by using a Foucauldian framework. He defines (2012, 
p.45) development as a 
historical construct that provides a space in which poor coun-
tries are known, specified and intervened upon. To speak of 
development as a historical construct requires an analysis of 
the mechanisms through which it becomes an active, real force. 
These mechanisms are structured by forms of knowledge and 
power and can be studied in terms of processes of institution-
alisation and professionalisation.
In his analysis of how development grew from the 1960s, he stresses the 
importance of understanding the mechanisms through which power 
relations are established and reinforced through development dis-
course, with explicit reference to Foucault (Escobar, 2012, p.5): 
Foucault’s work on the dynamics of discourse and power in the 
representation of social reality, in particular, has been instru-
mental in unveiling the mechanisms by which a certain order of 
discourse producers permissible modes of being and thinking 
while disqualifying and even making others impossible. 
In this understanding of development as a discourse, a power 
dynamic is identified between a dominant discourse –what Escobar 
later refers to as ‘development industry’– enforced on those countries 
of the Global South which have long been represented as ‘Third World’. 
In his analysis of development, Escobar identifies a power structure 
with a top and bottom—and studies the dynamics in between in terms 
of domination, a hegemonic exercise of power (ibid, p.53). 
Along the same lines, in his analysis of development as an ‘anti-politics 
machine’, James Ferguson (2014) takes up the Foucauldian analysis of 
the genealogy the of prison to explain failure in development as an (un)
intended outcome that produces depoliticisation of poverty and the 
poor. In the introduction of his book (Ferguson, 2014, p.20—21), the 
author explains: 
Specifically, the remaining chapters will show how outcomes 
that at first appear as mere “side effects” of an unsuccessful 
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attempt to engineer an economic transformation become legi-
ble in another perspective as unintended yet instrumental ele-
ments in a resultant constellation that has the effect of expand-
ing the exercise of a particular sort of state power while 
simultaneously exerting a powerful depoliticizing effect. It is this 
unauthored resultant constellation that I call “the anti-politics 
machine”. 
Taking the dichotomic representation (with a top and bottom end of 
power relations) of development even a step forward, James Scott 
has studied the hidden transcripts of peasants’ morality and practic-
es. In this earlier study on ‘Domination and the Art of Resistance’ 
Scott (1992) gives a dualistic interpretation of Foucault’s analysis of 
power and domination. He opens this study by referring to an Ethio-
pian proverb that declaims ‘When the great lord passes the wise 
peasant bows deeply and silently farts’. The division between lords 
and peasants in the case study of Scott (1992, p.54) is analysed in its 
dualistic opposition, distributing power on the one hand (the top) 
and resistance on the other (the bottom):
The balance of power in the village, however, was sufficiently 
skewed against the harvester that they abstained, out of pru-
dence, from publicly contesting the self-serving definition 
applied by the rich. (…) Euphemisms in the broad sense I am 
using the term –the self-interested tailoring of descriptions and 
appearances by dominant powerholders– is not confined to 
language. It may be seen in gestures, architecture, ritual actions, 
public ceremonies, any other actions in which the powerful may 
portray their domination as they wish. Taken together they rep-
resent the dominant elite’s flattering self-portrait. 
In fact, as he proceeds in his analysis of class relations in a Malay 
village, Scott takes further the discursive analysis of Foucault by 
reading power relations as in a dramaturgical metaphor: 
Most acts of power from below, even when they are protests 
–implicitly or explicitly– will largely observe the “rules” even if 
their objective is to undermine them (…) As Foucault notes, 
such formulas “cause beggars, poor folks, or simply the 
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mediocre to appear in a strange theatre where they assume 
poses, declamations, grandiloquences, where they dress up in 
bits of drapery which are necessary if they want to be paid 
attention to on the stage of power”. The “strange theatre” to 
which Foucault refers is deployed not merely to gain a hearing 
but often as a valuable political resource in conflict and even in 
rebellion. 
Within the school of Scott and Ferguson, Murray Li (2007, p.277) has 
examined the ways in which development in Indonesia has attempt-
ed and failed to be adaptive to demands of farmers. In fact, she 
shows how development schemes fail to recognise and work with 
the heterogeneity of the reality on the ground:
Villagers resented being required to spend long hours and 
days in meetings drawing pictures and making themselves 
attractive to patrons, for which they received minimal material 
payback and no serious response to the fundamental prob-
lem of access to land. (…) Yet, as I have argued, analysis of 
what empowerment programmes and participatory initiatives 
fail to do –empower people, alleviate poverty, achieve “genu-
ine” consultation, or even contain and depoliticise– does not 
exhaust the topic. (…) as Foucault insisted, programs of inter-
vention are not “abortive schemas for the creation of reality. 
They are fragments of reality which induce…particular effects 
in the real”. 
In her analysis, Murray Li stresses how the development schemes 
she studied failed to deliver their objectives and admits that although 
failing, these programmes still have effects on the reality on the 
ground—if only exasperating locals and depoliticizing their role in 
society (by ‘rendering society technical’ in (Mosse, 2011, p.57—79)). 
Although problematised, explored in their dimensions of agency, 
contestation and failure, the analytical categories used by these 
authors have been assumed to be in contraposition to each other as 
a top and bottom dimensions of development. There is a (seemingly) 
Foucauldian understanding of development that divides actors, their 
narratives and practices within a dualistic understanding and 
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categorisation of development as a structure that is formed, embod-
ied, and reproduced through agency. 
However, as I showed in the section above (2.3) Foucault (1976, p.29) 
gives a different interpretation of domination and distribution of 
power:
Third methodological precaution: Do not regard power as a 
phenomenon of mass and homogeneous domination—the 
domination of one individual over others, of one group over 
others, or of one class over others; keep it clearly in mind that 
unless we are looking at it from a great height and from a very 
great distance, power is not something that is divided 
between those who have it and hold it exclusively, and those 
who do not have it and are subject to it. 
In this perspective, in fact, power functions outside of a dichotomic 
contraposition of power-holders and subjects. Power is exercised by 
individuals in relation to each other, and the force relations between 
them are the result of mechanisms such as truth discourses. There-
fore, Foucault pointed the analysis of power in a different direction 
than the dualistic contraposition of a top and bottom—without denying 
hegemony: 
It is in this sphere of force relations that we must try to ana-
lyse the mechanisms of power. In this way we will escape from 
the system of Law-and-Sovereign which has captivated politi-
cal thought for such a long time. And if it is true that MachiavelIi 
was among the few - and this no doubt was the scandal of his 
“cynicism”- who conceived the power of the Prince in terms of 
force relationships, perhaps we need to go one step further, do 
without the persona of the Prince, and decipher power mecha-
nisms on the basis of a strategy that is immanent in the force 
relationships. (Foucault M., 1978, p.97)
The methodological prescription of Foucault in the analysis of power 
–and thus also the analysis power in development– is a paradigmatic 
change. It encourages to investigate the ‘power mechanisms’ sustain-
ing the force relationships, rather than the force relationships as 
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relations of sovereignty. Therefore, the study of power should focus on 
the mechanisms that sustain power structures, rather than on a 
dichotomic relation between the sovereign (top) and the dominated 
(bottom).
On the contrary, while scholars such as Scott, Ferguson and Escobar 
have studied the power relations between development top and bot-
tom, few studies have focused on the socio-economic and political 
dynamics within the bottom (Scott J., 1992) (Murray Li, 2007) and within 
the top (Mosse, 2011). My study proposes a combined study of develop-
ment dynamics between and within. The Foucauldian conceptualisation 
of power prescribes an analysis of power mechanisms and apparatuses 
to understand the strategies and rationales of force relationships—as 
they function everywhere (though not homogenously). Given a case 
study (e.g. agricultural practices in a Malay village, or the development 
industry in Lesotho), the Foucauldian analysis deconstructs the dis-
courses, practices and knowledge that are immanent in all social rela-
tions and structures. In order to understand and explain the power 
structures and relations, it is necessary to elaborate an analysis of its 
functioning devices and what their effect is. Therefore, it is not sufficient 
to explain that homogeneous development programmes fail to adjust 
and embrace the heterogeneity on the ground, nor to highlight the (un)
intended consequences of hegemonic relations in the field of 
development. 
In the remaining of this chapter, I attempt to adapt the Foucauldian par-
adigm of analysis to the study of empirical data collected on the field. I 
will ground the analysis of power relations within the Foucauldian 
approach to the relations between development actors in Uganda. In 
this way, I will operationalise the study of discourse and practices of 
development practitioners and youths. 
2.5 Foucault in development: 
a framework for an ethnographic analysis of development
trend around youth in agribusiness in Uganda
In the previous sections, I have considered the Foucauldian paradigm 
for the analysis of power and the interpretations given by some scholars 
in development studies, as they adjusted it to their field of study. In this 
section, I will attempt the elaboration of an operationalised Foucauldian 
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theoretical framework for the study of the development trend around 
youth in agribusiness in Uganda. 
Rather than studying development policies and programmes for what 
they prescribe and then evaluating how or whether they work—devel-
opment analysis should focus on the mechanisms that produce the 
regimes of truth supporting development policies and programmes. 
Regimes of truth being the knowledge, meaning-giving process and 
system of values that underpin the development trend around youth in 
agribusiness in Uganda. Such regimes of truth are what I refer to as dis-
courses, and are constituted by narratives and practices (I examine 
these concepts below). 
2.5.1 Discourse, knowledge and narratives
Within a Foucauldian approach, the scholar in development studies 
operates a hermeneutic exercise on the discourses (in its narratives and 
practices)—what Escobar calls an ‘hyperethnography’ of development. 
In fact, while the paradigm of Foucault is extremely theoretical in nature, 
scholars in development studies have operationalised it (therefore 
adjusting it) by means of qualitative studies—in search for the social 
meaning underlying and constituting power structures. 
Within this type of ethnographic investigation of power within develop-
ment, narratives and practices constitute the bricks of discourses. Nar-
ratives are the frame against which stories and oral or written accounts 
make sense. ‘Making sense’ is the process of laying the bricks of truths 
which social actors hold on to in order to give meaning to their socio-cul-
tural world. Practices are the embodiment of the truths constructed 
within narratives. Together, narratives and practices constitute a dis-
course—which is a process ever evolving in the talking and doing of the 
social actors involved. In this way, discourses function in creating, sus-
taining or changing the established social and political-economic norms 
regulating social relations. In such process, discourses function as pow-
er. Where development actors talk about their ideas and activities as 
concrete facts, they do not only tell a story—but they create, in doing that, 
the foundations for development action. 
Even though we speak of these actions as if our understandings 
are hard and concrete, they are in reality the narrative stories 
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we construct as plausible explanations. What we take to be 
‘fixed truths’ are only the stories that have over time come to 
be consensually accepted as plausible by a significant number 
of people, including influential interpreters of political events, 
such as journalists, political elites, scholars, and the like. (…) 
That is to say, commonly accepted inter-subjective meanings 
are embedded in the very institutions and practices of socie-
ty; and without them these institutions and practices would be 
dramatically different, if they existed at all. In short, these so-
cial entities cannot be discussed independently of them. Social 
meanings, in short, cannot simply be abstracted and treated 
as one of the various variables explaining institutions. (Fischer, 
2003, p.43—44)
Fisher stresses that not all stories develop into fixed truths: individu-
als do not create meaning alone, but as social beings with others. 
The shared dimension of discourse is precisely the relational nature 
of power. Fischer (2003, p.39) refers to ‘fixed truths’, not as static but 
rather as shared discourses that become dominant. 
Their [words, things, knowledge] regulatory discourses pro-
duce ‘truth’ in the sense that they supply systematic proce-
dures for the generation, regulation, and circulation of state-
ments. The knowledge produced is a part of the discursive 
practices by which rules are constructed, objects and sub-
jects are defined, and events for study are identified and con-
stituted. 
This process of generation of knowledge, truth and meaning has 
been the object of study of anthropologists for decades. With 
Geertz, anthropologists investigated knowledge and actions in politi-
cal-economic and social contexts in the understanding that 
man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself 
has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it 
to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but 
an interpretive one in search of meaning (Geertz, 1973, p.5). 
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In order to understand and explain the mechanisms of power within 
development, it is necessary to make a ‘thick description’ of narratives, 
practices and the context in which they take place. 
Thick description is an approach for exploring and discover-
ing the meanings embedded in the language and actions of 
social actors. Because meanings are attached to the actors 
being described, the process is both descriptive and inter-
pretive (Maxwell 1992: 288). The depth of such meanings, 
writes Geertz, can be revealed only through detailed descrip-
tions of the social context of the situation in which commu-
nication and action take place. In describing the context of 
an action, the anthropologists make their field notes ‘thick’ 
with underlying inferences and implications relevant to their 
descriptions. (Fischer, 2003, p.150)
Here, I take the thick description of a case study in development to 
be the operationalisation of the Foucauldian paradigm for the analysis 
of development discourses and power. In this context, ‘communica-
tion’ and ‘action’ –which I here take as ‘narratives’ and ‘practices’– are 
the entry points for a qualitative analysis of discourses and power in 
development. By contextualising and deconstructing (see Methods 
chapter) such narratives and practices, I hope to bring to light the 
underlying discourses structuring the new development trend around 
youth in agribusiness in Uganda.
2.5.1a Youth and agribusiness as categories of 
knowledge and action
The first most evident knowledge category created by this recent 
development trend in Uganda is youth. As Van Dijk et al (2011, p.1) 
stress, discussions on the definition of this social category have 
emerged while the development trend increasingly investing in 
youth: “Under the current dispensation of donor funding, relief pro-
grammes and international aid, these discussions [on the definition 
of youth] have made the ‘youth’ the major beneficiary of what these 
policies offer and imply”. 
Moreover, Sommers (2015) has stressed how despite the increased 
development attention for this social category of youth—development 
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agencies mostly do not operate with a definition of youth other than a 
simple age range. It is thus a generic ‘youth’—for which replicable devel-
opment measures are adopted. In his analysis of state simplification and 
legibility, Scott (1998: 81) argues:
First, the knowledge that an official needs must give him or her a 
synoptic view of the ensemble; it must be cast in terms that are 
replicable across many cases. In this respect, such facts must lose 
their particularity and reappear in schematic or simplified form as 
a member of a class of facts. Second, in a meaning closely related 
to the first, the grouping of synoptic facts necessarily entails col-
lapsing or ignoring distinctions that might otherwise be relevant.
Standardised human subjects are “uniform in their needs and even inter-
changeable (…) they have none of the particular, situated, and contextual 
attributes that one would expect of any population” (Scott 1998: 346). 
Societies are, then, reified objects—subject to a kind of social gardening 
tuned to the abstract knowledge of development. In the specific, the 
development knowledge in place is the assumption that investing in 
“youth” in “agribusiness” will contribute at solving the “development 
problem”—namely “youth unemployment” and un-commercial/unpro-
ductive agriculture. 
Within this paradigm of the relation between youth and risk, instigated by 
the sheer size of the problem, an aid-industry has come to fruition. In its 
many NGO activities and initiatives, this aid-industry apparently has 
shifted policy-orientations from the ‘rural’, the ‘women’ or the ‘house-
hold’, to the ‘youth’ as the new developmental target and hope for the 
future (van Dijk, de Bruijn, Cardoso, & Butter, 2011, p.2)
Interestingly, the discourse relating youth to risk and violence is almost 
exclusively referring to young men. Reviewing some of the stereotypising 
discourses around young men, Sommers (2015, p.21) points at an impor-
tant flaw inherent to argumentations (often backed with statistics): “The 
statements set out here look unassailable. Young men are violent. When 
their numbers become excessive, they threaten their own societies. 
However, although most violent criminals may be male youth, most male 
youth are not criminals.”. In fact, Sommers continues (2015, p.21), the cor-
relation is not necessarily causal:
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As with crime, most male youth don’t get involved in warfare, ei-
ther. “While the youth bulge argument is compelling”, Barker and 
Ricardo note, “it is important to reaffirm that in any of these set-
tings, only a minority of young men participate in conflicts. For 
example, the vast majority of young men, even those unemployed 
and out of school, were not involved in conflicts in Liberia and Si-
erra Leone” (2006: 181).
This counter-argumentation to the discourse that relates a youth bulge to 
violence shows, indirectly, how the development attention for youth is 
justified by a discourse of fear for conflict. By building a development dis-
course on the strategic assumption that an increased young population 
might lead to increased criminality and even warfare, the development 
industry has laid the ideology that calls for development intervention. 
However, van Dijk et al (2011, p.9) argue that the creation of a develop-
ment ideology around youth is not a prerogative of development actors 
alone: 
While ‘youth’ has become a project for governments, religious and 
political leaders and NGOs in the ordering of society and produc-
tion and control of interests and resources, youth has become an 
active ideology for themselves in the pursuit of their own interests; 
in other words, they have acquired an ideological force of their 
own. 
This argument suggests that indeed the development does not project 
its forces as a form of domination, shaping social realities and pre-
scribing roles, relations and ambitions for the youths. As Foucault 
stresses, the discursive nature of power is embodied by all social 
actors involved and is not concentrated in the hands of some. 
At the same time, looking into the ‘ideological project’ (van Dijk, de 
Bruijn, Cardoso, & Butter, 2011) of development agencies for youth, 
it is clear how it prescribes their engagement in agribusiness. As 
mentioned above, the development agenda encouraging a turn from 
subsistence to commercial agriculture is not new—but the specific tar-
get of these policies for youth is recent. Agribusiness is supported by 
development programmes as a strategy for the increase of agricultural 
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productivity and the marketisation of the sector: an openly neoliberal 
agenda. As Scott (1976: 23) argues, within this neoliberal approach 
common villagers are “transformed into untrammelled Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurs and price and profit become the major standards”. 
These neoliberal values are not in line with the “subsistence ethic” or 
anyhow the “moral economy of the peasants” (ibid).
According to Scott (ibid: 264) the ‘imperial pretentions’ of develop-
ment is the inability to incorporate knowledge from outside its own 
paradigm. Inevitably, certain forms of knowledge –like the develop-
ment discourse– require a narrowing of population, and spaces into 
closed systems of categories. Categories make the environment legi-
ble and thus manageable, and Scott (ibid: 83) describes them as an 
“authoritative tune to which most population must dance”. 
2.5.1b Theory of change
In this section I set the theoretical premises for the use of an analytical 
tool for the investigation of narratives of development actors: ‘theories 
of change’. I refer to theory of change as a meta-concept of develop-
ment organisations, which emerged inductively from the analysis of 
interviews with practitioners. In fact, it appeared from the interviews 
that organisations had an implicit vision of what the development 
problem was, what its ideal solution would be and what their strategy 
should be. I systematised development practitioners’ strategic views 
on development in Uganda in chapter 4 (‘Aidnography’), using their 
theories of change as analytical tool.39 
A theory of change is the inherent idea behind a development policy, 
programme or project that there is a pathway of development that 
should lead from an identified development problem to an ideal 
development outcome. In fact, as Chabal (2009, p.4) argues, I am 
aware that the assumptions underlying development programmes 
can be particularly powerful in steering its directions: “Theories of 
development, whatever their guise, made two clear assumptions: the 
first was that there is a path to (economic and political) development, 
39 I do not make reference to any specific body of literature theoris-
ing on this concept because it is functional to my analysis only within the 
Foucauldian understanding of discourse analysis. In particular, I elaborate 
on Mosse’s study of development discourses and ‘aidland’. 
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which all countries follow, if in different ways; the second was that Afri-
ca is merely behind on that path but that it will eventually catch up.” 
In his overview of development studies, Mosse (2013, p.228) argues that:
The anthropology of development raises core anthropological 
questions about human similarity and difference, Western 
modernity, and the terms of economic and cultural integra-
tion. International development itself has a commitment both 
to the principle of difference and to similarity (Corbridge 
2007, p.179). Its narrative of progress implies that difference is 
a deficit to be overcome, whereas its narrative of emancipation 
implies that difference is sovereign self-determination and thus 
present equality (Rottenburg 2009). 
The framing of development in these terms, stresses the importance 
of the ideologies in the development effort of ascribing similarities 
and difference to the subjects ‘to be developed’—with a tendency to 
position such differences and similarities on a moral scale defining 
‘poverty’ as deficit in the tension towards the achievement of Western 
standards of modernity. This “subtraction approach” –a developing 
country’s inability to be more like a developed country– has been the 
lens for mainstream economics’ reading of Africa’s chronic failure of 
growth (Jerven M., 2015, p.2). Development cooperation has based its 
interventions on complex discourses that problematised and defined 
‘poverty’ and ‘the poor’ in different fashions throughout history. In 
Uganda, like in other ‘developing countries’, standards and criteria are 
set as to what still needs to be achieved for a country to be considered 
developed. The development discourse shapes this agenda, but 
according to Mosse (2004, p.664) it is an illusion to think that good 
development policies shape reality according to the agenda they 
explicitly set: 
The ‘public transcripts’ of development are sustained by the 
powerful and the subordinate, both of whose interests lead 
them to ‘tactically conspire to misrepresent’ (Scott, 1990: 2). 
In development, we cannot speak of policy controlling or dis-
ciplining, being resisted or subverted. Policy is an end rather 
than a cause; a result, often a fragile one, of social processes. 
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Projects are successful because they sustain policy models of-
fering a significant interpretation of events, not because they 
turn policy into reality. In this way the gap between policy and 
practice is constantly negotiated away.
With policy being an end rather than a cause, Mosse means to 
explain that yes, development policy shapes reality by establishing 
powerful metaphors and narratives around (segments of) societies 
which it approaches—but more through its hidden agenda (Fergu-
son refers to it as unintended). Such underpinning development ide-
ology can be extrapolated by means of conducting an aidnography 
(Mosse, 2013)—namely an ethnography of development aid.
2.5.2 Practices
I refer to development practices as the actions and practical behav-
iours of development actors involved in the enactment of a develop-
ment programme or project. These practices entail activities involving 
prevalently development practitioners, such as stakeholders meet-
ings, negotiations of strategies, agenda’s and budget allocation, 
implementation, capacity building, extension services, monitoring and 
evaluation; but also activities involving development beneficiaries such 
as: adoption and/or resistance to development programmes. Below, I 
specify two particular types of practices in development: negotiation 
and adaptation.
Within a Foucauldian understanding of power, according to Lewis 
and Mosse (2006, p.3), development practices are part of the dis-
course and can be studied by means of ethnography: 
The conception of a power that is productive rather than 
repressive, that comes from below as well as above, that is 
heterogeneous, diffuse, immanent and unstable (Gedaloff, 
1999, pp. 8—9), informs understanding of the practices and 
negotiations around development “orders” in the ethnographies 
that follow. 
Moreover, I draw from Bourdieu’s ‘Theory of Practice’, which is the 
study of why social actors do what they do the way they do that—and 
the related concept of habitus. In Bourdieu’s theorisation, habitus 
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refers to the embodied dispositions and tendencies to perceive and 
act on the social world, thereby reflecting and shaping social struc-
tures. Bourdieu (1990, p.53) refers to habitus as:
Systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured 
structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, 
that is, as principles which generate and organize practices 
and representations that can be objectively adapted to their 
outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends 
or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to 
attain them. Objectively “regulated” and “regular” without 
being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can 
be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the 
organising action of a conductor.
This understanding of practices as habitus allows to search for the 
embodied and performed activities in development as part of the 
Foucauldian discourse—or as Mosse refers to as ‘domain of thought 
and action’. In my analysis of the development trend on youth in agri-
business, I specifically concentrate on the implementation of pro-
grammes and projects both on the ground (the actual agricultural 
ground) and in formal official settings in Kampala. In particular, prac-
tices that include relations between different social actors in develop-
ment –the experts and the youths– are crucial to the structuration of 
power in development. In fact, as Lewis and Mosse (2006, p.4) argue: 
An important tradition in both the sociology and anthropology 
of development has made such routines, immediate practices, 
and the lifeworlds of agents and “targets” of development its 
focus, arguing that it is from these social interactions and 
interfaces that meaning and structures of power emerge. 
2.5.2a Negotiation
As mentioned above, Mosse has shown how the very practices in 
development make good policy unimplementable. For this reason, I 
will pay particular attention (chapter 6) to processes of negotiation 
among development actors. I refer to negotiation in development as 
a practice that involves mostly development practitioners (civil serv-
ants and professionals working in the development industry), at 
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different levels of the hierarchy—who need to compromise on their 
divergent interests and views. Negotiations can happen at a round 
table, where decisions need to be made (for example about the design 
of a development programme or project), but can also happen in the 
informal interactions and practices (for example in the selection of tar-
get groups, management of funds and partners) that shape a develop-
ment programme or project ‘in action’. 
Organizational theory has helped anthropologists show how 
bureaucratic systems (NGO or state) tend to prioritize their 
own internal “system goals” (of maintenance and survival) over 
meeting official policy goals (Mintzberg 1979, via Quarles van 
Ufford 1988). Moreover, the “institutional organisations” that 
typify the field of international development are those that 
are compelled, “[to] serve first and foremost the legitimation 
narrative assigned to them by their [political] environment” 
(Rottenburg 2009, p.68), which contains such a diversity of 
competing interests that these official narratives are charac-
terized by vagueness and ambiguity. The result is pervasive 
disjuncture in development order (Lewis & Mosse 2006b).
2.5.2b Adaptation
The pervasive disjuncture that Lewis and Mosse refer to, emerges in 
the implementation phase where the development programmes or 
projects meet reality on the ground. This is the body of practices 
that I refer to as adaptation: the process by which a given develop-
ment programme or project comes to terms with the reality on the 
ground, thereby adjusting strategies and means to fit the sociocul-
tural, economic and value chain context. In practice, this adaptation 
entails a change in the implementation of the project to adjust to the 
heterogeneity factors characterising youths and their needs and 
capacities in agribusiness. 
It is a process that is particularly influenced by the agency and 
resistance exercised by development recipients, and has the effect 
of modifying the modus operandi of a programme or project. This 
process can be described as a youths’ demand-driven change in the 
implementation and even design of the development programme or 
project. While this process is most evident in the implementation 
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phase, it has effects on the outcomes of a development programme 
or project—and might (in few cases) influence the re-designing of a 
programme, thereby influencing the negotiation process. 
I find myself in line with Lewis and Mosse (2006, p.4—5) as they use 
the concept of agency to operationalise the Foucauldian theoretical 
analysis: “This focus on agency allows for a useful and important cor-
rective to a subjectless Foucauldian analysis. However, we cannot 
simply substitute an endless multiplicity of actor perspectives, inten-
tions and scenarios for Foucault’s anonymous micro-physics of 
power.”
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have set the theoretical grounds for my study on the 
recent development trend around youth in agribusiness in Uganda. I 
have explored the current academic debate in development studies 
and contextualised the particular focus on agribusiness and youth. I 
have argued that like most critical development scholars, I will make 
use of a Foucauldian paradigm for my study. In order to understand 
how youth has come to the centre of programmes for agribusiness, 
I will study the narratives of both development practitioners and 
youth. Moreover, in order to understand the impact of these pro-
grammes, I will study the practices on the ground. A Foucauldian 
approach to this study will allow to understand how the development 
trend has been constructed, considering Foucauldian understand-
ing of discourse and knowledge as devices of power.
In section 2.3 of this chapter, I have elaborated on Foucault’s theorisa-
tion of power and his conceptualisation of the analysis of knowledge 
and discourse to understand and explain power structures. By explor-
ing how scholars in development studies have used this Foucauldian 
theoretical paradigm, I have showed that there were some inconsist-
encies in the operationalisation of Foucault’s theory. In fact, some of 
the studies of Scott, Escobar and Ferguson, for example, have not 
escaped the logic of the Leviathan—thereby understanding power as 
a quality that some social actors can accumulate and exercise upon 
others. On the contrary, Foucault (1976, p.29) stressed that power cir-
culates, functions and is exercised through networks and individuals. 
YOUTH AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA98
This understanding of power implies that the construction of power 
structures and relations in development is the result of narratives, 
practices and interactions of all actors involved. In other words, devel-
opment practitioners and youths also interact among themselves and 
thereby construct the discourse that sustains a new trend in develop-
ment. It is not necessarily the case that development organisations 
impose their will and programmes on youths—as a vertical exercise of 
power (domination). Rather, the Foucauldian approach invites to inves-
tigate the construction of power also horizontally, as the result of inter-
actions, narratives and practices. Therefore, the use of this paradigm 
allows to analyse the construction of a development trend as a hetero-
geneous process. 
By using this theoretical approach to the study of the recent trend in 
development around youth in agribusiness, I expect to unravel: 1) 
how through narratives and practices the category of youths has 
driven the recent trend around agribusiness; 2) what the impact has 
been so far, through the practices of implementation of the 
programmes. 
Understanding, with Escobar (2012) and Mosse (2013), development 
as a political and historically contextual process, ethnographic 
research methods will allow to collect data on this process. By 
means of anthropological theories and methods, I adjust Foucault’s 
paradigm to the study of the development trend of youth in agribusi-
ness in Uganda. As Mosse and Lewis (2006, p.5) argue, in fact 
development can be analysed as a process where narratives and 
practices are intertwined and constitute what Foucault would call a 
development system of power discourse and relations: 
In various ways the ethnographies in this issue demonstrate 
that policy does not precede or order practice. (…) the disjunc-
ture arising from the autonomy of practice from rationalizing 
policy is not an unfortunate “gap to be bridged” between inten-
tion and action, but is instead necessary and must therefore be 
actively maintained and reproduced. 
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Image 3. Fieldwork scene in northern Uganda, 2017. 
From left to right: Cathy (interpreter), Farmer (anonymous), Maya Turolla, 
Driver (anonymous). Picture taken by author.

Chapter 3
Methods
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3.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to lay out the methodological frame I have 
used for the collection, present the ethnographic data and outline the 
qualitative analysis of my data. In this study, I explore the ways in which 
a trend in development policy making around youth in agribusiness is 
adopted and implemented in Uganda. I assume, as argued in the pre-
vious chapter, that such trend is constructed through the narratives 
and practices of all development actors involved (both youths and 
practitioners). Through qualitative research, I attempt to answer the 
following research question:
How has the social category of youth been driving a new trend in devel-
opment around agribusiness, and what has been its impact so far? 
To describe, interpret and explain development as a socially construct-
ed reality requires qualitative methods. Therefore, this research entails 
the investigation of what the social actors involved say and do. As Beu-
ving and de Vries (2015, p.15) explain, qualitative research means: 
studying people in everyday circumstances by ordinary 
means. This includes observing how people go about their 
daily business and how they interact, listening to what they 
have to tell, considering what they accomplish and produce, 
understanding what their stories, interactions and accom-
plishments mean, and reporting back to them.
The study of people’s interaction, stories and actions is a quest for 
meaning. In the understanding that words and actions are the fun-
damental bricks through which social actors construct meaning and 
make sense of their experiences, the qualitative study of people’s 
words and actions is an interpretation of their symbolic representa-
tion “that can serve in the pursuit of uncovering the mental catego-
ries by which a society functions” (Beuving & De Vries, 2015, p.41). In 
fact, qualitative research methods are the most suitable for the 
investigation of narratives and practices, in the process of construc-
tion of a development trend. 
The use, adaptation and adjustment of theoretical frameworks and 
concepts is crucial to the process of ethnographic research. In fact, 
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qualitative research entails the data collection within a theoretical 
framework that helps the research during fieldwork—and which 
often needs to be adjusted after ethnographic data has been ana-
lysed. This process is crucial to most qualitative research, and specifi-
cally the grounded theory methods I have chosen. The role and use of 
theories, is described by Sanjek (1990, p.396) in these terms:
In addition to significant theories, the fieldworker develops 
terrain-specific theories of significance about people, events, 
and places. These determine much of the looking and listen-
ing that are recorded in fieldnotes and, in turn, confirm, 
extend, or revise the significant theories.
Prior knowledge of the theoretical debates around development 
studies helped me shape preliminary ideas, or ‘sensitizing concepts’, 
of what I was to explore through ethnographic research. Sensitizing 
concepts “are not seen as hypotheses that have to be tested against 
data, but as interesting or challenges ideas to be further explored in 
the field” (ibid: 60). In fact, Smit (2017, p.51) refers to Middleton who 
writes that “[w]hat the fieldworker does in essence is to build up 
hypothetical structures or patterns as he goes along. Every new fact 
that he gathers can either be fitted into that structure, or if not, he is 
forced to change the structure”. 
The chapter is structured in five sections. In the following section 
3.2, I outline the mixed methods I have used, showing how grounded 
theory combines with the Foucauldian paradigm (delineated in 
chapter 2). In section 3.3 I operationalise the theoretical concepts 
that are key to my analysis, and describe the knowledge categories 
related to my informants. Subsequently (section 3.4), I move to the 
description of my fieldwork design, the justification of country selec-
tion and its generalisability, and an overview of the data I have col-
lected. In section 3.5, I zoom in the field sites of my analysis, to con-
textualise the history and social background of my fieldwork. In the 
next section (3.6), I describe the qualitative methods of analysis I 
have used, with a critical reflection on the representation of data. I 
conclude (section 3.7) with a reflection on the limitations of my eth-
nographic research. 
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3.2 Mixed methods: Foucault and grounded theory
In order to elaborate an analysis of the devices that sustain the 
design and implementation of recent development trend around 
youth in agribusiness in Uganda, I explore the systems of knowledge 
and practices constructed and performed by the social actors 
involved—both the development practitioners as the youths. I 
attempt an analysis and explanation of the power ‘dispositives’ (Fou-
cault M., 1976) and the structures they endorse (and contest). In par-
ticular, I focus on the construction of knowledge structures through 
narratives, and the practices for the implementation of development 
programmes and projects—which define relations and power distri-
bution among social actors in development. 
As Fisher (2003, p.43—44) argues: 
Thus, given that the languages of politics inscribe the mean-
ings of a policy problem, public policy is not only expressed in 
words, it is literally ‘constructed’ through the language(s) in 
which it is described. To offer a simple but clear example, it 
makes an important difference whether policy deliberations 
over drug addiction are framed in a medical or a legal dis-
course. That is, to say something one way rather than another 
is to also implicitly say a whole host of other things, which will 
be grasped by some and not by others. In this way, a political 
‘agenda is established out the history, traditions, attitudes, 
and beliefs of a people encapsulated and codified in the 
terms of its political discourse’ (Hewlett and Ramesh 1995: 
110; Jenson 1991). A discursive approach not only examines 
these discourses, but seeks to determine which political forc-
es lead to their construction.
The focus of my analysis are the dispositives –narratives and prac-
tices– constructing the development trend around youth in agribusi-
ness in Uganda, positioning this study within the field of develop-
ment studies. At the same time, the methods I used to collect data 
on these dispositives have been ethnographic, because of the 
nature of the research question: it does not aim at defining whether 
development works, but rather how it functions, and what its conse-
quences are on the ground. 
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As mentioned, I conducted such investigation of narratives and prac-
tices with qualitative methods because they are the most suitable to 
investigate meaning-giving processes and discourses. In fact, Boeije 
(2010, p.11) defines qualitative research as the process of interpreta-
tive investigation of the meanings people give to social phenomena: 
The purpose of qualitative research is to describe and under-
stand social phenomena in terms of the meaning people 
bring to them. The research questions are studied through 
flexible methods enabling contact with the people involved to 
an extent that is necessary to grasp what is going on in the 
field. The methods produce rich, descriptive data that need to 
be interpreted through the identification and coding of 
themes and categories leading to findings that can contribute 
to theoretical knowledge and practical use. 
Escobar encourages an “hyperethnography of development” (2012: 
xv): an ethnography of the regimes of representation constructed by 
development discourse. The deconstruction of development as a 
discourse, aims to highlight its forms of knowledge, system of power 
regulating development practices and the forms of subjectivity fos-
tered by the development discourse (ibid: 10). I delved into this eth-
nographic field exploring the peculiar processes attributing mean-
ing to social, economic and political phenomena related to youth 
engagement in agribusiness: 
Policy discourse generates mobilizing metaphors (‘participa-
tion’, ‘partnership’, ‘governance’, ‘social capital’) whose vague-
ness, ambiguity and lack of conceptual precision is required 
to conceal ideological differences, to allow compromise and 
the enrolment of different interests, to build coalitions, to dis-
tribute agency and to multiply criteria of success within pro-
ject systems (cf. Dahl, 2001: 20; Li, 1999). (Mosse, 2004, 
p.663)
With this study, I embark an analysis of the ‘mobilizing metaphors’ 
shaping the development discourse around youth and agribusiness—
as it is constructed by both development practitioners and youths 
themselves. Anthropological methods of inquiry serve the purpose of 
YOUTH AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA106
understanding how development works, beyond the deconstruction of 
the regimes of representation, and beyond the technocratic question of 
whether development works (i.e. how successful development is) 
(Mosse 2013). In fact, as Ferguson (2014: 17) argues: 
As an anthropologist, one cannot assume, for instance, as many 
political economists do, that a structure simply and rationally 
“represents” or “expresses” a set of “objective interests”; one 
knows that structures are multi-layered, polyvalent, and often 
contradictory, and that economic functions and “objective inter-
ests” are always located within other, encompassing structures 
that may be invisible even to those who inhabit them. (…) the 
anthropologist knows well how easily structures can take on 
lives of their own that soon enough overtake intentional 
practices. 
Without assuming any knowledge structure or discourse as a given, I 
too acknowledge development as a situated social practice, where 
“social reality is not a thing ‘out there’ that determines our actions, but 
instead is a web of sustained interaction, (…) constantly being created 
and recreated by people through their interaction” (Beauving & de Vries 
2015: 52). Drawing from such theoretical framing of the object of study 
(the new development trend), the research and analysis methods I 
choose is grounded theory, or naturalistic inquiry. 
Grounded theory is committed to remaining close to lived expe-
rience and situated social practice. It views these not as some 
psychological by-product of the socio-structure, but as consti-
tuting the core of social life. Theorising is not done by deducting 
hypothesis from theory to be tested against some body of em-
pirical data selected for the purpose of verification. Instead what 
is needed is to formulate propositions inspired by the empirical 
data themselves. (…) In grounded theory, the same theories are 
not considered to be universal models of society, but rather as 
offering interesting ideas that can serve as preliminary guidance 
in the selection of cases (Beauving & de Vries 2015: 53). 
Applying grounded theory to the study of a new development trend 
such as youth in agribusiness means building a theoretical explanation 
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by inferring from description, interpretation and explanation of the con-
ditions that give rise to the development trend itself. 
Ethnography is defined by Fabietti and Remotti (2009, p.274) as (my 
translation): “both the research activity carried out during prolonged 
periods of stay in direct contact with the object of study, and the pro-
duction of an anthropological text.” The process that takes the ethnog-
rapher from theory, to empirical data and then back to theory requires 
the researcher to be his or her own tool of research. In particular during 
the period of data collection, the fieldwork, the ethnographer uses the 
knowledge gathered from literature to scan and select the relevant 
socio-cultural events, which will be revealing for the research question. 
This process is punctually described by Sanjek (1990, p.396): 
In the early stage of fieldwork the ethnographer “opportunisti-
cally” records wide-ranging fieldnotes about whatever goes on, 
but the objective is not to continue doing this forever (Honig-
mann 1970b: 269; Powdermaker 1966: 61; Saberwal 1975). This 
charting of the ethnographic terrain is filtered through theory so 
that more selective and systematic participant observation will 
follow. The net of people, places and activities studied opportun-
istically may continue to widen in fieldnotes, but theory-guided 
research activities will narrow at the same time
Specifically, I have used a number of concepts, both in my first approach 
to the field, and later after I had analysed the data and returned to the 
theory, developing a Foucauldian frame of analysis. In the following I 
examine such concepts as I bend them to be theoretical tools for analy-
sis of empirical data, in the following chapters. 
3.3 Operationalising concepts 
In this paragraph, I will explore the practical use of some of the theoret-
ical concepts I have discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter 2: The-
ory): discourse, narratives and practices. Moreover, I will also describe 
how I use the main knowledge categories: development actors, practi-
tioners, youths, agribusiness and ethnicity. 
3.3.1 Discourse: narratives, practices
As I have analysed in the previous chapter, scholars (Mosse, 2013; 
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Murray Li, 2007; Escobar, 2012) in critical development studies have 
examined development as a social construct and as a discourse. 
Particularly within its Foucauldian understanding, discourse is a slip-
pery concept to operationalise, since its use has mainly been within 
the realm of philosophy. Within this study, discourse is understood 
as the frame against which social actors’ narratives and practices 
make sense. In fact, it is produced as much as it reproduces itself 
through narratives and practices, which can be in agreement or in 
tension with each other. Therefore, the analysis of development as 
discourse is an interpretative quest for meaning. Combining the 
Foucauldian understanding of discourse with qualitative research, 
bends the concept to an interpretative approach: a thick description 
of the constituent parts of discourse (narratives and practices) will 
reveal the meaning of discourse. Meaning is important because it 
has concrete influence on social formations and actions. Meaning 
can be constructed both through oral or written narratives, and 
through actions—or practices. 
The concept of ‘narratives’ refers to the meaning socially construct-
ed and attached by individuals or groups of people to practical and 
concrete situations—working both as a justification and explanation. 
Narratives are thus extracted as meta-analysis from oral or written 
stories, which emerge from the way in which people perceive, under-
stand and explain their world. The stories a narrator (an individual, 
group or institution) tells reflect a cultural ideology, political beliefs 
and social norms at that given point in time—they can be written, 
oral or be reflected in actions and behaviours that reinforce such 
cultural constructs. Development actors (practitioners, policy mak-
ers and beneficiaries) create meaning through narratives—which 
again is the driver of development action. Below, I will explain how I 
collected and analysed such narratives.
As Beuving and De Vries argue (2015, p.32): “People act according 
to the meaning they impute in situations. Once enacted, these 
behavioural consequences or social formations have an impact on 
how people define new situations, on how they continue to think and 
act. (…) [A]cts and meaning continuously interact—there is a dialec-
tical relationship between them.” Discourse is, thus, the meaning 
and rationale behind the development trend I am investigating; the 
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process through which discourse is constructed is the object of 
analysis in the empirical chapters that follow. 
These acts are what I refer to as ‘practices’, in the context of the 
analysis of the development trend. These practices entail activities 
involving prevalently development practitioners, such as stakehold-
ers meetings, negotiations of strategies, agenda’s and budget allo-
cation, implementation, capacity building, extension services, moni-
toring and evaluation; but also activities involving development 
beneficiaries such as: adoption and/or resistance to development 
programmes, adaptation
3.3.2 Ethnicity
Ethnicity is a problematic knowledge category, since it has served 
‘tribalizing’ political purposes during colonial times (Mamdani 1996). 
In fact, despite the fact that tensions between groups of people in 
Uganda had emerged before colonisation, also on the basis of 
socio-cultural and political identities—the indirect rule has fossilised 
tensions and consolidated ethnic distinctions to serve the purpose 
of domination. In fact, Mamdani (1996, p.21) has argued, indirect rule 
established in Uganda was organized as an “ethnic power enforcing 
custom on tribespeople”. “Native” institutions (e.g. Native Authority) 
were established to rule subjects, and this was the process in which 
ethnic identities were constructed. Not only, but ethnic identities 
were anchored through customary laws to the land: the “tribally”-in-
dividuated community was made customary proprietor of land while 
the appointed “tribal” political leaders were appointed as “holders 
and executors of that proprietorship” (Mamdani, 1996, p.140). If “Trib-
alism then was the very form that colonial rule took within the local 
state (…) the revolt against indirect rule also took a tribal form” 
(Mamdani, 1996, p.183). 
The historical construction of the concept of ethnicity, and particularly 
its political use, are very sensitive and complex processes. Moreover, it 
is hard to discern the pre- and post- colonial denotations of the con-
cept, although this distinction is crucial for the contemporary use of 
the concept in academia. To this purpose, the analysis of Reid (2017, 
p.299—300) is useful: 
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But a note of caution is required here. (…) Claustrophobia and 
entrapment unquestionably, in many cases, produced more 
competitive, militant identities—identities which were less 
porous, it is argued, less flexible, more ‘otherising’ and exclu-
sive, than anything which existed in the broadly defined ‘preco-
lonial’ era. However this was also a process of some antiquity, 
and a multitude of groups were palpably and demonstrably not 
‘invented’ during colonial rule in any meaningful sense, but 
which were evolving long before 1900 (…). Colonial rule made 
ethnic identity a zero-sum game, in many cases, and the fragile 
nation suffered as a result; but ‘ethnic identity’ itself has become 
reified as a modern phenomenon, and nuance is needed in con-
sidering the twentieth-century evolution of political culture. 
Groupings that previously had some degree of internal cultural 
and linguistic affinity now began to consolidate, and cohere 
more closely. 
Having made these considerations, I make use of ‘ethnicity’ as an 
analytical category. Ethnicity will not be a sampling criteria or varia-
ble in the selection of the case study, but it remains an important 
identity marker in the individual and social interactions involving 
access to land. I have accounted for ethnicity in my participant 
observation among youths, to understand whether and how it plays 
a role in the making of agribusiness for young entrepreneurs. 
In fact, my informants were very much aware of ethnic differences and 
disparities, as much as ethnicity was an important trait of their identity. 
The very process of obtaining adulthood was, particularly for men, 
strictly tied to the achievement of the full belonging to their ethnic 
group. 
3.3.3 Collection of data: sampling strategy
In the sampling of my informants I paid attention to three social cate-
gories: development practitioners, youths, and their engagement in 
agribusiness—possibly making them agripreneurs. I adopted wide 
selection parameters in my selection, in order to reflect the diversity 
of the sample. In the following sub-sections, I define the profile of 
social actors I sampled. All of them were engaged in development, and 
can thus be called development actors.
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I refer to development actors as all the social actors involved in the 
development enactment process: policy-makers, civil servants, 
employees of development agencies (national and international, gov-
ernmental and non-), extension service providers, private sector com-
panies, but also youths engaged in agribusiness, both within and out-
side development schemes. The ensemble of all these social actors, 
engaged with different roles in the design, implementation or recep-
tion of development activities, are here referred to as development 
actors. For the sake of structuring the investigation, I have divided this 
group in two sub-categories: development practitioners and youths 
(see below). 
3.3.3a Development practitioners
According to the Oxford dictionary40 a practitioner is “a person 
actively engaged in an art, discipline, or profession, especially med-
icine”. In this study, I refer to development practitioners as those 
social actors employed in development agencies, both national and 
international, at different levels of the hierarchical structure of the 
organisation. Notably, the majority of the development practitioners 
I have interviewed were males, despite the fact that I did not pur-
posefully select males. 
The range of practitioners I have selected was representative of the 
development practitioners engaged in the development trend 
around youth in agribusiness. In fact, as I will show in more detail 
below, I have interviewed practitioners from most national and inter-
national development organisations involved in this trend.
3.3.3b Youth
As mentioned, 78% of the Ugandan population is under 30 years, 
and development organisations adopt several, conflicting definitions 
of youth (Sommers, 2015). In fact, it is the very vagueness of the 
definition of youth that triggered my research interest in the first 
place. The very knowledge category of youth is constantly under 
construction, and it was as such object of my investigation: the 
meanings and definitions of youth. 
40 Oxford Dictionary consulted on 31/07/2018: https://en.oxforddictio-
naries.com/definition/practitioner
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Accordingly, for sampling purposes, I selected social actors in the 
age range 15—35, the broadest bracket possible, including all defini-
tions from relevant development actors. This bracket is rather prob-
lematic given that the life expectancy in Uganda is about 60 years of 
age: in fact, this age range includes in the category of ‘youth’ also 
Ugandans in their mid-life stage. In the sampling of the social group of 
youths across the country I paid attention to the representativeness of 
the respondents I interviewed. I attempted to gather youths that 
reflected the heterogeneity of this social group, across the country. 
3.3.3c Agribusiness, agripreneurship, agripreneurs
The universe of possible case studies is quite extensive given 60% 
of the population is engaged in agriculture and 68% of the working 
population are youths (15—34 years) (World Bank, 2013). 
While agribusiness has been in the agenda of development agen-
cies for a while, there is no clear, uniform definition of what the con-
cept actually refers to. The basic working definition identifies agri-
business as any income-generating agricultural activity conducted 
on strictly commercial principles. However, especially those devel-
opment programmes that are more private-sector driven and/or ori-
ented, refer to a commercial type of agriculture that aims at maxim-
ising profit through the capitalisation of income. This capitalistic 
type of agribusiness often has a strongly competitive and hierarchi-
cal structure, and ideally it is envisioned to have a trickle-down 
effect for employment of labour. Agripreneurship is thus the entre-
preneurial mentality that farmers need to have, either as an innate 
quality or as a learnt skill, to make an agribusiness of their agricultural 
activity. Those who do are defined ‘agripreneurs’. However, this defini-
tion of agribusiness and agripreneur comprises a great variety of 
small- to large-scale enterprises, and professional figures. Paradoxi-
cally, in my experience, development practitioners defined as agripre-
neurs both those most wealthy businessmen or women working on 
large agri-food enterprises, and smallholders who barely made it to 
the end of the month. As for the sampling of my informants, thus, I had 
a very broad universe of possible cases, and I have adopted the emic41 
41 In anthropology, ‘emic’ refers to the perspective or point of view of 
the informants, in contraposition to ‘etic’—namely the perspective of the 
observer.
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definition of development organisations. Therefore, I have interviewed 
those young farmers who were targeted for the development 
programmes. 
3.4 Fieldwork
The field selection was focused on a single case study, Uganda, for 
two main reasons. First, because of the explorative nature of the 
research question, which required an in-depth focus on the process 
of formulation and implementation of development programmes. 
The research question investigated meanings, perspectives and 
practices of the social actors involved in order to describe develop-
ment as a process, and therefore required exhaustive examination 
of one case study. Second, this study sat out to describe a recent 
trend in development, on which little academic literature and theory 
was available. The inductive methods aimed at generating hypothe-
ses on a recent trend around youth in agribusiness, rather than test-
ing available theories. As Donmoyer (2000, p.51—52) argues, single 
“case study research might be used to expand and enrich the reper-
toire of social constructions available to practitioners and others; it 
may help, in other words, in the forming of questions rather than in 
the finding of answers.”. 
From the analysis of the single case study of Uganda, it is possible 
to infer the general themes in the development discourse around 
youth in agribusiness. At the same time, specific ethnographic 
knowledge can be generated around the implemented programmes 
on the ground and its beneficiaries. Moreover, by studying the nar-
ratives and practices in depth, it is possible to understand the power 
mechanisms that sustain the recent development trend. Such mecha-
nisms can be inferred to be valid also for other sub-Saharan countries 
of which Uganda is a representative case. Moreover, Flyvbjerg (2006, 
p.235) holds that “The advantage of the case study is that it can “close 
in” on real-life situations and test views directly in relation to phenom-
ena as they unfold in practice”. In this way, the single case study in 
Uganda allows to test and add to the available academic literature on 
development studies. 
The risk of a single case selection is related to the generalisability: 
while the specificities of the single case are peculiar to the 
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socio-cultural context investigated, the meta-analysis and interpreta-
tion of the results leads to generalizable conclusions. The generalisa-
bility of the conclusions of this study is related to the representative-
ness of the case study selected (see section below). 
3.4.1 Uganda—A typical case 
The selection of Uganda as case study for the exploration of the 
recent trend around youth in agribusiness is justified by the repre-
sentativeness of the country for other sub-Saharan countries. The 
goal of this study is to understand how development programmes 
for youth in agribusiness are adopted and implemented, and what 
their impact is. Therefore, the focus of this study is on the rationale 
and enactment of a new trend in development policy making. The 
range of possible case studies for this analysis is extended to all the 
African countries where such programmes are adopted. 
I have chosen Uganda as a ‘typical case’ (Gerring, 2008) in compar-
ison to other sub-Saharan countries receiving Official Development 
Assistance (ODA). In fact, as I have explained in chapter 1 (sections 
1.2.3 and 1.3) Uganda has an important though rather standard rela-
tion with development assistance. Like other developing countries 
on the continent, Uganda has experienced shifts in development 
approaches—from structural adjustment to liberalisation. Moreover, 
development agencies have focused, in the past decades across the 
continent, on various themes: education, health, family farming, gen-
der, agribusiness—and recently, youth in agribusiness. Of the top-10 
ODA receiving countries, Uganda is representative of: a) the demo-
graphic trend recording a ‘youth bulge’; b) youth engagement in agri-
culture; c) youth unemployment; d) recipient of the major programmes 
in this field.42 In fact, with relation to the mentioned criteria, Uganda 
falls in the averages. In the table below, I have summarised the main 
data related to the criteria of representativeness selected. 
42 I have here considered the major multilateral programme, by the 
African Development Bank—ENABLE Youth programme, which aims at 
engaging youth in commercial agribusiness. In terms of budget, it seems to 
be the major programme in this field. However, there is little transparency 
of the development agencies I have worked with, regarding the budgets.
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ODA recipi-
ents42, % of 
total USD dis-
bursed
Youth population Youth in agricul-
ture Average43: 
64% 
Youth 
unemploy-
ment44
Programmes for 
youth in agribusi-
ness
Ethiopia 8% Median age45: 17.9
% of population46: 34
60.9%47 7.4% (AfDB)48 ENABLE 
Youth programme
Nigeria 5% Median age: 18.4
% of population: 31
33.8%47 13.4% (AfDB) ENABLE 
Youth programme
Tanzania 5% Median age: 17.7
% of population: 32
65.6%47 3.9% (AfDB) ENABLE 
Youth programme
Kenya 4% Median age: 19.7
% of population: 33
Average: 64% 26.2% (AfDB) ENABLE 
Youth programme
Egypt 4% Median age: 23.9
% of population: 26
Average: 64% 34.4%
DR Congo 4% Median age: 18.6
% of population: 32
Average: 64% 7.3% (AfDB) ENABLE 
Youth programme
Morocco 4% Median age: 29.3
% of population: 25
Average: 64% 18%
Uganda 4% Median age: 15.8 
% of population: 34
67.1%47 2.9% (AfDB) ENABLE 
Youth programme
South Sudan 
3% 
Median age: 17.3 
% of population: 33
Average: 64% 17.6% (AfDB) ENABLE 
Youth programme
Mozambique 
3% 
Median age: 17.2 
% of population: 33
Average: 64% 42.7% (AfDB) ENABLE 
Youth programme
Table 2. Comparison top-10 ODA-receiving countries.4344454647
43 OECD 2018 report, on 2016 data, accessed on 4/10/2018: http://
www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-fi-
nance-data/Africa-Development-Aid-at-a-Glance-2018.pdf
44 I was not able to find uniform data for all countries, and there-
fore I refer to the average employment of African youth in agriculture 
(64%), which varies significantly between rural youths (76%) and urban 
youths (39%). According to WB data from 2012 (Brooks, Zorya, Gautam, 
& Goyal , 2013, p. 12), accessed on 5/10/2018 on: https://openknowl-
edge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/15605/WPS6473.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
45 World Bank data on youth unemployment refers to the % of youth 
(15—24) who do not work (also not in the informal sector). WB definition of 
youth unemployment: “share of the labor force ages 15—24 without work 
but available for and seeking employment”. Accessed on 4/10/2018: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.ZS
46 The CIA World Factbook, accessed on 4/10/2018: https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2177.html
47 In order to access uniform data for all selected countries, I have 
used UNFPA data. I have here reported the percentage of the population 
in the age range 10—24, which is out of my operational definition of youth 
YOUTH AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA116
Given the representativeness of Uganda as an ODA receiving coun-
try with young population, it can be considered a typical case study 
of how development functions—particularly with regards to the trend 
around youth in agribusiness. The process of adoption and imple-
mentation of the recent trend in development targeting youths in 
agribusiness, is typical to other developing countries on the African 
continent. Also in other countries, the trend is constructed through 
the narratives and practice of development actors involved. Moreo-
ver, the socio-cultural specificities that influence the implementation 
of the development programmes can be expected to play an impor-
tant role also in other sub-Saharan countries (see chapter 7). There-
fore, it is reasonable to assume that several considerations I make 
around this trend in development are applicable also to other con-
texts. However, empirical research in other aid receiving, sub-Saha-
ran countries would be necessary to verify the applicability of the 
conclusions drawn from this study.4849 
3.4.2 Design
I have carried out my ethnographic fieldwork during three periods: a 
pilot fieldtrip of 5 weeks in 2016; extensive fieldwork for 6 months in 
2017; and a follow up field trip of 4 weeks in 2018. Altogether, the 
fieldwork activities stretched along the timeline reported in table 
3.2, and allowed me to collect 134 semi-structured and in-depth 
interviews.
I have carried out multi-sited fieldwork in order to have an overview 
of how development programmes were implemented across the 
country. In fact, I have selected four sub-regions: Kampala in the 
central region, Gulu in the northern region, Mbale in the eastern and 
Mbarara in the south-western region. Within each of these regions, I 
have selected the precise areas of my fieldwork based on the areas 
of interest of the main development programmes I followed up on 
(18—35). This choice was taken because I could not find uniform data on 
the age group 18—35 for all countries. I accessed UNFPA statistics on 
4/10/2018 on: https://www.unfpa.org/data/world-population-dashboard
48 Africa Agriculture Status Report 2015, defining youth as 16 —35. 
Accessed on 5/10/2018 on: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/
resources/africa-agriculture-status-report-2015.pdf
49 Information accessed on 5/10/2018 on: https://www.afdb.org/en/
news-and-events/innovative-programme-to-improve-employment-and-in-
come-outcomes-for-young-people-14217/
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the ground. The selection of the programmes to follow up resulted 
from the first phase of fieldwork, in which I interviewed the main 
development agencies engaging youth in agribusiness. Conducting 
multi-sited fieldwork meant I had the chance to explore the diversity 
of Uganda’s regions. 
3.4.2a Field sites and research periods
Period Location Interviews
July—August 2016 Kampala Pilot fieldtrip
22 respondents: development experts 
and practitioners
January—February 2017 Kampala (capital city) 24 respondents: development prac-
titioners
March—April 2017 Gulu (north Uganda) 29 respondents: young agro-entrepre-
neurs involved in 2 dev schemes + 1 
control group
March & May 2017 Kampala (capital city) 26 respondents: young agro-entrepre-
neurs involved in 2 dev schemes + 1 
control group
May—June 2017 Mbarara (south-west 
Uganda)
25 respondents: young agro-entrepre-
neurs involved in 2 dev schemes + 1 
control group
June 2017 Mbale (east Uganda) 30 respondents: young agro-entrepre-
neurs involved in 2 dev schemes + 1 
control group
May 2018 Kampala Follow-up fieldwork
13 interviews with development prac-
titioners.
Table 3. Field sites and research periods
The pilot field trip was useful to ground my research focus on youth in 
agribusiness in empirical evidence of the development trends, and 
become acquainted with the socio-cultural reality in which I was to 
conduct fieldwork. Most importantly it was useful to narrow down my 
research question: from a general interest in the recent trend in devel-
opment focusing on youth, to a question on its construction through 
narratives and practices of development practitioners and youths. 
Therefore, I structured the extended fieldwork in two phases: I would 
spend two months interviewing practitioners in Kampala, and four 
months interviewing youths. Interviewing development practitioners 
from various development agencies helped me to identify their 
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agency’s sampling strategies, definitions of youths, and objectives, as 
well as the approaches of the implemented programmes. I then elabo-
rated a preliminary analysis of the narratives of development practi-
tioners as precursor to my interviews with youths. 
Based on the results of this first phase of my research and consid-
ering two pilot fieldtrips I conducted in the north (Gulu) and east 
(Mbale) of the country, I identified two main variables of interest. 
These variables emerged from the interviews as main factors diver-
sifying the development programmes: 1) different development 
approaches adopted by the development organisations (public or 
private-sector driven); and 2) geographic location. These two varia-
bles diversified the development approaches of the various agen-
cies I had interviewed, and were therefore assumed to have differ-
ent impacts on the ground. I have thus selected the two most diverse 
development approaches (private-sector driven approach VS public 
approach), which I followed up on the ground. Secondly, I have 
selected 4 sub-regions (Gulu, Kampala, Mbarara and Mbale) to 
locate the evaluation of the two above-mentioned development 
approaches. The choice of the locations was justified by two factors: 
I have considered the locations where the different development 
organisations were most actively implementing their programmes. 
Moreover, I have considered the disparity between the regions in 
terms of development, infrastructures, modes of production, value 
chains, socio-cultural and historical background. I suspected that 
the disparity and diversity between these regions would have had an 
influence on the way the development programmes were imple-
mented. In order to have an overall perspective of the impact of the 
programmes for the engagement of youths, I needed to collect an 
overview of the implementation in its diverse contexts on the ground. 
In addition to considering the variables of development approach 
and locations, I have considered a control group of young agripre-
neurs who were not involved in any development scheme, for each 
of the four field sites. This sampling strategy is illustrated in the 
below figure (Figure 3. Sampling strategy): 
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Locations
Development 
approaches
Target Group
Private sector 
approach
North (Gulu)
Central (KLA)
South-West
East (Mbale)
North (Gulu)
Central (KLA)
South-West 
East (Mbale)
North (Gulu)
Central (KLA)
South-West 
East (Mbale)
Control groupPublic approach
Youth in 
agribusiness
Figure 3. Sampling strategy
I have dedicated about 2 weeks of intense fieldwork activities in 
each of the four sites, to which added about one week of prepara-
tions and one week of field notes elaboration. 
After returning from the field, I have elaborated the discourse analy-
sis of all the interviews, and written the first two empirical chapters 
(‘aidnography’ and ‘youthnography’), and inevitably new questions 
emerged after structuring the analysis into written accounts. In 
order to answer some of these new questions, and as part of the 
grounded theory I had chosen for my methods, I embarked in a final 
follow-up field trip. During this time, I focused on the implementation 
of the programmes through the practices that took development 
practitioners to translate their narratives into concrete actions. 
3.4.3 The data
As mentioned, I have collected ethnographic data during three peri-
ods of fieldwork, which are described in more detail in Table 4 below. 
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Image 4. Author in the field, western Uganda, 2017. 
Picture taken by research assistant, author’s property.
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3.4.3a Dataset from fieldwork with development 
practitioners (2016, 2017, 2018)
Pilot fieldtrip 2016 Extensive fieldwork 2017 Follow-up fieldwork 2018 
3 Government civil servants 7 Government civil servants 4 Government civil 
servants
0 Ugandan agencies 
practitioners
6 Ugandan agencies 
practitioners
2 Ugandan agencies prac-
titioners
9 International agencies 
practitioners 
11 International agencies prac-
titioners
7 International agencies 
practitioners
7 agripreneurs See below
12 Males 
7 Females
Males 20
Females 4
Males 11
Females 2
Total: 19 (12 practitioners) Total: 24 practitioners Total: 13
Table 4. Dataset of fieldwork with dev. practitioners
I used a semi-structured approach during interviews, working from a 
common guideline but deviating when interesting ideas and topics 
emerged. While all semi-structured interviews were modelled along 
the themes described below, I adjusted the formulation of the inter-
views to the context I was in. This (relative) flexibility allowed me to 
be more receptive to the issues that emerged as being more burn-
ing in the specific contexts. 
Interview guideline’s themes
1. Agribusiness structure & trajectory
History, management, trajectory in productivity, profit and investments, marketing strategies 
and opportunities, definitions of ‘agribusiness’, ‘farmer’ and ‘agripreneur’. 
2. Social dimension of agribusiness (partly)
Cooperation with others, decision-making strategies, what others are up to
3. Personal dimension of agribusiness
General feeling, vision for the future, what should be done differently/what is necessary, 
what is the vision for their kids
4. Relation with donor/development scheme (partly)
Reflection on before/after, decision-making strategies and negotiations with donor, what 
works and what needs to be done differently, navigating different opportunities
Table 5. Interviews guideline for dev. practitioners (themes)
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3.4.3b Dataset from extensive fieldwork with youths (2017)
The majority of the interviews has been recorded and transcribed, 
except a few ones which have been only noted in my field notes, as 
the context (mostly the market place) didn’t allow me to pull out my 
recorder. In each of the four locations I have selected, I have inter-
viewed people who were engaged in either a public-sector develop-
ment scheme or a private-sector driven programme, and a control 
group, which were not members of either group. Generally, the 
youths in public sector programmes were more difficult to access 
because of a widespread suspicion: most of them had troubles 
returning the loan they had received to start their agribusiness, and 
in that period governmental authorities were patrolling and even jail-
ing incompliant youths. This situation left me with an unbalanced 
number of youths in the two different development schemes:
Region Recorded Not-re-corded Dev. scheme Gender
Focus 
group dis-
cussions
29 
north
24 5
12 private-sector 
8 public
9 control group
Males 19
Females 13
4
26 
central
18 8
9 private-sector
2 public
15 control group
Males 8
Females 11
1
25 
west
25 /
11 private-sector
2 public
12 control
Males 19
Females 8
2
30 east 25
10 private-sector
7 public
13 control
Males 19
Females 8
3
Total 
recorded: 
92
Total private sector: 42
Total public sector: 19
Total control: 49
Total males: 
69
Total
females: 41
TOTAL: 
110
Table 6. Dataset of fieldwork with youths
3.4.4 The interpreters
Many languages (4350) are spoken in Uganda, besides English official 
language—which Ugandans inherited from the colonial times. Despite 
being the main language taught in school, and also the official 
50 Ethnologue, visited on 3/08/2018 on: https://www.ethnologue.com/
country/UG
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language of instruction—English is still not spoken in most rural areas, 
as children often only attend the (compulsory) elementary school. On 
the contrary in Kampala, being a multicultural and multi-ethnic envi-
ronment, English is spoken by the majority of people –next to the local 
language, Luganda. Besides the rural-urban difference in English lit-
eracy, however, there also was a class disparity– both in rural areas 
and within Kampala: the poorer could not afford an education beyond 
compulsory schooling, and therefore did not speak English.
Because of all these reasons, the majority of my youth informants 
did not speak English, and therefore I often needed to conduct my 
interviews with the help of a translator. Interestingly, the interpreter 
was not only useful for the task of translation, but also as ‘cultural’ 
broker in circumstances in which I could not make sense of behav-
iours or answers to my questions. In fact, the interpreter turned out 
to also become a key informant—and in one case also a close friend. 
Therefore, I find myself in line with McMichael (2002, p.176) as she 
stresses that she “did not use an interpreter, but worked with an 
interpreter, (…) This approach enhanced the interview process, as 
we were able to work together and bring different skills and per-
spectives to the research project.” 
Fortunately, I had the chance of working with capable interpreters, 
but since I did not speak the local languages I could not judge 
whether the translations were accurate, during the time of fieldwork. 
In order to minimise the possible mistakes and misunderstandings 
in the translations of my interpreters, I have hired native speakers 
research assistants affiliated to IITA to type out the recordings of the 
interviews. 
3.4.4a North: Cathy translates Acholi
I met my first interpreter, Cathy, in a shopping mall in Kampala. She was 
selling honey as a peddler and as I bought a pot from her I figured she 
was indeed an agripreneur: in fact, she had explained how she would 
buy the honey in bulk, and add value by bottling and marketing it with 
her own brand. We got in conversation, and she proved to have great 
knowledge of the honey value chain from the north. After I had inter-
viewed her, on another occasion, I realised she had great command of 
English, was knowledgeable of socio cultural environment of the area 
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surrounding Gulu, and spoke the local language—Acholi. Most impor-
tantly, she seemed to immediately grasp the rationale of my research 
and the methods of data collection. For all these reasons, and also 
simply because I had the feeling I could trust her, I chose her to be my 
interpreter and ‘cultural broker’ for my field trip to Gulu. In fact, she 
served the last purpose better than the translations, since sometimes 
her vocabulary of rural circumstances and agricultural activities was a 
bit rusty—since her main language was English. 
Image 5. Author and Cathy (Interpreter) in a cafe in Gulu, northern Uganda, 
2017. Picture taken by bartender, property of the author.
3.4.4b Central and south-western regions: Joyce translates 
Luganda and Lunyankole
During the pilot fieldtrip to Kampala in 2016, an agribusiness expert 
from IITA brought me in touch with Joyce, a “very successful young 
agripreneur” producing and exporting red peppers. I visited Joyce at 
her place, where she welcomed warmly and was glad to share with 
me her experience as an agripreneur. This informal, first interview 
with her indicated that she was going to be a key informant and a 
good friend. She has a BA in management and has been working in 
a hotel before jumping into true passion—agribusiness. She started 
with hiring 2ha of land in the outskirts of Kampala, and by the time 
of our first interview she was managing 20ha. During the extended 
fieldwork in 2017 I visited Joyce weekly while she was pregnant, and 
three months after she gave birth she started helping me with transla-
tions in Kampala—when she guided me through the main vegetables 
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market. Since our collaboration was working smoothly, she joined me 
as on the field trip to the south-western region. Or rather, I followed her 
to her home village, where we stayed at her mother’s place for two 
weeks. Staying at her mother’s place was crucially important to facili-
tate my fieldwork in the area: her mother, the teacher at the local school 
was a respected figure in the community, which gave me access to 
contacts of district authorities, farmers and community leaders. 
3.4.4c East: Wilberforce and Timothy translate Lugisu
During the first fieldtrip to Mbale in February 2017, Wilberforce, a 
research assistant at IITA, helped me as interpreter. Together with 
Wilberforce, I visited the wholesale market in Kamu, up on Mount 
Elgon. This was also the place where he had built a house with his 
wife, to whom he introduced me. Wilberforce was an ideal interpret-
er, since he was accustomed to collaborating with researchers and 
he was familiar with many agripreneurs in the area who fell in my 
sampling criteria. Unfortunately, he was not available during the sec-
ond field trip to Mbale, in June 2017 so he directed me to his friend 
Timothy. While the relation with Timothy had not been as ideal as 
with Wilberforce, he was a competent interpreter and he facilitated 
the majority of the interviews I conducted in the area. He had him-
self completed a BA in social studies and was acquainted with the 
research methods of my fieldwork. 
3.4.5 Participant observations
Besides the collection of interviews, I have also done participant 
observations. This anthropological research practice is defined by 
Fabietti and Remotti (2009, p.544, my translation) as a technique 
that “implies the immersion in the daily activities of the community to 
be studied, (…) it is based on the concept of empathy, it aims at min-
imising the problem of reactivity and the distorting effect of the 
presence of the anthropologist, dissolving the presence of the 
observant among the observed”. The proximity of the observer to 
the reality of the case study is a prerequisite for an advanced under-
standing of the dynamics that are object of study (Flyvbjerg, 2006, 
p.236). Participant observations in a case study allow to cast off 
preconceived notions and theories, letting theory emerge from empir-
ical observations (ibid). 
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In the case of my multi-sited fieldwork, participant observations 
entailed mainly the observation of how my informants interacted with 
each other. Particularly useful was the observation of how develop-
ment practitioners interacted with youths (supposedly) benefitting 
from their programmes. In the third empirical chapter I will elaborate an 
analysis of this phase of the implementation of the programmes. 
However, given the multi-sited nature of the fieldwork I collected, 
the time I reserved for participant observations was limited in compar-
ison with the relevance of interviews in my data. In fact, participant 
observation requires the immersion of the ethnographer in the ‘natural 
environment’ of the informants, to live with them, and to make part of 
their daily life. On the contrary, I had only a one-time contact with the 
majority of my informants. 
The risks of participant observation are related to two main issues. 
First, the subjective perspective of the observer, who will make per-
sonal interpretations of the reality observed on the ground. The sub-
jectivity of the observer is not unique to ethnographic research 
methods, but the ‘real life’, transient, context of observations hinder 
the possibility of verification of observations. To strengthen the 
validity of participant observations, ethnographers adopt two tech-
niques: first, punctual annotation of events and observations in verifi-
able field notes; second, critical reflexivity—namely the researcher’s 
awareness of her/his relation to the field, which must be accounted for 
in the ethnography (see section 3.7). 
3.5 Contextualising the fields 
‘The pearl of Africa’ has a complex and troubled socio-political his-
tory that makes it a particularly sensitive context in which to conduct 
this research. In Uganda, where 95% of the poor live in rural areas 
(Fan & Zhang, 2012) and 60% of the population is engaged in agricul-
ture51, unsettled rural development issues (land tenure inequalities, 
poor infrastructure and gender and generational inequalities) are root-
ed in a long history of ethnic tensions and regional disparities. Further-
more, Uganda is an extremely diverse country in terms of its geogra-
phy and ecology, history, ethnicities, languages and cultures. 
51 Data of the Government of Uganda, accessed on 15th May 2016: 
http://gov.ug/content/agriculture
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Figure 4. Map of Uganda with field sites marked.
Its area is also quite extended: “It has a total area of 241,551 square 
kilometres, of which the land area covers 200,523 square kilometres” 
(UBOS, 2017, p.1)—six times bigger than The Netherlands (41,543km²), 
and a bit smaller than Italy (301,338km²). The country is divided into 
116 districts (as of August/September 2014). The districts are further 
subdivided into 200 Counties, 1,378 Sub-counties and 6,495 Parish-
es. The role of these administrative units is to implement and monitor 
government programmes at the respective levels (UBOS, 2017, p.1). 
Population has been growing steadily, at about an annual growth rate 
of 3%, since the 1960s.
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Population size and population growth rates, 1969—2014
Census 
year
Male Female Total Inter-censual period Average annual 
growth rate (%)
1969 4,812,447 4,722,604 9,535,051
1980 6,259,837 6,376,342 12,636,179 1969—1980 2.7
1991 8,185,747 8,485,558 16,671,705 1980—1991 2.5
2002 11,824,273 12,403,024 24,227,297 1991—2002 3.2
2014 17,060,832 17,573,818 34,634,650 2002—2014 3.0
Figure 5. Population size and growth 1969—2014. (UBOS, 2017, p.2)
Urbanisation 
While the majority of the population lives in rural areas, there is a there 
is a clear trend of Urbanisation, as more and more youth are moving 
towards the cities to find employment—thereby leaving their agricul-
tural activities. This process is often invoked by development organisa-
tions as a justification for the needs to focus on youth employment in 
agribusiness—thereby counteracting the process of Urbanisation.
Rural and urban population 1990—2016
RuralUrban
40.000
30.000
20.000
10.000
0
 1990 1996 2000 2006 2010 2016
Figure 6. Rural vs Urban population 1990—2016. Source: Faostat 201752
52 FAOSTAT country profile—Uganda; accessed on 27/07/2018: http://
www.fao.org/faostat/en/#country/226
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Urban
Urban and rural population 2017
Rural
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Figure 7. Rural vs Urban population 2017. Source: Faostat 201753
There is a substantial disparity in the levels of development of the 
regional economies, infrastructures, education levels and access to 
medical institutes. Overall, the greatest disparity is between rural 
and urban areas. This disparity is shown both in the ownership of 
assets and access to facilities (Figure 8. ownership of assets and 
access to facilities (proportion of pop.). (UBOS, Uganda Bureau of 
Statistics, 2014, p.37), below), and in the levels of education (Figure 
9. Youths’ levels of education. (Banks & Sulaiman, 2012, p.11), below). 
In the following sections I will delve deeper in the particularities of 
each of the four field sites where I have carried out fieldwork. 
53 FAOSTAT country profile—Uganda; accessed on 27/07/2018: http://
www.fao.org/faostat/en/#country/226
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Proportion of households owning selected assets by sex of household head and residence
Type of asset Sex of household head Residence
2002 Male Female Rural Urban National
Non-movable Asset
House 78.2 73.9 60.6 83.3 40.8 72.8
Agricultural Land na 63.2 56.5 70.6 33.7 61.6
Transport
Motor vehicle 1.7 4.3 2.5 2.2 8.9 3.9
Motor cycle 2.5 10.3 3.1 8.2 10.0 8.6
Bicycle 33.7 35.6 18.4 35.4 19.5 31.5
Canoe/boat 0.7 2.2 1.7 2.2 1.6 2.1
Donkey 0.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.5
ICT Equipment
Television 4.6 14.1 13.1 5.5 39.7 13.9
Radio 49.2 63.0 48.9 58.3 63.7 59.6
Fixed phone 0.5 5.5 3.9 5.0 5.4 5.1
Computer na 4.0 1.6 1.9 10.4 3.8
Generator na 2.4 1.6 1.9 2.7 2.1
Figure 8. Ownership of assets and access to facilities (proportion of pop.). 
(UBOS, Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014, p.37)
Educational attainment of youth in Uganda
Qualification Kampala Central Eastern Northern Western Uganda
None 2 4 2 17 6 6
P1—P7 30 42 45 53 50 46
S1—S4 42 39 38 22 31 34
S5—S6 16 9 9 3 5 7
Above S6 10 6 6 5 7 6
Years of education 
(mean)
9.4 8.2 8.2 6.0 7.5 7.7
Literacy 92 87 74 75 85 81
Source: Uganda Youth Watch Survey 2011
Literacy is defined as ‘can write in at least one language’
Figure 9. Youths’ levels of education. (Banks & Sulaiman, 2012, p.11)
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3.5.1 Kampala
Kampala is not only the capital of Uganda, but also the country’s 
largest urban centre. Officially, about 1.5 million people live in Kam-
pala, twice as many as in the 1990s.54 Unregistered inhabitants and 
daily commuters contribute to make the city congested with a 
non-quantifiable amount of people. As mentioned above, Kampala 
has the highest level of literacy in the country, and the longest 
school attendance (in terms of years of education). 
The city stretches over a very extended area, covering about 200km2 
across seven hills. It has a hectic business and trading centre and an 
extended residential area that reaches the shores of Lake Victoria. 
Most of governmental institutions are located in Kampala (and a few 
in Entebbe, near the presidential residence), as are most offices of 
(inter)national private sector companies and development agencies. 
From the street markets to the central market to the offices district, 
Kampala ferments with (informal) business activities. 
The strategic importance of Kampala for national and regional trade 
and politics dates centuries back. Before being the capital of Ugan-
da, Kampala was and still is the capital of the kingdom of Baganda. 
The importance of Lake Victoria trade meant, from the 1840s 
onward, the gradual rootedness, consolidation and expansion 
of the Ganda royal capital across the hills of modern day cen-
tral Kampala. Urban growth reflected the expansion of eco-
nomic scale, certainly in the case of Kampala; they comprised 
larger markets, housed more or less permanently resident 
trading communities, both foreign and indigenous, and repre-
sented the desire to maximise both profit and control. (Reid, 
2017, p.240)
The politico-economic stronghold of the city has been strengthened 
throughout history, by the succession of the various political hegemo-
nies. Also the British, during the colonial times, had chosen Kampala to 
be the capital—and the area their residential district is still today a 
well-off neighbourhood, where most embassies are located.
54 City population—accessed on 26/07/2018: http://www.citypopula-
tion.de/php/uganda-admin.php
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From the early twentieth century, urban growth resulted from 
a long-term combination of economic drivers, with towns be-
coming stable centres of commerce and industry, the loca-
tions of major regional markets, and pools of labour, as well 
as being sites of socio-economic opportunity. As Kampala, in 
particular, expanded, it had a wider economic impact: by the 
beginning of the 1950s, farmers surrounding the city tended 
to grow less cotton and more food for sale in town. Towns 
were the target of labour migration, mostly men, but increas-
ingly women, too, which was much more worrying to colo-
nial and chiefly patriarchy. As the local economy changed, 
providing opportunities as well as introducing new hardships, 
women sought new ways of earning their own living, including 
moving to town in the process of asserting their economic 
independence from men. (Reid, 2017, p.241)
These social and politico-economic developments contributed to 
making Kampala a relatively multicultural and multi-ethnic city. While 
it is very unusual in the rest of the country, inter-ethnic marriages 
are, in Kampala, quite common. This contributed to making the sam-
ple of people I interviewed in Kampala rather diverse, and at the 
same time their perceptions about ethnicity and gender relations 
more progressive than in other parts of the country. Nevertheless, 
the majority of the population are Baganda, from the Ganda ethnic 
group (the suffix ba- characterizes the plural form of ganda). 
Throughout history, “Kampala’s demographic composition has been 
heavily influenced by politics and by the fortunes and misfortunes of 
the nation’s ethnic groups” (Mwakikagile, 2009, p.52). 
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Image 6. Flower cutting farms, outskirts of Kampala, Central Uganda, 2017. 
Picture taken by author.
In Kampala, I have conducted fieldwork over four periods of time with 
two groups of social actors. Firstly, during the pilot field trip in 2016, 
when I have spoken with development experts, practitioners and some 
young agripreneurs. During the extensive ethnographic fieldwork in 
2017 I have spent two months interviewing development practitioners 
from 17 different development organisations—thereby spending most 
of my fieldwork time in offices and on boda-bodas (motor-taxis, the 
most popular public means of transport); and another month inter-
viewing young agro-entrepreneurs in or around the city. Finally in 2018 
I have spent a month following up with a final field trip, which I spent 
mostly interviewing development practitioners, and giving them feed-
back on the results of my research thus far. Altogether, Kampala is 
where I have been based, in-between field trips to other locations of 
my ethnographic research. Coming back there in 2018 felt somehow 
like coming home: in fact, during the time I spent there I have built a 
solid network of friends (mostly expats), and have learnt my way around 
the city, its amenities and dangers. 
3.5.2 Gulu
The fieldwork I conducted in the north was the first ethnographic 
research I carried out outside of Kampala. The journey that took me 
there gave me a first impression of the ecological change as I moved 
passed the Nile: it was in the middle of the dry season, and yet I had 
left behind a lush and green environment in the central region, which 
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make the yellow and dry picture of the region around Gulu very striking. 
As intense as the colours of the arid environment they live in, Acholi 
people have made a strong impression on me for their unusually direct-
ness in speech, and for the strength of their character—having endured 
one of the most violent conflicts of the past decades. Besides their 
tragic past however, Acholi people I interviewed were exceptionally 
proud of their cultural traditions and history. 
Image 7. Dirt road in outskirts of Gulu with kids fetching water, 
northern Uganda, 2017. Picture taken by author.
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In fact, Gulu is a town counting about 150 thousand inhabitants, locat-
ed in a widely uninhabited, arid area. There are small villages scattered 
throughout the countryside, mostly concentrated along the main 
roads. Outside of Gulu, people mostly live in communities of extended 
families, around commonly owned and cultivated land (which is inher-
ited patrilineally). With the land tenure being communal, the social 
structure is closely knit around agricultural production as a communi-
ty-effort. The main agricultural production in this region includes 
mostly grains and other food crops: millet, sorghum, beans, and 
groundnuts; recently large-scale farming has expanded the produc-
tion of maize, soya and rice. 
The vast majority of the population of that area belongs to the Acholi 
ethnic group and speaks Luo, a Nilotic language. Acholi people 
started identifying themselves as such at the end of the 19th century 
when tensions arose in the north of Uganda around the slave trade 
(Reid, 2017, p.150—151). Different ethnic groups in the area started 
competing for economic and political power—particularly with the 
Langi and the Teso, who continued to migrate as a consequence of 
the conflicts around slave trade. Furthermore, tensions arose with 
both Ethiopian an Arab merchants, and later against the Anglo-Egyp-
tians who were militarily present in the southern part of Sudan and 
northern Uganda. The Acholi “sought to take advantage of an 
increasingly volatile and unstable political environment. (…) this did 
‘Acholiland’ begin its journey into the modern era violently insecure—
and with a reputation for clannish and incessantly bloodthirsty feud-
ing” (ibid, p.151). Reid continues arguing that the favouring relation 
that the British colonialists established with Baganda from central 
region discriminated Acholi people who were imagined as the 
internal ‘other’, and this has been perpetuated by the current 
government (…) [T]his is a question of ‘reversal of fortune’, from 
north to south. Uganda in origin owes an enormous amount to 
the north in terms of politics, culture, religion; but the south has 
latterly come to dominate in political and economic terms, in 
part the curse of geopolitics and nature, but largely the result 
of particular hegemonic visions of political and economic mo-
dernity. And so in some ways it is no coincidence that the first 
twenty years of Uganda’s independence were dominated by 
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northern governments with self-consciously modernist, unitary 
and patriotic visions of Uganda.
In fact, I have found that many of my informants –who were openly 
against the current government– were nostalgic of Milton Obote. 
While in conducting fieldwork in rural areas, I happened to record 
traditional songs that had proudly incorporated in their lyrics 
excerpts from that historical period in which Acholi were the ruling 
elite. 
The economy and socio-political reality of this region has been 
heavily impacted by the long war that has affected the region 
between 1987 and 2006—2008. Although the conflict is considered 
to be over, Joseph Kony (its main leader) and the LRA are still active 
in neighbouring countries. More than half of Acholi people were 
re-settled in IDP camps, and all my informants had experienced the 
atrocities of the war either personally or in their family; the majority 
of them had lived in camps until about 5 to 7 years before. 
Despite the prolonged conflict, the there is a “relatively high level of 
literacy in north Uganda, even though this region displays the high-
est number of youth who have never been enrolled in school and the 
fewest youth who have reached secondary school.” (Banks & 
Sulaiman, 2012, p.11)
I have concentrated my fieldwork activities in four locations: Gulu 
town; Atiak –almost at the border with South Sudan–; Parabongo, 
on the way to Atiak; and Odek to the west of Gulu, the place of birth 
of Joseph Kony. The selection of these places was mainly deter-
mined by the availability of informants: farmers living in Parabongo, 
were working within a private sector driven development scheme led 
by USAID Feed the Future—the Youth Leadership in Agriculture 
Activities (YLA); the governmental programme led by the Ministry of 
Gender, the Youth Livelihood Programme (YLP), which was imple-
mented by the district authorities, led me to Odek; for the selection 
of a control group I went to Atiak, where a group of farmers was 
working in beekeeping, besides their own personal agribusiness; in 
Gulu town, I gathered contextual knowledge about the local culture, 
language and beliefs. 
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Figure 10. Map of four field sites in north: Gulu, Atiak, Parabongo, Odek. 
3.5.3 Mbale
Mbale is a small town at about 1000m above sea level, positioned at 
the slopes of Mount Elgon, at the border with Kenya. 240km and 5 
hours ride away from Kampala, Mbale gives the visitor a feeling of 
being landed in a quiet bubble: its 81 thousand inhabitants mind 
their own business, there is little hustling on the streets, few cars and a 
colder climate—thanks to the proximity to the mountain. 
Life starts early in the morning to make the best of the shorter days 
(because of the shade of the mountain), and after 7pm there is no-one 
to be seen in the streets. The environment is dominated by the 
breath-taking, lush green of the mountain. Land is densely cultivated 
and fragmented in small patches. The main agricultural production is 
coffee, which catalyses a variety of jobs along its chain. There are a 
few coffee cooperatives employing young labour force, but predomi-
nantly the coffee chain is dominated by older farmers (because of 
issues of land ownership and the long-term nature of the coffee pro-
duction). Another major value chain, employing youths, is horticulture 
–which supplies the local market, Kampala and Kenyan markets– and 
the production of some crops (onions and cabbages mostly) makes its 
way until South Sudan.
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Image 8. Tomatoes farmer on the slopes of Mount Elgon, eastern Uganda, 
2017. Picture taken by author.
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The majority of the population belongs to the Gisu ethnic group, 
speaking lugisu language and some Swahili—because of the proximity 
to Kenya. The identification with this ethnic group was strongly felt by 
my informants, particularly male ones—but the elaboration of an eth-
nic identity in this context is described as being emerged alongside 
the change brought by the colonial rule. The grouping that was first 
related to language and common cultural practices, became institu-
tionalised and reified in the twentieth century (Reid, 2017, p.300): 
Among Gisu, the anthropologist J.S. La Fontaine observed 
the rise of ‘tribal policy’ by the 1950s, and she described the 
emergence of ‘tribalism’ in Bugisu, (…) This [tribal policy] is 
action by Gisu leaders on behalf of the tribe as a whole over 
issues which appeared to them either to threaten their new 
identity or seemed to deny them rights accorded to other 
tribes. Tribalism in Bugisu is thus the mobilisation of loyalties 
which, in the traditional system, were latent and expressed 
only ritually, into a political pressure group. 
Whether it happened at once or in phases, it is important to notice 
how the mobilisation of a Gisu identity was the necessary, political 
response of defence of the socio-cultural traditions. 
In this area, I have concentrated my fieldwork at the slopes of the 
mountain, moving to different locations to reach representatives of 
the three groups of youths (attached to a public-sector development 
programme, private sector-driven one, and control group). The first 
group of informants I have interviewed was the control group, which 
I encountered in Kamu in February 2017. I returned to the area in 
June, after the rainy season—which had made transport almost 
impossible due to bad infrastructures on the mountain. I had looked 
for youths engaged in the governmental YLP (Youth Livelihood Pro-
gramme) in Wanale and Bumalunda—but I found that they were 
reluctant to meet me; therefore in those mountainous areas I have 
interviewed more youths who were not part of any development 
scheme. I interviewed youths involved in the YLP in Lwaso and 
Mbale town. Furthermore, I have interviewed youths working within a 
private sector driven development scheme sponsored by USAID’s 
YLA. This programme was implemented by the pumpkin processing 
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company ‘Byeffe’, and I reached youths in this programme in the 
localities of Bungokho, Kiende and Mbale town. These localities are 
all so small that are not even found on google maps.
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Figure 11. Map of field sites in the east: Mbale and mount Elgon.
3.5.4 Mbarara
The south-western region around Mbarara is known in popular wis-
dom as ‘the land of milk and honey’ because indeed is a verdant and 
fertile part of Uganda. Mbarara counts less than 70 thousands 
inhabitants, but is a crucial urban centre for the south-western 
region. The most important value chains are coffee and dairy, while 
horticulture is also a major income-generating sector, with matooke 
(green bananas, or plantain) as main food and cash crop.
The socio-cultural reality of the south-western region around Mbar-
ara is defined by the ethnic identities of the hima and iru—or, as the 
local, language declines the plural: bahima and bairu. They both 
share the same language, lunyankore, and in fact both belong to the 
Nkore ethnic group. There is little agreement whether they are sim-
ply two social classes of the same ethnic group, or whether there 
are two separate ethnic groups sharing a common language and 
history. Reid (2017, p.197) argues for the theory of class divisions: 
In Nkore, economic specialism came to denote social and 
political status, and there was an increasing emphasis on the 
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distinction between Hima herdsmen and Iru farmers; by the 
eighteen century, cattle-keeping and farming were almost 
mutually exclusive and unquestionably represented the pa-
rameters of class formation. While the clans were associated 
with various economic specialisms, the king was arbiter and 
ritually the embodiment of unity, seeking to represent both 
farming and herding in ceremonial terms. 
Another hypothesis, which is not necessarily in contradiction with 
that of Reid, argues that these two ethnic groups are associated 
with the hutu (iru) and tutsi (hima) of neighbouring Rwanda and 
Burundi. Green (2010, p.9) draws the progeny of herders and farm-
ers among the Nkore from the ethnic descent of neighbouring 
countries: 
the stratified systems of Ankole [Nkore], Rwanda, and Burun-
di, where society was split between cattle keepers (Bahima in 
Ankole; Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi), farmers (Bairu in 
Ankole; Hutu in Rwanda and Burundi), and, in Rwanda and 
Burundi, an underclass group named the Twa (Pygmies). In 
Ankole the “political elite was drawn almost exclusively from 
the Bahima segment of the population, whereas the Bairu 
stood largely outside direct political involvements in the state 
system and in a variety of areas enjoyed lesser rights and 
privileges in their contacts with the Bahima,” and intermarriage 
between the two groups was extremely limited. 
The strong ethnic identities and class relations between Hima and 
Iru was not only reportedly important to my informants in that region, 
but is also crucial for national and regional politics. In fact, president 
Museveni belongs to the Hima ethnic group and has allegedly 
favoured Nkore (and Hima people in particular) in the allocation of 
political, military and economic positions of power. Moreover, the 
south-western region of Uganda has experienced a faster develop-
ment in infrastructures and welfare than other regions of the country. 
From a regional perspective on the history power redistribution and 
conflicts in the Great Lakes region, Museveni developed important 
alliances around his belonging to the Hima ethnic group. Particularly 
strong were the political and military ties with fellow-hima presidents 
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Kagame (Rwanda) and Buyoya (former president of Burundi). As 
Lemarchand (2001, p.89) maintains: 
This mutual dependence is also true of Buyoya in Burundi, 
whose fortunes are linked to those of his neighbours to the 
west and the north. Even more important in creating strong 
solidarity among Kagame, Buyoya, and Museveni is their 
sense of belonging to the same embattled minority subcul-
ture, to the same pastoralist interlacustrine diaspora. Whether 
Tutsi (Kagame), Tutsi-Hima (Buyoya), or Hima-Munyankole 
(Museveni), they share the same cultural self-awareness and 
therefore see themselves as the spokesmen of threatened 
minorities. Deeply distrustful of what they see as the tyranny 
of the majority implicit in Western forms of democracy, they 
regard as their first obligation to ensure the survival of their 
respective communities. 
Because of the politically and culturally loaded dimension of ethnic 
identification in this area, I have selected the field sites in a way that 
would account for diversity and ethnic balance. In fact, fieldwork in 
this sub-region has required me to travel the most—compared to 
other regions. 
I have interviewed young farmers engaged in the YLP in Sheema; 
youths working independently of any development scheme (control 
group) in Sheema and Bushenyi. As for the youths engaged in a pri-
vate-sector driven programme, I focused on the Dutch-funded TIDE 
project in dairy, implemented by a Dutch NGO, SNV. I met these 
youths in Mbarara, Khasaka, Kyakabonga, Ntungamo and Sanga
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Figure 12. Map of field sites in south-west: Mbarara, Ntungamo, Sanga, 
Bushenyi, Kiruhura (Ibanda). 
3.6 Qualitative analysis and representing the data
After having collected all the ethnographic data, begins the phase of 
the analysis and written representation of data. In this section, I 
account for the ethnographic analytical methods I have used. 
According to Geertz (1973, p.11) “[d]oing ethnography is like trying to 
read (in the sense of “construct a reading of”) a manuscript—foreign, 
faded, full of ellipses, incoherencies, suspicious emendations, and 
tendentious commentaries, but written not in conventionalized 
graphs of sound but in transient examples of shaped behaviour.” I 
took this interpretative approach to the analysis of the interviews 
and observations I collected, with the purpose of writing an ethno-
graphic ‘thick description’ of the narratives and practices around youth 
in agribusiness. Again, Geertz has been illuminating on the methods to 
carry out and ethnography and make sense of the empirical data, 
which alone is dull of the socio-cultural meanings encrypted. Fisher 
(2003, p.150) reports famous example from his ethnography of village 
life in Bali, serves the purpose of explaining the value of the method:
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Geertz’s most famous example of thick description concerns 
cock-fighting in a Balinese village. While it would appear that 
only the cocks are fighting, they are discovered in fact to be 
fighting because the men are fighting. Geertz (1983) sets his 
detailed description of the strange features of cock-fighting 
against the holistic background of Balinese culture, including its 
understanding of social relations, traditional beliefs, and reli-
gious practices. Placing his contextual interpretation in 
ever-widening concentric circles, he reveals the ‘common world’ 
in which the practice of cock-fight betting makes sense to its 
participants. In the end, what appears to be an economically 
irrational game of betting for financial gain is disclosed to be 
about social structure and status relations in the village 
community. 
Through the elaboration of thick descriptions of the narratives and 
practices of both development practitioners and youths, I have 
attempted an interpretative explanation of the way in which this devel-
opment trend is being constructed, and what its consequences are. 
Based on the analysis of interviews, informal conversations, stories I 
have heard and practices I observed, I identified the main narratives of 
the two groups of social actors. 
The main task in the narrative analysis of the interviews is coding (Fis-
cher, 2003, p.173), which is defined as: “the process by which seg-
ments of data are identified as relating to, or being an example of, a 
more general idea, instance, theme or category. Segments of data 
from across the whole dataset are placed together in order to be 
retrieved together at a later stage.” (Lewins and Silver 2007, p.81 in 
Boeije, 2010, p.95). This process of segmenting and coding data is a 
lengthy process that requires a lot of going back and forth through the 
data. Thanks to the qualitative analysis programme Atlas.ti, I could car-
ry out this task digitally on my laptop. This computer programme helps 
to locate, code and annotate findings on primary data, and also to sys-
tematically group and compare fragments through the codes, which 
are manually attributed by the researcher. This process allows me to 
identify trends and themes, and eventually through systematic com-
parison the narratives and meta-narratives across interviews. 
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Image 10. Fieldwork with extended family that participated in a focused group 
discussion, in the outskirts of Gulu, Northern Uganda, 2017. 
Picture taken by author.
3.7 Ethnographic pitfalls and my position as researcher 
With ethnographic research, a concern for the validity of the study 
generally rises (Smit, 2017, p.55), particularly with regard to the biases 
of the researcher, who is her/himself the instrument of the study. For 
this reason, I will examine my position as white, female researcher in 
the field of agribusiness development in the paragraphs below. Reflex-
ivity is in fact the best antidote to flaws in my research that are related 
to my very presence in the field. While reflexivity allows the researcher 
to take into account the flaws, it does not eliminate them (Salzman, 
2002, p.807). For this reason, it is crucial to account for the position of 
the researcher in the field. Rosaldo (2000, p.533 in Salzman, 2002, 
p.807) elaborates on the researcher’s reflexivity on her/his position: 
The ethnographer, as a positioned subject, grasps certain 
human phenomena better than others. He or she occupies a 
position or structural location and observes with a particular 
angle of vision. Consider, for example, how age, gender, being 
an outsider, and association with a neo-colonial regime influ-
ence what the ethnographer learns. The notion of position also 
refers to how life experiences both enable and inhibit particular 
kinds of insight. 
Within this understanding of the position of the researcher, it becomes 
clear that any observer or commentator (also in other scientific fields) 
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is positioned. “Claims of objectivity and truth are really just claims of 
power” (2002, p.807) continues Salzman. Therefore, reflexivity helps 
to overcome the flaws brought along by the researcher’s position in 
the field. Moreover, the prolonged interaction with the field allows the 
ethnographer to develop an empathic understanding of the informants 
and their socio-cultural environment. 
Another concern is my position as an independent researcher in the 
field. I have carried out fieldwork in Uganda in collaboration with and 
supported by the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA). 
This institute, which is 50 years old, is pioneer in the researching the 
role of youth in agribusiness and has recently been appointed by the 
African Development Bank (AfDB) to lead a consistent development 
programme on youth in agribusiness.55 They offered logistical support 
(use of their office and accommodation facilities, support in visa appli-
cation, facilitating access to their network of experts and practitioners) 
and supervision in the field. My collaboration with this institute has 
been initiated in summer 2016 as I visited their offices in Kampala and 
Kigali. Subsequently, I have relied on IITA’s support during field trips to 
Uganda in 2017 and 2018. I have been attached to the institute as a 
‘graduate research fellow’, holding a position as independent 
researcher. While their views and aspirations within the development 
trend around youth in agribusiness may have influenced my approach, 
my continued relation with supervisors at Radboud and Bologna 
secured the impartiality of my position as researcher. 
3.7.1 A white lady in the (agricultural) field: “Mzungu! Mzungu!”
An inevitable yet crucial factor in the process of fieldwork research 
has been the white colour of my skin, in a context where the wide 
majority of white people in Uganda are development practitioners. 
Furthermore, regardless of the actual income, all white people are, in 
my experience, considered to belong to a higher socio-economic 
class. For both male and female whites, Ugandans throughout the 
country use the Bantu word ‘mzungu’, which literally means “someone 
who roams”, or “someone who is far from home and lost his/her way”. 
Interestingly, this term which originally did not have any racial 
55 ‘ENABLE youth programme’, info accessed on 25/10/2016 on: http://
www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/innovative-programme-to-im-
prove-employment-and-income-outcomes-for-young-people-14217/
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connotation, is nowadays mainly used for white people, or rich blacks 
who have lived abroad—regardless of their nationality. 
Image 11. Family of coffee farmers and author on the slopes of Mount Elgon, 
eastern Uganda, 2017.
The family insisted to give me a bag of onions worth the equivalent of a 
week’s income, as a sign of hospitality, although I just stopped by their 
farm to ask for directions. 
Picture taken by driver, property of the author.
From the field notes of 22 may 2017, while on the fieldtrip to the south-
west region, a first impression at the arrival is revealing: 
We meet many people, as soon as we arrive at Rose’s home [the 
mother of Joyce, the interpreter]: everybody wants to meet Joyce 
and the babies, as much as they are curious to meet the mzungu. 
There is so much fuzz around my presence, that I almost feel un-
comfortable. (…) We go and visit the nearby church, where a group 
of women is cooking at the reverend’s house. (…) The ladies react 
very surprised by the visit of a mzungu. They all want to greet me 
and shake hands, they are very friendly and all ask me ‘how are you 
mzungu?’ which is the only English words they know. It is as funny 
as embarrassing for me, because besides being white, I have no 
right to be there inside the house of the revered, taking the seats 
of honour (while the majority is sitting outside on whatever seat). 
A few days later, on the same trip, my field notes reveal how uncom-
fortable I was feeling in my skin: 
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Joyce is really doing her best to make my stay as easy and 
pleasant as possible, as much as mama Rose is the sweetest 
host I could hope for. I never feel alone, even though it becomes 
clearer by the day that I do not belong here: the recurrent theme 
in my days is the colour of my skin—mzungu!
Also during fieldtrips to the north and east I had experienced this type 
of “discrimination”—but the scarce presence of development pro-
grammes in the south-west region (which is more developed than oth-
er parts of the country) also contribute to making the presence of 
white people more of an exception. 
Moreover, it also must be mentioned that being perceived a ‘mzungu’ 
also might have mislead some of my informants. In fact, since the 
majority of whites in Uganda work in development, they are often 
associated with profitable opportunities. Particularly in the north 
where the population has experienced humanitarian aid after the war, 
I have encountered an attitude of entitlement to (monetary) help. 
Within the context of anthropology of development, I thus feel in line 
with the arguments of Mosse (2005, p.243): 
The ground of anthropological practice has changed funda-
mentally in the past two decades. The fact that anthropologists 
are no longer justified as value-free and objective observers, 
the source of politically neutral and authoritative scientific 
knowledge places anthropology back within historical relations 
of power. In relation to international development this provides 
opportunities, if not obligations, for engagement and self-criti-
cal reflection, for hope and critical understanding —neither of 
which is possible without close encounters with the administra-
tive politics of development practice. 
In fact, my position in the field has been influenced by the social and 
historical role of ‘benefactor’ that whites have played in my informants’ 
lives, despite the efforts I have made during each interview to clarify I 
was an independent researcher. Being aware of the way in which I 
might be perceived as a white researcher, I remained reflexive of the 
position of power in which I found myself. I exercised reflexivity in three 
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ways. First, I punctually asked my translators to explain to the inform-
ants that I was a student and was not in any position to financially help 
them. I took considerable time, in the beginning of my interviews, to 
contextualise and explain the scientific purposes of my research. Sec-
ond, the translator her-/himself helped me to discern those state-
ments, during interviews, that were conditioned by a bias towards me 
as a (powerful, external) white lady. Third, and more importantly, in the 
process of analysis and writing, I discerned the biased and unbiased 
narratives of my informants, to retain only those which were not too 
influenced by my position of power. 
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Image 12. Lake Bunyony, Western Uganda, 2017. Picture taken by author.

Chapter 4
Aidnography56 
56 The term ‘aidnography’ is drawn from Mosse 
2013—I don’t claim any intellectual property or 
originality on this term.
YOUTH AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA154
4.1 Introduction
The first issue to be raised, perhaps, is that the present study 
is an anthropological one. Unlike many anthropological works 
on “development”, this one takes as its primary object not the 
people to be “developed”, but the apparatus that is to do the 
“developing”. This is not principally a book about the Basotho 
people, or even about Lesotho; it is principally a book about 
the operation of the international “development” apparatus in a 
particular setting. (Ferguson, 1994, p.17)
This chapter aims at answering the first research question of this 
study, namely: how are development organisations adopting youth in 
agribusiness strategies in Uganda? The chapter presents the analy-
sis of ethnographic fieldwork conducted among development prac-
titioners in Kampala. In this chapter I will pay particular attention to 
the narratives emerging from the interviews I conducted with devel-
opment practitioners, leaving the observations of development 
practices for chapter 6. This narrative approach will be particularly 
useful to elaborate an explenation to the ‘how’ of the research ques-
tion leading this chapter. 
All of my informants were involved in promoting youth engagement 
in agribusienss, within Ugandan and international development 
agencies. In this chapter, I elaborate an aidnography—namely an 
examination and deconstruction of the narratives that are produced 
and reproduce the development discourse. I analyse such system of 
knowledge (the development discourse), in the effort of investigat-
ing how “the delineation of [development] emerges from, and pro-
duces, particular historical circumstances, particular cultural logics, 
and finally, particular subjectivities” (Curtis & Spencer 2012, p.179 in 
(Mosse, 2013, p.230). The goal of an aidnography is to offer a critical 
reflection on the elaboration and implementation of development 
policies and programmes. Development cooperation is far from just 
a neutral, a-political philanthropic hurl to make the world a better 
place: it has its interests and politics, and is very much contingent to its 
socio-historical context (Ferguson, 2014) (Escobar, 2012) (Scott J., 
1998) (Mosse, 2011). An analysis of how the development discourse 
evolved can shed light on the politics driving one strategy rather than 
another. 
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The chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2 I briefly introduce 
the research and analytical methods I have used to collect the data for 
this aidnography. In section 4.3 I start the empirical analysis by intro-
ducing the way in which development change is being conceptualised 
by the development practitioners I interviewed in Kampala. Subse-
quently, in section 4.4, I describe the analytical tool of the theory of 
change, namely a structure of three steps (development problem, 
vision and pathway to change) which I will use to analyse practitioners’ 
narratives. In section 4.5 I delve into the discourse analysis of the the-
ories of change of development practitioeners, step by step. I outline 
the narratives adopted by development practitioners in conceptualiz-
ing the development problem, the ideal outcome they envision, and the 
implementation strategy to operationalise their vision for change. 
Moreover, I comparatively analyze the theories of change of Ugandan 
and international development organisations. In sub-section 4.5.4, I 
describe how development practitioners aim to target youths as object 
of their development programmes. In section 4.6, I analyze the differ-
ent development approaches that emerge from the theory of change, 
showing how Ugandan an international organisations have a tendency 
towards public or private-sector driven strategies. In section (4.7), I 
confront the theories of change and approaches that emerged from 
the interviews with development practitioners, with those emerging 
from policy papers. I hereby validate or problematise the discrepan-
cies between oral and written perspectives on development for youths 
in agribusiness. I conclude (section 4.8) by summarising and discuss-
ing the conclusions of the aidnography. I argue that there are hetero-
geneous approaches to development and tensions within the pro-
posed goals and strategies to achieve them. In particular, I confront the 
approaches of national and international views to the same ‘develop-
ment problem’.
4.2 Research and analytical methods 
In my analysis of how the policy discourses frame the development 
problems affecting youth in agribusiness, I have adopted an inductive 
method of analysis (Boeije, Analysis in Qualitative Research, 2010) 
(Beuving & De Vries, 2015). I approached the study of the development 
narratives by analysing of the semi-structured interviews I conducted 
with 24 development practitioners from 17 development organisations 
based in Kampala, all engaged in supporting youths’ engagement in 
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agribusiness. I carried out these interviews during two months of field-
work in Kampala, in 2017. Table 7 below provides a list of the 17 organ-
isations57 where I conducted the interviews: 
Type of development agency Development agencies
International Multilateral 
development coo-
peration
Food and Agriculture Organisation 
African Development Bank
Bilateral develop-
ment cooperation
Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
USAID - Feed the Future, commodity production and 
marketing (CPM) & Youth Leadership in Agriculture 
Activity (YLA)
AgriProFocus (agripreneurs network and agribusiness 
facilitator)
Non-governmental 
organisations 
AVSI (Italian NGO implementing the Dutch-funded 
SKY programme)
ICCO (Dutch NGO)
ZOA (Dutch NGO)
Private sector MasterCard Foundation—DYNAMIC project
Triodos Bank—BRAC programme
National Grassroots organi-
sations, public and 
private
AKORION (services and marketing provision com-
pany)
Young Farmers Coalition of Uganda (farmers’ net-
work)
Young Farmers Champions Network (farmers’ net-
work)
CURAD (incubation centre)
Public sector Makerere University Kampala 
Ugandan Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industries 
and Fisheries
Ugandan Ministry of Gender, Labor and Social De-
velopment
Table 7. Development organisations where I conducted interviews.
57 In the following, I use development ‘organisations’ and ‘agencies’ 
interchangeably, as much as I refer to development actors, informants and 
respondents as synonymous.
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Importantly, the individual interviews are in my analysis assumed to be 
representative for the views of development organisation the respond-
ent was affiliated to—unless expressly stated to be a personal view. I 
was able to assume the representativeness of the respondents’ views 
for their organisations’ because during the interviews I prompted the 
development practitioners to elaborate, in their answers, on the views 
of their agency. As much as possible, I cross-checked the organisa-
tional positions elaborated by the interviewees with relevant policy 
documents from these institutions (see section 4.7). 
I explored the conceptualisations, definitions and ambitions of the 
development practitioners I interviewed with the understanding that 
“if people define a situation as real, it is real in its consequences” 
(Thomas 1928 in (Boeije, 2010, p.13). The development discourse is 
not only a matter of knowledge production withinin the development 
world, but a knowledge production that has specific influences in 
the historical circumstances it is embededd in.
Development narratives also have the function of mobilising sup-
port. In fact, Rap (2006, p.1303) continues: 
(…) particular stories, called policy narratives, are influential in 
informing policy-making. They are considered to be a force in 
themselves and do not change even when they are confront-
ed with ‘contradicting empirical data’, as ‘they continue to 
underwrite and stabilize the assumptions’ for policy-making 
‘in the face of high uncertainty, complexity, and polarization’ 
(Roe, 1994: 2; Fairhead and Leach, 1995). Other related ana-
lytical approaches study policy as argumentation or as a dis-
course: ‘an ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories 
through which meaning is given to phenomena’. They illus-
trate how ‘policy discourses frame certain problems’, distin-
guishing ‘some aspects of a situation rather than others’ 
(Hajer, 1993, in Apthorpe and Gasper, 1996: 2). 
I first carried out open-coding of the transcribed 24 interviews with the 
development actors, in Atlas.ti. I then extrapolated the themes which 
were most representative of the actors’ views on the issues around 
youth and agribusiness. These themes, which are not mutually 
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exclusive, contain the actors’ understandings on the development 
trend they are principal practitioners in shaping, through their dis-
courses, in Aidland (Mosse, 2011). At the same time, these themes are 
also my abstraction and meta-analytical conceptualisation of their 
narratives.
4.3 Development Change—Emic Views
In this section, I introduce the development sector in Kampala and 
the development practitioners I have interviewed by presenting their 
views on what they see to be necessary for youth to engage in agri-
business. Through my anthropological analysis of development dis-
course around youth and agribusiness, I aim to shed light on the 
narrative of progress that emerges from my interviews with the 
development practitioners I interviewed in Kampala. 
For example, when envisioning a future for the Ugandan agricultural 
sector, an informant from the African Development Bank58 noted: 
[…W]e know that the aged population will wear out. What do 
we do? …[R]emember that no country becomes self-suffi-
cient in food production by turning all its youths, or its nation-
als into farmers. In America, how many percentage of the 
people population are involved in agriculture? In Italy, in other 
parts of Europe, what is the percent of the people that are 
involved in agriculture? But, it is also interesting to know that 
in Africa, a lot of people almost up to 60% of the people are 
involved in agriculture. 
In this passage, the respondent reveals that his narrative of progress 
leads to a specific type of modernity. A modernity that resembles 
the agricultural value chains of “developed” countries (“like where 
you come from”). She continues:
Someone who is doing agribusiness will need electricity, will need 
communication, will need to communicate to access markets. So 
58 At the African Development Bank I have interviewed three develop-
ment practitioners (in the same group interview): a country programme of-
ficer, a senior macroeconomist, and an agricultural and rural development 
expert. I will not specify, for each quote, who of the three respondents said 
it as to protect their identity. This interview took place on 17/01/2017
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that kind of needs… [will need to] package, add value: package, 
have designs and you know… Modern, it is modern agriculture. 
Actually, when you talk about modern agriculture, modernisation 
of agriculture, you talk about mechanization, value addition, pro-
cessing, packaging and all that. So you look at aspect of kind of a 
modern style of farming.
This description of what modernity entails –mechanization, process-
ing, value addition etc.– sketches a rather straightforward profile of 
what the desirable outcome of development efforts can be. 
The conceptualisation of development in agriculture as a commercial-
isation of the sector, with the required modernisation and technology 
adoption, is well explicated by one of the directors at the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries, whom I interviewed in the 
headquarters in Entebbe59: 
[W]e want to guide them [the youth] to look at agriculture as 
an investment. You have to get money and invest. (…) Yes, 
they should just continue or even [get?] bigger but also now 
put fertilizers, put good food, even seed, can you put some 
mechanization or can you may be do some supplementary 
irrigation, so that at least the productivity goes up. We are 
trying to say, can you please do it better so that the yield is 
bigger, and your volume is higher? Can you invest? Can you 
buy seed? Can you buy fertilizers? Can you may be like hire 
tractors so that when you do it in time, and you are seen to be 
doing commercial business? Can you make that investment 
profile and see what you are going to produce? Can you be 
linked to a market so that people don’t come to your farm 
looking for [agricultural produce]? May be can you join up with 
some other people doing the same enterprise in the area and 
have a warehouse or store where you can put your grain, it is 
sorted, it is good quality then you can market? 
The respondent makes a long list of the technical changes that are 
envisioned to be necessary for a modern type of agriculture that is 
59 This interview took place on 27/01/2018
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competitive on the market. In fact, the desirable outcome in her view 
is either large-scale or intensive production60, which with the sup-
port of technologies and stronger business perspectives, would turn 
subsistence farming into modern agribusiness. 
Importantly, the turn towards this specific understanding of moder-
nity is depicted as a choice: the civil servant asks the farmer to 
choose to become an agripreneur, and they respond positively. In 
most interviews, respondents mentioned that such change –very 
much a choice– was a matter of mindset change.61 Participants in 
their development schemes were asked to choose to be more entre-
preneurial and “don’t do business as usual”, wherein the usual busi-
ness is subsistence agriculture and does not result in revenue.62 
Particularly youth, who are (also) seen as the future of (commercial) 
agriculture, were depicted as the share of society who is to be men-
tored to change their mind. When asked what investing in youth in 
Uganda means, one respondent, for example, explained that it 
meant inducing a mindset change. According to her, their role as 
development actors is mentoring and coaching them to make this 
mental shift. In her words, “They were used to begging, now they are 
turning to be self-sufficient.”.63 This respondent, who works for a 
large bilateral development organisation, clearly envisions change 
as a matter of choice: from being dependent to being self-sufficient, 
which in agriculture translates from being subsistence farmers to 
becoming agripreneurs. 
In her narratives, the missing link between the choice of changing 
one’s own mind and actually enacting the envisioned outcome is a 
matter of a) acquiring the right skills; and b) accessing finance. As a 
respondent working for a multilateral donor organisation explained:
60 Where large-scale refers to commercial agriculture on a large plot 
of land owned by one corporation or individual, and intensive production 
refers to a higher use of agricultural inputs, labor and machinery to obtain 
the highest yield possible also from a limited plot of land.
61 Mindset change was explicitly mentioned, without prompting from 
my side, in the majority of the interviews with all development actors, as I 
will describe in more depth in section 4.c.
62 See section on Agriculture in the previous chapter for a detailed dis-
cussion on the conceptualisation of agriculture. 
63 This quote is extracted from the transcript of one of the interviews I 
carried out at the Kampala offices of USAID—the respondent is to remain 
anonymous. 
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Those who are interested in agricultural production, they can 
go into it. Those who are interested in value addition, they can 
go into value addition. Those who are interested in service 
related to the agriculture in the value chain can also go in 
and that is why the programme is mainly focusing on capacity 
building for the youth in terms of the incubation, changing 
their mindset and designing projects that they are interested 
in and linking them to financing.64
The mindset change described by my informants in Kampala reso-
nates with the discourse recorded by Ferguson in Lesotho, decennia 
back: 
Achieving “development” is thus largely a matter of changing 
values and attitudes, of winning over individual Sotho hearts 
and minds. In its extreme forms, “development” discourse 
sometimes even speaks as if the problem of poverty is all in 
the hear—as if impoverished villagers could escape their con-
dition by a simple change of attitude or intellectual conver-
sion. The religious imagery suggested by the common 
self-description of teams of “development” experts as “mis-
sions” is thus well sustained in their search for “converts”. 
(Ferguson, 1994, p.58)
As described by Ferguson and explicitly stated by my respondent, 
this mindset change is attitudinal and the role of development prac-
titioners is to facilitate this change by mentoring and coaching the 
youth to adopt an entrepreneurial and business-oriented mindset. 
“To develop” is something that can be taught, and therefore justifies 
the presence and activities of development practitioners as the 
experts and mentors. 
Indeed, it emerges from their own accounts, that development prac-
titioners often perceive themselves to have a mentoring role. As 
highlighted by Ferguson (2014), in the development industry stake-
holders take on the role of experts in a redeeming function that can 
“cure” poverty by operating a mindset change. In reference to youth’s 
64 This interview was carried out on 02/02/2017
YOUTH AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA162
engagement in agribusiness and their presumed impatience, I was told 
at the Ministry of Agriculture that: 
Most youth were not interested in that [agribusiness], so we 
are looking to guide our youth to think in terms of having pos-
itive work ethics that you must work hard in order to benefit 
and you must be patient enough in order to attain what you 
require so this is just a matter of like sensitizing, encouraging 
them and motivating them to invest more into the abilities that 
they have. Yeah, so that’s the thing that we are looking at. Just 
continuous, even as you do your thing, you should know that 
you believe in yourself that you can achieve it and it will take 
you longer than you think. You encourage them that you see 
when it gets harder, you are about to reach the solution so 
you don’t give up when you see things are getting tougher so 
it’s about talking to them and making them understand that 
things are possible and it’s not just about having something 
beautiful.65
In this account, it is suggested that by being patient, motivated and 
believing in one-self it is possible to obtain successful results in 
agribusiness. While the mentioned attitudes and values are ascribed 
to a “positive work ethic”, the role of the development practitioner is 
the messianic one of a mentor. In fact, it seems that the opportuni-
ties for development are there to be grasped. The role of the devel-
opment practitioner is to simply point them out to young inexpert 
who have yet to figure out how to sustain themselves through agri-
culture. As one respondent told me: 
[…T]here are so many opportunities out there in the food 
industry, in agriculture and agribusiness where they [the 
youth] can sustain themselves and their lives and be able to 
make it big actually in the near future if you know what to do. 
So for us, our role is to help them you know, for example to 
keep the records and track their inputs and see what they get 
out. To help them do marketing, for example good markets, 
good prices. Help them to do good business plans, feasibility 
65 This interview was carried out on 27/01/2017
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studies and business plans so that they able to know that if I 
want to go into beans in this area, in this area I can only go for 
maize, chicken and if I go for chicken, what type of chicken 
and if am ready, where do I sell. So that’s where agribusiness 
is going to come in, to guide them.66
Specific skills (accounting, records-keeping, market knowledge) can 
be taught for the purpose of succeeding in the predefined objective 
identified as successful (“make it big”). In the previous and following 
fragments, by the same respondent, the religious imaginary evoked 
by Ferguson (2014) stand out: 
Me: Okay. So you said that the opportunities are there and 
your role is to?
Respondent: Mentor, coach and mentor and transform them. 
Coach, mentor and transform them.
Me: What do you mean transform?
Respondent: Transform is [for example] Maya, don’t tell me 
you can’t do it. Okay?
Me: So it’s about mindset.
Respondent: Mindset. And actually, investing along with [for 
example] Maya to make sure Maya sees, because Maya may 
say “oh no it’s not possible”. And I say “no it’s possible. Where 
is the risk?”—“I cannot buy that thing alone, I don’t have the 
money”—“I cost share with you, pilot this scheme, let him see 
it.”
In this passage the respondent argues that successful agribusiness 
is a matter of choice and belief. The role of the development actor, 
the respondent states, is that of shaping this mindset and making 
the youth believe (in his words: ‘transform’) the capabilities and busi-
ness values he himself believes to be the right ones for agribusiness. 
Several more topics emerge from this account: as in the above frag-
ments, opportunities to succeed in agribusiness are there but young 
people don’t see it, and it is for the development practitioners to play 
the role of mentoring, guiding and coach towards transformation. 
66 This interview was carried out on 19/01/2017 at a large bilateral de-
velopment agency; as asked by the respondent, I cannot refer either to the 
organisation or to his identity.
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‘Development’ is a transformation that first of all happens in the minds 
of young Ugandans, thanks to the mentoring role of development 
practitioners. 
4.4 Analytical framework—Theory of change
In order to systematise the narratives of development practitioners, 
I needed an analytical tool that would capture their views on youth in 
agribusiness, and would allow for comparison among organisations’ 
views. I have elaborated a theory of change on the basis of the themes 
that emerged from the analysis of my interviews: development prob-
lem, vision for change, and pathway to change (see Figure 4.2). 
The three key propositions summarized by Bacchi (2009, p.xxi) for 
theory of change analysis are three: 
1. We are governed through problematisations.
2. We need to study problematisations (through analysing the 
problem representations they contain), rather than ‘problems’. 
3. We need to problematise (interrogate) the problematisa-
tions on offer through scrutinizing the premises and effects 
of the problem representations they contain.
I thus elaborated an analytical tool, shaped around theory of change 
(TOC), which I have used in the analysis of the semi-structured inter-
views with development practitioners. This tool, which is conceptual-
ised in the below figure (Figure 13), has been used to screen the 
narratives in three different phases. These phases were not identi-
fied before I started conducting interviews with development actors, 
but emerged in the inductive analysis of the interviews, as major 
themes. Although the respondents never referred to the concept of 
TOC, it appeared from their narratives that they were relying on an 
implicit idea (or ideology) of how development works or should work. 
I am aware of the critical scholarly debate around the linearity of 
development (Rap, 2006) (Scott J., 1998) (Mosse, 2004), and my 
analysis follows the linearity of TOC only to the extent that it helps 
clarify the discourses of the development actors. As Rap (2006, 
p.1303) argues: 
According to the linear or instrumental model, all policies run 
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through the successive phases of problem identification, pol-
icy formulation, implementation, and impact evaluation (Sut-
ton, 1999; Mosse, 2004). (…) As the political decision to pur-
sue a policy is taken as a given, the usual concern of policy 
analysts is how to implement the policy and how to realise 
institutional models in practice. Underlying this instrumental 
approach, (…) is a positivist epistemological framework (Stir-
rat, 2001). This implies that success can be measured with a 
coherent set of policy objectives as clear criteria for impartial 
researchers that use scientific methods and universal 
theories.
In this chapter, my analysis concerns only the phases of problem 
identification, development programme formulation and envisioned 
implementation, in the search for particular meanings (narratives) 
and underlying structures of meaning (grand narratives). 
Development problem
Vision for Change
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Pathway to Change
Figure 13. The three phases of the theory of change
Below, I outline the aspects I investigated with the theory of change 
I elaborated as my analytical tool for the discourse analysis of my inter-
views with development actors. 
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The development problem entails the circumstances and social or 
institutional actors identified as development problem:
ǑEgdWaZbVi^hVi^dcǑd[Ǒ^hhjZ/ǑegdWaZbǑgZegZhZciVi^dc
Ǒ6gZVhǑd[ǑX]Vc\Z/Ǒl]^X]ǑhZXidghǑcZZYǑidǑWZǑiVX`aZY
The vision for change entails the envisioned development outcome:
Ǒ>YZVaǑdjiXdbZ/Ǒl]ViǑ^hǑi]ZǑ\dVaǑd[ǑYZkZadebZciǑZ[[dgih4Ǒ]dlǑ
is the solution to the development problem envisioned? What 
are the role models?
The pathway to change entails the trajectory and necessary steps to 
concretize the development goal:
ǑHigViZ\nǑ[dgǑX]Vc\Z/Ǒl]^X]ǑVgZǑi]ZǑXdcXgZiZǑ^beaZbZciVi^dcǑ
strategies and instruments?
ǑIVg\Zi^c\/Ǒl]dǑ^hǑi]ZǑdW_ZXi^kZǑd[ǑYZkZadebZciǑegd\gVbbZhǑ
and how are beneficiaries conceptualised?
4.5 Theories of change: emic views
As Autesserre (2017, p.119) rightly puts it, “theories of change are not 
“theories” in the academic understanding of the term; instead, they 
are “explanations of how and why a set of activities will achieve 
desired objectives (Lederach, Neufeldt, and Culbertson 2007, 25)”. 
Rather than explicitly relying on theories of change, most develop-
ment organisations and their programmes implicitly rely on assump-
tions of how their activities will deliver desired outcomes. In fact, 
theories of change are often not even part of the process of pro-
gramme planning. Assumptions and rationales underpinning policy 
briefs, programmes and projects –or even the organisations’ central 
structures– can be deconstructed to dissect their logical frame-
work. As scholars have stressed (Cameron et al 2015; and and 
Brown et al 2015; both in Autesserre, 2017, p.120) the problems with 
these underlying assumptions or (implicit) theories of change, is that 
they often are unrealistic, simplistic and/or make gigantic leaps in 
logic. As the wide range of examples in development failures shows, 
the process between programmes elaboration and their outcomes is 
not self-evident nor linear, and often results in unexpected outcomes 
or failure. A case in point is the example of mosquito nets distirbution 
for malaria prevention, which are instead used for fishing, to protect 
crops, to build chicken coops or even as wedding veil.67 Assumptions 
67 Journal article from 31/01/2018, from The Guardian, accessed on 
24/01/2019 on: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jan/31/
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play a crucial role in the elaboration and implementation of develop-
ment programmes, as they direct investment from a perceived devel-
opment problem to an envisioned outcome through pathways that are 
often devious. Considering the fact that the development trend around 
youth in agribusiness in Uganda is relatively new, theories of change 
were not yet tested at the time of my fieldwork research. As a matter of 
fact, they were mostly implicit (in the form of assumptions) in the narra-
tives of development practitioners I interviewed. 
My use of theory of change was thus explorative, as an investigation 
of their assumptions and rationales. The theory of change (TOC) is 
here used as framework to search the discourses and strategies of 
development actors. Below I outline the narratives and trends 
emerging from my interviews, for each of the three TOC steps. 
4.5.1 The development problem
So many people around here [are] talking about the youth cli-
mate change and the youth agriculture and the youth, educa-
tion and the youth so the youth has now come so much top of 
the agenda of many disciplines so meaning that the government 
has now realized that the issues of the youth is becoming a big 
challenge. And it happened also during the campaigns, last 
year; the presidential campaigns and the MPs. Most of the peo-
ple who were being arrested because of misbehaviour and the 
like, were the youth. Most of the people, who were fighting and 
doing this and this, were the youth. So am sure the president 
would advise we need to do something for the youth otherwise 
it’s going to be a time bomb. This is a time bomb which is going 
to be really a big challenge to us. So right now many of them are 
going into that approach.68 
The considerations of this respondent—a professor at the Makerere 
College of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences, collaborating with 
the Ministry of Agriculture in the elaboration of the new Strategy for 
Youth —summarize some of the common concerns shared by the 
development practitioners I have interviewed. He himself was, at the 
time of the interview, involved in the development of a development 
global-use-of-mosquito-nets-for-fishing-endangering-humans-and-wildlife
68 This interview was carried out on 25/01/2017
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Strategy for Youth for the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and 
Fisheries (MAAIF). Besides the specific challenges which, according 
to him, youths in Uganda are facing (climate change, agriculture com-
mercialisation, education), he mentioned political concerns regarding 
the topic of youth in agribusiness. He stresses the increasing attention 
that this issue is receiving in the (inter)national development efforts—a 
strengthened focus on the issue that conceptualises it as a develop-
ment problem. Through discourse analysis, in the following section, I 
aim to analyse the conceptualisation of youth and/in agribusiness as a 
development problem. 
Firstly, I clustered the spontaneous and variegated answers of my 
respondents into five categories (Table 1): these categories emerged 
from the qualitative analysis (open coding in Atlas.ti) of the semi-struc-
tured interviews.
Unemployment Food security Demography Stability Other
Formal unemployment 
and under-employment, 
here referring to youth: 
this category comprises 
different understandings 
and forms of shortage or 
inadequacy of absorption 
of the workforce in the 
labour market; compe-
tences or skills mismatch 
(e.g. educated youth doing 
unskilled work). It is a 
category that hides the 
fundamental truth that the 
majority of unemployed is 
indeed engaged in agri-
cultural activities (though 
often unpaid), and is thus 
not entirely idle. 
This category 
includes con-
cerns regarding 
the food se-
curity (strictly 
speaking) of 
Ugandans but 
also worries 
about the 
necessary pro-
ductivity of the 
agricultural sec-
tor (to secure 
food security).
Here I include 
references 
to the ‘youth 
bulge’ (or in 
any case the 
concerns 
regarding the 
growth of the 
young share 
of the popula-
tion), about the 
aging of the 
population in 
the agricultural 
sector.
This category 
comprises the 
social and po-
litical stability 
of Uganda: 
respondents 
expressed their 
concerns about 
the possibility 
for the demo-
graphic reality 
of Uganda to 
result in social 
unrest and for 
the widespread 
youth unem-
ployment to 
cause political 
instability. 
Mainly re-
fers to two 
concerns, 
expressed 
respectively 
by two res-
pondents: 
the lack of 
adequate 
skills and 
education of 
youth and the 
concern for 
Uganda to 
obtain mid-
dle-income 
status.
Table 8. Categories clustering the conceptualisations of the development 
problem
These categories are useful in the identification of trends in the narra-
tives of my respondents, and thus in the identification of the theory of 
change of the various development organisations—both national and 
international.69 
69 I refer to the development organisations listed and described in the 
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I have also calculated the frequency in which development agencies 
made reference to these five categories.70 These categories are not 
mutually exclusive but rather indicative of the emphasis they put on 
one theme rather than the other. Observing the incidence of referenc-
es to these categories, allowed me to deduce the ways in which the 
organisations conceptualised the development problem. The majority 
of organisations (about 65% of the 17 organisations) conceptualise the 
development problem in terms of unemployment. The second major 
concern (47%) is the booming young population and the aging of the 
rural population (Figure 14). Food security and agricultural productivity 
worry about 30% of the organisations. The social and political stability 
of the country are reasons of apprehension for 23% of the organisa-
tions—mainly with reference to the distress deriving from the “youth 
bulge” and youth unemployment. The achievement of the middle-in-
come status and the supposedly inadequate education of the youth 
were only distinctly mentioned in two interviews. 
Conceptualisation of Development Problem
64.7% 29.4% 47% 23.5% 5.9%
Unemployment
Food Security
Demography
Stability
Other
Figure 14. Percentages depict how many organisations out of the total of 17 
organisations mentioned the development problem category.
However, the trend looks different when we look at ‘national’ vs. 
‘international’ organisations (Figure 15). Looking more closely, unem-
ployment concerns all national organisations but only 40% of the 
international organisations. Alternatively, while apprehensions about 
the demographic dividend of the country are widespread among 
international organisations (70%), they are a more minor concern for 
national organisations (14%). Food security and agricultural 
previous section. 
70 In cases in which I have interviewed more than one development 
practitioner per agency, I have only considered the incidence of the men-
tioned categories per agency, as shown in the appendix in this chapter.
YOUTH AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA170
productivity worry national organisations more than international 
organisations (20% vs 43%)—and the same disparity is observed for 
the socio-political stability of Uganda (about 43% for national organi-
sations vs. 10% of international ones). 
Conceptualisation of the Development Problem 
International vs National
40% 70%20% 10% 100% 14.3%42.8% 42.8%
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Figure 15. Percentages depict how many organisations out of the total of 17 
organisations mentioned the development problem category, national vs 
international organisations.
Having identified the trends in the conceptualisation of the develop-
ment problem by development practitioners in all development organ-
isations I accessed, and differences among international and national 
organisations, I continue to the discourse analysis. I will do that by cat-
egory, following an order of importance. 
4.5.1a Unemployment
This concept emerges predominantly in the conceptualisation of the 
development problem among national development organisations 
and public institutions. It is problematised by the respondent below as 
comprising more than ‘formal’ unemployment—which according to 
World Bank (WB, World Bank, 2008/2009) data reaches up to 83% 
of the population in working age. At the Ministry of Gender Labour and 
Social Development, I was told by the Assistant Commissioner of the 
Youth Livelihood Programme that: 
My personal view is that yes [the youth bulge] is a time bomb 
but the problem here in Uganda, when you talk about statistics, 
truly from a realistic perspective, the problem here in Uganda 
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is not unemployment per se, unemployment going by the strict 
definition of ILO, is not that very high. But under-employment. 
There are so many young people who are under employed.71
Besides the time bomb of the youth bulge, what worries the respond-
ent is the dissatisfaction of the young people in Uganda, who are not 
necessarily unemployed –the informal economy is flourishing72– but 
employed below their potential. This is attracting the attention of 
development practitioners and civil servants who are starting to won-
der “how to handle these youths”:
Youth unemployment is a big thing and because of that we have 
so many issues [later in the interview he refers to socio-political 
instability] in the country. That’s why right now what I see every-
body literally is thinking about; how do we handle these youths? 
because they have to be involved in some gainful employment, 
something which will hold them, something which will guide 
them, make them good citizens. But unemployment is a big 
task.73 As a professor at the Makerere College of Agricultural 
and Environmental Sciences, this respondent links the develop-
ment problem of unemployment to that of stability (discussed 
below). Employment is envisioned as tool for social stability. 
4.5.1b Demography
As mentioned above, under this category go all the concerns related to 
the demographic dividend of Uganda’s youth bulge. Often the demo-
graphic phenomenon is described in the development discourse with a 
threatening vocabulary with particular reference being made to the 
problem being a time bomb. This is exemplified in the account below, 
which was extracted from an interview with the Chief of Party of one of 
USAID’s ‘Feed the Future’ programmes: 
This is a time bomb for Uganda. It’s alarming in the sense that if 
you look at the statistics, I mean the demographics, the sheer 
71 This interview was carried out on 20/01/2017
72 World Bank data reports that more than 60% of the economy is in-
formal, accessed on 28/09/2018 on:
http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/understanding-the-informal-econo-
my-in-african-cities-recent-evidence-from-greater-kampala
73 This interview was carried out on 25/01/2017
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number of youth and concentration of specific age group in the 
Uganda population is one where a significant percentage of the 
population is young.74
While the concern with the youth bulge seems to be overwhelmingly 
widespread among development actors, I was curious to hear from 
them whether they thought that this issue would justify a long-term 
focus of the development sector on this topic—or whether it was a 
development trend doomed to fade shortly. Thus, I questioned my 
informants about the longevity of the development trend focusing 
on youths. At a Dutch NGO, the development actor –a programme 
manager– told me that it is the very demographic situation that 
requires such development attention: 
It should at least for now stay, I mean not for now but looking 
at the number of youth in this country, if you don’t do some-
thing it’s going to explode or implode or something.75 
Another Chief of Party at ‘Feed the Future’ responded along the same lines: 
Respondent: The youth will not go; you know the biggest chal-
lenge was in age. Those who are in farming they are 68 years 
old. They will start dying off. Who is going to feed you? So we 
need to attract more youth into agriculture to make them farm 
and provide services and make money to feed the nation. Oth-
erwise we have a time bomb of hunger. (…) The time bomb we 
were fighting was two things. Unemployment and hunger. 
Me: So you mean the time bomb will be youth unemployment or 
aging farmers?
Respondent: The aging farmers with the hunger because they 
will not be able to produce anymore. Having the highest number 
of yout h population in the world, okay in Africa, meaning not 
everybody can be employed.76
74 As explicitly demanded by this actor, I cannot further identify him/
her by specifying the specific programme within Feed the Future for 
which this actor was Chief of Party. This interview was carried out on 
02/02/2017 
75 This interview was carried out on 23/01/2017 
76 Also this respondent explicitly demanded to remain anonymous, so I 
cannot further identify him/her by specifying the specific programme with-
in Feed the Future for which this actor was Chief of Party. This interview 
was carried out on 19/01/2017
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In this fragment of interview, different themes emerge: the develop-
ment trend focusing on youth is expected to last; it is considered to be 
a demographic phenomenon concerning a wide share of the popula-
tion (the ‘bulge’), which is particularly problematic because of the 
unemployment attached and it has implications for the food security of 
the country. The demographic phenomenon is described with an 
alarming tone for two reasons: because in the meantime the farming 
population is aging—therefore affecting food security—and because 
“not everybody can be employed”. 
4.5.1c Food security
Food security emerged in fewer interviews compared to the previous 
themes. The capacity to feed the growing population and even ‘to feed 
Africa’ was a concern that entailed the agricultural productivity and the 
efficiency of agribusiness. At the same time, it is a matter of employ-
ment—showing how development practitioners perceived youths as 
being more interested in engaging in other forms of employment. A 
classic concern was the “boda boda” (motor bicycles which serve as 
informal transport service, see also section below on stability). In sev-
eral interviews and casual conversation this form of employment was 
mentioned as a preferred income-generating strategy to agriculture, 
thereby contributing to rural-urban migration of young males: 
But we are also sure as a nation that there will be food in the 
nation because if everybody runs away from agriculture and 
they go into “boda boda” riding, and they go into gambling, 
sports betting, then who is going to produce the food.77
In this fragment, the respondent –a professor at the Makerere College 
of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences– expresses his worries 
about youths running away from agriculture and thereby endangering 
the agricultural productivity and food security. Interestingly, “boda 
boda” driving is associated to other depraved activities such as gam-
bling and betting—implicitly ascribing agricultural work to the morally 
positive endeavours. 
77 This interview was carried out on 25/01/2017
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At the USAID offices, a respondent –who wished to remain anony-
mous– working within the programme ‘Feed the Future’, argued that 
there are a number of factors concurring to food insecurity in Uganda: 
Respondent: …the average age of Ugandan farmers is now 
67 years old. And definitely 67 years means productivity would 
have reduced. And the farmers who were trained 20 years 
ago are now old to actually go into farming…And that means 
in a long run there will be shortage of food because… unless 
we come out with mechanization, but most of the Ugandan 
farmers still practice the hand hoe method. Mechanization is 
not rampant across there. That’s one. Second one, Uganda 
have the highest youth population in the world.78
Aging population, lack of mechanisation and growing young popula-
tion are, in his views, the major factors of concern for the food secu-
rity of the country. 
4.5.1d Stability
Stability, which (explicitly) concerned more national than international 
development agencies, was explicitly linked to youth unemployment. 
The dissatisfaction and inability of youths to be economically inde-
pendent would, in the narratives of development practitioners, push 
them into criminal activities. At the Ministry of Gender, I was told: 
And in addition to that, these youths when they are not em-
ployed… unemployment causes political instability. At all 
times, they are in need of money and they cannot access it, 
they always keep on breaking into people’s houses at night 
looking for money, at the same time they don’t have money 
to purchase what to use. So, if you empower them to get em-
ployed in agriculture, you are empowering them financially as 
well putting the country’s political stability at rest.79 
The respondent referred to political instability, while actually exempli-
fying the concern with reference to criminality: it seems that in her 
views the political stability is directly linked to purchasing power and 
78 This interview was carried out on 19/01/2017
79 This interview was carried out on 20/01/2017
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safety of the citizens. Agriculture is thus mentioned as a tool for the 
financial empowerment of youths, with the indirect effect of allowing 
socio-political stability to be maintained. From this narrative, it becomes 
clear that the employment of youths in agriculture is (also) used as a 
tool for pursuing a specific political goal, namely political stability. 
Where the threat of political instability becomes a development prob-
lem, agriculture is represented as a political tool. Youths are reserved a 
space of political convenience: employ them to avoid social distress –in 
agricultural business– to contribute to economic growth and food 
security, therefore securing political stability. At an interview at a public 
institution, my respondent stressed the link between unemployment 
and political instability with these words: 
So if you have many involved in work, you certainly get out of 
some demonstrations you know, some agitation you know, 
they get quickly agitated because they lack the money but if 
they have something to do.80
Chaos, riots and criminality as a result of discontent with unemploy-
ment were mentioned in several other interviews—each stressing 
the capacity of agriculture to offer a distraction from political unrest. 
Interestingly, criminality and political instability were considered as 
being part of the same issue, which anyhow is related to the capac-
ity of the government to ensure stability to the country. Between 
2016 and 2017 there have been several episodes of social unrest, 
translating into political instability for Museveni’s government. During 
election times demonstrations and oppositions triggered violent reac-
tion of the police81, and few months later a demonstration in Kasese82 
was repressed with fierce violence. In late 2017 in Kampala, students 
organized demonstrations and strikes83 against the proposed removal 
80 The respondent explicitly asked to remain anonymous with refer-
ence to his/her opinions on this topic. This interview was carried out on 
20/01/2017
81 Aljazeera covered the news of the days preceding elections in 
February 2016: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/uganda-oppo-
sition-leader-arrested-days-elections-160215132155444.html
82 Human Rights Watch issued a special report in 
May 2017: https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/15/
uganda-ensure-independent-investigation-kasese-killings
83 Protests in September 2017 were covered by various news: https://
www.news24.com/Africa/News/ugandan-students-defy-ban-to-protest-
over-presidential-age-limit-20170921
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of the age limit for presidency—which would allow Museveni to remain 
in power. During an interview at a Ugandan farmers’ organisation84, the 
respondent reflected on social unrest: 
One like I have said, it is a threat because when people don’t 
have what to do, in simple terms they say it is a “devil’s work”. 
So I expect high crime rate as a challenge and you know what 
that means, I also expect, these young people can influence 
even, they can be a threat to create some chaos in terms of 
riots and that is also a challenge because the government 
can spend on tear gas trying to calm them down… 
Unemployment and the supposedly consequent high crime rate is 
here referred to as “devil’s work”. The social unrest and government 
repression is envisioned as a risk for the future, thereby justifying 
the necessity of development interventions.
Moreover, the issue of unemployment and instability seem to be 
related to two other concerns: rural-urban migration and “boda-bo-
das”. Both are quite burning issues, yet interestingly have not been 
explicitly referred to in the interviews I collected if only en passent. In 
a policy brief by the Ministry of Agriculture (MAAIF, 2016), these 
issues emerged as being related to one another, as much as they 
seem to have a strong connection to both unemployment and stabil-
ity of the country: 
The participation of youth in the agricultural sector is minimal 
and is partially attributed to the migration of youth from rural 
to urban areas, to engage in small urban based income gen-
erating activities like riding ‘bodaboda’ (motorcycles for hire), 
petty trade and service sector work. The youth prefer to partic-
ipate in activities that offer quick and regular income with less 
risk and yet opportunities for them to cause change in rural 
communities with their increased involvement exist especially if 
they can perceive agriculture as a business while adopting 
commercially viable practices
84 This interview was carried out on 02/02/2017
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For all the issues mentioned in this passage, the solution proposed 
seems to be the engagement of youths in agricultural activities. I 
was surprised that the phenomenon of rural-urban migration had 
not been mentioned in the interviews and only briefly referred to in 
one of the 10 policy briefs I analysed (see section below). 
4.5.1e Other
A few development practitioners mentioned issues as development 
problems in Uganda which do not fit the above-mentioned catego-
ries—despite being closely related to them: the education and skills 
of young Ugandans, and the concern for obtaining the middle-in-
come status by 2020 (mentioned as a problem in itself, rather than 
as an objective—which will be explored in more depth in the para-
graphs below). I here report a somewhat lengthy fragment of an 
interview with one of the Chiefs of Party at USAID’s ‘Feed the Future’ 
programme, which besides problematising the Ugandan education 
system, offers an emblematic example of what it currently lacks: 
There future is their youth so if they are not investing in edu-
cation, you are not investing in the policies actually where you 
can change these patterns making education more accessible, 
making quality education really worthy so there are kids no 
matter what who get the skills, in the long term you have invest-
ed in the young population to be prepared with the necessary 
skills that are of value to private sector. 
(…) I don’t have any drivers for these tractors you know any driv-
ers, because there are no skills to drive these tractors needless 
to say they repair them. I need to bring my drivers skilled from 
Germany, Zimbabwe and South Africa at a huge expense. I am 
dying to get those skills here. (…). Let them know that four inch-
es, which is a measurement that you have been taught in school, 
is relevant when you see precisely seed planted four inches by 
four inches and take them to the classroom here, when you 
get that kid and have him sit for the first time in his life, in the 
huge monster tractor and tell him when you are twenty-five, this 
could be you. That’s the behaviour. 
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In his account, the respondent explains that there is a lack and need for 
skilled labourers who could be employed in the mechanized agricultur-
al enterprises. He suggests that if youths would be educated and 
shown what they could aspire to become (driving a modern “monster” 
tractor), that they could be happily employed in agribusiness. Implicitly, 
it is suggested that operating agricultural machinery is an ideal of suc-
cess—for which only the right behaviour and skills are necessary: that 
is what to invest in, that is the future envisioned for youths and for the 
agricultural sector. In the following section I will analyse more closely 
the narratives around development organisations’ visions for change. 
4.5.2 The vision for change
Considering the variegated conceptualisation of the development 
problem, we might expect an accordingly diversified range of envi-
sioned development goals. Instead, I found a rather homogenous nar-
rative on the ‘vision for change’, which can be summarized in two main 
categories (Table 9): economic growth and agricultural modernisation. 
Moreover, while the objectives between international and national 
organisations varied, there was no substantial difference between the 
vision for change of national and international development 
organisations. 
Economic growth Agricultural modernisation
This category concerns a generic economic 
transformation to achieve the middle-in-
come status (by 2020, as envisioned by the 
president). It is a shift from largely informal 
to a formal economy which ensures taxation 
capacity, and it principally draws from the in-
centivizing of small and large businesses—as 
stated in the National Development Plan II. 
It is a tension towards a “modern” economy, 
an openly neo-liberal one, which would have 
the ‘trickle-down’ capacity of lifting the poor 
from the bottom. 
This category comprises a varied range 
of mostly technical transformation neces-
sary to achieve an idea of modernisation 
in the agricultural sector: mechanization, 
intensification, productivity enhancement 
through agricultural technologies and quality 
inputs. Altogether, it is a radical shift from 
subsistence farming towards a market-led 
agriculture. As described in the previous 
chapter, the ideal for this sector is agribusi-
ness—a neoliberal model for this sector, 
which requires a mindset change for an agri-
preneurial attitude.
Table 9. Main categories summarizing the visions for change of all develop-
ment practitioners interviewed
Below, I will examine the narratives of these two categories. 
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4.5.2a Economic growth
The vision leading development endeavours involving youths and 
agribusiness in Uganda is that of economic growth. This is not so 
surprisingly considering the debated shift from aid to trade (Westen 
& Zoomers, 2014), which prescribes a neoliberal agenda of markets 
liberalisation, as driver of development change. Within this frame-
work, increasing hopes and expectations have been laid on private 
sector initiatives for the rural development of emerging countries. 
This vision is clearly explained in the following fragment from an 
interview with an actor from a private sector development agen-
cy:Because we need to have money in the economy, we need to 
have the tax base increasing and I think the other thing that I would 
like to have is the question that I would love to see …because in 
such a case we need to always is, so when they do that, they make 
money. (…) The more youth registered businesses we have, I think 
the better. It doesn’t mean registration say…right but what does that 
mean, you are counted in the economy and you are moving away 
from an informal economy to a formal economy. You are moving to 
one which recognises this work as a formal agribusiness.85, 86
On the contrary at the Ministry of Agriculture I was told that the 
vision should be that of making people rich not through taxation but 
through boosting the market economy: 
the way I look at it among the economies, I am against a situ-
ation where you over tax people and they don’t have money; 
disposable income. Give people money, make them rich so 
that they can buy so if we empower these youth, we make 
them productive, in the end they will be the market; a huge 
market for east Africa.87The perspective of both respondents, 
which is emblematic for the widespread vision I have recorded 
in most of my interviews, suggests that boosting the formal 
economic growth –particularly through agribusiness– is the 
answer to the development problems of Uganda—particularly 
concerning youths. In his anthropology of international de-
velopment, Mosse (2013, p.237) describes this agenda as an 
85 This interview was carried out on 09/03/2017 
86 the respondent explicitly asked to remain anonymous.
87 This interview was carried out on 06/02/2017
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effort to make the markets work for the poor. This vision lies 
on the assumption that economic growth will have a trick-
le-down effect on unemployment; a mechanism which in his 
analysis of poverty alleviation strategies Mosse (2013, p.238) 
refers to as “bottom of the pyramid capitalism”.
This vision implies a peculiar ideology of success, which was well 
exemplified by one Chief of Party at ‘Feed the Future’: 
Why should I take up providing [agricultural] services in the 
village, why can’t I sit in the bank? That means you need to 
make more money than the guy seated in the bank. That is 
the motivation by greed. Maya is working in the bank, earns 
400 dollars. But you, if you are able to work with 250 farmers, 
or 230 farmers, you make 6000 dollars.88 The respondent 
explicitly lays the accent on greed as drive for success, where 
success is defined in terms of financial success. 
4.5.2b Agricultural modernisation
As described in the previous section, the vision for change in the 
agricultural sector rests on the persuasion that agriculture needs to 
turn from subsistence farming to agribusiness. Moreover, in the view 
of a respondent from the African Development Bank reported below, 
this seems to be the only future perspective that ensures food 
security: 
So that is why the bank is targeting a lot of activities to ensure 
that Africa feeds itself. (…) And so we want to see a situation 
where we could make agriculture instead of being a subsist-
ence type of thing so that it becomes commercial in nature.89
Therefore, there is the need for radical transformation of the agricul-
tural sector—continues the same respondent from the African Devel-
opment Bank: 
… the overall objective of the Bank is to transform the agri-
cultural sector. Not only the youth but the entire agricultural 
88 This interview was carried out on 19/01/2017
89 This interview was carried out on 17/01/2017
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sector. To transform it from the subsistence level the way it is 
into a self-sustaining agricultural business right from produc-
tion up to consumption, value addition, and everything. 
The envisioned transformation entails the industrialization and com-
mercialisation of agriculture. 
4.5.2c Agripreneurship
Agripreneurship, in my analysis, does not emerge as a vision in itself, 
but more as a consequent by-product of the vision for economic 
growth and agricultural modernisation. It is a means to an end, rather 
than an end it of itself. However, as it emerges from the fragments 
reported below, it becomes an objective of development pro-
grammes to make sure farmers turn into agripreneurs: 
Actually we no longer look at farmers as farmers: farmers are 
entrepreneurs. So the only issue is to give them an opportuni-
ty to do what they do in a more business oriented manner 
which we call farming as a business. So, yes they might be in 
primary agriculture but they have to do it as a business…to 
make sure whatever they do is profitable. (…) It’s for all the 
population. Everyone involving in agriculture should do for a 
market perspective not for the sake of it because if you use a 
market perspective90
This respondent, executive director of a Ugandan agribusiness incu-
bation centre, spells out what can be expected from an agripreneur. 
The personal and professional qualities of an agripreneur are envi-
sioned within the neoliberal framework which also shapes the 
visions for change previously analysed. These qualities are exempli-
fied in the fragment below, which is extracted from an interview with 
a development actor working at AgriProFocus in Kampala:
Coming back to your question of entrepreneurship, I know 
there is a question of risk taking … That this person is not 
afraid of introducing something new into business, you get? 
90 To protect the anonymity of the respondent I will not specify 
the name of the incubation centre. This interview was carried out on 
23/01/2017
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And I think purely that’s the characteristic of an entrepreneur 
that every time he improves. Every time he improves. Because 
of the dynamics of demands and supplies, the forces of 
demand and supply. So if this person is truly, truly an entre-
preneur, you will see some of these things happening on his 
farm or in whatever business he is doing. But if someone is 
doing it because there is no option, he will tell you I have done 
it for 5 years but he is doing the same thing over the years. 
Now, that’s the difference between an entrepreneur and 
someone doing it for fun or as a hobby (…) yeah, that’s what I 
was saying. So the element of competitiveness, of a competi-
tiveness mind is very typical of an entrepreneur.91
4.5.3 The pathway to change
In this section I explore the envisioned strategies of the various 
development organisations, as they transpire from practitioners’ 
narratives. Within the framework of theory of change, this part of the 
analysis entails the understanding of the tools and tactics that con-
stitute the practical enactment of the development schemes. It is 
determinant in defining the type of development approach that each 
agency operationalises for their vision for change. In the section 
below I aim to outline the conceptualisations of the organisations’ 
pathway to change through an analysis of the narratives. 
4.5.3a Conceptualisation of pathway to change—all
A number of themes emerged from the inductive coding of the inter-
views with development actors. Table 10 lists the most frequent, 
while Figure 16 reports their frequency. The strategies that were 
most frequently mentioned were ‘capacity building’ and ‘mindset 
change’. ‘Market linkages’ is considered to be the second-favourite 
development tool; ‘organising’ and ‘agricultural inputs’ were almost 
equally popular. The funding of farmers through start-up capital was 
only envisioned as a minor development tool.
91 This intervie was carried out on 21/01/2017
CHAPTER 4—AIDNOGRAPHY 183
Funding Capacity buil-
ding
Organising Mindset 
change
Market linkages Ag. inputs
Providing a 
start-up ca-
pital directly 
to farmers 
or groups of 
farmers.
Training, 
capacity 
building, 
accountancy, 
business mo-
dels.
Organising 
youths into 
groups or (in)
formal coo-
peratives.
Change 
towards a 
business 
oriented 
agricultural 
enterprise, 
therefore 
turning 
youths into 
agripre-
neurs.
Getting youths 
in touch with 
(inter)national 
private sector 
actors.
Technology, 
mechaniza-
tion, seeds, 
chemicals. 
Table 10. Conceptualisation of pathway to change (themes)
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Figure 16. Percentages depict how many organisations out of the total of 
17 organisations mentioned the pathway to change category.
However, when dividing such results between the responses of nation-
al and international development agencies, quite substantial differ-
ences emerge (Figure 17). The most significant difference seems to 
concern funding and organisation, which was not considered as a rel-
evant pathway by international organisations as much as it was by 
national ones. While capacity building and mindset change were 
equally important both among international and among national devel-
opment agencies, they were both significantly more important for 
national organisations than international ones. The provision and 
investment in agricultural inputs was considered slightly more impor-
tant by national than by international organisations. 
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Conceptualisation of the Development Problem 
International vs National
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Figure 17. Percentages depict how many organisations out of the total of 17 
organisations mentioned the pathway to change category, national vs interna-
tional organisations 
The differentiation in the popularity of some development tools and 
strategies over others between national and international agencies 
suggests that there is a variety of approaches to the operationalisation 
of visions for development change. I will explore the different 
approaches in the next section. In the remaining of this section I will 
analyse the narratives that were emerging for each of these themes. 
4.5.3b Funding
The theme of funding was mentioned as a strategy for change only 
by two national development agencies, namely the two Ministries I 
approached. At the Ministry of Agriculture, a civil servant in mana-
gerial position explained that the rationale behind the provision of 
start-up capital is that of empowering youths to be more productive in 
their agricultural business: “And also within the strategy we are coming 
up with, there is an element of giving youth capital; start-up capital or 
giving them equipment to start engaging in production. That is what 
we are talking about. That is the [agricultural] production part of it”.92 
While one regional implementer of the Youth Livelihood Programme 
(YLP) explained the practicalities of their strategy: “The fund is always 
given, if you are given a fund to utilize within one year and you refund 
92 This interview was carried out on 13/02/2017, with a civil servant 
who asked to remain anonymous. 
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the money, that one will be without any interest, but now when you 
enter into the second year without paying back the money, that is when 
they give them five percent [interest rates].”
These practical aspects, which may seem straightforward microcre-
dit strategies, have been originating crucial misunderstandings with 
the beneficiaries of the programme because rural development pro-
grammes providing financial assistance were until now on a grant 
basis: “That’s why you see at the moment we are finding difficulties 
to recover the money”—told me the same YLP implementer. Howev-
er, the trouble recovering the capital invested in groups of agripre-
neurs was not only originating from a naive misunderstanding about 
the terms and conditions attached to the fund: there are very politi-
cal strings attached to the implementation of this strategy. As I found 
out later during my interviews with young beneficiaries of the YLP, 
funding was often distributed in times of elections (especially in the 
Central and Western regions). However, a civil servant in managerial 
position at the Ministry of Agriculture93 –reflecting on the YLP– 
went even further with his hypothesis on the political mandates of 
funding agripreneurs: 
What I am saying is that, like youth livelihood program, the aim 
was to give the money to the youth in terms of capital, I mean 
in terms of capital or train them, give them skills and then give 
them equipment and then they pay for what they have got 
within a specified period of time. But then you find that if it is 
politicized and they say “no this thing is free”, you know there 
are some politicians that go around, even if government pro-
grams are well intended, they take it the other way. They say, 
no, no, don’t pay, this is what the government has just given 
you… No, it should not be politicized. Bad politics [i.e. corrup-
tion] that’s what I mean. It must have a government way and 
everybody’s will because it is like a loan, once they get it; they 
have to pay it back. It’s like a revolving fund.94 It is interesting 
to notice how the respondent strikes an association between 
government resources and free (political) money: the previous 
93 This interview was carried out on 06/02/2017
94 This interview was carried out on 13/02/2017, with a civil servant 
who asked to remain anonymous. 
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programmes investing in agriculture were indeed on a grant 
basis (“free money”), and thus known to have been exploited 
for corrupt political purposes. The idea of the “revolving fund”, 
which would jeopardize corrupt attempts at abusing grants 
for farmers, is not welcome by some civil servants doing “bad 
politics”. 
4.5.3c Capacity building
Interestingly, capacity building was a particularly popular tool among 
the international and national development agencies alike. At a 
grass root national agency, I was told that the capacity building con-
cerned mainly financial skills: “so now, we are building capacity in 
terms of them knowing okay, in terms of business plans, in terms of 
financial management, they don’t have financial systems so you find 
they just write that today I have bought this”.95
In any case, it is clear that the skills which are acquired through 
capacity building strategies are specifically focusing on technical 
agricultural business, as highlighted by the manager of the SKY pro-
gramme, a Dutch funded programme for youths in agribusiness in 
Uganda, implemented by an Italian NGO: “well we designed model 
within the system that is called earn as you learn so as they learn, as 
they are getting skilled, they are also earning money…And this money 
is then kept by the agribusiness and at the end its dispatched to each 
and they can use it as a start-up.” The model here described with the 
appealing narrative of a “win-win” situation sheds light on an important 
factor of capacity building: it serves the private sector hiring or provid-
ing the training as much as the ‘beneficiary’. In fact, the beneficiary of 
capacity building is formed to develop those specific skills that are 
functional to agribusiness private sector company. At the African 
Development Bank, capacity building was described in terms of “incu-
bation”: “the programme is mainly focusing on capacity building for the 
youth in terms of the incubation, changing their mindset and designing 
projects that they are interested in and linking them to financing 
[opportunities]”.96 The “incubation of youths” through capacity building 
is reminiscent of the social gardening described by Scott (1998, p.346), 
95 The development actor I interviewed expressly asked to remain 
anonymous. This interview was carried out on 23/01/2017 
96 This interview was carried out on 17/01/2017
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in which the ‘objects’ of development programmes become Standard-
ised human subjects “uniform in their needs and even interchangeable 
(…) they have none of the particular, situated, and contextual attributes 
that one would expect of any population”.
Moreover, the functionalism of the capacity building is common also 
to development agencies that were not directly working with market 
linkages. So a regional implementer of the YLP explained to me that: 
“First of all these youths are always, before we give them the fund-
ing, they are always given training… we get their leaders, chairman 
of the group, the secretary and the treasurer of the group to go for 
some training. We train them on record keeping, we train them on 
group dynamics, then also we train them on procurement process-
es.”97 As it emerges from this account, the capacity building is also 
necessary for the Ministry to be able to recover the money invested: 
having trained the youths on how to manage their loan, they expect 
to be more assured of retrieving the sum. 
4.5.3d Organising
This strategy was considered relevant by all development agencies, 
but particularly the national ones. This strategy entails both the 
gathering of youths into business groups or cooperatives, as the 
formalization (subject to taxation) or registration of the group (in the 
record books of the local authorities). From the narratives, it emerges 
that the organising of youths into groups has a direct link to the viability 
and productivity of the business, as explained by a development actor 
from a grass-root farmers’ organisation (who asked to remain 
anonymous): 
Now we are strengthening them and growing their capacity 
into business entities which are cooperatives and companies. 
So they aren’t registered either, currently, most of them are 
community based…Now we are building the capacity such 
that they can now move from a non-profit orientation to a 
business orientation and we are going to do that into co-
operatives so these groups that we are working with under 
this project, we are now building their capacity so that they 
97 This interview was carried out at the regional offices 
in Gulu on 07/04/2017
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go into cooperative which is a business entity according to 
Uganda, or form companies.98
The respondent associates the business mentality of the agripreneurs 
in the business with the organisation into cooperatives—and even the 
very formation of the cooperative is subject to capacity building. In fact, 
it seems that the group formation is a component of the same strategy 
as capacity-building itself, as it leads to same objective of adopting a 
business mindset change and acquiring skills to perform productively 
in their agribusiness.
4.5.3e Mindset change
Mindset change was together with ‘capacity building’ the most popular 
strategy for development, particularly among national development 
agencies. The ideology implied by this strategy is loaded with moral 
values –the right values– which are envisioned to be necessary to pro-
mote change. Within this discourse, development is considered as 
modernisation; and is the adoption of the ““right” values, namely, those 
held by the white minority (…) those embodied in the ideal of the culti-
vated European” (Escobar, 2012, p.43). Development is a form of 
socio-economic engineering upon the tabula- rasa of non-places of a 
generic underdeveloped country—to be developed according to con-
structed systems of development knowledge. The ‘right values’ are 
systematized in truth regimes which “(…) represent the Third World as 
a child in need of adult guidance”—a sort of ‘secular theory of salvation’ 
(ibid: 30) that infantilise the global south. 
One Chief of Party at ‘Feed the Future’ insisted that it really boils down 
to adopting the right behaviour towards agriculture to make it an 
income-generating business: 
In that way, you first need to talk to them, it’s a behaviour change 
thing. As I said, motivation is by greed. If they are aware that they 
will make 10000 dollars a year even irrespective of what age I 
am, I will do anything to make ten thousand dollars. So age is not 
a barrier for the youth. We need 18 to 35. It’s a concept mindset 
change that we must make money. and that is the drive.99 
98 This interview was carried out on 19/01/2017
99 This interview was carried out on 19/01/2017
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At the Ministry of Agriculture, I was told by a civil servant in managerial 
position that having the right business mindset entails a radically dif-
ferent approach than subsistence agriculture, to the extent that: “that’s 
where they get their income but now we are saying that: can you now 
deliberately grow it as an income generating [activity]? You eat little 
but you grow with a mind of saying that you are growing to sell”. In the 
words of the respondent, agribusiness is prioritized even over food 
security. 
4.5.3f Market linkages
Particularly dear to international development agencies, this strate-
gy for change implies a belief in the power of the private sector to 
drive development change—within what is described to be a clearly 
neoliberal development paradigm. At the Ministry of Agriculture the 
director of a department explained that they adopt the strategy of 
“linking them to the market, to the other value chain actors; like seed 
and input, dealers then may be if there is a mechanization unit which 
is hiring out. (…) That’s what we are talking about and we link to the 
traders”.100 And again, the CEO of a Ugandan service provision compa-
ny, AKORION, collaborating with a bilateral donor, made the role of the 
private sector was made clear: “one of the systems which we use is 
called a market driven system. What we mean… like we are private 
market people right, so I am driven by what the market wants”.101 On 
the one hand the agripreneurs are linked-up to market actors to devel-
op their agribusiness further. On the other hand it is the market itself to 
determine—through their linkage to the agripreneurs—the direction of 
the development of agribusiness: the one is profiting from the other. It 
becomes clear than that development is also strictly tied to the dynam-
ics of supply and demand, as explained by a Chief of Party at ‘Feed the 
Future’: 
I think is about change to improve what aspects of that frame-
work but not necessarily any longer applicable to the reality 
of the business and because markets are dynamic; …private 
sector if there is something that knows how to do is they 
know how to adopt the conditions of the market. That’s what 
100 This interview was carried out on 27/01/2017 
at the headquarters in Entebbe.
101 This interview was carried out on 19/01/2017
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supply and demand is all about, it’s the ability to really see, 
you know, based on those markets, how does your business 
need to adapt? So, market trends dictate how opportunities 
happen and that’s why you want to have a voice and say “hey, 
let’s go at this together, policy makers and economic clusters”. 
This is where we need government to invest time, research to 
assist to facilitate this to happen. And you know, things like 
incentives that promote, develop private sector that way work 
better when the design of which incentive takes into account 
precisely these needs. 
From this fragment of the interview, it becomes clear that the incen-
tive of market linkages is a strategy to operationalise the vision for 
change which foresees the engagement of the agricultural sector in 
a (global) neoliberal economy. It seems that the role of development 
agencies (in this narrative, including the basic functions of the govern-
ment itself) is to promote the wellbeing of the private sector—whereby 
agripreneurs should be trained to adapt to. The respondent foresees a 
collaboration of development stakeholders to adopt the same devel-
opment approach: a market-driven development strategy to boost 
agribusiness. In fact, in his vision, it is a radical change of development 
framework—with a strong belief in the power of private sector. 
4.5.3g Agricultural inputs
A rather technical strategy for change, this category particularly 
refers to the tools necessary to make agriculture ‘modern’—as 
described in the second category analysed in the section on the 
‘vision for change’. The framework in which the agricultural inputs 
were promoted, were mostly business oriented, as explained the 
CEO of AKORION102: 
You can start with the farmer, provide them the right seed, 
train them how to plant, do spray for them, provide them ba-
sically production services to farmers so that you can contin-
ue getting continuous income throughout the value chain or 
even the season. So one of the characteristics is like really 
business oriented. 
102 This interview was carried out on 19/01/2017
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The agricultural inputs referred to in this category are, first of all, tech-
nologies and machineries, which would make agriculture attractive for 
Ugandan youths—as stated by the professor at the Makerere College 
of Agricultural and Environmental Sciences, reflecting on the Strategy 
for Youths he was elaborating with the Ministry of Agriculture: 
So that was another perspective altogether. And I think it’s 
one of the reason why most of them are detesting agriculture. 
So one thing we are pushing for is mechanization. All people 
who love agriculture in this country will talk about mechani-
zation because that’s the way to go…You cannot attract the 
youth with the hoe. They wouldn’t.103 
More explicitly, the mechanization which is seen as necessary strategy 
for the modernisation of the agricultural sector, include a list of techni-
cal elements, mentioned by a respondent in a grass-root national 
organisation (who asked to remain anonymous): 
That comes with like access to finance as I said, we are guar-
anteed a market through contracts, so we are the ones look-
ing for the different buyers such that these members can 
produce and have markets but they need things related to 
mechanization. Tractors, irrigation systems, agricultural in-
surance, now if we get some people who can ensure these 
farmers and off take some of these risks, so now, that agro 
entrepreneur in future we want is that person who has the 
right behaviour as far as business is concerned, the right at-
titude, a business mind, the right skills, the right knowledge, 
the right values and is surrounded by resources in terms of 
if he need the machines, he has the machinery, if it is irriga-
tion, he is not depending on rain because now they are being 
struck by drought.104
As it emerges from this account, the provision or support of agricultur-
al inputs for agribusiness is a development realm of technical sup-
port—and very much market oriented. The very future of the agribusi-
ness depends –together with the right knowledge and skills– on the 
103 This interview was carried out on 25/01/2017
104 This interview was carried out on 19/01/2017
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capability of adopting the right inputs for agribusiness. At BRAC, an 
international private sector development agency, this rationale 
became clear: 
if you buy seeds from here, and how do you sell them, whom 
do you sell them to how to target clients, at what price can 
you offer the seeds, so that they, they don’t really charge the 
farmers higher prices so that they if they charge them higher 
prices, they can escape. Farmers can go to other shops. 
In this way, agricultural inputs allow agripreneurs to earn more—and 
thereby be ‘successful’ according to the neoliberal definition of success. 
4.5.4 Targeting
A question that remains un-answered is: who is going to be the benefi-
ciary and implementer of the development efforts described within the 
theories of change of the development agencies I interviewed? It 
seems clear, also considering the prompting of my questions (regard-
ing development programmes for youths in agribusiness), that the tar-
get is youth (see Figure 18)—while and only the minority of respondents 
thought it should be a structural investment in the agricultural sector. 
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Figure 18. Percentages depict how many organisations out of the total of 17 
organisations mentioned the target category for development programmes
Why focus on the youths (the unemployed) themselves? According to 
respondents, targeting youths is a strategy relying on the assumption 
that youths are intrinsically innovative and energetic—and therefore 
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can play the role of change agents and drivers of economic growth. As 
a development actor working at AgriProFocus in Kampala told me: 
we have considered youth as the priority and so they are on 
the list of the top agenda for, for our strategic plan. So, in our 
strategic plan, we have prioritized youth as the most innova-
tive and energetic group of people that can be the change 
agents and drivers of economic transformation especially in 
the agri-, the agrifood sector. So, we prioritize youth effective 
2017—2022 in our strategic plan. 
Having demarcated the rationale for targeting the development 
efforts towards youths, the question remains whether the programmes 
potentially target the whole share of the population between 18 and 35 
(broadest definition of youths, including all age brackets) or only a part 
of it. I encountered both possibilities in the targeting approaches of the 
development agencies I have interviewed (Table 11), although most 
organisations used a selected approach (Figure 19): 
Targeting ALL Targeting SELECTED
Blanket approach—ideally reaching all 
possible interested youths, currently in 
or out of agribusiness.
Targeting a designated number of youths who 
are interested and/or respond to given require-
ments—often already engaged in agribusiness.
Table 11. Targeting youths (rationales)
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Figure 19. Percentages depict how many organisations out of the total of 17 
organisations mentioned the targeting strategy for development programmes
At AgriProFocus, the approach of targeting selected youth, was 
explained to me as having a market-oriented rationale: 
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…the idea is that you target those youths who already have 
been active either with land in the production, or in the market-
ing or in the value addition. It’s not like you are trying to get more 
youths who are doing other things maybe subsistence farming 
or whatever else to do agribusiness. You are focusing on those 
who are already doing it. yeah, to do it better…we are identify-
ing, we are focusing at least from 18 to 35 age bracket and then 
youth who are already motivated, who already appreciate that 
they can do, they can make it.105
The goal of this agency is supporting those youths who are already 
in the agribusiness sector to develop the business further. The 
selection requirements are thus strictly bond to the rationale behind 
the vision for change of the organisation—agricultural commercialisa-
tion. At a multilateral development agency, I was told a similar strate-
gy– investing in few, selected agripreneurs –with the purpose of 
championing the ones who are already successful and through their 
empowerment expect a trickle-down effect on the rest of the society, 
as a development actor at FAO explained: “see how best I can support 
them and help use those people to change the others. (…) Even if they 
are just 20%, I use them to become game changers in society. Empow-
er them, train them, give them the necessary capacity, expose them 
and use them to be game changers of the rest of the country”.106 The 
trickle-down effect was really perceived to be a promising trick: “If you 
become a successful entrepreneur and you employ ten people, wow!”.107
In contrast, government ministries did not target selected groups. At 
the Ministry of Agriculture this approach was explained to me by one 
of the principal economists: 
Respondent: but now this time ‘round, we want to target the 
youth. You know the youth are scattered all over, they are not in a 
specific part of the value chain, they are scattered and you know 
they are just disguising because of the resources which are 
105 This interview was carried out on 21/02/2017
106 This respondent, responsible for the coordination and development 
of policies for the support of Ugandan youths, explicitly asked to remain 
anonymous, therefore I cannot further specify what his position was. This 
interview was carried out on 20/01/2017
107 This interview was carried out on 23/01/2017
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required in this. Now, the focus is empowering the youth to 
empower them to become agri-business leaders, to carry out 
activities of agri-business along the value chain. This time ‘round, 
it’s not focusing on those successful people but we are looking 
at people who are willing and able to take activities along the val-
ue chain which are the youth in particular… our population, 70% 
are youth, young people so you need to empower them because 
if you don’t empower them at this age. 
Me: So the idea is to empower the majority?
Respondent: Yes the majority which are the youth specifically108 
The rationale is rather different: targeting all the youth who are 
willing and able, the majority of the population in working age—
assuming they only need to be empowered with start-up capital, 
to unlock the potential of Ugandan agribusiness. This approach 
also entails targeting the youth as a separate social category, to 
enable them to become a generation of agribusiness leaders. In 
fact, this targeting strategy does not focus on supporting val-
ue-chain specific agribusiness activities, but rather assumes an 
intrinsic capacity of the youths to make agribusiness successful, 
provided they are empowered with start-up capital. 
4.6 Clustering different approaches
There are different approaches to solve the development problem, as 
emerges from the theory of change analysis outlined above. Different 
strategies have emerged, with an interesting differentiation between 
national and international development agencies. From the analysis of 
the pathway to change, there seems to be a substantial difference 
between agencies targeting selected youths or all of them, and those 
providing funding or rather market linkages. Here it is possible to iden-
tify two approaches: one that is more private-sector drive and orient-
ed, and another that is driven by the public sector. In the table below 
(Table 12), I have summarized the characteristics of the two develop-
ment approaches:
108 This interview was carried out on 06/02/2017
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Private-sector (PS) approach Public sector approach
—Selected (few) number of agripreneurs
—Working with groups or individuals
—Sampling: mobilization through (PS) com-
pany structures
—Implementation through (PS) company
—Providing: market linkages, inputs (seeds, 
chemicals), training/capacity building and 
ready market
—Getting potentially all Ugandan youths 
on board
—Working with groups
—Sampling: project-based application 
through government structures
—Implementation through government 
structures
—Providing start-up capital
Table 12. Development approaches (private sector vs public)
The figure below (Figure 20) gives an indication of the development 
approaches adopted by the 17 development organisations I have inter-
acted with, where the category ‘other’ comprises agencies adopting 
in-between approaches. The distribution of the agencies per approach 
shows a homogeneously spread sampling of the agencies. 
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Figure 20. Percentages depict how many organisations out of the total of 17 
are public sector, private-sector driven or other organisations
Taking a closer look at the distribution of national and international 
organisations sheds light on interesting trends in the preferences of the 
agencies. Of the organisations that had adopted a private-sector driv-
en approach, the wide majority (83%) were international. Of the agen-
cies that had chosen a public-sector approach, the majority (60%) 
were Ugandan. The organisations that had adopted a mixed approach 
(in the category ‘other’), were equally national and international.
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International vs National
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Figure 21. Percentages depict how many organisations out of the total of 17 
are public sector, private-sector driven or other type of organisations, 
national vs international. 
The preference of international development agencies for a pri-
vate-sector oriented approach confirms the general shift in the inter-
national development cooperation from aid to trade, which was men-
tioned in section 4.4b concerning the vision for change. 
4.7 On paper: the development policies for youths in agribusiness
This section is aimed to verify that the views expressed by develop-
ment practitioners reflected the views of their agencies. These poli-
cies papers do not constitute my primary data. As the main goal of the 
analysis was to verify the representativeness of the theories of change 
that emerged from the interviews with development practitioners, I 
adopted the same analytical tool of theory of change described above. 
I analysed the narratives in the policy documents with axial coding on 
Atlas.ti, using specific categories of discourse which had emerged in 
the analysis of the interviews. 
For each category, which was a step in the ToC analytical frame-
work, I explored the narratives responding to the codes that more 
strongly emerged from the ToC analysis of the interviews (Table 13). 
In fact, I wanted to double-check each the representativeness of the 
responses emerging from the interviews for each code. 
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Development 
problem
Vision for change Pathway to change Targeting
Unemployment Economic growth Funding Targeting all
Demography Agricultural modernisation Capacity building Targeting selected
Food Security Organising
Stability Mindset change
Other Marketing
Agricultural inputs
Table 13. Codes that emerged from the ToC analysis of the interviews
Below, I portray an overview of the theories of change of the develop-
ment organisations as they emerge from the narrative analysis of a 
selected number of policy papers around the theme of youths in agri-
business. The documents I analysed were selected for the representa-
tiveness of the peculiar approach, namely where the public versus pri-
vate-sector driven approaches stand out more clearly. More importantly, 
these policies are the framework of those programmes which imple-
mentation I have evaluated (see chapter 6). As for the public sector, I 
have compiled a list of 5 development policies, strategic plans and report 
which feature the government theory of change (ToC) for the country as 
a whole; the ToC of the Ministry of Gender for what concerns youth poli-
cies (namely, the Youth Livelihood Programme, YLP) and the ToC of the 
Ministry of Agriculture for what entails the development strategy for the 
agricultural sector and the role youths should play in it. Regarding the 
development policy framework for programmes which are more driven 
and focused on the role of the private sector, I focused on the USAID 
programme ‘Feed the Future’ and the Dutch-funded SKY project imple-
mented by the Italian NGO AVSI. The only exception being the document 
of Youth Watch 2012, which I selected mostly because of the overview it 
gives on the specificities of the young share of the Ugandan population. 
Just to clarify the ordering of public policies, let me refer to the Census 
(UBOS, Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014, p.5) as it states the hierarchy 
and logic of the public administration system guiding the development 
efforts of the Ugandan public institutions: 
Uganda’s economy is guided by the National Development Plan. 
The country is now implementing her second National Development 
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plan (NDP II) which is designed to propel the economy towards mid-
dle income status by 2020 in line with the Vision 2040. The NDP is 
implemented through Sector Investment Plans (SIPs), Local Gov-
ernment Development Plans (LGDPs), Annual work plans and 
Budgets of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs). The 
NDP II also seeks to leverage the International and Regional Frame-
works such as Africa Agenda 2063 and the Post 2015 Development 
Agenda to exploit growth opportunities.
Below (Table 14) is a list of the policy briefs, strategies and reports I have 
analysed—and which I generally refer to as policy briefs or documents: 
Sector Organisation and programme Policy papers
Public sector Ministry of Gender, Labor and 
Social Development - Youth 
Livelihood Programme 
YLP Periodic update on progress in 
mplementation—31 August 2017
Second National Development Plan 
(NDPII) –2015/16–2019/20
National Population and Housing 
Census—2014 Main Report
Uganda Vision 2040—approved in 
2007
Ministry of Agriculture, Animal 
Industries and Fisheries
Agriculture Sector Strategic Plan 
2015/16—2019/20—April 2016
Private-sector 
driven
USAID—Feed the Future, Youth 
Leadership in Agriculture Ac-
tivities 
Feed the Future, 2016 PROGRESS 
REPORT - Growing Prosperity for a 
Food-Secure Future
Youth and Agriculture in Uganda: An 
Assessment. Combining agriculture 
improvements and youth devel-
opment shows promise for both. 
October 2014
AVSI—SKY project, funded by 
the Dutch Embassy
Presentation for Dutch Embassy: 
Skilling Youths for Employment in 
Agribusiness (SKY) - A Private Pub-
lic Partnership approach in skilling 
and job creation in Uganda
AVSI Foundation proposal to The 
Embassy of the Kingdom of Nether-
lands for funding the Skilling Youth 
for Employment in Agribusiness 
(SKY)—November 2015
BRAC & MasterCard Foundation Youth Watch 2012—Problem or 
Promise? Harnessing Youth Poten-
tial in Uganda
Table 14. Policy briefs, strategies and reports
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Below I report the analysis of the codes for each ToC category, some 
emphasizing the consistency of ToC narratives of development prac-
titioners and policy papers, and some (minority) which showed some 
degree of variation. As for the narrative analysis of the interviews, 
the categories and codes were not used as mutually-exclusive clas-
sifications, but are rather observed as importance and attention giv-
en to certain topics (codes within the categories). 
4.7.1 Development problem
The development problem has been framed in a more extensive and 
detailed way in the policy documents than in the interviews—but strik-
ingly reflect a consistency with the visions of the development actors. 
Although I have not developed the analysis of the policies and guide-
lines of all the development organisations I encountered in the field, I 
report below a comparison between the trends in the answers of 
development practitioners and the framing of the development prob-
lem in the 10 policy documents I have analysed. This comparison is 
meant as an indication of the consistency I wanted to investigate: it 
should not be treated as an absolute result in itself but rather as a sug-
gestion that the opinions of my interviewees were generally consistent 
with the views expressed in the policy frameworks. 
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Figure 22. Percentages depict how many organisations out of the total of 17 
organisations mentioned the development problem category, during inter-
views vs in policy papers. 
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As exemplified in the figure above (Figure 22), there is a substantial 
consistency in the narratives of development practitioners and their 
organisations as with what concerns the conceptualisation of the 
development problem. The major discrepancy regards the category 
‘other’, which mainly refers to the lack of skills and adequate education 
of youths and the economic condition of Uganda as a ‘least developed 
country’: more attention to these issues was given in the policy papers 
I analysed than in the interviews I recorded. The same goes for ‘stabili-
ty’ and ‘food security’, which were granted greater attention in policy 
papers than in the interviews. This could be explained as a variation 
that originates from the broader spectrum of possible conceptualis-
ation of the development problems of Uganda, particularly considering 
the fact that the government policies guiding the implementation of the 
YLP are broader than main concerns about youths and agribusiness. 
The issue of youth unemployment was described as a burning devel-
opment issue in all the policy briefs I have analysed, with a rhetoric 
similar to the one used in this fragment from the USAID assessment on 
Youth and Agriculture in Uganda (Butler & Kebba, 2014, p.7):
It is clear from all available data that Ugandan youth are strug-
gling to transition into the formal workforce, with the labour mar-
ket able to absorb only 80,000 new workforce entrants out of 
the 400,000 youth entering the labour market each year. Weak 
demand for workers, coupled with a lack of access to finance or 
to other resources such as land, provides youth with very few 
pathways to enter formal work, either at an existing workplace or 
a start-up enterprise of their own making. 
The text is underpinned with references to numeric facts and figures 
and resonates as assertive and sound. 
4.7.2 Vision for change
In regards to the vision for change, there was again a strong consistency 
between the views expressed by the development practitioners I inter-
viewed and those expressed in the policy documents I analysed. In fact, 
economic growth and agricultural modernisation were clearly stated in 
the documents I examined as the main goals of development attention. 
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Possibly the brief that had most ambitious development goals was the 
Vision 2040 (GoU, Government of Uganda, 2007, p.IV), which “is con-
ceptualised around strengthening the fundamentals of the economy to 
harness the abundant opportunities around the country”. More specifi-
cally, as with what concerns the agricultural sector, the same policy brief 
(ibid, p.45) states that:
102. Uganda aspires to transform the agriculture sector from 
subsistence farming to commercial agriculture. This will make 
agriculture profitable, competitive and sustainable to provide 
food and income security to all the people of Uganda. It will also 
create employment opportunities along the entire commodity 
value chain of production, processing and marketing.
The Vision 2040 was really intended to be a guiding principle and 
framework for all development activities, both for the public sector as 
for (inter)national development agencies, and therefore maintained a 
rhetoric that allows for the broad scope of the brief. 
Curiously, the issue of employment (particularly of youths) was men-
tioned as a development goal in itself—while in the interviews it emerged 
more as a development problem (unemployment) to be solved, rather 
than being framed as an ideal vision for the future of Uganda. However, 
for how strongly emphasized in the policy documents, it was referred to 
as instrumental to the economic growth of the country. Either way, 
employment was mentioned in development policies of both national 
and international agencies. 
4.7.3 Pathway to change
The analysis of the 10 development policies I selected has highlighted a 
certain level of discrepancy between the interviews and the documents 
(Figure 23). 
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Figure 23. Percentages depict how many organisations out of the total of 17 
organisations mentioned the pathway to change category, during interviews 
vs in policy papers. 
While ‘capacity building’, ‘organising’ and ‘agricultural inputs’ have 
been reported with rather coherent consistency in both datasets, oth-
er categories were talked about with different levels of importance. 
However, as for ‘funding’, it mainly has to do with the over-representa-
tion of public sector policies, which are the development agencies 
investing in this development tool; on the contrary the sample of inter-
views had a majority of development practitioners from non-public 
organisations, which preferred other pathways to change. The same 
goes for the category of ‘market linkages’: this tool was preferred by 
non-public development agencies, which were under-represented in 
the sample of policy documents analysed (in comparison with the 
sample of interviews). 
The YLP reminds us both of the vision for change as of the pathway to 
obtain such development objectives in clear and ambitious tones: 
The Programme Development Objective (PDO) of YLP is to em-
power the target youth in Uganda to harness their socio-eco-
nomic potential and increase self-employment opportunities 
and income levels.
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(i) Specific Objectives
ǑIdǑegdk^YZǑndji]Ǒl^i]ǑbVg`ZiVWaZǑkdXVi^dcVaǑh`^aahǑVcYǑiddaǑ`^ihǑ
for self-employment and job creation.
ǑIdǑegdk^YZǑÑcVcX^VaǑhjeedgiǑidǑZcVWaZǑi]ZǑndji]ǑZhiVWa^h]Ǒ>c-
come Generating Activities (IGAs).
ǑIdǑegdk^YZǑi]ZǑndji]Ǒl^i]ǑZcigZegZcZjgh]^eǑVcYǑa^[ZǑh`^aahǑVhǑVcǑ
integral part of their livelihoods.
ǑIdǑegdk^YZǑndji]Ǒl^i]ǑgZaZkVciǑ`cdlaZY\ZǑVcYǑ^c[dgbVi^dcǑ[dgǑ
attitudinal change (positive mindset change). (Ministry of Gender, 
2017, p.3)
In this passage, several development tools are mentioned: firstly 
‘capacity building’ (through the teaching of ‘marketable skills’); then 
‘funding’ as a tool for the generation of ‘income generating activities’ 
(i.e. economic growth); and lastly the building of ‘life skills’ for youths to 
be able to change their attitudes towards a positive mindset—which 
would supposedly help them towards employment. 
Interestingly, the development tool of ‘capacity building’ is linked in the 
USAID assessment on Youth in Agriculture (Butler & Kebba, 2014, 
p.54) as a set of skills that would allow youths to ‘be their own boss’ and 
thereby become ‘agripreneurs’: 
Basic business skills training –“what you need to know to be 
your own boss”– could be offered as an option, and ought to be 
a significant menu option, coupled with mentoring and advise-
ment. This is the “agripreneur” option. There will be opportunities 
arising from the connection to value chain operations for young 
people to form their own enterprises. They will need skills, advice 
and mentoring, and guidance in basic business strategies. 
The most problematic discrepancy between the two datasets con-
cerns a ‘mindset change’. Attitude, behaviour, and mindset were given 
in policy documents far less importance than in the interviews. I expect 
that this is to be related to the active and grounded role development 
practitioners played: the interaction and experience with youths might 
have triggered the elaboration of ‘mindset change’ as a development 
tool which could not be valued in policy briefs due to the more abstract 
than experience-informed nature of the context. 
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Moreover, an important concept has emerged from the analysis of pol-
icy documents: institutional change, described in terms of the necessity 
to adequate the institutional structures, practices and attitudes of 
practitioners to the development goals set in the ToC. This concept had 
not so prominently emerged from the interviews, and therefore has not 
been highlighted in the narrative analysis. The policy briefs by USAID, 
AVSI, the NDPII and the Vision 2040 in particular highlight the impor-
tance of institutional change. The latest document (GoU, Government 
of Uganda, 2007, p.112), for example, discusses the issue in these terms: 
Over the Vision period, government shall adopt the business 
approach for public service delivery where efficiency, effective-
ness and economy will be the main basis of decision making. 
This will include high quality public services, efficient civil service 
and independence from political interference, quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the Gov-
ernment’s commitment to such policies. All public services shall 
be available to all Ugandans without any form of discrimination.
Interestingly, the government efficiency and broad institutional change 
seems to be related to a general shift towards a ‘business approach for 
public service delivery’. This institutional change towards more of a 
corporate management of the res publica is referred to in Mosse (2013, 
p.228—237) as a neoliberal development that puts “business at the 
centre, governing at the periphery”. 
4.7.4 Targeting
As for targeting, the analysis of development policies confirmed the 
trends of public sector organisations to target the whole social group 
of youths (mainly the unemployed youths) and non-public sector 
organisations to be focusing on a more selected number of youths 
(particularly the SKY project). For example, the YLP (Ministry of Gen-
der, 2017, p.3) report states that: “The Youth Livelihood Programme 
(YLP) is Government of Uganda Rolling Programme, targeting the 
unemployed and poor youth in the country. It was designed in response 
to the high unemployment rate and poverty level among the youth in 
the country.”
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4.7.5 Discussion
The analysis of the 10 policy briefs enriches but does not alter the ToC 
that has emerged from the narrative analysis of the interviews with 
development actors. In fact, while there were some discrepancies, 
there is a broad level of general consistency between interviews and 
documents. A peculiar aspect of the narratives emerging from the pol-
icy briefs concerns the rhetoric used in the expression of rather vague 
arguments: 
The intermediate benefits arising out the YLP include the fol-
lowing: (i) Youth Empowerment: The greater involvement of the 
Youth in mobilization, sensitization, prioritization and planning 
for their needs, implementation and monitoring and evaluation 
of Programme activities has created a sense of empowerment 
and confidence to take charge of their destiny.
This extract of the YLP report on progress implementation (Ministry of 
Gender, 2017, p.10) is an emblematic example of collection of fuzzy 
words –mainly development jargon– which refer to little concrete. 
Although this rhetoric was not a prerogative of public sector policy 
briefs, it might have emerged more prominently in government docu-
ments because of the all-encompassing nature of their scope. Anoth-
er example of such vague expressions comes from the Vision 2040 
(GoU, Government of Uganda, 2007, p.45) : 
101. The opportunity for value addition through agro processing 
is enormous. This will enhance Uganda’s competitiveness on 
the world market, boost foreign exchange earnings and 
employment. It can also reduce wastage, enhance food securi-
ty, improve livelihoods for low-income groups and empower 
disadvantaged groups of society like rural women, youth and 
the disabled.
Interestingly, in this fragment the youths are clearly depicted as being part 
of the broader social category of disadvantaged people to be empowered 
and thereby achieving a list of not better specified objectives: global eco-
nomic competitiveness, foreign exchange, food security etc. 
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4.8 Conclusion & Discussion
As emerges from the narrative analysis described above, there are dif-
ferent patterns characterizing the development trend around youth in 
agribusiness in Uganda. These patterns highlight how the development 
organisations adopt strategies for youth in agribusiness—thereby 
answering part of the research question I set out to answer in this chap-
ter. For the sake of the analysis of their narratives, I have structured my 
investigation of the ‘how’ through the three phases of the TOC. 
As for the conceptualisation of the development problem, there appear 
to be an array of concepts emerging from the development actors’ nar-
ratives, which follow different trends depending whether the actor is 
affiliated to a national or international organisation. Altogether, the 
development problem is described in terms of youth unemployment and 
demographic preponderance of youths (the so-called ‘youth bulge’). 
However, youth unemployment seems to be considered much more of a 
problem by national development agencies than international ones, who 
are more concerned about the ‘youth bulge’. 
When setting out to envisioning the ideal outcomes of their develop-
ment efforts, development practitioners describe their vision for change 
in terms of economic growth and agricultural modernisation. About the 
vision for change, I did not encounter any particular trend differentiating 
national from international organisations. Significantly, the development 
goals of the organisations were not diversified according to the defini-
tion of the development problem. 
Instead, when describing the best strategies for operationalising their 
vision for change and tackle the development problem, a considerable 
variation emerged again: while mindset change and capacity building 
emerged predominantly for both national and international organisa-
tions, they were both significantly more important for national than for 
international agencies. Moreover, another important difference was that 
directly funding youth was considered as viable strategy by national 
organisations, but not by international ones. The narratives concerning 
the pathway to change were set in a rather ‘technicalizing’ tone, where 
development change seems to be largely dependent on the adoption of 
the right business skills and mentality, plus the implementation of mod-
ern agricultural technologies and inputs. Despite aligning the analysis of 
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the development narratives in the three phases of TOC, there seems to 
be quite a dissonance between the conceptualisations of the three 
phases, as elaborated by the development actors. 
Besides the differences between national and international develop-
ment organisations, two different development approaches were 
identified as strategies for change. The first being a primarily public 
approach, adopted largely by national (governmental) institutions, the 
second being private-sector driven and adopted more by international 
institutions. While the goal of both development approaches is that of 
modernizing the agricultural sector and lifting the economy to mid-
dle-income status, the operationalisation was rather different: the first 
would invest in creating a new generation of organized agripreneurs by 
supporting their business plan with an investment capital; the second 
would focus on connecting private-sector driven market opportunities 
to a selected number of youths, to promote their business skills to sup-
ply the market demand. The private-sector driven development 
approach seems to be particularly symptomatic of the shift from aid to 
trade, which is more general to the international development cooper-
ation (Westen & Zoomers, 2014). Mosse (2013, p.228) describes this 
shift as putting “business at the center, governing at the periphery”—
thereby strengthening the depoliticizing force identified by Ferguson 
(2014) in the ‘90s in his aidnography of the development industry in 
Lesotho. 
Whatever the differences and trends in the approaches to development 
efforts, a clearly neoliberal pattern emerged. The development problem 
was identified as a structural issue that combines the skew demographic 
dividend with high youth unemployment rates. However, the strategy to 
target such issues would lay the responsibility of change with those most 
affected by the development issue: the youths themselves. This also 
explains the severe tones in which youths are talked about (see previous 
chapter) in development discourse: either blamed for being lazy, with an 
entitlement mentality that dooms them to missing business opportunities 
in agribusiness; or praises them for being the drivers of change, the future 
of agriculture—the very champions and hope of Uganda. This develop-
ment trend that shifts the attention from unemployment to the unem-
ployed (the youths), recalls the shift, already identified by Mosse (2010, in 
Pallotti & Zamponi, 2014, p.45), from poverty to the poor. 
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Moreover, this shift of attention to the youths as beneficiaries and imple-
menters of development change pathologizes those among the youths 
who fail to become agripreneurs, while praising the successful ones as 
being the champions and drivers of change. This trend in international 
development had been identified by Ferguson (2014), with reference to 
poverty and the poor—which in his analysis of the development industry 
are indeed pathologized and depoliticised. As Rap (2006, p.1303) recalls: 
Ferguson shows that the framing of development interventions in a 
technical policy discourse explains why ‘many projects fail in terms 
of their stated objectives while being more successful in terms of 
unstated agendas’ (Gasper, 1996a: 166). It works as part of a 
two-sided process: the ideological effect of such a discourse –
depoliticisation– disguises its institutional effects, that is the 
expansion of bureaucratic power (Ferguson, 1990).
YOUTH AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA210
CHAPTER 4—AIDNOGRAPHY 211
Image 13. Sunrise in Murchison’s National Park, 
central Uganda, 2017. Picture taken by author.

Chapter 5
Youthnography
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“The ears will never be higher than the head”
– Acholi proverb 
5.1 Introduction 
The Ugandan population has grown six-fold since the ‘50s (UNFPA, 
United Nations Population Fund, 2011). According to the United 
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), in 2011, 78%, of the Ugandan pop-
ulation was under 30 years of age, with the perspective of a steady 
increase of this percentage as the population continues to grow. In 
2014, the Ugandan Census recorded that 22.5% of the population was 
in the youth category (18—30) recognised by the Ugandan Constitu-
tion. With an increasingly young population, the government and inter-
national development agencies have in the last 5—10 years focused 
their development efforts on this social category. 
As described in the previous chapter, development efforts are target-
ing youth with different strategies and approaches, to boost their 
employability in agribusiness. Despite the process of Urbanisation, the 
majority of the youth still live in rural areas and the majority of youths 
are engaged in agricultural activities, either for subsistence or busi-
ness. As mentioned in earlier chapters, I sampled to youths as a social 
group comprehended between 18 and 35—the widest range adopted 
by development agencies. However, defining and identifying their 
characteristics, capacities and constraints of such a broad social 
group remains a challenging enterprise that scholars are just starting 
to attend. There are 56 different ethnic groups living in Uganda 
(National Youth Policy, 2001). Besides the ethnic variety, youths 
include both males and females, illiterates and highly educated farm-
ers, experienced agripreneurs and simple subsistence farmers. What 
is the use of the analytical category of ‘youth’ if it refers to the majority 
of the population in such a heterogeneous country? How can youths’ 
heterogeneity be systematised? How do the youths define themselves 
and how do they experience the engagement in agribusiness? 
In this chapter, I explore the meaning and making of youth as a social 
category in Uganda. Using a qualitative approach, I study youth from 
the perspective of youths themselves—as it emerges from their narra-
tives, and from my participant observation during fieldwork in four sub 
regions of Uganda. I investigate youth as a concept, social category, 
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identity and status. Furthermore, I look at youth as object and subject 
in the discourse of the recent development trend around youth in agri-
business. By doing this, I try to give an empirical answer to the second 
(sub) research question of this study: who are the youths in Uganda, 
and how do they experience engagement in agribusiness?
This chapter addresses the definitional problem of youths in Ugan-
da. Given that the majority of the Ugandan population is under 30 
years of age, development programmes targeting youth are address-
ing a wide share of the population—leaving development actors and 
scholars with the issue of approaching an extremely heterogeneous 
social group. This chapter offers a youthnography—an ethnographic 
description of the youth’s identity, aspirations and experiences in 
agribusiness, in and out of development schemes. I hereby attempt 
a systematisation of the heterogeneity of factors making the youths 
such a diverse social category, as it emerged from the ethnographic 
data I collected throughout the country. 
The chapter will first (section 5.2) explore the issue defining youths 
through the academic debate and discussions among development 
actors, showing how ‘youth’ remains a controversial and fuzzy social 
category. In section 5.3, I provide a brief overview of the data I have 
collected from interviews with youth themselves. In this section I will 
also introduce the heterogeneity factors, which all emerged from 
the qualitative analysis of my data—as recurrent codes or determi-
nant factors emerging from my observations in the field. These fac-
tors, that emerged from an inductive process of analysis, were indic-
ative of the traits that determined youths’ identity and their 
experience of engagement in agribusiness. In the section 5.4, I sys-
temize the heterogeneity factors making up three main dimensions 
in which youths are embedded. These dimensions, territorial, 
socio-cultural and value chain, emerged from the analysis of my 
data as meta-categories of the heterogeneity factors. In this section, 
I analyse the data related to each of the three dimensions. Before 
coming to the conclusion, I make an overview (section 5.5) of the 
dynamics and relations playing out around the youths. Here, I show 
the complexity and messiness of the relations in which youths are 
embedded when engaging in agribusiness development. 
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5.2 Youth: a contended and heterogeneous social category
Over the last decades the studies on African youths have increas-
ingly grown in number and popularity (Sumberg, Anyidoho, Leavy, te 
Lintelo, & Wellard, 2012), in large part because the demographic 
growth in most African nations. The analytical tools elaborated by 
social and development studies make us aware that approaching 
this social category is an extremely delicate endeavour. Christiansen 
et al (2006, p.11) argue that
In studying young people we must, in other words, see youth 
as both social being and social becoming: as a position in 
movement (Vigh 2003; 2006). Youth is both a social position 
which is internally and externally shaped and constructed, as 
well as part of a larger societal and generational process, a 
state of becoming. We need thus to look at the ways youth 
are positioned in society and the ways they seek to position 
themselves in society, to illuminate the ways the category of 
youths is socio-politically constructed, as well as the ways 
young people construct counter-positions and definitions.
According to Van Dijk et al (2011) youth can be studied as a phenom-
enon, as a category and as an ideology: as a phenomenon, it refers 
to the booming demography of most African countries; as a catego-
ry, it indicates a phase of ‘becoming’ from childhood to adulthood; 
and recently as an ideology, “Under the current dispensation of 
donor funding, relief programmes and international aid, these [devel-
opment] discussions have made the ‘youth’ the major beneficiary of 
what these policies offer and imply. (…) If the donor- ideology pre-
scribes youthfulness for societal and developmental relevance, it will 
then dictate practice.” (2011, p.1). Framing the academic debate 
around youth is a heated and ever-unfinished dispute. As a conse-
quence of the magnitude of the demographic phenomenon, youth has 
become the object of increased development attention. The study of 
youths has become an increasingly politicized topic. 
Paradoxically, the very fact that youths have been framed as an age-
range, puts them in a marginal and liminal position in society. Their 
precarious condition of unemployment, has extended the period 
before youth are able to attain adulthood through economic status. 
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Youth, which has traditionally been a brief, liminal, phase of passage 
(Aime & Pietropolli Charmet, 2014) has become an extended condi-
tion of ‘waithood’ (Sommers, 2015, p.13). Sommers (2015, p.65) 
argues that: “Attaining and retaining adulthood is the most crucially 
overlooked issue in Africa. As Honwana has highlighted, “Youth are 
the majority of Africa’s population, but they have been pushed to the 
margins of their societies and live in a limbo between childhood and 
adulthood” (2012: 165)”. 
As I will explain in more details in the sections below, I found that 
attaining the status of adulthood was one of the most crucial aspira-
tions for young men I interviewed, also driving their ambitions in and 
beyond agribusiness. In several contexts, the social status of youth 
is associated to personal and economic irresponsibility—an uncer-
tain state where especially young males want to get out of. On the 
contrary, proving to be adult is related to (relative) economic success 
as much as it is to personal and business planning. The passage 
from youth to adult social status is thus not bond to age, but rather 
dependent on personal and material achievements. Moreover, par-
ticularly for male youths, the achievement of the adult status is also 
related to social inclusion in the ethnic group as men. In the case of 
Bagishu men (eastern sub-region around Mbale), this passage would 
be consolidated by the ritual of circumcision—which would deter-
mine both the attainment of adulthood and manhood, and full-
fledged belonging to the ethnic group. As Alex, a fruit vendor at the 
central food market in Kampala, originally from Mbale, explained to 
me: 
Me: And other than circumcision, what are other things that 
can contribute to making someone mature, like a proper man?
Alex: Of course now, we have this way, now like me, I am not at 
school as I told you. now like I’m 25 years. But what have you 
done? You have what? Are you planning? Eh? That is the way. 
They can show you someone that, yea, you are mature 
enough, you are planning? What have you done? For example, 
now like in, as I told you that I did a nursery, I did, I did eh, my 
project of the nursery bedding [he had cultivated and traded 
coffee seedlings in Mbale, years back, as first business]. From 
nursery bedding, I used to pay some school fees [for himself 
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and siblings], I could afford to eat at school and I bought my 
three cows. That one can show that someone [has achieved 
economic independence], eh? This guy is mature! Instead of 
getting money, you go and enjoy with your friends, drinking, 
what, without doing anything. As you said, when you get 
10000 [Ugandan shillings], do you save [it]? you eat some, you 
save some for future, for tomorrow. There, someone can say 
that this guy, or this lady is mature enough. A grown up.109
Because of the precarious economic environment in which most 
Ugandan youths live, the attainment of adulthood through economic 
success is a precarious. In line with Sommers, such social transfor-
mation is closely connected to social instability: where the attain-
ment of adulthood follows the achievement of social status and eco-
nomic success, “defining young people as youth, in Africa and many 
other world regions, must entail more than an age range or a cultur-
ally delineated transformation period” (2015, p.14). Nonetheless, 
most development agencies work with a youth definition determined 
by age boundaries, although there is no agreement on what the age 
ranges should be (Table 15). 
Organisation Definition of youth
Ugandan Constitution110 18—30 
UN111 15—24 
AU112 15—35 
WB113 15—24 
USAID114 10—29 
Table 15. Definition of youths by dev. organisation110111112113114
However, given the broad share of the Ugandan population falling 
109 Extract from interview with Alex, on 5/05/2017 in Kampala. 
110 National Youth Policy: http://www.youthpolicy.org/national/
Uganda_2001_National_Youth_Policy.pdf
111 UN Youth Definition: http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/documents/
youth/fact-sheets/youth-definition.pdf
112 African Youth Charter: http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/
african_youth_charter_2006.pdf
113 WB youth policy: http://www.youthpolicy.org/mappings/
internationalyouthsector/directory/actors/worldbank/
114 USAID Youth Development Policy https://www.usaid.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/documents/1870/Youth_in_Development_Policy_0.pdf
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under the category of youth, it is hard to underestimate the great 
heterogeneity. In 2001 the first, rather loose and non-binding 
National Youth Policy (MGLSD, 2001) was published in Uganda, rec-
ognizing the socio-cultural diversity of the group the policy was 
targeting: 
Uganda being a multi-ethnic country with 56 different ethnic 
groups has so many divergent beliefs and practices. These 
include issues of early non-consensual marriage where over 
50% of Ugandan women marry before 18 years, while their 
male counterparts marry at 23 years. Other negative practic-
es include wife inheritance/sharing or replacement, Female 
Genital Mutilation, with associated rituals and culture that 
teaches females submissiveness rather than assertiveness.
The urban youth are also experiencing a lot of influence from 
Western culture through the media and are continuously and 
inappropriately exposed to pornographic materials. This cou-
pled with changing family structures, disruptions etc. chal-
lenge traditional control on behaviours of youth. This leaves 
them in a generation with no clear cultural identity or values 
often conflicting with society and established structures. 
Furthermore the youth in nomadic and pastoral communities 
experience unique conditions such as lack of education and 
health facilities and engage in cattle rustling which warrant 
special consideration.115
From this short article a number of themes emerge as defining the 
diversity of the young population in Uganda: ethnicity, “beliefs and 
practices”, marriage practices, gender and adulthood related rites of 
passage, rural/urban diversity in socio-cultural practices, evolving 
identity and values, accessibility to facilities and education. 
As discussed by Van Dijk et al (2011, p.4), there is a heated academic 
debate regarding the definitional boundaries of youth: 
115 Ministry of Gender, 2001, article 2.8, p.8
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…the question of how we can make sure that we do not 
superimpose Western categories of social analysis, which 
may become meaningless in the particular cultural or historical 
setting. Does African youth exist at all and in whose hands rests 
the conceptual invention here? Or are we exoticising African 
youth if we assume that matters must be different in Africa, 
compared to the West or Asia (…) when it comes to such delim-
itations and demarcations? (…) Social science studies often fol-
lowed these ‘emic’ categorisations, sometimes naively, believ-
ing that the emic116 is the royal road to the truth. Yet in addition to 
this, the missionary endeavour, the colonial apparatus and the 
independent nation-states all put in place systems of education 
that to a large extent were capable of capturing youth and which 
therefore operated on the basis of ideas of what youth is. 
In the following of this chapter, I will attempt a systematic analysis of 
the factors contributing to shape Ugandan youths’ identity and agri-
business experiences—for the complex, dynamic and heterogene-
ous socio-economic group they are. 
5.3 Studying heterogeneity
In this section I briefly summarise the ethnographic methods through 
which I collected the data on Uganda youths. Moreover, I will make 
an overview of the main traits that emerged from the qualitative 
analysis of the interviews with youths. 
Before starting the extensive fieldwork with youths, I had travelled 
through the country during two pilot field trips: I was aware of the 
diverse socio-cultural, economic and ecologic scenarios I was going 
to encounter in the different sub-regions. In fact, it was precisely this 
diversity, together with the awareness I had built up through litera-
ture review—that convinced me to focus my research in four differ-
ent locations117: I was puzzled as to how the theories of change of 
the development actors I had interviewed would have been imple-
mented in such diverse contexts. Altogether, I have conducted 110 
116 ‘Emic’ is, in anthropological terms, the perspective of the subject, 
while ‘etic’ is the perspective of the observer. 
117 I have elaborated the justification of the four fieldwork locations in 
the methods chapter.
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semi-structured interviews in four locations:
Period Location Activity
March—April 2017 Gulu 29 semi-structured interviews with young 
agro-entrepreneurs
March & May 2017 Kampala 26 semi-structured interviews with young 
agro-entrepreneurs
May—June 2017 Mbarara 25 semi-structured interviews with young 
agro-entrepreneurs
June 2017 Mbale 30 semi-structured interviews with young 
agro-entrepreneurs
Table 16. Timetable multi-sited fieldwork with youths
I have studied youths’ heterogeneity with qualitative methods, ana-
lysing the interviews collected through coding. In this process, a 
number of factors emerged as being most influential in determining 
youths’ heterogeneity of identity and agribusiness practices. I 
describe such heterogeneity factors in section 5.3.1 below, summa-
rising the main traits of these factors. These factors, which emerged 
from the coding of the interviews, are categories grouping the most 
recurrent codes, or determinant aspects I have recorded through 
participant observation and comparison of data across the regions 
of multi-sited fieldwork. 
Later in this chapter, I will further explore their traits as they emerge 
from empirical ethnographic data. 
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5.3.1 Heterogeneity factors 
Heterogene-
ity factors Explanation
1. Family 
background
Crucial in shaping youths’ identity, aspirations and success in agribusiness 
was the family in which the youth was born. I encountered youths who, with 
pride, took over their family enterprise, and others whom had been penalised 
by their parents for being last born. By family background I refer to the ex-
tended family including grandparents, aunts and uncles, grandchildren and 
female in-laws. In most instances, I encountered patriarchal families where 
assets and status were inherited patri-lineally and married women would live 
in their husband’s ancestral land. Exceptions were made when the eldest 
member of the family was a woman, in which case she would be making 
decisions about agribusiness, inheritance and marriages. There are several 
components forming factor: a) the social class and status of the family, b) it’s 
economic status and ownership of land, and c) the availability of the family to 
support its youths in agribusiness enterprising.
2. Gender
Gender is certainly a defining trait of one’s identity, particularly so in the 
liminal phase of youth: the capacity to obtain adulthood was shaped by the 
cultural norms and values attributed to youths’ sex. In fact, the socio-cultural 
and economic requirements for the attainment of adulthood (and thus exit 
the social category of youth) were radically different for men and women. 
Men would be required to gain social status through economic success: ac-
quiring manhood is in fact strictly linked to economic realization, assuming 
the latter can be obtained when a youth is mature enough to make sensitive 
economic choices. In most cases I encountered, this status would be sealed 
by a rite of passage which confirmed its social recognition (e.g. circumcision). 
Because of the financial pressure to the achievement of adulthood, male 
youths I spoke were particularly eager to focus on the quick returns of their 
agribusiness to exit youth and enter manhood. Female youth would be less 
bond to economic status for the achievement of adulthood. On the contrary, 
they would exit the category of youth when they would get married and/or 
have children. However, economic power of women was generally perceived 
as a threat to both the patriarchal power distribution in the family, and to the 
fragile status of men as adults. 
Moreover, for women, marital relationship radically impacted their identity 
and their ability to shape their careers in agribusiness: only the few who 
were lucky enough to marry a permissive husband would be allowed to work, 
spend long hours out of home and potentially earn a higher financial and 
social status then their spouse.
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Heterogene-
ity factors Explanation
3. Age
For this research, I have adopted a very broad age range for youths, from 
18 to 35, a definition which would include all the definitions of the develop-
ment organisations I have interviewed. However, there was a great variation 
between the younger and older informants in this category. Such variety 
mainly depended on: a) youths’ ability to access assets (the elder ones would 
have more chance of inheriting from their parents, and would have greater 
chances of accessing financial services) b) aspirations and planning (the 
younger ones would focus more on agribusiness activities that would give 
quick returns like horticulture and service provision, while the elder ones 
would aim at more ambitious agribusiness); c) knowledge and skills also 
greatly differed according to the experience gained.
4. Values & 
norms in ag-
riculture
There was great variation in the meanings attributed to the agricultural 
enterprises, which could be considered anything from a forced-choice func-
tional to subsistence, to a major ambition for entrepreneurial business. In 
fact, while the majority of the Ugandan population is engaged in agriculture, 
this is mostly subsistence agriculture rather than commercial agribusiness. 
Values and norms attributed to agricultural activities also greatly varied in the 
different sub-regions where I conducted fieldwork.
5. Ethnicity
Ethnicity was a socio-cultural trait which youths often referred to in defining 
their identity (as youth) and their activities (in agribusiness). It was a crucial 
factor influencing both criteria for attainment of adulthood status and in 
shaping the values and norms attributed to agribusiness. I here refer to the 
concept of ethnicity as a socio-cultural category comprising a shared and 
dynamic system of norms and values for social interaction, identity and 
belonging to a community of people sharing language and traditions. The 
recent, post-independence history has sclerotized ethnic differences, par-
ticularly in the north –where Acholi people suffered a long civil war– and in 
the south-west, where Museveni has favoured the Banyankole people for 
political reasons. Baganda people in the Central region, which are the largest 
ethnic group in Uganda had been favoured by the British colonial political 
system and are recently claiming recognition. During the period of my field-
work I have often heard concerns about the violent clashes that occurred 
in November 2016 in the district of Kasese, when the police repressed the 
Rwenzururu movement for independence of their kingdom.
6. Politics
The development of an agribusiness, involving the management and compe-
tition for resources such as land and financial services, became increasingly 
politicised as development agencies have dedicated increasing budgets 
and policy attention. Beyond the national politics, which was a theme that 
emerged relatively seldom during the interviews, my informants often re-
ferred to the way in which local level politics had an important impact on the 
development of their agribusiness. In particular, the majority of my informants 
lamented the corruption of public structures, and the discriminatory prac-
tices favouring Banyankole people for positions of power within institutions.
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Heterogene-
ity factors Explanation
7. Ecosystem
The geography of Uganda is very diverse, comprising a variety of ecosystems 
throughout the country—which naturally has an important impact on the 
agricultural activities. In the north, the weather can be pretty extreme, with 
two very dry and hot seasons and two tropical rainy seasons; the major value 
chains are grains. The Central region also has two dry and two rainy season 
but are more temperate; besides the major trading activities in Kampala 
(main market hub of the country), the major value chains are horticulture and 
animal husbandry (piggery, goats and chicken rearing). In the south-west, 
also known as the land of milk and honey for its fertility, there the two dry 
and two rainy seasons are temperate and influenced by the hilly ecosystem 
that favours the cultivation of tea and coffee, which is done mostly on large-
scale. The majority of people are engaged either in cattle rearing and dairy 
(in the lower plateaus around Mbarara) or in horticulture (mainly matooke and 
fruits) and animal husbandry. The ecosystem of the eastern region around 
Mbale is strongly influenced by the presence of the mount Elgon: on the 
slopes of the mountain coffee is the main agribusiness, while around Mbale 
the ecosystem is ideal for horticulture.
8. Belonging 
(to environ-
ment)
I refer to belonging to the environment as the territorial dimension of ethnic-
ity, where bonding to ancestral land and its agribusiness traditions is crucial 
for the development of the identity and career of youths. This feeling of 
belonging was strong for the majority of my informants, particularly for those 
living in rural areas. It was crucially important for the ambitions of the youths, 
and for their commitment to investing into their agribusiness. However, it was 
not a condition necessary for the realisation of the agribusiness, in fact in 
Kampala were living people who were eradicated from their ancestral land 
and were economically successful in their business.
9. Urban/
rural
The urban or rural context in which my informants were living had an im-
portant impact on the type of business they would get involved, but also 
influenced their accessibility to market and marketing information. Urban 
contexts were characterised by a higher exposition to technological and 
marketing innovations, but greater difficulty to access land. On the contrary 
rural contexts offered more availability of land, and agribusiness enterprises 
were more strongly embed in family context (either as family business or as 
inheritance of ancestral land). It was striking to observe how multicultural was 
Kampala in comparison to the rest of the country, where particularly in rural 
areas there was more homogeneity in terms of ethnicity and language.
10. Proximity 
to market
When confronting the agribusiness experiences of the youths I interviewed, 
proximity to the market (local village market, regional or central Kampala 
hub) impacted the profitability of the agribusiness, for the ability of the 
farmers to bypass middlemen. The only exception was constituted by co-
operatives in the south-west of the country, which had built such a strong 
bargaining power to constitute a market in itself, where the buyer would go 
to get supply.
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Heterogene-
ity factors Explanation
11. Identity 
(worker or 
entrepre-
neur)
There was quite an important difference among the youths I interviewed, be-
tween those who regarded themselves as workers or (subsistence) farmers 
and those who considered themselves as being agripreneurs. Their identifi-
cation with their profession widely differed also within the same environment, 
development scheme, value chain, and even work group.
12. Embed-
dedness in 
value chain
The intensity of the attachment to a specific value chain was very different 
for my informants: some of them were entirely devoted to one value chain, 
while other would switch according to market prices without specialising. 
I encountered youths who were strongly rooted in the value chain of their 
agribusiness, to the point that their own identity and social status was tied to 
their success in their agribusiness in that specific sector; this was particularly 
true for Bahima people with cattle rearing. I also encountered youths who 
had been working in different sectors and even chunks of the value chain—
from transport to service provision to production of various agricultural 
produce.
13. Aspira-
tions in/out 
agribusiness
The commitment of youths to agribusiness differed greatly depending on 
their aspirations: for some of my informants agricultural activities were a 
forced-choice, as they had no alternative career paths, while for others it was 
a deliberate choice and great ambition to be successful in their agribusiness 
(and not another).
Table 17. Heterogeneity factors
5.4 Embedding heterogeneity
“Stop calling me a youth! I’ve been circumcised!” Alex tells me. Alex 
is a 25 years old fruits vendor at Nakasero central market in Kampa-
la, who hailing from the eastern sub-region of Mbale. Sitting on a 
pile of fruit boxes in what can be considered the busiest spot of the 
capital, I had been interviewing Alex about his career and aspirations, 
as a youth. Observed by tens of pairs of inquisitive eyes, Alex felt he 
should make his identity as an adult clear to me and the indiscrete pas-
sers: he had obtained a social status which would be insulting not to 
recognise, a status marked on his body in one of the most harsh and 
diffused rites of passage in eastern Uganda. Without the blink of an 
eye, later on the same morning he asked me for advice on how to 
access a youth development project. Puzzled by what to me was a 
contradiction, and about to jump to the conclusion that Alex was not a 
reliable informant, I later came to realize that the Ugandans I interacted 
with did not see any inconsistency in identifying with different social 
categories. Belonging to the category of youth was perceived as much 
as transitory phase, as a situational and interchangeable identity. 
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Interviewing young (18—35) Ugandans throughout the country allowed 
me to develop an overview of the diverse ways in which young people 
defined themselves in different settings. There were different factors 
and circumstances that had an influence in their perceptions and stra-
tegically positioning in the scale from childhood to adulthood. Youth is 
indeed a liminal phase of transition, but also an iterative process that 
can be redefined and undone. Not only diverse circumstances, but 
social contexts, and sociocultural environment played a role in the 
identification and definition of youth, but also defined and was defined 
by the ways in which agricultural business was experienced.
Importantly, in contrast to definitions used by development actors, 
identification as a youth was not necessarily bond to an age range: 
Stephen, a 34 years old dairy farmer, married with children, was not 
only proudly identifying himself as a youth, but even advocating for 
a political standing up of a new generation of leaders—in and out-
side of agricultural business: 
We have peace so I think it’s also upon us, the youth, the new 
generation, to fight for our rights and to fight for transformation. 
We shouldn’t sit and think some people will come from abroad 
and do it for us. (…)[But] We can’t have a voice when we are 
scattered. We have to get an organized group that unites us and 
we start that voice. Once that voice is heard, even the president 
will change. Because we are the owners of this country tomor-
row. These politicians are going away; they are getting old. So, 
we who are coming in… are we trained? are we capable of tak-
ing over? In whatever sector, leave alone agriculture, in other 
sectors so we need… the youth need to be organized and we 
have to organize ourselves first.118 
Interestingly, Stephen refers to youths as the new generation of 
political-economic leaders, embracing a narrative of youth as the 
future of the nation: a social category not only of great prestige, but 
also of great responsibility. In fact, youth in Uganda means anything 
from a denigrating social status of someone who is not yet a man, to 
a political category of crucial importance to the future of the nation. 
118 Extract from an interview at Stephen’s dairy cooperative in south-
west Uganda, 1st June 2017.
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In fact, the specific ways in which youth engaged and gave meaning 
to their agricultural enterprises was as diverse as the heterogeneity 
of the subjects involved. Methorst et al (2017, p.1) argue that:
Diversity or heterogeneity in farming is, as many studies have 
shown over the past 25 years, one of the main features of 
farm development. Heterogeneity in farming is likely to affect 
the pathways in farm development strategies towards more 
sustainable food production systems. (…) In farm develop-
ment, the farmer both reacts to and enacts the context, whilst 
adapting to changes and perceived threats and opportuni-
ties. The decisions made by the farmer will structure farming 
practices and the relation between the farm and its context. 
Likewise, the heterogeneity of farmers has an influence as much on 
the decisions made for the development of the agribusiness as it 
does have an impact on the way in which development schemes 
unfold on the ground. I argue that heterogeneity impacts the outcome 
of development programmes as much as development programmes 
influence the identities and meanings in/of farming activities. 
Below, I identify and describe the factors and qualities of the heter-
ogeneity characterising the young Ugandans I have interviewed. 
These are valid for all the youths I have interviewed, although some 
factors played a stronger role for certain youths than for others. Sys-
tematising the heterogeneity by analysing its factors is a process 
that required a selection (and thereby a simplification) of all the pos-
sible features and influences of diversity. This analytical process is 
grounded on the qualitative coding of the interviews with youths, but 
also on the participant observations I have made while on the field. 
Three main themes emerged from the analysis of the interviews and 
the observations I have made on the ground: territorial embedded-
ness, socio-cultural embeddedness and value chain embeddedness. 
These three dimensions had great influence in shaping the identity of 
the youths, and in determining their engagement in agribusiness. Later 
on, I will analyse the ways in which such themes also interact with the 
implementation of development programmes. Such themes are ana-
lysed here in light of the concept of embeddedness as it has been 
re-elaborated by Methorst et al (2017, p.3): “embeddedness can best 
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be viewed as a dynamic process that can vary and is subject to manage-
ment choices. The dynamic process approach places the emphasis on 
the agency of an actor in making choices in relation to the context in 
which the actor operates”. Embeddedness as a concept referring to a 
dynamic process can best be used in its verb form embedding. Drawing 
from the work of Hess (2004), Methorst et al elaborate on three dimen-
sions of the process of embedding: societal embedding, network 
embedding and territorial embedding: 
The societal embedding is re-conceptualised as the socio-cul-
tural relations of the farmer, asking how farmers view themselves 
as a farmer and with which values, norms, and ‘culture’ of farm-
ing a farmer identifies him or herself. The network embedding 
is re-conceptualised as the value chain relations, asking which 
value chain the farm is a part of or linked to, or which networks 
or spheres of influence affect farm development. The territorial 
embedding is re-conceptualised as the resource relations of the 
farm, asking about the origin of the resources for farm produc-
tion.
The re-conceptualisation of the authors helps to frame the themes that 
emerged from the analysis of the data I collected among Ugandan 
youths. As I minor change to their conceptualisation, I will refer more spe-
cifically to value-chain embedding instead of network embedding, and 
more precisely about socio-cultural embedding instead of social embed-
ding. Interestingly in fact, from the analysis of my data, there emerged to 
be the same three dimensions of embedding characterizing youths’ iden-
tity and experience in agribusiness (in and out of development schemes). 
Moreover, the positioning of youths within a specific context is also object 
of arguments of van Dijk et al (2011, p.5), where they argue that:
As social science in Africa has moved away from conceptualising 
youth only in terms of time –a passage through the generations– 
and has included the notion of space –not when one is youth but 
also where one is youth– the ‘situational’ exploration of youth has 
at least allowed for the possibility of looking at space and place as 
new modes of understanding. In addition to the concept of youth 
as emphasising the ‘situational’ it has also turned into the ‘loca-
tional’ dimensions. 
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Drawing from this theoretical framework, I have proceeded to systema-
tizing the data I have collected into three dimensions—abstract categori-
sations of the various factors of diversity emerging from my data.119 These 
factors have, for the sake of systematic analysis of heterogeneity, been 
distributed among the dimensions of embedding. However, the observa-
tion of realities of youths and the interaction of all the diversity factors 
show that these dimensions interrelate and overlap and are not mutually 
exclusive. In the figure below, I illustrate the clustering of the diversity fac-
tors among the above-described dimensions of embedding. 
5.4.1 Clustering embedding dimensions and heterogeneity 
factors
Socio-Cultural Embedding
Territorial Embedding Value Chain Embedding
Family 
background
Vaues & norms 
in ag.
Age
Gender
Identity
Proximity 
market
Embeddedness
AspirationsUrban/
rural
Belonging
Ecosystem
Ethnicity
Politics
Figure 24. Clustering embedding dimensions and heterogeneity factors
119 I am aware of the fact that there is a vivid debate within social geog-
raphy regarding spatiality, territoriality and environmental embeddedness. 
It would be a promising line of research to explore these dimensions to a 
wider extent, yet it is not the focus of my research. 
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As it is exemplified in the figure above, and as transpires from the data 
I have collected, the multitude of factors contributing to the heteroge-
neity of the youths can be categorised in the three dimensions of 
embedding. However, the factors are in a dynamic relation with one 
another, and the intensity of their influence on youths’ identities and 
agribusiness experiences can vary. 
5.4.2 Territorial embedding 
Exploring the definition and identity of youths in agribusiness, and 
the meaning and experience of their farming activities throughout 4 
different sub-regions in Uganda, I could appreciate how the contex-
tual specificities of the environment had particular impact on the 
youths and their agribusiness. The ecosystem and agricultural tradi-
tions were very context-specific, as much as the perception of 
belonging to the territory was articulated in a variety of different 
ways and intensity. Moreover, the politics and history of the sub-re-
gions were crucial in influencing youths’ perception and interaction 
with agribusiness stakeholders, constraints, possibilities and 
ambitions. 
This dimension was particularly determinant in differentiating the 
experiences of youths in agribusiness, and their identity. In fact, due 
to the regional disparity in terms of development of history, infra-
structures (roads, schools, health facilities), climate and markets (see 
chapter 3)—this dimension was very influential also of the socio-cul-
tural and value-chain dimensions. 
5.4.2a North—Gulu sub-region
The northern sub-region around Gulu is a dry and torrid one, with 
two main rain seasons and two dry ones. I have conducted fieldwork 
in the districts of Gulu, Pader and Amuru. All the informants I have 
interviewed belonged to the Acholi ethnic group. 
With regards to agriculture, this sub-region mostly produces grains—
the most resistant crop to the extreme weather conditions of this 
ecosystem. However, agribusiness is an enterprise that requires 
investment, and thus implies some sort of trust in the future. 
Because of the prolonged insecurity of living in camps and under 
the constant threat of violence of civil war, trust was certainly a 
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shaky ground for the establishment of a business. The proximity to 
the South Sudanese border also had a strong influence in the mar-
keting of local agricultural produce and the trading business. In fact, 
particularly for people living close to the border in Atiak, selling and 
trading produce over the border was quite a lucrative business. 
Image 14. Fieldsite during focused group discussion under a mango tree in 
Parabongo, outskirts of Gulu, Northern Uganda, 2017. 
Picture taken by author.
I arrived in Gulu for the first time in the beginning of 2017, 30 years 
after the sanguinary civil war was initiated by the Lord’s Resistance 
Army’s (LRA) insurgency. The youths had lived most of their lives in a 
territory affected by conflict, eradicated from ancestral land, living in 
camps. Every single person I spoke to while on the field around Gulu 
had lost at least one family member during the civil war, and most of 
them had returned to their own land or village since 5—10 years, 
after having lived in camps or hiding in Gulu town for decades. As all 
of the lives of youths I spoke to had been affected by conflict. They had 
also been affected by conspicuous flows of humanitarian and later 
development aid. Local civil servants and development actors often 
complained about the ‘entitlement mentality’ of farmers: participating 
in governmental and/or international development programmes was 
for the majority of my informants one of the livelihood strategies. 
Historically, the northern region around Gulu has been supporting 
the opposition parties against the current NRM regime. This political 
opposition is rooted in ethnical rivalries that have been strengthened 
YOUTH AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA232
after the conflict. Acholi people often express feelings of discrimina-
tion, particularly by Baganda people from central region and Ban-
yankole people from the south-west.120 Francis, a 26 years old student 
at the University in Gulu told me how he had spent part of his education 
period in Kampala, but that he would have never want to return to live 
there as he would feel discriminated by Baganda: “when I was there I 
would always get to pay higher prices…If I went to the market, I would 
pay two or three times more for a pair of trousers than any other Bagan-
da. Life there is not good for us”.121 The other way around, some of the 
Baganda friends I had asked about the tense relationships with Acholi 
people, expressed that they could not trust them after the prolonged 
violence and massacres of the civil war: “They have been killing each 
other for so long, why did they do that? Also, they are probably trauma-
tized… how can you trust them after what they have gone through?”. 
A feeling of belonging to the territory was strongly bonding my 
informants around Gulu to their ancestral land, to the extent that 
they didn’t feel their land could be sold, yet land was often cause of 
fierce land-related conflicts. In March 2017, I asked Clementine, a 
lady who was old enough to have witnessed independence, but who 
was not sure of her age, about the possibility of buying and selling 
ancestral land: “it cannot happen—if someone would want to sell 
land, there would start a rebellion”. 
5.4.2b East—Mbale sub-region
In the eastern sub-region I conducted fieldwork in the district of 
Mbale, Sironko and Bududa, on the slopes of mount Elgon. The 
majority of the informants belonged to the Bagishu ethnic group, as 
this area is socio-culturally quite homogeneous. The agricultural 
business revolves around horticultural and coffee production, on the 
slopes of the mountain. Older famers who are landowners, however, 
120 I have recorded these feelings of discrimination in my field notes 
from Gulu, on 31/03/2017, from informal conversations I had with 3 young 
Acholi who had lived in Kampala while studying, and had returned to Gulu 
because they felt unwelcomed and discriminated, and were unable to find 
a job in the capital. This issue of discrimination was also confirmed by my 
interpreter Cathy, an Acholi lady who had been living in Kampala for de-
cades, and felt threatened and discriminated. 
121 This conversation took place in an informal setting, at a cafè in Gulu, 
in April 2017. 
CHAPTER 5—YOUTHNOGRAPHY 233
dominate coffee production.122 Therefore I focused my research on 
the horticultural value chain. 
I visited this region when the rainy season had just ended, and it was as 
green as it gets—with idyllic tropical landscapes and breath-taking 
views over the fertile plain, cultivated in regular, small patches and 
orchards. I had left the congested streets and hectic life of Kampala: 
Mbale felt like a sleepy far-west destination, as much as its people 
seemed discreet. I wanted to reach the core of the horticultural activi-
ties of the region, so I was directed to the wholesale market in Kamu. 
Image 15. Wholesale market in Kamu with cabbage sellers, eastern Uganda, 
2017. Picture taken by author.
I arrived in Kamu at 7 in the morning, after we had been climbing up 
mount Elgon on an unpaved, tortuous road that was made more for 
donkeys than for cars. I was looking forward to getting out of the car to 
give my stomach some fresh air, and there I found myself amid one of 
the most vivid markets I had visited. I was late! –I was told– “people get 
here to start trading when the sun is rising, around 4 or 5 am!”. Cab-
bage, tomatoes, onions and potatoes in great quantities, strictly 
122 On 16/02/2017 I conducted a long interview with Charles, the old 
head of a family of coffee producers; his sons and daughters took part in 
the interview as well. They reported how young generations were not able 
to work in this value chain because of the long-term investment neces-
sary for a coffee plantation, and the difficulty in accessing large plots of 
property land. This was confirmed also by IITA experts in this sector, during 
various conversations both in Kampala and during the trip to Mbale. 
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divided along the road by produce: I was told there was a hierarchy of 
social status in the production and trading of the horticultural produce. 
Farmers would climb up the ranking from potatoes to cabbages, and 
would reach a higher status when they could afford buying a cow or 
even purchasing land for coffee production—which was seen as the 
most valuable (and profitable). Another important trait distinguishing 
the social status of farmers was the amount of time they had been 
working on the market: the newcomers were relegated to a position of 
service provision, while the veterans were trading their produce—the 
highest position was taken by those who owned a shop along the road. 
Interestingly, the socio-cultural norms ordering the market hierarchies 
and practices were strictly intertwined with business experience and 
embeddedness in the value chain networks. 
The proximity to the Kenyan border had made the population 
acquainted to transnational trading as much as movement of people, 
both ways. In fact, there was a strong perception of the region beyond 
the boundary dividing the mountain in two, and several of my (male) 
informants had been in Kenya to attend some business, work for a 
period, or visit a relative.
Generally, the majority of my informants showed a rather strong feel-
ing of belonging to their ancestral land. This emerged in several 
interviews with both males and female informants, but particularly 
during an incidental episode in which I found myself in the midst of 
a land conflict. I was directed to a remote area in Sironko district, 
where I was to meet a group of youths engaged in the governmental 
Youth Livelihood Programme. Accidentally, a group of angry men on 
the road mistook our car for that of the district authorities—which 
they were expecting to come and redraw the boundaries of the 
national park, to their loss. Thinking we were the cause of their loss, 
they directed us towards an ambush they had prepared. Luckily my 
translator had smelled the danger and decided to take a right, 
towards the other side of the valley: once on the other side we could 
see and hear how the car of the district authorities was ambuscaded. 
The day after, the local newspapers reported a small conflict between 
stout mountain people and the authorities—no one had lost their lives. 
At a safe distance from the ambush, I interviewed a group of young 
men that had observed the scene with us, explaining how the tensions 
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with authorities had escalated in the past months. “This is our land, our 
ancestors are buried here—they cannot take it away from us. If they 
take it from us, it’s like taking the food from our mouths. (…) If they [the 
park people] enter peoples land it means fighting…we are ready to die 
with them!” told me Amidou during the interview.123 With this blunt 
statement, Amidou was reinforcing his arguments about the injustice of 
the land conflict—tensions that had been ongoing since 1993 when 
Museveni had distributed land, but then reclaimed it a decade after. 
Amidou, in his thirties, had sat with me, the translator and the driver and 
a bunch of other furious men discussing the politics of land ownership, 
analysing corruption at district level up until the injustices perpetrated 
at national level by politicians and police men. Land, belonging and agri-
cultural production proved once more to be a heated political arena. 
5.4.2c Central—Kampala sub-region
I concentrated my fieldwork in this region on the urban district of 
Kampala and the neighbouring district of Wakiso. Although I had 
been traveling around the country, I was new to the environment: I 
had spent the first two months of my fieldwork in Kampala, as I was 
carrying out interviews with development actors. Yet the feverish 
and hectic life of Kampala started to get me only after I started 
interviewing its youths: the population of capital and its surround-
ings is indeed a very young. While the urban population keeps on 
growing as effect of the steady rural-urban migration, the number of 
people populating the city also varies incredibly from the night to 
the day: it is estimated124 that almost half of its population lives in the 
outskirts of the city, commuting daily. I encountered a substantial 
variety in the ethnical background of the people I have interviewed 
in the Central region, defining this territory as a melting pot of 
socio-cultural traditions. The issue of rural-urban migration concerns 
the local authorities as much as development actors, incentivizing the 
strategies that focus on employment creation in rural areas. Youths 
who moved to Kampala from elsewhere refer to their homeland as ‘the 
village’—whatever the location and size of their hometown: Kampala is 
somehow perceived to be an island of ‘modernity’ and opportunities. 
123 Extract of field notes, trip to Sironko on 13/06/2018.
124 This data was reported by the Dutch Embassy on 
13/11/2017; article accessed on 26/09/2018 on: https://
www.government.nl/documents/media-articles/2017/11/13/
tackling-traffic-jams-and-air-pollution-in-kampala
YOUTH AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA236
Image 16. Interview with a brother and sister rearing pigs in the periphery of 
Kampala, central Uganda, 2017. Picture taken by author.
During an interview with two youths engaged in the Youth Livelihood 
Programme with a piggery project, in the outskirts of Kampala, I asked 
Henry what made him move from his village in the West to Kampala: 
Me: And why did you decide to move in 2010? what was the 
decision that made you move here?
Henry: The decision?
Me: Yes, was it for the job, was it for love, was it for…you want-
ed to change?
Henry: it was just for the job. Because I had completed 
schooling, so I had to move around [to find employment]
Dorah: You know for us we have a saying that if you want to die 
rich you move to Kampala
Me: I didn’t know
Henry: Money is raised from Kampala then you go back to the 
village with sugar and bread
Me: ok. Repeat it one more time? 
Dorah: If you want to die rich, you have to come to Kampala. You 
have to leave the village125
I was aware that Kampala was perceived to be an environment offering 
more employment opportunities than the countryside, and indeed I 
125 extract from a group discussion with Dorah, Henry and Joyce (trans-
lator) in Kampala on 4/05/2017
CHAPTER 5—YOUTHNOGRAPHY 237
found that such perceptions to be so explicitly rooted in common 
sense. Besides education, may be the major driver of rural-urban 
migration is indeed the belief that through living the hard city life, 
youths can achieve success—and with it, adulthood. 
The major agricultural production around Kampala is horticulture 
(and floriculture), followed by animals rearing (mainly pigs and chick-
en). This involves different types of production—from the most tech-
nologically advanced greenhouses systems producing mainly for the 
export market and restaurants in the capital, to small-scale production 
for the main markets downtown. I have found that although the major-
ity of my informants in the capital would not want to move anywhere 
else in the country, their attachment to the territory was mostly related 
to their perceived work opportunities than to the land itself. On the 
contrary, in the rural areas where I had conducted fieldwork, my 
informants were attached to their ancestral land and ideally would not 
want to move. 
During the time I spent in Kampala I came to realise how citizens are 
very sophisticated about the national and local politics, keeping up 
to date with several newspapers and radio programmes daily. Politics 
is a major topic of conversation—mostly resulting in a frustrated laugh-
ter: in informal chats corruption is a given, discrimination in resources 
distribution is reinforcing ethnic divisions, while long-yearned change 
seems long to come. My young informants were well aware of these 
dynamics, yet a resigned, apathetic attitude permeated our conversa-
tions about the possibility of political change. They were born under 
the current regime, and testified the widespread presence of intelli-
gence reporting on non-compliant political activities: chit-chats and 
informal complaints don’t get anyone into troubles, but political action 
is repressed. 
As I left the country in summer 2017, new hopes had risen about the 
election as member of parliament of Robert Kyagulangyi Ssentamu, 
a business man and musician, known under the stage name of Bobi 
Wine. Representing a local constituency in Wakiso District, Bobi Wine 
was seen to bring the wind of change he had been singing about into 
the parliament: outspokenly supporting the opposition, during 2016 
election he had released a song calling for change: “When the going 
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gets tough, the tough must get going, especially when our leaders 
have become mis-leaders and mentors have become tormentors, 
when freedom of expression becomes a target of suppression opposi-
tion becomes our position.”126 
The song was banned, but he had already became a role model for 
the youths, and his public figure had been recognised by foreign 
and Ugandan institutions for being a positive example to the next 
generations. In an interview for the local newspaper ‘Daily Monitor’, 
he told about his farm and stressed the importance of producing 
one’s own food, and encouraged Ugandan youths to do the same: 
“Your parents educated you with money from the farms. Why can’t 
you go back and do some farming? That’s where real money is, not 
the air-conditioned offices and sports betting halls. But still, we also 
have to blame the government for neglecting the youth”.127
After leading heated protests against the unpopular social media 
tax128 in summer 2018, Bobi Wine was again at the centre of interna-
tional attention in August and September 2018. His life was attempted 
by the military forces in Arua after a political rally, when his driver was 
mistakenly shot dead. He was arrested and tortured in prison129, and 
only weeks later was allowed to fly to the USA for specialised medical 
treatments. During those heated weeks, protests were brutally 
repressed in Kampala, as Bobi Wine’s supporters called for political 
change. As the socio-political situation in Kampala remains tense, 
youths have hopes that Bobi Wine will be able to succeed to 
Museveni. 
126 The full original video of the song from 2016 can be found on 
YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nBiEhk_CVjw While another 
version of the video was released later, reporting news on political re-
pression of journalists and openly supporting the opposition leader, Kizza 
Besigye. 
127 Daily Monitor, 18/03/2016: http://www.monitor.co.ug/artsculture/
Entertainment/Bobi-Wine-s--Situka--song-epitomises-his-resilient-
persona/812796—3121740—4p46fkz/index.html 
128 This news was reported on national and international level. BBC 
article from 11/07/2018 accessed on 26/09/2018: https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-africa-44798627
129 BBC news report from 25/08/2018, accessed on 26/09/2018: 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45298650
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5.4.2d South-west—Mbarara sub-region 
I conducted fieldwork in the districts of Mbarara, Kiruhura, Sheema, 
Ntungamo and Bushenyi. This sub-region is known in Uganda as ‘the 
land of milk and honey’. In fact, it is a particularly fertile and green land, 
where there are strong agricultural traditions, mainly dairy farming, 
coffee and matooke. However, the majority of the young population 
engaged in agricultural business is involved in horticulture and animal
rearing (pigs and goats), or in dairy cooperatives. While the population 
is generally known to belong to the Ankole ethnic group, there are 
important differences between Bahima and Bairu peoples.130 
Image 17. Two boys transporting matooke (plantain) from the nearby local 
market, one of the main crops in western Uganda, 2017.
Picture taken by author. 
In fact, the most striking example of ethnic tensions and embedded-
ness of agricultural practices in ethnic-bond cultures and traditions 
was located in the south-western sub-region, between Bahima and 
Bairu. My informants reported different and contrasting historical and 
cultural justifications of the differences and tensions between the two 
ethnic groups. In an interview with the community leader of the village 
in Sheema where I was staying, I was given the perspective of the 
Bairu: 
130 For a detailed historical and social analysis of this ethnic question, 
see the methods chapter.
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Janet: In the ‘40s and ‘50s this tribe of Bahima, the cattle keep-
ers, did not like the crop farmers, the Bairu
Me: But is there a relation between the Bahima or the Bairu and 
the Bahutu and the Batutsi? `
Janet: History says so, that the Bahima and the Batutsi originat-
ed from Somalia
Me: so the Bahima and the Batutsi…
Janet: …Are the same except that one group went to Rwanda 
and the other group went to Ankole but they all came from 
Somalia. And then the Bairu came from Congo 
(…)
Me: But while their [Bahima and Bairu] look is different, their 
language is the same! 
Janet: They say we are all Bantu, but you speak the language, 
these Batutsi and Bahima speak the language where they go. 
Where they immigrated to, eh, but they, when you see their 
looks, is different.
(…)
Me: That’s something that is confusing for me because I thought 
I come to west region, it’s all Banyankole
Janet: yeah, we are Banyankole but we have different cultures
(…)
Me: so is the difference in culture related to the different habits 
of agriculturalists and pastoralists?
Janet: I think different habits. Because you say the Bahima were 
not eating solid food they used to depend on milk (…) they don’t 
like eating solid food
(…)
Me: so they were not interested in cultivating?
Janet: yeah, but these days they are trying to cultivate. Now they 
have banana plantations but they themselves can’t dig. So the 
Bairu help them to cultivate. A Muhima woman will never 
cultivate…
Another important consideration to be made about the territorial iden-
tity of this country regards its politics: Museveni, who is originally from 
this area is perceived to favour this sub-region.131 The infrastructures 
131 More specifically, Museveni is from Kiruhura district, which is mainly 
inhabited by Bahima people.
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in this area are noticeably (though relatively) more developed than the 
rest of the country, with the exception of Kampala. Ugandans from the 
rest of the country assume people from the south-west are better off, 
but my informants in Kiruhura complained that it is not the case: 
Me: So you have a good road but no electricity?
Isaac: Electricity is powered, it’s going to the president’s place 
but hasn’t been channelled here yet.
Me: But if he’s the president, why doesn’t he provide for his 
people?
Isaac: That is always in people’s minds, but it depends what 
he can do… he could provide, but he doesn’t. It doesn’t work 
this way
(…) 
Alice: You think Museveni is coming from Kiruhura, so every 
Kiruhura people [Bahima] are rich. Museveni could supply 
money…but we have never seen Museveni with our eyes.132
Interestingly, the development programmes implemented in this 
sub-region were sensibly less than in other parts of Uganda: in the 
north of the country the highest number of development activities is 
recorded and in the south west the lowest. However, I have found 
that my informants could rely on a strong support network constituted 
by members of their extended family. More than in other regions, fam-
ily constituted a springboard for youths’ agribusiness, possibly 
because family enterprises were also in a better economic position to 
offer start-up help. 
5.4.3 Socio-cultural embedding 
Besides the dimensions of territorial and socio-cultural embedding 
is the factor of values and norms in agricultural practices: this factor 
strongly emerged across all the interviews I carried out, although it 
indirectly arose from the analysis of the narratives and observation 
of the agribusiness practices. In fact, youths seemed to give very 
disparate meanings to their agricultural activities. Engagement in 
dairy farming in the south-west was a crucial feature of acquiring a 
132 extract from a group discussion with three members (two young 
men and one older lady in the management position) of a dairy cooperative 
in Kiruhura, on 30/05/2017. 
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respectable social status for the bahima ethnic group; in the east, 
men would need to obtain economic independence through their 
business to even being considered men and bagishu (see below); for 
some youths, particularly in the north, the agricultural activities are 
strictly bond to the well-being of their extended family, and thus is not 
felt as an individual enterprise. 
In fact, the experience of youths in agribusiness was influenced by the 
belonging to one or another ethnic group. The clearest example comes 
from the south-west of the country, where there was a strong identifi-
cation of the ethnic group with the type of agricultural value chain. 
Bahima –historically the same ethnic group as the Tutsi of Rwanda, 
have a particular bond with the dairy sector, while the Bairu– histori-
cally belonging to the ethnic group of the Hutu of Rwanda, are more 
inclined to agricultural activities, mostly matooke, coffee and horticul-
tural production. While Bairu have long been owners of land, Bahima 
had been nomadic until the late ‘80s, when president Museveni allo-
cated land and enforced a schooling policy. During a group discussion133 
in Kiruhura, young dairy farmers, all Bahima, explained to me: 
Peter: “It’s like this: we are all Banyankole but we have different 
clans…”
Isaacs: “Banyankole is a tribe, then Bahima are cattle keepers”
Alice: “then the Bairu are farmers”
Isaacs: “Only after Bahima started going to school [after they 
settled, in the late ‘80s], they learned from each other, so the 
Bahima can also grow crops, Bairu can have cattle”. 
Interestingly, the development programmes in this region reflected 
the propensity of such deeply rooted agricultural cultures. 
As with regards to ethnic identity and adulthood, there is a strong 
gender component—which clearly emerged in the eastern region. 
Properly becoming a mugishu man is quite a tricky business: in fact, 
ethnic belonging is not a given identity that comes with birth but rather 
a status that has to be earned and socially recognised. There is, 
133 extract from a group discussion with three members (two young 
men and one older lady in the management position) of a dairy cooperative 
in Kiruhura, on 30/05/2017. 
CHAPTER 5—YOUTHNOGRAPHY 243
properly speaking, no category of youths but only a passage from child-
hood to adulthood. A young mugishu man is not properly recognised as 
retaining the ethnic ‘mugishu’ identity until he’s considered mature 
enough to be circumcised—among others factors of ‘maturity’ consid-
ered, having achieved economic independence. This usually happens 
around the twenties, in a majestic public ceremony that lasts three days 
and involves the whole community. During this rite of passage young 
men obtain both the adulthood status and their manhood status. On the 
contrary, mugishu women do not need to undergo any rite of passage, 
as their adulthood is obtained with marriage and pregnancy—thereby 
entirely detached from their maturity or economic status.
Discrimination of women, especially in land ownership and agribusi-
ness entrepreneurship, is a painfully problematic issue throughout the 
country. In fact, it is often the case that women are held in a subordi-
nated position in household relations, by means of distribution of 
resources and responsibilities that keep women in a position of 
dependence. Because the attainment of adulthood (and thereby, 
manhood) for young men is closely linked to their economic status, 
the economic status of women in the family is perceived as a threat: 
women should not be the bread winners of the household, else the 
social status of men is at risk. 
While the development schemes I have followed up on were sensitive 
to gender equity in the implementation of their programmes, this often 
didn’t go beyond the inclusion of women’s quota in the number of par-
ticipants. The majority of women I interviewed who were involved in 
development schemes reported that they had to hand in their salary to 
their husbands, many testified that some of their colleagues had to 
stop working because their husbands were beating them. The majority 
of the successful women agripreneurs I encountered lived in Kampala 
and were either single or divorced. Only a few were able to retain a 
balance in their marriage.
Another feature complicating the gender relations is polygyny—
which was more widespread in the regions I visited out of Kampala. 
Just as a general precaution I had been holding on the white lie that 
I was married, which in most cases did not prevent my informants to 
encourage me to marry again with one of their relatives. In such cases, 
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I would ask whether it was also allowed for women to have multiple 
husbands—to which they would reply that in fact it is only allowed for 
men to marry multiple times: besides jealousy, this socio-cultural norm 
had to do with the responsibilities attached to manhood, who would 
have to provide for the wives: 
Joyce [translator]: what about your country, is there jealousy 
or why do you only marry once?
Me: yeah. We don’t have many wives and many husbands, we 
only have one—one.
Peter: one, one? Due to lack of land? or is it a government 
policy? What is it?
Me: it’s a cultural thing. Yeah, what about you, are you planning 
to marry again?
Peter: yes, if I have enough resources
Me: if you have, you have to have a what?
Peter: if you have enough resources like money, or cows, or 
assets you can marry, there is no problem.
(…)
Me: wow. What is the maximum [number of wives] that you 
ever heard of?
Isaac: there is no maximum
Gender norms regulating relations and the possibility to marry multiple 
times is related to the fact that men are the perceived bread winners of 
the household, and therefore their capacity to provide for more than 
one wife is related to their socio-economic status. 
It is important to consider that within the broad age category of youth 
that I have worked with –between 18 and 35– there was a great diver-
sity between the younger and the older ones. In fact, the younger ones 
were coming out of school and had little experience in agribusiness 
compared to the older youths. Needless to say, perhaps the divergence 
in the levels of education and experience which are necessarily bond to 
age. While some of the older youths were already considered by their 
family and peers as adults, others were still in the uncertain position of 
youths—struggling to exit it by means of socio-economic status. 
Therefore, their aspirations were different, as much as their accessibil-
ity to financial assets is more likely for older youths (see Figure 25). 
CHAPTER 5—YOUTHNOGRAPHY 245
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financial services
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 Figure 25. Youths’ accessibility to financial services.134
Besides the access to financial services, the younger youths would 
have a harder time accessing land. In fact, older youths were more like-
ly to have inherited land from their family, either after their father’s 
passing, or in correspondence with marriage. As with the passing on of 
ancestral land to (male) youths, the factor of age would intersect with 
that of the family’s socio-economic status. 
In fact, another important factor emerging from the interviews with 
youths throughout the country is the family background: while the 
ethnicity may affect the broader socio-cultural environment, the 
family has proved to have a strong impact not only in the definition 
of youth identity and status, but also for youths’ engagement and 
success in agribusiness. The most direct impact of the family back-
ground is that of the socio-economic class, offering youths a more 
or less advantaged start of their career. 
5.4.4 Value chain embedding
I have approached the sampling of my informants in a rather loose 
way, by adopting the definitions and targeting strategies of the 
development programmes which implementation I have evaluated. 
In fact, the youths (18—35) were mostly defined as ‘agripreneurs’ for 
the mere commercial attitude they held towards their agribusiness: 
anyone who was doing agribusiness for the purpose of earning an 
income out of it –and not solely as subsistence strategy– was consid-
ered by most development agencies an agripreneur. However, 
throughout the four sub-regions where I have conducted fieldwork I 
have encountered the most diverse attitudes towards agribusiness, 
134 Source: Uganda National Panel Service 2013/2014, elaborated by 
Economic Policy Research Centre, courtesy of dr Mildred Barungi
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among the same youths aiming at earning a living out of agriculture. 
As part of my interview guidelines, I ask each interviewee their own 
definition of their identity as farmers or agripreneurs. While in the 
east sub-region, Cathy –a single mother in her thirties, engaged in a 
private-sector driven programme– explained to me that there is a 
substantial difference between farmers and agribusiness-men or 
women: 
Cathy: Yeah doing something…now like growing pumpkins 
you have to have that passion and say I love these pumpkins, 
I have to every evening you go there and check on them, you 
have that love for the for something so that it also, because if 
you don’t have love for it [you won’t manage]
Me: Yeah, but then a businessman or woman does not have 
love for what they grow?
Cathy: They just grow it for money.
In fact, for the majority of my respondents, the main criteria for distin-
guishing farmers from agripreneurs was whether they were farming 
for subsistence (possibly also including earning a little income from 
cash crops) or as a business activity that requires dedication to the 
management of a development plan and accountancy. Moreover, 
those youths who consider themselves as agripreneurs would not 
necessarily be involved in the production section of the value chain, 
and would aim at pursuing their career within agribusiness, while 
others would simply use the opportunities agribusiness offers to 
step out of agriculture into another sector (a widespread aspiration 
regarded the tertiary sector135). 
Youths who were located in proximity to the market were mostly 
more deeply embedded in the value chain network: they had a wider 
network of people involved in different activities along the value 
chain, thereby being exposed to more updated knowledge about 
technologies, prices and opportunities. In fact, while this was particu-
larly evident in the comparison between youths in and away from 
135 There is a higher social status associated with jobs that do not 
require physical efforts. As it was reported by several of my informants, 
a common ambition of farmers was to be able to open a shop—as, the 
case of Carlos and Scovia, whom I interviewed in Parabongo (Gulu) 
on30/03/2017.
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Kampala, also in rural contexts the youths that were living closer to the 
market had stronger connections and positions in their agribusiness 
relations along the value chain. Depending on the value chain, youths 
were able to make higher profits out of their business in rural or urban 
markets—or in the trading of products: what mattered was their ability 
to play with the latest marketing information, but also activating the 
right connections to make the best of business opportunities. On the 
contrary those who were living in more remote areas and were not very 
embedded in the value chain relations of their crop, were to rely on 
second-hand information, on middle men and ended up profiting less 
than their colleagues close to the market. Interestingly, this factor 
seemed to play an even stronger role than whether or not the youths 
were engaged in a development scheme.
Particularly influencing youths’ identity and aspirations in agribusi-
ness was their residence in rural or urban contexts. As Burgess and 
Burton argue: 
What is perhaps more obvious now is that, as young people in 
Africa migrated in greater numbers to towns and cities, their 
immersion in a new world of urban tastes, sounds, and stimuli, 
and new encounters with diverse peoples and conditions led 
to relative anonymity and often a process of personal reinven-
tion and the embrace of new identities. (2010, p.1)
While the author make a general statement about African youths, 
this was certainly accurate for the youths I encounter in and away 
from Kampala. Being resident in the capital, but also in bigger urban 
centres like Mbarara, Gulu or Mbale required my informants to attain 
a different attitude than they would hold in the village where they 
were coming from. The urban lifestyle would push youths towards 
other priorities and status symbols—but also, as Sommers (2015) 
argued, gave youths an escape from the community pressures for 
the attainment of adulthood. This was particularly true for women 
among the youths, who would have a higher chance of pursuing an 
independent career outside of their household duties. 
5.5 Youth in development in action
After having observed the way in which youths went about their agri-
business activities, in and out of development schemes—I came to 
YOUTH AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA248
realise that the reality in which they were embedded was more com-
plex and dynamic than I had expected as I approached the field. As I 
argued in the paragraphs above, there emerged to be the three major 
dimensions in which youths were embedded, each containing a num-
ber of factors of heterogeneity. Considering the various degrees to 
which each of the factors of heterogeneity were playing a role in shap-
ing youths’ agribusiness experiences, it becomes evident that youths 
were embedded in a complex network of relations. The complexity and 
multiplicity of relations in which youths were embedded problematises 
the perspective that opposes the social group of youth to that of 
development practitioners. 
Scholars (Escobar, 2012) (Murray Li, 2007) (Scott J., 1998) (Rotten-
burg, 2009) analysing development processes, on the contrary, often 
portray a dualistic opposition of development practitioners and the 
groups of their programmes. In the following chapter, I further prob-
lematise this framework of analysis. On the contrary, from my observa-
tions in the field I observed how youths were embedded in an intricate 
web of relations with each other and with various development and 
social actors. In Table 18, I listed the 18 types of social actors with 
whom youths were to some extent related, directly or indirectly, while 
involved in development schemes. 
Actors Explanation
Youths Within the broad age range comprising both males and females be-
tween 18 and 35; working as individuals, in groups or cooperatives. 
Multilateral Donors engaged in supporting youths’ engagement in agribusiness 
were, in my research, the African Development Bank and FAO
Bilateral Donors engaged in supporting youths’ engagement in agribusiness 
were, in my research, USAID and the Dutch Embassy—but I am aware 
that other embassies were also involved in related programmes. 
Ugandan Govern-
ment
Within the frame of this research, it comprised mainly the Ministry of 
Gender, Labour and Social Development and the Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Fisheries and Animal Industries. At a broader level, the central 
Ugandan government was responsible for the elaboration of national 
youths and agribusiness strategies which would server as guidelines 
for international donors.
Local Government District authorities, local councils, sub-country and parish authorities. 
Implementers Extension providers –mostly at the level of district authorities– but 
also contracted development agencies (NGOs): in this case I refer to 
the specific individuals 
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NGOs Within my research, I have interacted with a number of actors working 
for the following NGOs which were implementing bilateral develop-
ment programmes (mainly for the Dutch embassy): ICCO, AVSI, ZOA
Research Next to institutes carrying out research for development (for example, 
IITA), the Makerere University was playing an important role in advising 
the ministries in the elaboration of development policies.
Media In Uganda the media which are reaching out to most people were 
the newspapers The New Vision and the Daily Monitor, together with 
radio programmes. All of these played a role in mainstreaming youths 
engagement in agribusiness: for example the New Vision had a com-
petition programme for the best farmer, funded by the Dutch Embassy. 
Associations (Grassroot) farmers’ associations, unions, both governmental and 
non-governmental. 
Private sector Small, medium or large size private enterprises or companies offering 
input or output markets to the youths.
Banks Financial institutions offering loans to individuals or groups of youths 
within or out of development programmes. I hereby also refer to two 
banks, Mastercard Foundation and Triodos (through Brac foundation), 
who were implementing their own development programmes for 
youths. 
Education Primary or secondary schools, incubation centres, courses and de-
grees which were attended by my young informants.
Service providers These include middle men, transport providers, owners of machiner-
ies (tractors etc.) providing seasonal services, input (chemicals etc.) 
retailers.
Market The market itself is, besides a physical place, a space for social in-
teraction and economic transactions: the people rotating around it 
contribute to shaping, with their relations and interaction, the dynamic 
environment that constitutes the testing ground of youths’ agribusi-
ness, and often times the place where they build their professional 
figure. 
Peers Other youths, also out of agribusiness, who contributing in consolidat-
ing socio-cultural values and norms. 
Family By family I refer to the broad extended family comprising various gen-
erations running down the patrilineal kin structures. Oftentimes the 
youths I interacted with had been raised by other relatives than their 
parents. 
Community lead-
ers
These key figures –usually the elders in the community– are impor-
tant in giving an imprint to the socio-cultural identity of youths, but 
also shaping their ambitions in and out of agribusiness.
Table 18. Types of social actors in relation with youths
The extent to which these relations were direct, intense, or determinant 
for youths’ engagement in agribusiness varied considerably in relation 
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to the three dimensions analysed above. For instance, community 
leaders and family background had a stronger impact in rural areas, 
while in urban contexts the proximity to the market and exposure to 
media and market actors was more determinant. However, it was not 
the core purpose of my research and analysis to map the nature of the 
relations between youths and social actors in agribusiness develop-
ment, nonetheless I was struck by the messiness of it all. In the figure 
below (Figure 26) I outline the messiness and intricacy of the relations, 
showing how some actors were directly related among each other and 
only indirectly to the youths (for instance, Ugandan government and 
multilateral donors). 
NGOs
Local 
Gov.
Media
Imple-
menters
Private 
Sector Research
Banks
Youth
UG Gov. Multilateral Peers
MarketsFamily
Com-
munity 
Leaders
Service 
Provider
Education
Biliteral
Associa-
tions
Figure 26. mapping of the network of actors involved in shaping youths’ identi-
ty and agribusiness
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The various social, political and economic factors contributing to shape 
youths’ agribusiness experience were heavily affecting both their iden-
tity as youths as their approach and aspirations in agribusiness. The 
success of their agribusiness depended on institutional development 
actors as much as on many other actors, institutions and organisations. 
Observing the way in which these actors were contributing to shape 
youths’ reality, I realised the framework with which I had approached 
the fieldwork was not exhaustive. In line with the theoretical framework 
(see chapter 2) I had built up, I had planned to study the relation 
between youths on the one side and development actors on the other, 
their respective narratives, theories of change and experiences. How-
ever, this dualistic framing of the development reality did not prove to 
be accurately corresponding to the phenomenology of development in 
action on the ground. Where by development in action I refer to the 
actual practices and relations involved in the implementation of devel-
opment schemes, with the above mapping (figure 5.3) also refer to the 
broad web of relations the youths are embedded in order to be able to 
carry out their agribusiness activities. 
5.6 Conclusion
I set up the fieldwork research throughout the country with the ambi-
tion of understanding who were the youths engaged in development 
programmes, and how their experience in agribusiness shaped up in 
their respective socio-cultural, political, economic and ecologic envi-
ronments. In fact, from the literature review and pilot field trips I had 
carried out, I observed an important heterogeneity characterising the 
social category of youths—as in Uganda the majority of the population 
is ‘young’. As Methorst et al (2017, p.1) argued: 
Diversity cannot be explained in full by ‘external’ structural fac-
tors such as ‘markets’, ‘technology’, or ‘nature’ [1,5,6]. Farmers 
make decisions about the everyday management of their farm 
as well as strategic decisions about farm development. The 
practices resulting from these strategic decisions in turn affect 
the perceived opportunities and new strategic decisions. In this 
iterative process of strategic decision-making in farm develop-
ment, the farmer tries to anticipate and balance the effect of 
developments in the context of the farm with the needs and 
aims of the family farm.
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In line with the authors, I have encountered three main dimensions 
clustering the heterogeneity of the Ugandan youths: my informants 
were embedded in territory, sociocultural and value chain environ-
ments. Within these dimensions, I identified 18 factors contributing to 
the heterogeneity of my informants. The interaction of these factors 
contributed in shaping the different traits making youths the diverse 
social category they constitute. At the same time, such dimensions 
and heterogeneity factors were interacting with each other in a 
dynamic way—making the agribusiness experience of youths an 
ever-evolving process that point out to the vibrant reality of their iden-
tity and business activities. 
Through such analysis I could identify the social and institutional actors 
that embody the processual and dynamic agribusiness reality in which 
youths are embedded, and I mapped such relations in Figure 26. 
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Image 18. Sunset in Murchinson’s National Park, central Uganda, 2017. 
Picture taken by author.

Chapter 6
Mind the gap:
Negotiations between 
and within policies 
and practices 
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6.1 Introduction
The previous chapters have investigated the narratives of two 
groups of development actors: development practitioners and 
youths. I explored the ways in which development practitioners and 
recipients constructed their discourse around youth in agribusiness. 
On the one hand, development practitioners constructed a variegat-
ed development discourse resulting in different theories of change, 
and thus developing a diverse of development approaches. On the 
other hand, given a variety of heterogeneity factors, young farmers 
constructed a diverse range of narratives and definitions of youth 
and agribusiness. While both youths and development practitioners 
were aiming to engage youth in agribusiness, their narratives indi-
cated they had different understandings of what youth and agribusi-
ness actually mean, as well as what youths’ needs actually are. How 
this mismatch affects development outcomes is the first object of 
study of this chapter. 
The second objective is to analyse the actual implementation of 
development programmes for youths in agribusiness in Uganda. 
Through an examination of the youths’ and practitioners’ percep-
tions of the programmes practices, I come to an observation of how 
‘youth’ is constructed as a knowledge category and ‘driving meta-
phor’ for development and political contention. 
The academic debate in development studies has focused its atten-
tion on different sets of issues in development, its politics and pow-
er relations, effectiveness, ideology and mandates. These studies 
have operated with analytical categories borrowed from a Foucauld-
ian study of power: on the one hand the development practitioners 
with their dominant discourse –produced and reproduced (and 
sometimes contested) through the agency of the social actors work-
ing in the ‘development industry’, and on the other the development 
recipients with their own narratives and agency– more often than 
not contesting the dominant development discourse enforced on 
them. My own research has been operationalised within these ana-
lytical categories: where the first chapter explores the production 
and reproduction of the development practitioners’ discourse 
around youth in agribusiness, the second analyses the variety of 
narratives and experiences of youths themselves—highlighting their 
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heterogeneity. With this chapter I bring together the study of top 
and bottom dimensions of this development trend in the analysis of 
development practices on the ground—to understand how the mis-
match affects the development outcomes. Through the analysis of 
such outcomes, in the very process of programmes implementation, 
I observe the tensions between perceptions, incentives and political 
agendas. In this way, I provide insights on the unfolding, flaws and 
strengths of the recent development trend on youth in agribusiness 
in Uganda. 
This chapter is divided in nine sections, before coming to a conclu-
sion. I will start by giving an outline of the research methods (section 
6.2) I have used, describing the phases of the ethnographic research, 
between 2017 and 2018, that constitute the empirical basis for the 
analysis for this chapter. With section 6.3, I start the analysis with a 
comparative analysis elaborated in the previous empirical chapter: I 
confront the narratives and practices of development practitioners 
and youths, around their perceptions of youth, agribusiness and 
development programmes. In this section, I also briefly compare the 
development approaches of public-sector programmes versus pri-
vate sector driven ones, as intended by the development practition-
ers and perceived by the youths. In the section 6.4 I make an 
in-depth analysis of the implementation of the programmes. I ana-
lyse the social impact of the programmes, exploring the perceptions 
of the programmes from the point of view of both youths, their main 
constraints. As part of this section, I also examine the heterogene-
ous outcomes of the development programmes which implementa-
tion I have observed on the ground. In section 6.5, I discuss how the 
perceptions of the programmes reveal that they contribute to ‘ren-
dering technical’ the needs of youths, who are reduced to a social 
category that responds to the agendas of development organisa-
tions. I continue on this line of analysis in the sixth section, where I 
analyse the political agenda behind some of the development pro-
grammes, and the instrumentality of the social category of youth, 
despite being a very broad and vague category due to its heteroge-
neity. In section 6.7, I describe the ways in which some of the pro-
grammes I have observed manage to adapt to the heterogeneity of 
the needs and capacities of youths. In the eighth section I describe 
the ways in which various development practitioners, who have 
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different stakes and incentives in the administration and implementa-
tion of the programmes, negotiate among each other—often changing 
(and frustrating) the initial outset of the programmes. In section 6.9, I 
analyse the observation of the case of a development project for youth 
in agribusiness, which has been frustrated by strenuous negotiations 
and corruption of the parties involved. In the last section, I draw the 
conclusions of the analysis of narratives of the various development 
actors involved, the practices of implementation and their perceptions. 
6.2 Methods 
In this chapter, I analyse ethnographic data that I collected during 
extensive fieldwork across Uganda in 2017, as well as during a fol-
low-up fieldtrip to Kampala that I carried out during the month of 
May 2018. The motives for returning to the field were two-fold. On 
the one hand, returning to the field offered the opportunity to vali-
date my conclusions on the development agencies’ theories of 
change and approaches, during interviews and feedback sessions. 
On the other, it offered me the opportunity to investigate the rea-
sons why there was a mismatch between the narratives of develop-
ment practitioners and recipients. 
During the first phase, I focused mainly on identifying the two the 
narratives. The purpose of this chapter, and my subsequent field-
work was to analyse and explain the mismatch between different 
sets of development narratives and practices—as exemplified in the 
figure below (Figure 27). By development practices, I mean the actu-
al activities that involve development actors –both at the top and 
bottom– as a development programme unfolds from design to 
implementation and outcome: these include formal and informal 
meetings, evaluations, extension services, consultations and actual 
agronomic and business activities within the framework of the pro-
gramme or project. This definition is functional to my analysis: in 
addition to an analysis of the mismatch between development prac-
titioners’ narratives and practices and those on the ground, I also 
explore gap between development programmes’ narrative elaboration 
and their implementation in practice. 
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Figure 27. Exemplification of the mismatches in development programmes
Moreover, in this chapter I analyse the implementation of the devel-
opment programmes supporting youths in agribusiness through the 
examination of the participant observations on the ground (which I 
carried out in 2017). During multiple fieldtrips throughout the coun-
try, I had the opportunity of observing how development practition-
ers implemented the programmes, how they interacted with youths, 
and how youths perceived these practices. 
The data for the analysis of adaptation and negotiations include 
interviews with development practitioners and youths I had previ-
ously met during extensive fieldwork, in addition to observations of 
meetings and high-level negotiations among development practi-
tioners. I carried out such observations in a partially new setting, 
among two groups of practitioners: one in the process of setting up 
a pilot project for youth engagement in agribusiness, and one agri-
business development platform for public-private partnership (PPP). 
6.3 Development practitioners and youths: confronting 
narratives
The previous chapters offered an in-depth analysis of the way in which 
development practitioners and youths understand and perceive the 
programmes engaging youths in agribusiness. In this section, I summa-
rise the results from previous chapters, by confronting their narratives 
(Table 19). The summarised perspectives in the table below are based 
on the ethnographic data collected during fieldwork in 2017. 
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6.3.1 Narratives 
Themes Development practitioners Youths
Expectations from 
development pro-
grammes
—Create the enabling environ-
ment for youths’ engagement in 
agribusiness
—Achieve gainful employment in 
agribusiness
Who are the youths? —Age bracket ranging 15- or 
18- to -30 or -35, male and 
female.
- Social category constituting 
the target of development 
programmes: youths are seen 
as both the bearers of the 
problem of unemployment as 
they are the agents of change, 
through agribusiness.
—Youths are different through-
out the country, but they are 
mostly targeted with homoge-
neous programmes. 
—Youth is primarily a socio-cul-
tural category between childhood 
and adulthood, not necessarily 
and contextually bond to an age 
bracket.
—Meanings and belonging to this 
category are radically different for 
males and females.
—There are a number of heter-
ogeneity factors defining youth 
in relation to their agribusiness 
activities, and these are related to 
three dimensions of embedding: 
socio-cultural, territorial and val-
ue-chain. 
What are the youths’ 
problems, preventing 
them from engage-
ment in agribusiness?
—Youths are unemployed and 
don’t have the entrepreneurial 
mindset and assets to start 
their own agribusiness. 
—Youths lack land, access to 
financial services, training and 
information
—Youths struggle to earn re-
warding income from agricultural 
activities because of technical, 
economic and political con-
straints—which vary depending on 
the three dimensions of embed-
ding: quality agricultural inputs, 
What is agribusiness? —Agribusiness is not for 
subsistence but for self-em-
ployment, with the supposed 
trickle-down effect of gener-
ating employment. It is thus 
radically different from subsist-
ence agriculture. 
—Agribusiness is modern ag-
riculture, which can contribute 
to making Uganda a middle-in-
come country. 
—Agribusiness is not agriculture 
for subsistence but for income 
generation, thus it is a rupture 
with the older generation’s under-
standing of agriculture. 
—Agribusiness is perceived as the 
way out from the youth category 
into adulthood.
What is needed to im-
prove agribusiness? 
—Capacity building: including 
training, entrepreneurship 
skills development, extension 
services, accountancy and 
management 
—Access to financial services 
and land
—Input and output markets: qual-
ity inputs (chemicals, machineries), 
and ready markets for their pro-
duce or value addition
—Access to financial services
Table 19. Comparing narratives of youths and dev. practitioners
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6.4 Implementation 
Besides the above-mentioned disparities in narratives, I have also 
observed tensions in the implementation phase. Throughout the 
multi-sited fieldwork, I have observed various stages of implementa-
tion of development programmes both in the public as in the pri-
vate-sector driven approaches. For the majority of the field visits, I 
moved independently (with driver and interpreter), I was also able to 
conduct some participant observations of field visits with develop-
ment practitioners. Visiting agribusiness enterprises, mostly in occa-
sion of monitoring and evaluation visits, was particularly interesting 
to observe the interaction between development practitioners and 
youths. These observations revealed different ranges of discrepan-
cy between their perceptions of the programmes and what they 
were intended to deliver. I have encountered heterogeneity also in 
the success and limits of the programmes, not only because of their 
efficiency, but also because each had a different working definition 
of success. In this section, I examine the complex and diverse 
dynamics I have observed in the phase of implementation, exploring 
the impact of the programmes on the local socio-economic realities, 
interaction between the actors, their perceptions of the programmes, 
and the success and limits of the programmes. 
The analysis of the implementation phase is particularly important, 
after having examined the narratives, for two reasons: on the one hand the 
functionalistic assumption that policy discourse simply needs to be ‘trans-
lated’ into practice appears to be more complex and problematic when 
paying due attention to the relations and practices on the ground. On the 
other hand, implementation is as crucial as production of narratives for the 
construction of a development discourse through practices. As Mosse 
(2004, p.640) observed:
Despite the enormous energy devoted to generating the right 
policy models, however, there is surprisingly little attention paid 
to the relationship between these models and the practices 
and events that they are expected to generate or legitimize in 
particular contexts. (…) At best, the relationship between policy 
and practice is understood in terms of an unintended ‘gap’ be-
tween theory and practice, to be reduced by better policy more 
effectively implemented. 
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The ‘unintended gap’ between policies and their outcomes are the object of 
study of Mosse, who analyses the implementation of a British farming project 
in India in which he participated as development practitioner. His analysis 
(2004, p.653) lead him to conclude that however ‘good’ the policies guiding 
the project, they could not be implemented due to the organisation’s interests 
to remain in the development business: “It was increasingly clear that project 
practices were shaped less and less by the formal goals (of policy/design) and 
more and more by the organisation’s ‘system goals’ that revolved around the 
preservation of rules and administrative order”. Interestingly, my very first par-
ticipant observation of an agribusiness programme implementation quickly 
drew me to the same conclusion.
The first field trip I have conducted out of Kampala was to Gulu, as I 
joined a monitoring and evaluation trip of a large bilateral agency 
that asked to remain anonymous. I was quite excited: I was going to 
the ‘real field’—the agricultural one. I was going to observe the 
unfolding of a strongly private sector-driven and oriented scheme 
that linked medium and large-scale agribusiness to groups of farm-
ers. These farmers, who development practitioners from the agency 
called ‘agripreneurs’, would be working in out-grower schemes (con-
tract farming) for the agribusiness companies. I went along with a 
Chief of Party of the programme, who illustrated his strategy: “We 
plan a quick-in and quick-out: we are not going to be there forever, 
and these guys need to be doing their business without us. We are 
just facilitating”.136 In his narrative, the facilitation of market linkages 
between different parties was bluntly expressed as “they don’t see 
the market opportunities”. In fact, much of the activities the develop-
ment agency was implementing on the ground were oriented to the 
education of farmers to become agripreneurs, and “change their 
mindset”. In fact, the role of development practitioners I observed 
in-action was that of mentoring and training. 
Besides the Chief of Party, I was traveling with two communications 
officers and one implementer based in Gulu. I was excited to see 
how they would operate, observe the way they talked about the pro-
gramme and agripreneurs, and finally find out who these agripreneurs 
were according to them. However, the first participant observation as 
136 Extract from an informal conversation in the car, on the way from 
Kampala to Gulu, on 7/02/2017.
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we arrived at the local offices had been rather shocking: at the debrief-
ing meeting with the rest of the team, the Chief of Party explained to 
the communication specialists:
we are here to collect success stories, high level stories with 
pictures…They have to be impact-stories, we have to convince 
the current administration keep funding this project, other-
wise we can all go home! Guys, we are here to make busi-
ness! We make money out of this, it’s our job. We need to get 
new contracts for development projects! We’re making money 
out of this by helping others making business… so let’s col-
lect our success stories and go back to Kampala.137 
This statement was an explicit positioning of the role the develop-
ment practitioners would be playing on the ground: working for 
themselves to remain in the business of the Ugandan development 
industry, while at the same time facilitating agribusiness for young 
farmers. The implementation of the programme, and it monitoring 
and evaluation, were instrumental for the preservation of the devel-
opment agency position as professional actors in the field of agri-
business development. This finding may not be surprising nor reveal-
ing of the inherent system flaws of the ‘development industry’, but 
highlights how the implementation phase as an object of study is 
more than the measurement of the ‘gap between policies and prac-
tices’. In line with Mosse (2004, p.655), it seems that “Policy may not 
generate events, but it helps stabilize the interpretation of events”. 
The Chief of Party was determined to demonstrate the social impact 
of the programme, in terms of creation of agribusiness opportunities 
for youths in Gulu as a necessary justification for the programme’s 
existence. Particularly during times of budget cuts, the role of commu-
nication officers in this endeavour was crucial in the assessment of the 
programme’s impact. As in the case of Mosse’s DIFID project in India 
(2004, p.659), The project never did clarify the instrumentality of its 
model, instead it focused on demonstrating impact. Significantly, the 
series of detailed impact assessment studies that followed (and in 
137 Extract from an observation I made in the offices of the organisa-
tion, in Gulu, on 7/02/2017—which I noted in my field notes. Emphasis 
added by author.
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which I was involved) demonstrated that the project was perceived by 
villagers as having a significant positive economic and social impact”.
6.4.1 Social impact of the programmes 
Besides the development organisations’ question of the economic 
improvement, development programmes have a variety of different 
social impacts on the individuals and communities involved in the 
schemes. Given the fact that since independence western develop-
ment organisations have been supporting agribusiness with differ-
ent approaches, it is hard to isolate the impact of a single pro-
gramme. In some regions more (north) than in others (south-west), 
my informants had been engaged in several development pro-
grammes for agribusiness before the scheme I was interviewing 
them about. The study of implementation of programmes targeting 
the social group of youth, which is relatively recent target, has the 
advantage of showing the impact of a single, isolated programme. At 
the same time, most of the programmes I have followed up on in the 
four different regions had been running for a relatively short period 
of time (minimum of 6 months to maximum of 2 years), and thus 
made it sometimes difficult to assess their impact. 
Nonetheless, my interviews with participants revealed several flaws 
in the programmes. The establishment of a development programme 
catalyses both social and economic transformation in the communi-
ty—whether the scheme involves single individuals or multiple mem-
bers of the family. It is precisely the external input of economic pos-
sibilities for transformation that can provoke a misbalance in the 
community. In fact, social dynamics are generally structured around 
economic status. The case of Acholi communities in the north are 
emblematic of the important transformation that the engagement in a 
private-sector development scheme had brought. 
During my first visit in the area together with the Chief of Party and 
communication officers, I came in touch with one of the farmers, 
Robert, who had been enrolled both as seeds out-grower for the 
seed company, as for the extension service provider for the company. 
Robert was considered a success case, and had become a role model 
for other youths—and a flagship case for the programme. He had 
directly been trained by the bilateral development agency, and linked 
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up to the seed company who, through him, would reach out to more 
farmers to be contracted. Farmers in the scheme, were given improved 
seeds together with the necessary chemicals by the company itself, 
and were in charge of multiplying the seeds on their land. Robert had 
gained both an improved income from the seed multiplication, as much 
as a higher social status as focal point for the members of the commu-
nity he was mentoring as trainer and extension-service provider. 
Friends and family members from his community would look up to him 
as the one who had brought a new opportunity for income generation. 
He had catalysed the formation of a social group around renovated 
ties—based on a principle of entitlement through age. They would 
meet to discuss their business and strategies and advice each other 
on agricultural practices. However, the most crucial aspect for them 
was the ability, as youth, to obtain the economic status that would 
allow them to enter adulthood. In fact, the improved income of a num-
ber of youths in the community had drawn to them both the responsi-
bility and honour of the social status of breadwinners. The develop-
ment programme had therefore offered a paradoxical possibility for 
the youths –as such– to overcome their status as youths and enter 
adulthood. 
The attention that the community paid to Robert and his fellow 
young/adult agripreneurs however, was not only positive. On the 
contrary, their economic success also triggered jealousy. Robert 
introduced me to his friend Carlos, who received me in his home not 
far from Robert’s household. Carlos and his wife Scovia had joined 
the seeds multiplication project since little more than a year and had 
already gained sufficiently to open up a small store in the village 
located on the main road. They worked there in turns, made a relatively 
considerable profit, and substantially improved their income and social 
status. Scovia told me how this improvement had made their parents 
happy for them, yet she had observed a change in the behaviour of her 
neighbours. She explained how they would not greet her anymore, 
“they are jealous”—she said, with much concern and anxiety. I under-
stood that the sudden economic improvement distressed her relations 
and asked her whether paradoxically such improvement had negative 
effects, too. She answered, “yeah, it is now becoming a bit difficult, if… 
That is why we don’t want to stay in this kind of house [straw hut] when 
we are fearing that when we are not home, you can even see… We can 
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even find our house has been burnt. That is why we fear to stay in that 
kind of house”. In fact she was fearing what she had seen happening to 
another neighbour, whose house had been burned down by jealous 
neighbours. These facts were later confirmed by other farmers in the 
community.
I recorded similar events of jealousy in other socio-cultural contexts 
and other regions, where the accumulation of capital in the hands of 
individuals or agribusiness groups had created inequality in the 
community, and provoked theft or even damage of the yields.138 The 
social impact of development schemes is an economic trigger, with 
important consequences for the balance of resource distribution 
and social status.
6.4.2 Perceptions of development programmes on the ground
Perceptions of development programmes are extremely variegated 
and can be summarised along three key dimensions: first, the differ-
ence of perspectives of youths and development practitioners; sec-
ond, the strong influence of regional differences in the implementa-
tion of the programmes (also the same ones); finally, the difference 
of development approaches: private sector driven and/or oriented, 
or public sector schemes. 
6.4.2a The youths
Participants in the development programmes I have observed per-
ceived development schemes as transitory economic opportunities. 
Informants who had not taken part in development schemes before 
had heard of programmes of different kinds from their social net-
works. Either way, participation in development programmes was 
mostly perceived as an opportunity to improve agribusiness 
income—although with the awareness of the transient nature of 
such opportunity. When asking them about their previous experiences 
with development initiatives, they would mention participation in the 
most disparate range of activities, more or less related to agribusiness: 
from the distribution of seedlings and calves139, to the setting up of 
138 I recorded such events in group discussions in Atiak, at the border 
with South Sudan, on 3/04/2017, and also the next day by the treasurer of 
the YLP group in Odek, who wanted to remain anonymous.
139 As reported by Michael in Parabongo (north), on 30/03/2017
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saving groups140, women’s self-help groups141, or sporadic experiences 
with cooperatives142 and contract farming. 
Around Gulu in particular, I found that the post-conflict peace-build-
ing and development programmes had marked farmers’ perception 
of the relatively new programmes targeting youth in agribusiness: 
the fact that they were accustomed to receiving humanitarian aid, 
had developed an attitude of entitlement in many of my informants.143 
Development programmes were perceived as providing temporary 
relief from a (structural) poverty that set them in an underprivileged 
position in comparison to other regions, and especially in compari-
son with whites. Receiving aid seemed a form of compensation in 
the eyes of many of my Acholi informants. Nevertheless, I was told 
several instances of programmes that had failed to bring neither 
tangible nor lasting benefits. Because of the precarious and tempo-
rary nature of development programmes, farmers would welcome 
them like discounts in the supermarket. 
Besides such disillusioned perceptions of development pro-
grammes, my informants also reported how they had benefitted 
from previous or present programmes: as springboards for their 
agribusiness, they had navigated opportunities to capitalize on their 
income. Perceived improvement was often measured with the ability 
to buy a cow or build a bricks home. Those who were more positive 
about development programmes reported having learned business 
skills and having established an agribusiness of their own—leaving 
subsistence agriculture behind for a more commercial one. As a 
matter of fact, the transition from subsistence to commercial agricul-
ture emerged as generalizable threshold of success for my informants 
140 As reported by Lydia in Mbale, on 21/06/2017
141 As reported by Joy in Sheema (western), on 27/05/2017 
142 I found two examples in the dairy sectors, in Kiruhura (western), one 
on 30/05/2017 and one the day after. 
143 Off record, when I had completed my interviews, it happened in sev-
eral instances that informants expected to benefit either directly or indi-
rectly from the collaboration with me—despite explaining upfront that I was 
a student conducting independent research. In particular, on 30/03/2017 
in Parabongo (north), Clementine asked me whether I was going to help 
her and her family with handouts. Also the interviews I conducted in Odek 
(north) on 4/04/2017 with members of the YLP group framed the pres-
ence of several other programmes in the past (mostly related to post-con-
flict relief) in terms of ‘help’. 
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throughout the country, thus taking the risk of positioning income gen-
eration above food security. However, the majority of those who were 
indeed able to capitalize on the transitory opportunities that develop-
ment programmes offered, were youths who had the personal quali-
ties of an entrepreneur. As a matter of fact, in my experience, a key 
factor for youths to benefit from a development scheme was an entre-
preneurial personality or character—and therefore a very arbitrary and 
personal quality. This personal trait was so determinant that I could 
notice how some of the most successful agripreneurs were not even 
part of any development scheme (see section below on control group). 
Moreover, since the programmes were stressing the educational 
component, they were perceived by youths as learning opportuni-
ties. In a context in which education is seen as exit route from pov-
erty, my informants highly valued the training and capacity building 
of programmes. In fact, one of the recurrent complaints concerned 
the lack of training and extension services—mostly regarding public 
sector institutions. However, the transient nature of programmes 
partially hindered the commitment of youth to the learning trajecto-
ry. Programmes that were giving out certificates of participation 
were seen as providing a sustainable service, since the certificate 
could be invested for future employment. However, the fact that 
development agencies would become providers of such educational 
services, made youths identify development programmes targeting 
them as even more of an ephemeral yet essential process. Training 
in agribusiness skills had somehow turned into a necessary commodi-
ty for youths to profit from in their pathway towards commercial 
agriculture.
Perhaps the most surprising effect of development schemes for 
youths was their impact on the socialisation of agribusiness colleagues 
on the principle of age. Programmes would catalyse the gathering of 
men and women within a given age range, who in most cases would 
undergo a training process before continuing with their agribusiness 
as partners within one common enterprise or as colleagues in individ-
ual enterprises. Either way, their cooperation was crucial at least for 
marketing purposes, and in most cases also for learning from each 
other. The majority of the programmes I have observed included a 
gender quota in their strategy, to ensure women’s participation in 
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agribusiness. However, more often than not, I have observed how 
women in the newly formed youth groups were discriminated by their 
male colleagues or by their very husbands at home. Although it was not 
always openly discussed, I observed that in the majority of youth 
groups the economic independence of women seemed to be per-
ceived as problematic.144 Particularly but not exclusively in remote rural 
areas in the eastern and southern regions, women are relegated to 
household activities and are mostly not entitled to retaining their own 
finances. Their engagement in agribusiness enterprises, particularly in 
collaboration (or competition) with men, is perceived as a threat to the 
gendered relations within the household and community at large.
This issue, which had emerged during interviews and informal con-
versations—is unfortunately common knowledge in Uganda. It was 
explained to me very clearly by Immaculate, the manager of a large 
flower-cuttings enterprise in the outskirts of Kampala. She was 
supervising the work of hundreds of women in the enterprise—in 
both the branch in Kampala and in the West-Nile region; she was 
the point of reference for all the ladies who had compliances—either 
work- or home- related. I visited her several times, and on 16 March 
2017, we discussed the difficulties that women had, paradoxically, 
due to their empowered economic status. When I asked her what 
were the consequences for the female employees, who became the 
breadwinners, she told me: 
Immaculate: Like when they are here they are working for 
their families so when they reach home of course they are 
women as you said and as we saw and in the African setting, 
a woman is always kept low. And when you are kept low, even 
you may not be participating in using your own salary to develop 
a family so you find that even when the person has learnt and 
144 On International Women’s Day, 8/03/2017, in Kampala, I interviewed 
Sharon—the successful CEO of an agribusiness enterprise. She told me 
how she was finding it hard to get married, because she was so ‘empow-
ered’. She reported: “And also you know that most of the successful wom-
en, they are either widows or they have separated with their husbands or 
they have, we don’t have divorced now, it is not so much pronounced but 
they have probably separated with their husbands or their husbands are 
fully involved in the business”. On 15/03/2017, also in Kampala, Joyce told 
me she was facing the same struggles to find a husband, because of her 
successful financial status. 
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you see you are the one supporting the family a hundred per-
cent, you are not supposed to say that “I am a bread winner”. 
There is that hindrance…
Me: I have heard that a lot. Yeah
(…) 
Me: so women are working, they take money home, the majority 
of the people here…Do you think they are able administer their 
own money or they bring money and they give it to?
Immaculate: They are not able, some are able, and others are 
not. The biggest percentage are not able.
Moreover, I have recorded several instances in which women were 
beaten and forced to quit their jobs within contract farming develop-
ment schemes, while the championing of individual female agripreneurs 
had led to sexual harassment of a couple of my informants.145 The social 
prominence that women would obtain with economic status was like a 
revolution in the patriarchal and sexist social contexts, and therefore 
forcefully repressed by males who felt their status was threatened. 
This became particularly clear during a visit I paid to project in the north, 
were youths out of school (already from the age of 15) were trained to 
operate tractors. As I was discussing the project’s strategy to include 
women in the training for tractors operating, Barbara146 walked in. A 
20—something years old girl, wearing a bright yellow dress, she 
appeared proud of the leading position she held in the project: from 
being an apprentice, she was now herself training other youths. She 
145 I recorded these events around Kampala, by 3 managers (ladies) in 
two large horticultural enterprises, who were in touch with female employ-
ees—on 16 and 17/03/2017. Moreover, Joyce, on 10/03/2017 had told 
me how an acquaintance from her region, in the south-west, got her hand 
chopped by her husband for having dared to sell some of the goats she 
had bought with her own money—but he considered to be his own:
Joyce: When the husband came home, asked, “where are the goats?” 
She said “I sold them to Mwesigwa’s son” and then the man cut her. 
They said he asked for money, money or goats, bring money or goats. 
The woman I think wanted to pay for fees for the children…
Me: So, the man cut her
I: But he really chopped the hand?
Joyce: It almost went off because for a villager to move from Sheema 
[south-west region] to come to Mulago [hospital] for treatment in 
Kampala, it has to be serious…
146 I use a fictitious name, as much as I was asked to keep the anonym-
ity of the tractors training project and the bilateral programme which was 
financially supporting it.
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told us how she enjoyed driving tractors, fighting the Acholi socio-cul-
tural stereotypes around women, not supposed to be doing this kind of 
job. She bluntly stated “I can do what men can do”—as she was explain-
ing that in the beginning members of the community wouldn’t believe 
that she and her colleagues were actually females! In fact, it was 
unheard of women to wear trousers, let alone driving a tractor bigger 
than the huts where people lived in. In fact, they were encouraged by 
the (Australian) project managers to wear trousers for the practical rea-
son of operating tractors—and they were, for this simple reason, 
assumed to be men by community members. Barbara was upset by the 
fact that rather than challenging their own stereotypes about what 
women can do, her community questioned her gender. Therefore, she 
insisted she wanted to stick to her traditional women clothes, “to show 
that you don’t have to be even like a man to do that work”. However, 
such ‘revolutionary’ act of challenging the local gender roles, did not 
pass unpunished: later on, I learned that Barbara had experienced sex-
ual harassment when she was working as a tractor operator in a large 
agribusiness. Unfortunately, this is far from being an isolated case, and 
I have encountered several women that had to give up on their married 
life to pursue their career in agribusiness—either through divorce, or 
simply remaining unmarried.
This discrimination, and the perceived negative impact of pro-
grammes supporting women participation, would also partially 
explain the fact that the majority of my informants were males, 
despite my efforts to achieve a gender balance in the sampling 
phase. The social impact of a development programme targeting 
youths with a quota for female participation was rather disrupted. I 
encountered several instances in which groups of youths were 
already formed before joining the development scheme, as saving 
groups (known as SACCO, Saving And Credit Cooperative). Besides 
few gender-mixed saving groups, the majority of cases I observed 
where women were included were women-only groups: this would 
allow them to retain economic independence and capitalize on their 
profit (either for agribusiness, kids’ education or personal purposes) 
without having to hand in their finances to their husbands. Besides this 
gender issue, members of saving groups were not gathering with any 
other criteria than the purpose of saving, and when turning to a devel-
opment scheme the age benchmark felt as artificial. In fact, I have 
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observed how the majority of my informants did not share the aware-
ness of belonging to a specific social category for fitting an age brack-
et. Other socio-cultural and economic categories were perceived as 
being more determinant, such as gender, economic and social status, 
ethnic group, were perceived as being more determinant.
6.4.2b Main constraints to youths’ engagement in agribusiness 
Throughout my interviews with youth informants, I systematically 
asked my informants about what they thought need improvement in 
the development programmes they were participating it. Besides the 
contingent necessities such as agricultural machinery and quality input 
(seeds and chemicals), the issues that youths reported as having the 
most negative impact on their agribusiness were problems that lay 
beyond the possibilities of programmes: namely financial capital, 
access to land and climate change. 
The main issue that was reported was the ability to access financial. In 
fact, interest rates of financial institutions that are not collaborating 
with development programmes or the government are extremely high 
(fluctuating around 20%), and thus inaccessible. Moreover, accessibil-
ity to financial services is particularly difficult for younger youths, who 
have no collaterals to show as guarantee for their loans. This issue was 
confirmed by dr Mildred Barungi, who conducted a large survey in 
2013 for the Economic Policy Research Centre147 (Figure 28, below). 
Youths’ accessibility to 
financial services
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Figure 28. Youths’ Accessibility to financial services
147 The Economic Policy Research Centre is part of the Uganda 
National Panel Service. 
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As for accessibility to financial services, the youngest among the youth 
were having a harder time accessing land. Land is mostly inherited 
patrilineally, therefore access to land affects female even more than 
male youths. However, despite the fact that land is a minimum requisite 
for agribusiness, is yet beyond the scope of any short-term develop-
ment programme. In fact, as outlined in the first chapter, the issue of 
land tenureship reform is a complex issue that remains unsolved since 
decades. The possibility to address this issue lays within the responsi-
bility of the government, yet no serious attempts have been made.148
Respondents also point to challenges related to climate change. 
Unpredictable rain fall, together with a stable increase of temperatures 
had impaired yields productivity and exacerbated pests and diseases. 
Seasons were perceived to have blurred, jeopardizing traditional 
knowledge on agricultural techniques. These issues in turn made farm-
ers even more reliable on the support of development programmes. 
For example, after hearing how the area around Gulu had been suf-
fering from irregular rain fall for the past two or three seasons, I 
asked Robert149 and his mother Clementine how their engagement 
in agriculture had changed. Clementine answered, and her son Rob-
ert translated for me: 
Robert: so what changed the weather like this, the rain is not 
coming?
Clementine: we don’t know God’s will
Robert: maybe because of the trees that are not there.
Clementine: this rain, back then in this month it would have 
rained…but now it’s gone like it’s the dry season.
Robert: it has been two years that the rain keeps disturbing 
us like this.
Clementine: you plant rice like this, the sun comes and 
dries everything.
148 In April 2018, there was a rather science-fiction proposal to use 
blockchain technology to regulate the cadaster, as reported in the news 
after an international conference to which Museveni enthusiastically par-
ticipated. The New Vision reports an article, accessed on 24/09/2018 
on: https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1476564/
transform-uganda-land-registries-blockchain-technology 
149 Group leader for a private-sector driven programme in Gulu, inter-
view extract from 30/03/2017.
YOUTH AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA276
Climate change was an issue perceived by most farmers and agripre-
neurs, regardless of their age. On the contrary, issues such as accessi-
bility to financial services and land were more youth-specific. 
6.4.2c Development practitioners
As I will describe in the sections below (negotiation, adaptation and 
in the case study analysis), development practitioners on the ground 
would have to undergo a consistent amount of adjustments to imple-
ment the programmes as they had elaborated in theory. Much of 
these adjustments were driven by specific, contextual characteris-
tics of the regional agribusiness market, and in some instances on 
the requirements of the private sector partners. However, in the 
encounter with the youths, their perceptions, narratives and practic-
es were shaped by the concrete reality of the individual youths—who 
mostly did not correspond to the ideal archetype of youth envisioned 
before implementation. In fact, I have observed how there was a 
substantial difference in the perception of the youths (and the nar-
ratives around them) depending on the degree of engagement of 
the practitioners with operations on the ground. In fact, practitioners 
working mainly from headquarters office had a more general and 
abstract perception of youths, with a superficial knowledge of the 
specific characteristics, needs and capacities of the target groups in 
the different socio-cultural, regional contexts. 
Interestingly, development practitioners that were either observing 
(monitoring and evaluating) or directly implementing a programme on 
the ground, had a very ambiguous perspective on the youths involved 
in their scheme. Sometimes youths were perceived as being victims of 
poverty, precious potential to be “unlocked” for a “brighter future”, 
while at times they were described as “stubborn” or unwilling to adopt 
their development strategies or knowledge.150,151 
150 Such polarized perceptions of development ‘subjects’ had also been 
recorded by Mosse (2004, p.652) in a British programme he had been 
working on in India.
151 The narrative of ‘unlocking youths’ potential’ for a brighter future 
was reported by the most optimistic development practitioners within 
the Ministry of Gender I interviewed on 20/01/2017, at the Ministry of 
Agriculture on 27/01/2018, and International NGOs on 13/03/2017 and 
21/02/2017; but also reported in the news, as titles the New Vision article: 
“Unlocking youth potential imperative in transforming Uganda”, consulted 
on 24/09/2018: https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1458529/
unlocking-potential-youth-imperative-transforming-country
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In February 2017, I observed how a development practitioner from a 
private-sector programme152 monitored the progress of a small 
enterprise in Nwoya, a couple of hours drive from Gulu. Denis, I was 
told on the way there, was their most successful agripreneur: he had 
set up a business from scratch, and now had set up an agri-school 
to train other youths within their scheme. He was a “role model” for 
the youths in the area, because he was the living testimony that 
“there is money to be made in agribusiness!”. Yet when we sat down 
with him in the back of his office I could see how the interaction 
between the development practitioner and Denis revealed a skewed 
relation: Denis was holding a reverential posture, looking down on 
the ground and twisting his fingers, as he was asking for advice on 
the training of young farmers on his demonstration-farm. On the 
other hand, the development practitioner was questioning his deci-
sions, asking why and how he had not yet completed some bureau-
cratic procedures to show for his trainings, complaining about his 
administration and pushing him to justify himself. I felt so uncomfort-
able that I left the room. Later on the practitioner conducting the 
evaluation explained to me how he saw his role as mentor—“you 
have to keep on pushing them! There’s money to be made, you know, 
but they don’t see the market opportunities so we have to create the 
market linkages.”153 
6.4.2d Mismatch in perceptions 
Importantly, a mismatch in practice did not only emerge between the 
two groups of development actors, but also among the actors within 
them. The enactment of a development policy involves several devel-
opment actors from the elaboration of a theory of change, to the 
design, implementation and outcome of the programme. Reflecting 
the reality of ‘Aidland’ (Mosse, 2011), the data I collected on the inter-
actions among development practitioners also shows that the process 
The counter-narrative depicting youths with a negative tone was also re-
corded in several instances, both in Ugandan and international agencies. 
For example, on 20/01/2017, at FAO headquarters in Kampala, I heard the 
concerns of an anonymous development practitioner saying that youths 
were “sitting idle, doing nothing and they get into the political arena be-
cause of unemployment—youth unemployment rates are dangerous be-
cause they can harm the stability of the country”. 
152 The organisation expressly asked to remain anonymous
153 This observation and conversation took place during a monitoring 
and evaluation visit on 8/02/2017 in Nwoya, northern region. 
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of designing and implementing programmes and projects frustrated 
the outcomes. In fact, such process involves the cooperation among 
parties that have different understandings of the development prob-
lem and how it should be tackled, but also different interests and 
incentives. Taking a closer look at the practices ‘at the top’ over a peri-
od of time of roughly one year (spring 2017 to spring 2018), I have 
observed how the programme changes over time. To exemplify and 
attempt an explanation of how such mismatch emerges, later in this 
chapter I will examine one example at length, as to explore all the 
dynamics involved from elaboration of a theory of change to the 
outcomes. 
As with regards to the youths, I recorded a sensible variety in youths’ 
perceptions of the programmes I have evaluated throughout the 
country. The country-wide public programme, the most homogene-
ous approach, still resulted in very different outcomes for several 
reasons: politics at local level played an important role in the inter-
action with communities on the ground, particularly in favouring 
NRM supporters.154 
Moreover, the financial incentive was capitalized differently, according 
to the heterogeneity factors outlined in the previous chapter. Youths 
that were well connected in their value chains networks and received 
land and support from families were better off than those who needed 
to rent land and start the enterprise anew. Territorial and socio-cultural 
embedding –particularly factors such as the ecosystem and norms 
and values in agribusiness– also played a crucial role in diversifying 
throughout the outcomes of both development approaches. This was 
particularly true for the different private-sector driven programmes, 
because of the slightly different approaches of the programmes (for 
instance, some programmes were offering stronger marketing con-
nections while others were structured as out-grower scheme), but 
mainly because the strategy of the programmes was capitalizing on 
assets and qualities that were not distributed homogeneously among 
the youths. For instance, only some of the youths were able to become 
out-growers, depending on whether they had access to land. This 
socio-economic factor was unequally distributed across the country. 
154 In section 6.4.3a I analyse these issues in depth. 
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The heterogeneity of youths, in fact, emerged as a major factor shap-
ing the outcomes of programmes. For example, in a conversation with 
Trust Birungi, an agribusiness man working as service provider for 
AKORION, I asked him what he thought were the most relevant fea-
tures defining youths as a diverse social group. He stressed that the 
contextual differences where determined by the socio-economic sta-
tus of the youths and their family, telling me that: 
there are the underprivileged, who don’t have a perception 
of development as if it was in their hands to change—they 
expect help to come from the development programmes, so 
when they’re targeted in terms of entrepreneurship there is 
a clash with the programme’s design; on the contrary, the 
non-underprivileged have more questions about the pro-
gramme’s potential benefit for them—engaging with ques-
tions such as ‘how can the programme benefit me for my 
purposes?’.155 
Trust related this economic-class difference to the fact that those 
better off could afford taking more risks. In addition, they were more 
likely to have their own resources for starting up. The combination of 
these two factors enabled an entrepreneurial mindset. 
Importantly, these socio-economic disparities map up with regional 
and ethnic groups. Trust argued, for example, that “For instance, in 
Mbarara, people have bigger farms (for example 10 acres) and are 
thus able to diversify the value chains in which they engage, getting 
into several businesses at the same time—but those who have less 
than 1 acre will invest in food crops for subsistence.” Inevitably, dis-
crimination as side effect of homogeneous development approach-
es to diverse socio-economic contexts, also unfolded along regional 
disparities. At AKORION, for example, they found that it was easier 
to have relationships with affluent groups in the south-west. According 
to Trust, these farmers would ask to become partners of AKORION, 
rather than clients. Alternatively, farmer groups in the north, near Gulu 
would ask: “Can you help my farmers? Can you subsidise this or that?”. 
155 Extract from an interview with Trust in Kampala, on 23/05/2018
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Moreover, he added that there was a cultural reason, besides the 
socio-economic ones, contributing to the major difference between 
north and south-west—both in the agribusiness mentality and relation 
with development partners. As it was also confirmed by other develop-
ment practitioners156, he stressed that the handouts people in the north 
had been receiving after the war had influenced northerners’ ‘entitle-
ment mentality’ (see section 6.4.2a). Furthermore, he stressed that in 
the north agribusiness is influenced by “a cultural mentality: land hold-
ing is communal, so it’s more of a socialist, less capitalist mentality. For 
example, if the community decides they’re going to plant millet, but one 
entrepreneur who sees potential and wants to plant simsim [sesame]—
he cannot decide on the land use! While in the south-west the individ-
ual can decide on the value chain which can generate more returns: it’s 
individual choices, together with a stronger support of the family.”157 
6.4.3 Heterogeneous outcomes and limits of the programmes 
The evaluation of the ‘success’ of heterogeneous programmes sup-
porting youth in agribusiness in Uganda is a complex and at the same 
time somehow arbitrary task. In fact, the programmes I have observed 
on the ground differed in their approach (public vs private-sector driv-
en), institutional structure, donor funding and incentives. Ministerial 
programmes were guided by the National Development Plan II (NDPII), 
and worked in the political interest of the government to show for their 
commitment to tackle youths’ employment issues. Programmes from 
bilateral organisations were only to some extent bond to governmental 
guidelines, and rather responded to the incentives of their own home 
agency, in the interest of obtaining funding for yet new development 
projects. Grassroot Ugandan organisations instead, worked to lobby 
their position in policy making and to strengthen their visibility within 
government structures. 
Predictably, such heterogeneity was also reflected in the programmes’ 
definitions of success, which were as disparate. With the observation 
156 This argument was made also by development practitioners I in-
terviewed in Kampala in an international NGO on 23/01/2017 and at the 
Ministry of Gender on 10/04/2017.
157 This argument was also made by a development practitioner in an 
international NGO on 25/05/2018, and confirmed by conversations I had 
with agricultural experts at IITA, during the follow up field trip in May 2018.
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of programmes’ implementation, I came to realise that there was a dis-
crepancy between programmes’ definitions of success and the organ-
isations’ theories of change. For instance, the ministerial Youth Liveli-
hood Programme aimed, on paper and in the practitioners’ narratives 
of their theory of change, to boost employability of youth in productive 
agribusiness. However, in practice, the programme was considered 
successful when the loans that had been disbursed to youth groups 
had been restored, thereby fuelling a revolving fund for district author-
ities to re-invest in new youth groups. During the last follow-up field 
trip to Kampala, I met several practitioners at the Ministry of Gender, 
who had evaluated the programme one year after my observation in 
the field. They insisted on the success of the programme, since they 
had financed youth groups who had managed to repay their loans. On 
the contrary, while in the field in the south-west region, young partici-
pants in the programme reported their disappointment in the scheme: 
despite having repaid the loan, they said they had not improved their 
situation but instead contributed to enriching corrupt civil servants. 
Repayment of the loans was, in the instances I observed, not synony-
mous of ‘success’ for the youths. In fact, as Mosse (2004, p.662) 
argues “‘success’ and ‘failure’ are policy-oriented judgements that 
obscure project effects”. 
Oftentimes private-sector programmes funded by international 
agencies needed to demonstrate their success in terms of number 
of youths they had engaged in agribusiness. Their impact was meas-
ured as training of a certain amount (their specific target) of youths in 
agribusiness skills, or their engagement in contract farming. Strikingly, 
the success of the programmes which implementation I observed on 
the ground, was relative to their specific programmatic definitions of 
objectives, that would respond to their structural incentives—while 
their theories of change aimed at economic growth and agricultural 
modernisation for youth employability. This mirrors Mosse’s (2004) 
finding that the very selection of participants in a development scheme 
tended to facilitate a biased selection of those who already possessed 
the qualities and skills they were to be taught. Moreover, the regional 
differences I outlined in the previous chapters played an important role 
in diversifying the range of ‘meanings of success’. Because each 
region had its territorial, socio-cultural specificities (see chapter on 
youthnography), and because there was great variety in the value 
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chain in which youth were venturing, the success of the agribusiness 
enterprises was contextual. For instance, the same private sector driv-
en approach, in which the development agency constitutes the link 
between groups of farmers and private sector companies, had very 
different outcomes in the north then in the southwest. In the north, 
farmers would multiply improved seeds for a company that constituted 
both the input and output market: i.e. providing the seeds and chemi-
cals and buying the end product. In the south-west, dairy farmers, 
working in cooperatives, would be provided the machinery (e.g. cooler) 
to collect milk by the same private sector company who would buy the 
milk. In the case of seeds multiplication, farmers would earn higher 
incomes but commit their land use for non-food crops, where market 
was (nearly) exclusively constitute by the company, risking a position of 
dependency for the marketing of their produce. In case of the dairy 
cooperatives, farmers would actually gain a stronger bargaining 
power in prices negotiation, thanks to the consolidation of the coop-
erative, and thanks to the broader market of the dairy sector (with 
multiple buyers). 
A common characteristic to all programmes, throughout the country, 
was the perception, on the side of the youth, of the programmes as 
transient and not durable. The impact of the programmes engaging 
youth was thus that of creating a momentum of attention for the cause 
of youth unemployment, with the cynical understanding that it was a 
temporary opportunity. Since the majority of my informants had 
already experienced multiple other development programmes, they 
knew how to surf the trend around youth agribusiness but were con-
cerned about the sustainability of the change the programmes prom-
ised to bring. During fieldwork in the north, I interviewed a 23—years 
old member of a youth group in the Youth Livelihood Programme, who 
had participated in international development and humanitarian pro-
grammes before. He expressed his concern, when I asked him how he 
viewed the various development organisations active in the territory: 
Yeah so they don’t implement what they intend to do. So they 
only implement half of it leaving other [objectives unimplement-
ed]. So they just do things just to complete may be the project 
period and other things so they only look at the sustainability of 
the project to the community. I don’t have a problem with the 
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donors but the implementers here, the social workers and the 
rest.158
His concern was with the capacity of development practitioners on 
the ground rather than with the good intentions of the programme, 
as he later lamented the corruption that was frustrating the potential 
impact for the communities. Elsewhere in the same region, I had 
observed several sign posts of past programmes and organisations 
that had been operative on the ground, engaging various social 
groups—women, victims of the war, smallholders and now youths. In 
general complaints, lamented the water pumps that broke down 
shortly after the development agencies left, or the useless provision 
of banana suckers or coffee seedlings from the government—“they 
only come around here [hinting at the remote rural areas] when it’s 
time to harvest votes”, I was told during the same interview. 
6.4.3a Public sector approach—Youth Livelihood Programme 
The aim of the programme, enforced by the Ministry of Gender, 
Labour and Social Development, is that of supporting groups of 
youths mainly with a start-up capital (loan) to start or scale their agri-
business. The implementation involved a long bureaucratic procedure 
which would foresee youths’ groups application for funding to the local 
authorities, which would pass it to regional authorities and then to the 
ministry of Gender in Kampala. Once granted the loan, youths would 
receive one-time training for agricultural and business skills from local 
authorities. During the first fieldwork there were widespread contro-
versies between government authorities and youths about the repay-
ment of the loans, while during the follow-up I was reassured by civil 
servants that the majority of funds had been recovered. Practices of 
implementation included the training of youths at the beginning of the 
projects, and sensitization campaigns launched by the Ministry to 
recover funds. While the programme’s definition of success is the 
engagement of as many youths as possible in profitable agribusiness, 
the actual measure of success was the repayment of the loans (with 
little or no follow-up on the ground).
Through fieldwork, it became clear that, although both practitioners 
and youths had the same goal (youths’ employment in agribusiness) 
158 Extract from an interview in Odek, province of Gulu, on 8/04/2017, 
the responded wished to remain anonymous. 
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they defined very differently the key concepts, procedures and prac-
tices of implementation. Throughout the country, youths lamented 
corruption of civil servants involved in the programme and lack of qual-
ity inputs and extension services. In general, the loans were misunder-
stood for hand-outs and often referred to as ‘political money’, namely 
bribery of their votes. An emblematic example of this practice, which 
tied the loan of the programme to the elections’ agenda, emerged in 
May 2017, as I interviewed Dorah, a member of a group within the 
Youth Livelihood Programme (YLP) in the outskirts of Kampala: 
Me: When did you get together for the first time?
Dorah: The first time, it was 2016, around January [a month 
before the presidential elections]
Me: Ok. How did you decide to get together? What were the 
main reasons why you wanted to work together as a group?
Dorah: As a group, no, we started with, remember by 2016, we 
had started organising for elections, primaries, NRM [National 
Resistance Movement] whatever… So, we were a group, they 
were looking for votes of our councillor. So as a group, we 
were around 15 youths. So, during that process, we said but 
the election, after the elections what are we going to do so 
that we keep our group together? So we decided to…we 
started, we decided to start with poultry as a community work 
that could keep us together still even after the elections so 
from there we started working as a group, till we got that pro-
gram of YLP to apply for the money of the youth
Dorah and her colleagues expected that the local councillor wanted 
youths’ votes, bringing funding opportunities along with the presiden-
tial elections. They decided to capitalize on this opportunity and joined 
the YLP, facilitated by the councillor. While on the one hand this epi-
sode shows how buying votes is assumed to be the custom, on the 
other it also showed how youth in this context were aware that their 
vote counted. 
Beyond this instance, I have encountered several other YLP members 
who –often off record– would confirm that it was perceived as being a 
governmental programme institutionalising the custom of distributing 
“political money”. Since this form of public development was 
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experienced as being highly political, there was much confusion as 
how the loan system was supposed to work. In fact, I was told that dur-
ing previous elections or other campaigns, civil servants distributed 
handouts or in-kind goods, so the loan system was not welcomed. 
On a positive note, the procedures for the implementation of this 
programme secured the ownership of the projects. In fact, the spon-
taneous application of groups of youths for funding of their agribusi-
ness allowed them to invest in the enterprise and value chain which 
was most relevant to them. Moreover, securing the means for their 
enterprise, and thereby income, allowed youths that were successful 
in obtaining the grant to gain higher social status—therefore exiting 
the local cultural category of youth into adulthood. Perhaps the most 
successful example of YLP groups was the one I encountered in 
Gulu—more precisely Odek, the village of birth of Joseph Cony. 
Working together in the YLP group enterprise allowed youths to 
strengthen previously distressed social relations. Besides repaying 
the loan, they were able to capitalise on the profits to set up a saving 
group—allowing for resilience in times of poor yields. Moreover, they 
would often meet up even when they did not need to talk business: 
they had set up an amateur theatre in which they re-elaborated 
social issues such as alcohol abuse or domestic violence. 
In cases in which the groups were not as successful in setting up a col-
lective agribusiness, the loan system generated financial debts. While 
in Mbale in June, Hassan told me (euphemistically): “the Youth Liveli-
hood Programme has helped to get simple things like soap, kerosene 
and doing small business and the family gets what to eat. Generally, it 
has not been bad. But now the yields have not been good because 
changes in seasons, so we have some debts.”159 In fact, Hassan was 
pointing to the fact that without sufficient training and experience in 
managing capital, external issues such as changes in the weather not 
only damaged their productivity, but also put them in tricky financial 
debts—having invested a higher sum than they were used to. 
159 Extract from an interview with Hassan, member of a YLP group in 
Mbale, on 14/06/2017
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6.4.3b Private sector approach 
The programmes I have evaluated were mainly aiming at linking individ-
uals or groups of agripreneurs to private-sector companies that would 
enable youths to scale their business, also by facilitating access to 
financial services (by providing collaterals). The implementation 
involved the setting up of consortia of youths and directing their agro-
nomic activities towards the business model set-up by the private sec-
tor. Practices for the implementation entailed mainly facilitating market 
linkages, access to input (machinery and chemicals) and output mar-
kets (selling their produce), training and capacity building. Besides the 
agricultural skills, youths would be trained in developing an agripre-
neurial mentality and management and accountancy skills. Different 
development agencies had different definitions of success (training a 
given number of youths, constituting or strengthening cooperatives, 
employment in out-grower schemes)—but all shared the same focus 
on the economic interests of the private sector company, who would 
have to benefit either in terms of production, labour or marketing for 
their input and services.
Despite the context-specific regional variety, youths engaged in these 
programmes generally reported to be earning higher incomes than 
before, mainly thanks to the connection with ready markets (often the 
company itself) for their produce. For instance, John from Gulu told me: 
At first, the level of production was a bit low but due to the NGO 
coming to facilitate farmers by giving them training and facilitat-
ing them with some other inputs, and taking them to some other 
outside companies who buy goods from here, made us gain 
some capital out of it, out of the produce we normally get from 
the garden. 160
In this extract, John points at some of the most valued aspects of pri-
vate sector approaches—namely the specialized agribusiness skills 
training and the input provision. Both were seen as opportunities to 
capitalise on agricultural enterprises and move from subsistence to 
commercial agriculture. 
160 John is a fictitious name, since he asked to remain anonymous—in-
terviewed in Gulu on 8/04/2017 
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In fact, youths appreciated private sector driven programmes because 
they provided, besides the inputs (seeds, chemicals), also the output 
market. In Mbale, Richard explained what made him satisfied about the 
programme (which asked to remain anonymous) he had joined as con-
tract pumpkin farmer: “They give you seeds and that the end of it all 
they are going to buy the produce.”161 Richard contrasted this to the 
YLP program where it “was good to give a lot of money” but since it was 
a loan, there was no security of being able to capitalise on it, thereby 
running the risk of frustrating the possibility of improvement.
However, the contract-farming scheme implied that youth were 
attracted to the programme as a way of securing a job, rather than 
boosting their entrepreneurship. In fact, their capacity to continue in 
the sector or value chain in which they were trained strictly depend-
ed on the marketability of the produce beyond the company in the 
scheme. In fact, as in the case of pumpkins or improved seeds, often 
the value chains in which the private sector was investing were not 
marketable beyond the company itself. I found an interesting excep-
tion in the south-west region, where the programmes were investing in 
value chains which were rooted in the local agribusiness culture (dairy). 
Not only where the youths facilitated in accessing the dairy business, 
but they were not in a unidirectional relation with a single private sector 
company.
Therefore, the resilience of the agribusiness and the capacity for 
spill over depended on the value chain. The best example in this 
sense was an SNV project, funded by the Dutch Embassy, in the 
south-west region.162 The project had capitalized on the dairy value 
chain, supporting cooperatives by linking them with private sector 
companies that would provide machinery and buy the milk. SNV was 
responsible for the training of youths within the cooperative, and for 
providing collaterals for loans—where necessary. The fact that the 
dairy sector is strongly embedded in the socio-cultural and economic 
dimensions of the region made it possible for youths in the programme 
to capitalize on the profits derived from the scheme, and include 
161 Richard was interviewed in the outskirts of Mbale on 15/06/2017. 
Emphasis added by author. 
162 SNV’s TIDE project in Uganda, website accessed on 2/09/2018: 
http://www.snv.org/project/inclusive-dairy-enterprise-tide
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growing numbers of members in the cooperatives and even set up sav-
ing schemes. As a consequence of the growing number of members, 
respondents reported that cooperatives were strengthened and with it 
also their capacity to negotiate better deals with the dairy industry.163 
Moreover, as argued in section 6.4.2a, the programmes were per-
ceived as transient business opportunities and were not considered 
as sustainable frameworks to support their business. In fact, youths 
had seen a variety of international organisations coming and going, 
and lamented the brevity of their programmes.
6.4.3c Control group 
The control group was a very heterogeneous sample of youths, not 
only because of the heterogeneity factors I mentioned in the previ-
ous chapter, but also because such factors emerged more strongly 
than in the other groups of youths I interviewed. This happened 
because of two combined reasons. One, the broad sampling cate-
gory of ‘youth in agribusiness’ allowed me to collect interviews with 
youths from all walks of life. Two, youth who were gathered in groups 
within development schemes had more in common among themselves 
than random youngsters in agribusiness. In fact, for the youths within 
the development schemes the bias of the selection of the develop-
ment organisation played a homogenizing role. 
Therefore, I met youths –both male and female– who barely earned 
an income from (partially) commercial agriculture, but did not see 
nor aspire a future in agribusiness, and others who had left well-paid 
white collar jobs to venture into agribusiness as profitable enterprise 
and desirable career. Both fit the definition of young (18—35) agripre-
neur (earning income from commercial non-food crops production), 
although for the one, agribusiness is a forced-choice, and for the other 
an aspiration and career path. 
Interestingly, the most successful ones –in terms of economic profit and 
satisfaction with their career– had not benefitted from development 
163 This emerged both from the interview I conducted with members 
of a cooperative in a remote village in Kiruhura (south-west region), on 
30/05/2017, as from the interview with the director of a cooperative in 
Sanga (south-west region) on 1/06/2017
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schemes to start their enterprise. In their cases, other factors were play-
ing an important role: firstly, the arbitrary component of their entrepre-
neurial mindset and personality; secondly, their family and economic 
background, which in most cases allowed them to study till university 
level—as education was in fact a third determinant factor. The majority 
of youths in the control group of my informants were working individually 
rather than as groups. This was certainly due to my sampling, which did 
not target youths working in cooperatives or organized groups since I 
had learnt that group-enterprises were not representative of the major-
ity of the social category of ‘youths in agribusiness’. In fact, besides 
some highly organized value chains such as dairy, young agripreneurs 
joined forces only in the phase of bulking produce for transportation. 
As for this group, it can be deduced that factors such as socio-cultural 
context and economic background played a crucial role. Moreover, 
these factors had even more impact than the development pro-
grammes had for youths participating. 
6.5 Rendering Technical164 
Considering the perceptions that youths had of the programmes, 
and those of practitioners about the practical implementation of the 
programmes, it can be inferred that there was a discrepancy in the 
perception of the social and economic impact of the programmes. 
Moreover, it appears that while for development practitioners the 
implementation of programmes was a technical matter that was 
restricted to agribusiness practices and skills, the agribusiness 
experiences of youths were a complex matter that encompassed 
their whole socio-cultural and economic world. In fact, as shown by 
the case of successful agripreneurs in the control group, the hetero-
geneity factors described in the previous chapter were crucial. On the 
contrary, the approach of practitioners was partial –limited to few 
aspects of agribusiness– such as business skills, market and financ-
es, namely their notions of success.
This is clear in the prominent role given by practitioners to the concept 
of ‘mindset’ in the implementation of programmes. Mindset was dis-
cussed as a skill that could be taught; a personal trait to be developed 
164 I borrow the concept of ‘rendering technical’ from the analysis of 
development implementation in Malaysia of Murray Li (2007).
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through capacity building. Mindset was a commodity that the pro-
grammes claimed to provide, as a service for youths, and at the same 
time depicted as a key to success in agribusiness. As a commodity, 
mindset was something that most youths lacked and could be provid-
ed. As a consequence, youths’ poverty or unemployment becomes a 
condition that depends on the personal, individual capabilities of farm-
ers to turn into agripreneurs. By giving the responsibility of coming out 
of poverty to the individual, the structural adjustments that would be 
responsibility of the government –such as infrastructure, industrializa-
tion– are depoliticised. Rather, the focus of development programmes 
lay with the skills that youths can learn to turn from subsistence to 
commercial agriculture, with the support of public or private-sector 
schemes. The solution to youth unemployment is to become an agri-
preneur.165 Similar to Mosse (2004, p.649—650), I observed the com-
modification of a personal trait such as the ‘entrepreneurial mindset’. 
Within such discourse, I observed during fieldwork, the projects’ ability 
to provide youths the skills to escape unemployment, justified the need 
for programmes implementation and thus the fuelling of the develop-
ment industry around youth in agribusiness. In other words, the way in 
which youths needs (for an entrepreneurial mindset and skills), justified 
the organisations role as mentors. It reinforced the development prac-
titioners position as (technical) experts in the field of agribusiness and 
youths mentoring. As Mosse (2004, p.652) concludes: “These factors 
shaped the style of project practice (tight schedules, targets, subsi-
dies) and the type of project relationships (patron–client, employer–
employee) that emerged”. 
Perhaps the most striking observation to be made about the implemen-
tation phase of the programmes and youths’ perceptions of them, is that 
the very targeting of youths as a social category was experienced as 
arbitrary. The variety of heterogeneity factors described in the previous 
chapter were in fact not only a cause for problematising this social cate-
gory, but, alone, determinant factors for youths to succeed or not in agri-
business. Youths, thus, had become the ‘collective subject’ to which Mur-
ray Li (2007, p.132) referred, as necessary target of development efforts:
165 As explained in the first empirical chapter, the aidnography, the fo-
cus on mindset change and agirpreneurship was stressed by the majority 
of the development organisations. 
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Through its program for community development, the project 
proposed to create a new collective subject, a community that 
would assess, plan, reach consensus, and think of population 
and natural resources as entities to be managed. The proposed 
technique for creating this subject was to guide villagers through 
a carefully crafted sequence of activities: participatory assess-
ment of community resources, problem analysis, preparation of 
development proposals, application for funding under the offi-
cial budget planning process, monitoring, and evaluation of out-
comes. The plan referred frequently to participation, but how 
villagers would participate and to what ends was predefined. 
However, the targeting of the social category of youth was not only 
functional to the fuelling of the development industry—but had also a 
political significance, particularly for Ugandan organisations (both 
governmental and grassroot). I will explore the political aspects of the 
development programmes for youth in the section below. 
6.6 Politics in contention 
The attention my informants received by development agencies for 
the sake of being young, felt arbitrary to all those who did not see 
the (political) potential of leveraging the momentum for their own 
benefits. In a few cases, young agripreneurs had a full awareness of 
the political and economic leverage they had for being part of a 
demographic majority. These cases stood out for being the exception.166 
Khamutima, a coffee farmer from the west who moved to Kampala for 
his studies, organised a youth network (YOFCHAN—the Young Farm-
ers Champions Network) of farmers to lobby for youths inclusion in 
policy making at the Ministries, FAO and other bilateral organisations; 
Joyce, crucial informant and friend in Kampala, advocated for young 
women in agribusiness at forums in east Africa; Stephen, a dairy farm-
er in the Western region and director of a dairy cooperative, is trying to 
halt rural-urban migration by sensitizing youth to form coalitions.
166 In chronological order: Khamutima, whom I interviewed in Kampala 
on 2/02/2017; Joyce, whom I interviewed in Kampala on 10/03/2017; 
Stephen, from the south west region, whom I interviewed on 1/06/2017; 
a young civil servant who will remain anonymous, whom I interviewed in 
Mbale on 14/06/2017. I will give more details on these informants through 
this section.
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Stephen explained how together with some other members of the 
cooperative, they had submitted a project to an international NGO to 
support the formation of a youth council: 
Stephen: For us we had a proposal to [the international NGO 
who wished to remain anonymous] but they didn’t like it, they 
never took it up, we wanted to form youth councils. Youth 
councils, we manage them as youth, we sensitize other youths 
who are in towns, we start setting up conferences in towns, 
let’s say in Kampala, you organize the youth, you call youths 
from Kampala, take them to Sheraton Hotel you talk to them, 
tell them people, why are you stuck in towns, come back to 
Villages, let’s go and do farming. (…) Let’s come back to here 
[Western region of Kiruhura] then if we have an organized 
group, also we can talk of such problems of land. A youth is 
willing to come back to the village but he doesn’t have own 
land. We can as a group petition. (…) If we have a voice, we 
can push. Even, we can push for laws if we have one voice. 
That is if we have an organisation or a platform that can petition 
even up top parliament for laws to be changed and they favour 
the youth who are trying to go into farming.
Me: Okay, I think that there is already a youth council in the 
parliament in Kampala
Stephen: One, representing the whole youth in Western 
Uganda. He [head of the youth council] is just there to eat 
money [i.e. corruption]. He can’t stand alone and fight for our 
rights. We need organisations that can support youths.
Stephen was motivated to constitute a youth network not only for 
agribusiness purposes, but also because the old generation of politi-
cians “must go—it’s our time to take the lead of the country”. However, 
the organisation of youths into political groups was not welcomed not 
only by international NGOs, but especially by the government. 
When in Mbale, I have a long conversation with a young exponent of the 
district authorities—who asked to remain anonymous. In the beginning 
of the conversation he was reluctant to share his thoughts with me and 
gave me a politically correct account of the motivations of the govern-
ment to invest in youths in agribusiness: he explained that Museveni 
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was supporting the youths because they otherwise would remain idle 
and be a threat to national security. He himself had voted for Museveni, 
but argued that since youths are the majority of the population, they 
should be given more space in politics. Until that moment, youths were 
organized in the National Youth Council, with representatives from 
each district—and had nominal authority in the parliament. I report 
from the field notes of 14th June 2017, my surprise when he finally took 
confidence to explain the real political stakes for government to 
engage youths in development programmes: 
When I switch off the recorder167, the real interview starts—the 
narrative totally changes. The first time he voted for nrm 
because he was grateful for the long-term peace that this 
president had brought to the country. But afterwards he real-
ized he didn’t really have another option—if he wanted to stay in 
politics and pursue his career. He gives the example of a friend 
of him who was also involved in politics as a youth representa-
tive and decided to stand up for the opposition and was cut off 
the political system. [He explained that] When it’s election time 
he gets money from the party to distribute and make sure that 
the youth votes NRM. Around those times the local politicians 
and the national politici who come from this area [Mbale] come 
and distribute sachets of waragi [local gin] to get people drunk 
and make them vote for Museveni. He admits that he’s actually 
just waiting for the president to die. He also tells me how in the 
beginning he really believed that Museveni had a good agenda 
and could make a difference for Uganda, but that now the peo-
ple around him are too corrupt and “eat the money” which is 
meant to go for the people on the ground. What scares me is 
what he tells me about the amount of intelligence that is hired by 
the government to be informed about the local dynamics: they 
are around at parish and village level, as much as in towns and 
within district authorities. Even those baganda men that live in 
Mbale and sell groundnuts on the streets, they are actually 
believed to be intelligence people controlling the movement 
and activities of people. If someone starts advocating for the 
opposition, s/he will be immediately reported so that will be 
167 He allowed me to make reference to the information he gave me, 
provided he would remain anonymous.
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jailed or at least their career jeopardized. He gives me an exam-
ple: he had once organised a youth group around Mbale, and 
the day they had an assembly to set the constitution “people 
from KLA” (meaning from NRM) came unexpectedly and unin-
vited, saying that he would be jailed if he wouldn’t accept the 
bribe and convince the youth group to vote for NRM. (…) “Either 
you remain poor and you keep your political opinions, or if you 
make progress and have success it means you support the gov-
ernment” (otherwise they don’t allow you to be successful). 
The strong control the government was holding on youth groups and 
organisations, both the agricultural and the political ones, showed 
how the support of youths was a controlled empowerment. Even 
more so, the organisation of a large portion of the population in 
groups facilitated the penetration of government structures among 
the electorate. In this way, it appears that the investment in the social 
category of youths –a fuzzy knowledge category with little explanato-
ry nor descriptive significance– resemblances what Mosse (2004, 
p.650—651) refers to as “‘mobilising metaphor’ (Porter, 1995)—could 
mean many things to many people, and allowed a multiplication of cri-
teria of success.” 
Rather than arguing that there is a premeditated causality in the support 
of youths in agribusiness for the actual purpose of electorate control—I 
argue with Mosse that ‘mobilising metaphors’ (such as youth) are part of 
the organisations’ exigencies to maintain relations through develop-
ment interventions. These metaphors are thus constructed as much 
through the narratives as through the practices of implementation. 
I do not hold that there is a programmatic intention in constructing 
metaphors, but rather they emerge in the process through which the 
discourse around development emerges. In fact, as I explain below, 
there are processes of adaptation and negotiation of the development 
programmes.
6.7 Adaptation
In my fieldwork, I observed how some programmes evolved over 
time, from their formulation to their implementations and outcomes. In 
this section I delve into the observations of how programmes (the few 
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ones which structures allowed for flexibility in implementation) 
changed to adapt to the heterogeneity they encountered on the 
ground. I refer to adaptation as the (positive) process by which a 
given development programme or project comes to terms with the 
reality on the ground, thereby adjusting strategies and means to fit 
the sociocultural, economic and value chain context. In practice, this 
adaptation entails a change in the implementation of the project to 
adjust to the heterogeneity factors characterising youths and their 
needs and capacities in agribusiness. 
Adaption is a process that is particularly influenced by the agency 
and resistance exercised by development recipients, and has the 
effect of modifying the modus operandi of a programme or project. 
This process can be described as a youths’ demand-driven change 
in the implementation and even design of the development programme 
or project. While this process is most evident in the implementation 
phase, it has effects on the outcomes of a development programme or 
project—and might (in few cases) influence the re-designing of a pro-
gramme to fit contextual specificities. 
In Uganda, I observed that the programme and projects that seem 
to be the most adaptive were either small in scale (in terms of budget 
and target regions and youths), or had little strings with their donors 
(namely, they had a relatively wide range of flexibility in the implemen-
tation). These two factors appeared to allowed development practi-
tioners the necessary flexibility to adjust their strategies to fit reality 
on the ground. On the contrary, programmes which involved many par-
ties had to negotiate and compromise their strategies (see section 6.8 
below on negotiations) to meet other practitioners’ priorities and inter-
ests. Negotiation and adaptation are not necessarily opposed to each 
other, since programmes that had to negotiate strategies and priorities 
with several parties would still be able to exercise flexibility to adapt to 
specific local agribusiness contexts. 
While I have encountered different degrees of adaptation of pro-
grammes to local contexts, only few of the programmes I have evaluat-
ed on the ground could actually be considered adaptive to the hetero-
geneity characterizing youths. Besides experiences such as that of 
Trust in AKORION, mentioned above –which was selecting the groups 
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of youths and regions where they could build on existing assets and 
“entrepreneurial mentality”– another example was that of the 
Dutch-funded SKY programme, implemented by the Italian NGO AVSI. 
The programme manager, Samuele Otim Rizzo, explained to me how 
the programme accounted for youths’ heterogeneity: he explained 
that their approach was focusing on individual characteristics and 
aspirations of the youths: “not all of them have the mindset to become 
entrepreneurs, each youth is different”. The programme had devel-
oped selection criteria for the beneficiaries, which would also include 
qualitative aspects besides hard criteria like age and gender. Develop-
ment practitioners in the selection process would, for example, con-
sider what the youths’ interests are, the specific value chains they 
were already engaged in—and then they would invest in that specific 
sector, enabling to grow the existing start-ups. I insisted asking about 
the different ways in which –in the implementation phase– the pro-
gramme had adapted to the different socio-cultural contexts and to all 
the individual specificities he mentioned. He explained that one of the 
main traits of SKY was its flexibility, which sometimes also brings them 
in a difficult position with the donors: “it’s hard to justify why some 
youth gets more start-up capital or input than others—and that really 
has to do with his or her capacities to capitalize and scale their 
business”. 
Besides adapting to the individual potential to capitalize on develop-
ment investments, adaptation also adjusts the programme to the terri-
torial differences between Ugandan regions. Reportedly, develop-
ment practitioners saw the greatest degree of regional disparity when 
comparing the northern region—which has been affected by war for 
decades –to the south-western region– which has been privileged by 
the president. “We cannot do a replication of the same approach in all 
regions.”—stresses one of the implementers of Agrivalue’s168 agribusi-
ness accelerator project. And he continues explaining what he recog-
nises to be the three major features that diversify Uganda’s regions: 
Well I think there are three main territorial differences: first of 
all language, you know in Uganda we have so many different 
languages, you may find it is difficult to translate the same 
168 See case study below
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message everywhere. Then tribalism…all the different ethnic 
groups, they have different cultures, if you think of the north 
and the west you see they have very different ways of life. 
And then education: in the north the education level is poorer 
because of the war they had for 20 years. 
While the three factors this development practitioner has mentioned 
might be a subjective perception, what is clear is that his programme 
would take those into account to adapt their development strategies 
to the contextual differences. Later in the interview, he also stressed 
how through the process of adaptation to regional variety the devel-
opment project itself changed: “Of course we have an idea of what 
we want, but we don’t know what will actually work—we are willing to 
bend and fit the complexities of the regions where we are going to 
work.
Despite stressing that heterogeneity was more of an individual trait 
or socio-economic asset that favoured or hindered agricultural 
entrepreneurship—also Samuele also admitted there were general 
regional specificities: 
Acholi [north] people are warriors—we know that, it takes 
much more convincing. And the Karamojong [north-east] are 
warriors and pastoralists. So we have to take into account the 
aspirations of the youths, but also the motivation of their fam-
ily. Family support is more important in the north than it is in 
the south, [in the north] they need to be encouraged and sus-
tained more than in the south—where they are more independ-
ent: [in the south] they rely on the social safety net for the start-
up but then it’s an individual agribusiness. In the south, there 
seems to be more respect for individual enterprises flourishing 
–they capitalise on their resources. In the north, there’s the 
mentality that it’s better to be equal than to have few success-
ful– there also is more jealousy than in the south. For example if 
someone starts a wood plantation, they go and burn their trees! 
This account was reinforcing some of the perceptions I had also 
recorded during my previous fieldwork: I had observed how land 
tenure and socio-cultural structures were strongly intertwined, as 
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much as they were influencing the agribusiness practices (see pre-
vious chapter). Therefore, I asked Samuele how they needed to 
adapt to all these differences that he had mentioned: he explained 
that of the four focus points of their programme, needed to be 
emphasized in the north and left behind in the south: 
Samuele reported how the programme was adapting to the different 
regional needs, as much as to the individual assets and aspirations: 
in his view, flexibility to adapt to the contextual specificities was their 
key to achieving their programme goals. By stressing the ways in 
which the programme was adapting to heterogeneous groups of 
youths, Samuele also indicated that the programme had changed 
from the time of its design, two years before. In fact, he also mentioned 
that the programme had started out too ambitious, and that some of 
the outputs will not be achieved. The choices on which outputs were to 
be left behind, had been made in agreement with the Dutch embas-
sy—where I perceived that the word agreement was actually referring 
to negotiations about both sides’ priorities. 
6.8 Negotiation 
I was sitting at a round table in an air-conditioned office –one of 
those buildings you could spot from afar, on top of Nakasero hill in 
Kampala– amid diplomats, business men and women, civil servants 
and development practitioners working for NGOs. The agenda ambi-
tiously announced we were to discuss the launch of the Belgian plat-
form for agribusiness and thereby also the future of the Belgian-Ugan-
dan cooperation. Facing the undeniable challenge if a decreasing 
budget for development, the Belgian Embassy had set up this “stake-
holders platform” to counteract fragmentation of aid among too many 
actors. 
The Belgian ambassador opened the meeting with a round of introduc-
tions, and then proceeded to presenting the viable strategies—all pointing 
towards an ‘aid to trade’ policy: the embassy would promote private-pub-
lic-partnerships, support Ugandan entrepreneurship and “open the doors 
for Belgian private sector companies who want to come to do business in 
Uganda”. Strategizing partnerships with the private sector was an 
approach that the ambassador recognised to be similar to that of the 
Dutch Embassy, “and certainly we want to partner up with our Dutch 
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colleagues and join forces”. As for the meeting itself, the theme of the 
cooperation between private and public sector meant that a fierce nego-
tiation unfolded between traditional development actors from NGOs, the 
Embassy representatives, and business men and women. 
As a matter of fact, the topic of the support of agribusiness entitled 
the representatives of private sector to set the agenda of what 
seemed to be a priority for them, while other development partners 
appeared to be playing a corollary and supportive role. Part of nego-
tiations were played around the responsibility for training youths for 
agribusiness agri- and soft skills such as accountability and business 
planning: actors from private sector companies insisted it was not their 
responsibility to provide training, while NGO workers argued they had 
other mandates than training youths to suit private sector labour 
needs. While the latter stressed the programmes they were bond to 
implement did not leave them with sufficient flexibility to adjust to mar-
ket demands, business men and women lamented they could not do all 
the development work on their own. Belgian civil servants stressed 
they had set mandates from Brussels that pushed them to invest in 
education, human rights and partnership and support with the private 
sector, while the business men and women at the round table sighted 
and rebutted that it was time to be pragmatic: the Embassy should 
facilitate financial frameworks for business development, and invest in 
opportunities that the private sector was ready to take. Eventually, the 
result was an agreement that the Embassy would be mapping private 
sector needs and facilitating interaction with financial and Ugandan 
governmental institutions, as long as the private sector would take up 
social responsibility towards Embassy’s target groups (mainly women 
and youths) in their agribusinesses, with the support of NGOs. The pur-
pose of setting up a platform of different development stakeholders 
was finalized. 
It was particularly interesting to observe the nature of the interaction, 
for it reflected the Embassy’s prioritization of the private sector inter-
ests and the business side of development cooperation. Such dynam-
ics were indicative of the contemporary trend described by Mosse 
(2013, p.239) as the positioning of business at the centre and govern-
ing at the periphery for the implementation of programmes that 
enforce a ‘Bottom of the Pyramid’ capitalism. The development 
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agencies were strong of their expertise in “making markets work for 
the poor” but were in the position in which they often had to justify their 
inability to adjust to market trends and needs. 
While at first sight the tuning of development practitioners into a com-
mon agenda could be considered an important effort towards cooper-
ation and maximisation of efforts, it should also be taken into consider-
ation that it meant important compromises—and veiled different 
incentives. As Mosse (2004, p.664) describes the process through 
which policies come to be shaped as a discourse that reinforces itself, 
he stresses how its flaws lay precisely in the interactions, incentives 
and negotiations: 
Practices and events are too obviously shaped by the logic and 
demands of institutional relations (and incentives). Indeed, dur-
ing the ‘implementation phase’ all the diverse and contradictory 
interests that were enrolled in the framing of an ambiguous pol-
icy model and project design, all the contests and contra- dic-
tions that are embedded in policy texts, are brought to life and 
replayed. (…) So, while the coherence of design unravels in the 
practical unfolding of a project, everybody is particularly con-
cerned with making, protecting, elaborating and promoting 
models with the power to organize authoritative interpretations, 
concealing operational realities, re-enforcing given models and 
limiting institutional learning.
Moreover, as many development practitioners have testified during 
the last follow-up fieldtrip, the development trend around youth in 
agribusiness in Uganda is gaining momentum: while a plethora of 
(governmental and international) guidelines, strategies and recom-
mendations are spreading, donor and private sector budgets increas-
ingly invest in this issue. As the scale and dimension of interests and 
investments in the theme of youth in agribusiness has been growing in 
the past few years in Uganda, more and diverse development practi-
tioners are involved. The growth of the attention and resources dedi-
cated to this issue have ambivalent consequences: development 
agencies develop different expertise and strategies, but the growing 
scale and number of programmes jeopardizes the ability to maintain 
flexibility to adapt to heterogeneity on the ground. Diversity within 
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development cooperation, in combination with a steady growth of 
development resources and incentives for the specific theme of youth 
engagement in agribusiness creates ambiguity and risks to frustrate 
outcomes. As the development trend grows to become a multi-million, 
multi-stakeholders industry, it sustains development of knowledge 
and expertise, but also fragments and multiplies efforts to please (too) 
many parties. As Ferguson (2014, p.19) argues: “A structure always 
reproduces itself through a process, and through a struggle; and the 
sense of a structure, Willis shows [Paul Willis’ Marxist analysis of 
reproducing structures through ‘education’169], can only be grasped 
through that sometimes surprising and ironic process, and never by 
merely labelling the structure with the name of those whose interests 
it serves.”
During a long conversation with a lady working for a private sector-ori-
ented development agency (who asked to remain anonymous), she 
often referred to the negotiations that she had to undergo with private 
sector partners and with the local governments. I prompted her to 
elaborate on this theme, asking to what extent she had seen her devel-
opment programme had changed through negotiations she referred 
to—and she boldly replied: “Are you kidding? It’s ALL about negotia-
tion!”. In particular, since her agency was providing market linkages 
with private sector companies in agribusiness, the implementation of 
their programme had changed in different regions—according to the 
value chains and market dynamics the programme was engaging with. 
While in the design phase of the programme she had theoretically 
considered all factors the programmes should be tackling to “unlock 
market system change”—during the implementation phase her ambi-
tious planning came to face the reality and interests of partners in 
development. Specifically, the private sector companies were respon-
sible for the actual market change, were also determining the shifts in 
the programme: “all development ideas depend on the market! Actual-
ly, on the private sector partner”. Through negotiations with develop-
ment partners, but also through the adaptation to market opportuni-
ties, the development programme changes. 
169 Learning to Labour: How Working Class Kids Get Working Class 
Jobs—1981. 
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6.9 ‘Empower Youth’—A failed programme
‘Empower Youth’170 is a relatively small development project, a project 
of the Development Bank—under a broader continent wide pro-
gramme. It is co-financed by two multilateral donors, and the budget is 
channelled through a Ugandan Ministry, administered by an NGO 
which in turn has contracted ‘Agrivalue’, an agribusiness accelerator. 
The purpose of this three-year project was to pilot a strategy to sup-
port young agripreneurs and scale their agribusiness in four Ugandan 
regions. On the basis of these results, the Development Bank would 
adjust a larger strategy for a wider and longer-term programme in 
Uganda. As the pilot project was still setting out its initial steps, and 
was yet to develop a strategy—the manager had been seeking empiri-
cally sound scientific evidence to guide their approach. In this contin-
gency and as a researcher on the theme of youth in agribusiness within 
IITA—I was able to engage with Agrivalue’s development practitioners 
and study a stretch of their experience in setting up the project.
On a Wednesday afternoon in May 2018 Agrivalue’s programme direc-
tor, programme manager and communication officer came to ask IITA 
advice on the implementation of their Empower Youth scheme: I had 
the pleasure to attend and get a sense of the politics involved in the 
interaction between donors, Ministry, coordinating NGO, contractor 
and youths—who all had different priorities and were pushing for dif-
ferent agendas. The room for manoeuvre and negotiation among the 
parties was quite spacious: the regions and budgeting had been deter-
mined by the Ministry, while Agrivalue was entitled to develop the agri-
business incubation strategy in agreement with the supervising NGO. 
Moreover, I could see how the project, which officially started in Janu-
ary 2018, had already changed some of the traits that were agreed 
upon during the first agreements. For instance, although the Ministry 
had insisted in investing in irrigation techniques, Agrivalue had select-
ed value chains such as beekeeping and fruits processing which did 
not foresee irrigation but other agricultural technologies. 
This meeting unfolds as a mating dance between the representatives 
of the two organisations: stressing on the qualities of each other, and 
on the reasons why they may need each other. They speak in turns, 
170 Under express request of my informants, I have substituted the all 
names of development agencies and practitioners to ensure anonymity. 
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alternating jokes, lessons learnt from the field, anecdotes about the 
poor functioning of the state institutions. At the end of the mat-
ing-meeting it was clear to the two directors that they were going to 
collaborate in the implementation of the programme—using the agro-
nomic knowledge of the research institute to inform the implementa-
tion techniques of the agribusiness accelerator. As for me—I was 
allowed to interview and follow operations in exchange for ‘expert 
advice’ on the ‘best strategies to engage youths’. 
A few days later I interviewed the project manager, and asked how the 
project had been evolving: 
We have an idea of how things should go, but it might change. 
For example, in the project proposal for the ministry we wrote 
that we wanted to use online tools for mentorship of the youths 
in the hubs in the various regions. But then we did a field visit 
and we realised that there was barely any internet connection: 
the proposal we submitted to the Ministry won’t work! So how 
should we mentor the youths? We then thought of taking trained 
mentors from Kampala to the local hubs. But then we realised 
that wouldn’t work either because of a number of factors: first 
of all language—the mentors from here wouldn’t speak the local 
languages of the youths! Secondly, the youths would listen 
more to the local community leaders, the people they know and 
trust in their environment. They would not establish a connec-
tion with the mentors we would send. So what we did was to get 
in touch with local mentors and trainers from within the commu-
nity. The mentors should be teaching hands-on knowledge 
about the daily running of the business—as they themselves 
had their business they could accompany the youths in the 
process. 
There are several aspects of the development enactment process that 
emerge from this account. Firstly, the development project had 
changed over time—despite it was, at the time of the interview, only 4 
months old. Regardless of the proposal that had been approved by the 
Ministry, the project needed to adjust to unforeseen traits of youths’ 
reality on the ground, for two reasons: the hard fact of youths’ lack of 
accessibility to internet connection, but also the capacity of extension 
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services to approach them effectively. The fact that they had not 
thought of these issues upfront was a revealing yet problematic 
aspect: it reflects a top-down approach that was not grounded on 
empirical evidence of the needs and capacities of youths on the 
ground. By choosing a different strategy, however, the project is 
adapted to the reality on the ground: not only the local language is 
necessary in communication, but also the trust relations with the com-
munity leaders is perceived by the programme manager as important 
strategies for the implementation of the programme. 
While the programme manager reflected on the ways in which they 
had been adjusting the project to youths’ reality—I was also able to 
observe how such process unfolded: I attended a meeting in which 
Agrivalue discussed beekeeping business strategies with one poten-
tial ‘local mentor’. Agrivalue had selected beekeeping as a suitable 
business for one of the sub-regions they were going to implement 
their agribusiness incubation project, and had requested a represent-
ative of the biggest private sector in the honey business to come to 
Kampala and discuss a strategy to work together. The private sector 
company would be in charge of the training of the youths selected by 
Agrivalue to be part of the scheme—and the two parties needed to 
negotiate the time frame and conditions for such training: Agrivalue 
had already allocated budget and amount of days in their planning, 
coming in tension with the honey company’s intention to follow Minis-
terial guidelines for beekeeping. They finally found a compromise, and 
moved on to discussing the profit margin the honey company would be 
allowed to keep from collecting honey produced by youths. 
Unfortunately, such negotiations with the private sector partner would 
have been frustrated by negotiations at a higher level, between 
Agrivalue, Ministry and coordinating NGO. Despite having sensed that 
there were tensions in their relations, I had not expected to observe 
how their interaction could cause a drastic change of perspectives for 
the project. It came as a cold shower on meeting in which we were sup-
posed to discuss the implementation strategy. 
I arrived at a meeting where I was to discuss the implementation strat-
egy for the pilot project in one of the four target regions and found 
there is a lot of trepidation: whispered half-words about “big changes”, 
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and bad-terms relations with the Ministry, and “the way forward” were 
on the mouth of everyone sitting at the round table. I understand half 
of what is going on, but I also understand it was not the right moment 
to ask questions. Finally, the project director, Sarah, sat down with me 
and gave me a short overview about what had been discussed before 
my arrival. She explained that ‘something happened’ and that she is 
not anymore willing to go along the ineffective cooperation with the 
Ministry. 
Sarah explained that “corruption is just too much—they don’t work 
towards an effective implementation of this project, they just want to 
get as much profit as possible from the fund, and don’t allow me to get 
any closer to the donors. I wanted to report all of what is happening 
along the structure, because they [donors] are unaware of the mis-
management of their money.” I perceived how disappointment and 
desolation had already left space for anger and frustration. “I’m with-
drawing –I don’t want to be part of this system even if this means that 
the programme is not proceeding with us. I’m going to do this myself– I 
have learnt from the past months and seen opportunities to make a 
business model of this. I’m just looking for funding to get started.” 
Sarah had already told me in several instances how the relation with 
the government parties was problematic, slow and inefficient—and 
how she was not going to comply with a number of their demands, 
which she thought didn’t make any sense (in terms of business oppor-
tunities for the agribusiness hubs). But this was the first instance I had 
ever heard where the relation was so bad that it would break the deal. I 
was surprised by how easily a project that was supposedly grounded 
as a strong operation, in the collaboration with multiple development 
parties could crumble for the decision of one of them. At the same 
time, it was an indication of the nature of negotiations among the par-
ties involved. 
6.10 Conclusion: explaining the mismatch 
Wary of a body of literature that, in the past decades, has focused its 
attention on the power dynamics between ‘top’ and ‘down’, and the 
gap that such dynamics trigger—I have explored the gap between pol-
icies and practices in my own field of development study. Bringing 
together the analysis carried out in the previous chapters, I have here 
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confronted the results of development practitioners and youths’ nar-
ratives and practices. Furthermore, I have examined the dynamics on 
the ground as the implementation of the programmes bring together 
youths’ and development practitioners’ narratives and practices. This 
chapter explores the tensions between and within two groups of 
development actors –practitioners and recipients– to understand 
whether, how and why a mismatch between policies and practices 
emerges in the unfolding of the recent development trend around 
youth in agribusiness. It argues that such gap can be explained through 
an analysis of the dynamics within the development ‘top’ and ‘bottom’. 
On the one hand the issues of adaptation and negotiation that emerge 
from the analysis of implementation practices at the ‘top’ (namely, 
among development practitioners). On the other, the variety of out-
comes of the programmes on the ground, which were influenced by 
the heterogeneity factors characterising youths in their specific cul-
tural and socio-economic contexts.
The perceptions of youths and practitioners of the implementation 
of programmes reveal how the outcomes of programmes are more 
than the translation of policies into practices. In fact, through imple-
mentation, the significance of the social category of youth emerges 
for its power as a driving metaphor. Different development organisa-
tions, according to their internal incentives and political agenda, have a 
stake in the ‘use’ of the metaphor of youth beyond the declared inten-
tions of the programmes. Naturally, I do not disregard the socio-eco-
nomic reasons for paying attention to the social category of youth. 
However, the construction of a discourse around it mobilises and rein-
forces power relations. 
While the demographic boom in Uganda is an objective reason of con-
cern, the targeting of the youths themselves as a social category –
rather than the structural factors contributing to their unemployment– 
remains unjustified. There is an overlooked need for structural market 
system change, such as the investment in other sectors than agricul-
ture, or the lack of infrastructures and legislations that would allow for 
employability of the Ugandan population (among which, the young 
generations). Despite these tangible deficiencies, the focus of devel-
opment programmes lay on youths. Besides the social impact of these 
programmes, there are social and political consequences: for instance, 
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as I argued above, the creation of a scrutinized social category that 
allows the government to control the electorate, or international devel-
opment agencies to provide commodified development services. 
Furthermore, I have compared the narratives and practices of the two 
groups of development actors: development practitioners and youths. 
From this comparative analysis, a mismatch emerges between the two 
groups’ narratives and practices. How could this mismatch be 
explained? I found that the social category of youth (18—35), being so 
heterogeneous, was misleading of the programmes—often targeting 
homogeneously (yet with different development approaches) young farm-
ers with different capacities and constraints. 
Few development programmes and projects manage to adapt to the 
heterogeneous reality of youths on the ground: most programmes do 
not need to engage in negotiations with multiple parties. On the con-
trary, those programmes that involve bigger budgets, little flexibility 
and a range of several development partners to conciliate—run the risk 
of being stuck in development negotiations. I have analysed how devel-
opment programmes fiercely negotiated both at formal round-table 
discussions as in informal interactions. As Mosse (Mosse, 2004, p.663) 
explains, it is not an inherent quality of ‘good policies’ to be 
unimplementable, 
Or, rather than ‘unimplementable’, we should say that policy 
goals come into contradiction with other institutional or ‘system 
goals’ (Latour, 1996: 92) such that policy models are poor guides 
to understanding the practices, events and effects of develop-
ment actors, which are shaped by the relationships and inter-
ests and cultures of specific organisational settings. 
As I have shown through the analysis of the case study, relationships, 
interests, and cultures of organisational settings, when brought 
together at the negotiation table, can hinder the unfolding of the pro-
ject to the point of making it collapse. 
While my analysis is certainly partial and only considers selected 
development practices, it does allude to the importance of studying 
power dynamics and relations at the same time between and within 
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groups of development actors. Development studies have explained 
the power dynamics between top and bottom within a dualistic under-
standing of development as a structure that is formed, embodied, 
reproduced and enforced through agency. However, for as much as 
this paradigm helps understand the dynamics between and within 
these development categories, it does not explain how development 
programmes evolve from design to implementation and 
outcome—sometimes failing along the way. My analysis suggests that 
it is the study of both dynamics between and within these categories at 
the same time that allow us to explain outcomes and the mismatch 
between policies and practices. In fact, my data show that there is 
such ‘messiness’ in the way development unfolds, that it indicates that 
development does not unfold as a structure enforced onto the social 
reality of recipients, but rather as a dialectic process, emerging prop-
erty, that is created through all the narratives and practices of all 
development actors. 
The ‘messiness’ of the unfolding process of programmes implementa-
tion, has nevertheless concrete impacts on the ground. These impacts, 
which I have analysed separately for each of the development 
approaches, reinforce the power of the constructed knowledge cate-
gory of youth that, by remaining fuzzy and ‘empty’, constitutes a ‘driv-
ing metaphor’ for development action. By studying the ‘messy actuali-
ties’ that characterize development practices around youth in 
agribusiness in Uganda, demonstrate that the messiness and diversity 
of narratives and practices in development do not neatly fit a coherent 
Foucauldian understanding of development unless practices and rela-
tions are studied in their interactive and processual nature—“the com-
plex conjunctures where multiple powers coincide”. “Empowerment is 
still, in short, a relationship of power” (Murray Li, 2007, p.275)—yet a 
relationship that emerges within and between groups of development 
practitioners and recipients. 
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Image 19. Boys playing near Matooke (plantain) field on the slopes of Mount 
Elgon, eastern Uganda, 2017. Picture taken by author. 

Chapter 7
Conclusion
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7.1 Introduction: the puzzle and research question 
The focus and strategies of development in Africa has changed over 
time, from structural adjustment, to market liberalisation, to health, 
environment or gender issues. The identified bottlenecks for devel-
opment drove policies, budgets and programmes—creating trends 
in development policy making. Recently, development concern has 
turned its attention to demographic growth and youth unemploy-
ment challenges. The average age of the African population is half 
as much that of the population in the European Union, so the social 
category of youth includes a growing share of the population across 
the continent. 
This category, however, is mostly defined as an age range—which 
differs per development agency or government (Sommers, 2015). 
Given the extent of the population in this age range, across the con-
tinent or even just within one country, the social category of ‘youth’ 
has little explanatory power of who the youths actually are. Moreo-
ver, as target of increased development attention, specific knowl-
edge would be required to tackle their capacities and constraints. 
However, recent programmes for youth are homogeneously target-
ing this social category with the aim of engaging them in agribusi-
ness. In fact, despite rapid economic growth of African countries, 
the labour market is not yet able to absorb the growing population, 
and the majority of young Africans is already engaged in 
agriculture. 
It is, therefore, unclear what the rationale is for engaging youth in 
agribusiness. There is little evidence that it would be the majority of 
youths’ aspiration, nor the most effective way of tackling youth 
unemployment. This puzzle around the social category of youth, in 
combination with youths’ engagement in agribusiness, triggered the 
question of the thesis: how has the recent trend in development been 
constructed and what has its impact been so far?
The focus of the research has been that of understanding the adop-
tion and implementation of new trend in development; therefore, I 
have focused on a major recipient of ODA: Uganda. The political 
economic history of the country has shown an emblematic relation 
with the ‘development industry’ over the past decades. With a very 
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young population, Uganda has a representative demographic compo-
sition in comparison to other sub-Saharan countries. 
This chapter is structured as follows. First (sections 7.2 and 7.3), I will 
summarise the results of the two-fold research question: 1) how 
through narratives and practices the category of youths has driven the 
recent trend around agribusiness; and 2) what the impact has been so 
far. I will also problematise the focus on the ‘gap between policies and 
practices’, which has occupied many scholars in development studies. 
In section 7.4, I confront my results with the existing academic litera-
ture, showing how my study contributes to a better understanding of 
the recent development trend. In this section, I also outline the poten-
tial implications of my study for other countries. Before concluding, I 
discuss (section 7.5) the shortcomings of my research and recommen-
dations for future research. In the final section (section 7.6), I elaborate 
some policy recommendations, focusing on the most practice-orient-
ed results that can be useful for development practitioners. I conclude 
(sub-section 7.6.3) with a short reflection on the implications of my 
research for conflict studies.
7.2 Youth in Agribusiness
In this section, I outline the ways in which the category of youth has 
driven the development trend around agribusiness in Uganda. An 
analysis of how the development discourse was constructed also illu-
minates the rationales of this trend. I draw from the empirical chapters 
(4, 5 and 6) and confront the results with the literature in critical devel-
opment studies. 
The analysis of development practitioners’ narratives in chapter 4 
showed that youths are defined as an age range representing both a 
threat and hope for development. While international development 
organisations are more concerned about the ‘youth bulge’, Ugandan 
agencies are more concerned about youth unemployment as a threat 
to the stability of the country. In both cases, youths are identified both 
as the ‘development problem’ as the target of development strategies. 
The social category of youth is invested of the responsibility of being 
‘drivers of change’—provided they change their mindset towards com-
mercial agribusiness. I have recorded, across all 17 development 
organisations approached, a polarisation of perspectives on youths: 
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narratives ranged from a description of youths as a ‘ticking time bomb’ 
to the optimistic portrayal of youths as the hope and future of Uganda. 
The development narrative on the social category of youth recall the 
instable development discourse on economic development in the con-
tinent. Jerven (2015, p.123) argues that “narratives on African economic 
development can switch from one extreme to the other so swiftly. Of 
course, the truth lies somewhere between the ‘miracles’ and ‘trage-
dies’. We went from a rhetoric of ‘Bottom Billion’ to ‘Africa Rising’ within 
half a decade.” Development cooperation, is contingent to its 
socio-historical context. The analysis of how the development dis-
course around youth in agribusiness evolved sheds light on the politics 
driving one strategy rather than another. 
Despite the awareness of the great socio-cultural and economic dis-
parity across Ugandan regions, the development narrative strikingly 
lacks a problematisation of the social category of ‘youth’. In fact, devel-
opment actors explained that their programmes had a regional focus. 
However, they themselves lamented not having empirical evidence on 
what youths’ capacities and constraints were, across the country. In 
chapter 5 (‘Youthnography’), as emerging from my interviews with 
youths themselves, I identified 13 heterogeneity factors clustered in 
three main dimensions socio-cultural, territorial and value-chain 
embedding. These dimensions had a strong influence in shaping both 
youths’ identity and their experience in agribusiness. As a result, the 
identity and agribusiness practices of youths across the country were 
extremely diverse.
In chapter 6, I compared the narratives and practices of the two groups 
of social actors—development practitioners and youths. Youths’ heter-
ogeneity was not reflected in the narratives I had collected in develop-
ment agencies in Kampala, anticipating a discrepancy of perspectives 
and practices also in the implementation phase of the programmes. A 
discrepancy emerged from the confrontation of perceptions and aspi-
rations of youths and development practitioners on who the youths in 
Uganda are and what their role in agribusiness should become. 
The vagueness of definitions of youths by development agencies do 
not reflect the complex heterogeneity of identities and agribusiness 
experiences I recorded. The social category of youths, thus, emerges 
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as an ambiguous concept that means everything and nothing at the 
same time. Ugandan and international organisations have defined on 
this social category as an age range. But an age bracket does not have 
the explanatory power to account for the heterogeneity I encountered 
on the ground. What is the rationale of using such category as main 
focus of multi-million development programmes? Mosse (2004, p.663) 
suggested the use, in development policy making, of fuzzy concepts as 
‘mobilizing metaphors’ for development: 
Policy discourse generates mobilizing metaphors (‘participa-
tion’, ‘partnership’, ‘governance’, ‘social capital’) whose vague-
ness, ambiguity and lack of conceptual precision is required to 
conceal ideological differences, to allow compromise and the 
enrolment of different interests, to build coalitions, to distribute 
agency and to multiply criteria of success within project. 
As a mobilizing metaphor, ‘youth’ has in fact had the power of driving a 
trend in development with the most disparate approaches and theories 
of change. 
I have asked development practitioners about their organisations’ 
views on youths’ engagement in agribusiness, and from the interviews 
emerged a variegated range of theories of change. The variety of con-
ceptualisations of development problem, vision and strategy for 
change show the heterogeneity characterising this trend in develop-
ment in Uganda. In fact, this trend is not a unilateral, homogeneous 
process. Such heterogeneity is also reflected in the variety of different 
development approaches of the development programmes aiming to 
engage youths in agribusiness. 
According to Mosse (2004, p.648, italics original), the formulation of 
development policies and programmes is driven by a political agenda: 
The first proposition is that policy (development models, strat-
egies and project designs) primarily functions to mobilize and 
maintain political support, that is to legitimize rather than to 
orientate practice. Anybody who has been involved in project 
formulation knows that this is work which is technically 
expressed (as project designs) but politically shaped (by the 
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interests and priorities of agencies). Project design is the art, 
firstly of making a convincing argument and developing a 
causal model (relating inputs, outputs and impacts) oriented 
upwards to justify the allocation of resources by validating 
higher policy goals; and secondly of bringing together diverse, 
even incompatible, interests—of national governments, imple-
menting agencies, collaborating NGOs, research institutions, or 
donor advisers of different hues. 
Such political dimension of development programmes for youth in 
agribusiness emerged in the analysis of how programmes changed 
over time (chapter 6). From the observation of how development pro-
grammes are negotiated among different stakeholders, different 
agendas and incentives emerge as determinant factors changing 
the course of development programmes. Tensions between agen-
das and incentives showed how tensions emerged also within the 
group development actors at the top. This adds to the body of liter-
ature in development studies that focused on discrepancies 
between development actors at the top and bottom. Furthermore, in 
the following section, I report the discrepancy within the develop-
ment practices at the bottom. 
7.3 Social Impact of the programmes, so far
The variety of theories of change of development organisations 
translated in a variety of programmes that were implemented on the 
ground. In chapter 6, I analysed what their impact has been, from the 
perspectives of youths. Considering the heterogeneity of develop-
ment approaches and the heterogeneity of youths across the coun-
try, the outcomes and impact of the programmes were also hetero-
geneous. There were two main variables influencing the diversity of 
outcomes: the regional variety and the development approaches 
(public vs private-sector driven). Within these two variables, the het-
erogeneity factors described in chapter 5 played an important role 
in diversifying the impact of programmes. For instance, the same 
programme in the same location would have different impact on 
males or females (gender being one of the heterogeneity factors). In 
most cases, while young males could dispose of the economic 
improvement obtained through agribusiness, female counterparts 
were not allowed (by their husbands) to retain their income for 
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themselves. Another example, regarding the factors of ethnicity and 
embeddedness in the value chain: programmes addressing the 
dairy sector in the south-west region had a stronger impact on youth 
from the bahima ethnic group, which historically and culturally have 
a tradition in this value chain. 
Besides the heterogeneity of outcomes (described in chapter 5) 
there were three general outcomes, homogeneously distributed 
across the country. 
First, the absence of political or civic engagement amongst youths. 
Men and women I spoke to did not identify themselves as ‘youth’, 
despite being targeted by programmes as youth. Despite the mobi-
lization of ministries, politicians, international organisations, media 
and budgets for the Ugandan ‘youths’, I recorded scarce awareness 
of their potential as a majoritarian share of the population. ‘Youth’ 
was, to young farmers in programmes targeting them, not a political 
category: belonging to the category of youth, culturally, is associat-
ed with not having obtained the status of adults. Only adulthood is a 
social status that allows access to political and social decision-mak-
ing. Youths felt, across the country, insulted when (mistakenly) 
approached as youth, while having obtained the social status of 
adults (for example through circumcision, for males). Youth was, to 
them, a condition to exit through attainment of socio-economic 
status. 
Second, agribusiness was considered a springboard to obtain the 
socio-economic status to access adulthood. Agriculture is still the 
major sector employing the Ugandan population, and commercial 
agriculture is perceived as a better income generating activity than 
subsistence agriculture. Despite the fact that youth experience agri-
business very diversely across the country, amongst my interview-
ees agribusiness was generally considered as the most accessible 
way to work up the ladder of socio-economic status. In this way, 
agribusiness could be considered a ‘rite of passage’ for youths to 
access adulthood. In this way, their requests and expectations from 
development programmes were mostly related to the improvement 
of their economic status. The most common requests regarded irri-
gation systems, tractors and quality inputs (seeds and chemicals). 
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These requests reveal their pragmatic views on the programmes as 
benchmarks for obtaining the socio-economic status for adulthood. 
Third, I observed a gap between development policies and pro-
grammes implemented. This gap was at two levels: on the one 
hand, there was a gap between practitioners’ narratives and practices. 
On the other hand, there was a gap between the intended and actual 
outcomes as perceived by youths. In the following sub-section (7.3.1), I 
will delve into the problematisation of these two gaps. 
7.3.1 Mind the Gap 
In chapter 6, I focussed on the practices of both groups of develop-
ment actors to explore the synergies and discrepancies between and 
within the narratives of the two groups. I examined the ways in which 
development programmes unfolded in the implementation phase. I 
analysed the perceptions, impact and outcomes of different develop-
ment approaches. From this analysis, it emerged that while develop-
ment practitioners were concerned about access to land, capital and 
markets, youths’ constraints in agribusiness were heavily influenced by 
other heterogeneity factors, such as family background, gender and 
location. Besides the heterogeneity factors, which in their three dimen-
sions played a crucial role in influencing the implementation of pro-
grammes, the outcomes of the programmes differed according to the 
approach used (public vs private sector driven). 
As for the public-sector approach, there was a substantial discrep-
ancy between the political agenda of development practitioners and 
youths understanding of the programme. In the central and 
south-western region, youths reported their disappointment with 
corruption: the start-up capital was intended by practitioners as 
‘political money’ in times of election. In the majority of cases YLP 
officers had trouble retrieving the loan, because the start-up capital 
was often perceived as a political handout (to buy votes). There was 
a great discrepancy in the ways in which the programme was politi-
cised, more in central and south-western regions than in the north. 
The most successful YLP groups were in the north and intended the 
programme as a way to strengthen the distressed social relations after 
the war, while building a self-help saving scheme in the meantime. 
As for the private-sector driven approach, there was a discrepancy 
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between the embedding of youths in the value chain and the interests 
of companies setting up the out-growing schemes. In fact, oftentimes 
the companies required the youths to work in value chains that were 
not the main focus of their household or agribusiness. The most suc-
cessful outcomes were in the environments where the private sector 
companies were investing in value chains grounded socio-culturally in 
the local environment (e.g. dairy sector in the south-west). The majori-
ty of youths working as contract-farmers were satisfied with the 
improved income, but they were in a position of dependency rather 
than of entrepreneurship (contrary to the proposed theory of change). 
In fact, the company constituted both the input and output market for 
their produce.
Moreover, only a few development agencies adapted their develop-
ment strategies to fit (or exploit) the heterogeneous agribusiness 
and socio-cultural environments in which youths were embedded. 
Here the Foucauldian approach was useful to gain a deeper under-
standing of the gaps both between and within development practi-
tioners and beneficiaries. Within a Foucauldian approach, develop-
ment is understood as a dialectic process where agency within the 
top and bottom are as explanatory as the power relation between 
the two. I argued that it is the very dynamics at the top, which I ana-
lysed in terms of negotiation practices, that shape the relations with 
and within the bottom. As the trend on youths in agribusiness grew 
to a multi-million ‘industry’ the negotiations among development 
practitioners’ collided with the necessity to be adaptive to the heter-
ogeneous reality of youths on the ground. 
7.4 Ethnography of development and Foucault 
I was able to bring to light the heterogeneity in development, and its 
‘messy actualities’ (Murray Li, 2007, p.282), thanks to the ethnograph-
ic research methods I adopted. In particular, an anthropological 
approach to the study of development as discourse accurately applied 
the Foucauldian approach to the study of power and discourse. While 
Foucault invited us to study power relations and discourse as a pro-
cess that circulates and is in the hands of all social actors, many schol-
ars in development have used a Foucauldian approach without exiting 
the dualistic paradigm of domination (see chapter 2). With this study, I 
show that through ethnographic research methods it is possible to 
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overcome such dualistic approach and explore the power mechanisms 
within development. In fact, my study shows that the development 
trend around youth in agribusiness materializes in a complex context of 
relations, with negotiations of different interests and agendas and 
adaptation to different contexts. The dynamics highlighted in my 
research stress that the enactment of a trend is far more complex than 
bilateral relation between development practitioners (‘top’) and ‘bene-
ficiaries’ (‘bottom’). 
Rather than focusing on how a policy was enacted, enforced from the 
top to the bottom, I studied how the trend around youth emerged, 
through the narratives and practices all social actors involved. This 
study is in line with the Foucauldian understanding of power as a circu-
lating rather than bilateral process, in the hands of all social actors. 
The study of narratives, in particular, is crucial ‘to explore how subjec-
tivities were produced’ (Murray Li, 2007, p.282). The social category of 
youth, which until recently was only considered a brief liminal phase, 
became the object of much development attention. ‘Youth’ was con-
structed in different ways by the narratives of the development actors I 
interviewed, contributing to the emergence of a social category. In the 
following sub-sections I spell out the ways in which such subjectivities 
(youths, 7.4.1) were produced and the development discourse (agri-
business, 7.4.2) in which they were incorporated. The production of 
such subjectivities and development discourse can be considered the 
‘unintended effects’ (Ferguson, 2014) of this development trend.
7.4.1 Youth
As discussed above, development practitioners and youths had differ-
ent understandings of what this social category means in Uganda. In 
particular, ‘youth’ loses explanatory power in light of the vague defini-
tions by development organisations (as discordant age ranges) and the 
heterogeneity of youths across the country. Yet, in the course of the 
years (2015—2018) I spent studying this development trend in Uganda, 
it turned into a multi-million development industry. Interestingly, the 
trend grew despite the fact that the major ‘development problems’ 
identified in the theories of change of the organisations were structural 
rather than youth-specific: demographic bulge, youth unemployment 
and stability, and agricultural modernisation. 
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Moreover, from the analysis of the implementation of the programmes 
emerged that approaching such a broad and heterogeneous segment 
of the population was often misleading. The programmes that had the 
most successful impact for youths’ engagement in agribusiness were 
those that adapted to their specificities. Youths themselves had mixed 
opinions on the same programme because of the heterogeneity fac-
tors characterising their experience of agribusiness. In fact, the heter-
ogeneity factors were often more determinant for youths’ success in 
agribusiness than the actual impact of the programmes. Therefore, 
the social category of youth stood out as a fuzzy concept in develop-
ment narratives. Yet it still functioned as a ‘mobilizing metaphor’ 
(Mosse, 2004, p.663). 
In light of the Foucauldian theoretical approach I sketched in chapter 1, 
as a ‘mobilizing metaphor’, ‘youth’ can be described as a dispositief of 
power in the construction of a development discourse. ‘Youth’ for 
development practitioners is the subject of knowledge inscribed in the 
power system of development programmes and relations. ‘Youth’ for 
the youths is a heterogeneous and concrete experience, a phase in life 
to be escaped to access adulthood through economic status. As a cat-
egory of development knowledge, constructed through narratives at 
different levels, ‘youth’ justifies the (re)inforcement of power relations 
tangled in the development industry. In this context, it is not the actual 
individual youths (with their particularities and heterogeneity) to be at 
the core of development focus: the theories of change of practitioners 
were concerned with general rather than actual youths, with the ‘mobi-
lizing metaphor’ of youth, the conceptual category. In the study of 
micro-physics of power in ‘Discipline and Punish’, Foucault reflects on 
the construction of power-knowledge relations that go beyond the 
actual subject of knowledge and domination (in his case, the body of 
the punished, in my case the youths). Foucault’s analysis (Foucault M., 
1975, p.27—28) is revealing: 
These ‘power-knowledge relations’ are to be analysed, there-
fore, not on the basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not 
free in relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, the 
subject who knows, the objects to be known and the modalities 
of knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these 
fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their histor-
YOUTH AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA322
ical transformations. In short, it is not the activity of the subject 
of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful or 
resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the processes and 
struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that deter-
mines the forms and possible domains of knowledge. 
In the case of the construction of a development discourse around 
youth, the focus of the analysis is not whether youths are ‘useful or 
resistant to the power’ relations in which they are built-in. Rather, 
youths as a social category have entered the domains of knowl-
edge-power. With this new trend in development, a share of the Ugan-
dan population –a majoritarian one– has entered in the realm of ‘social 
gardening’ (Scott J., 1998) and development politics (Ferguson, 2014). 
Of particular relevance, this social category also constitutes the major-
ity of the voting population. The political relevance of this social group 
is evident for governmental agencies that are subject to the strong 
power of Museveni, who came to power in 1986 when 78% of the cur-
rent Ugandan population was yet to be born. In fact, the regime of 
Museveni has been considered an example of ‘personal rule’ in 
post-colonial Africa (Carbone, 2015, p.42). Since the past election were 
rigged, it would seem that youths’ political opinion (which increasingly 
supports the opposition) is not actually taken into account. However, 
the democratic guise of the regime needs to contain the increasing 
dissatisfaction and tensions, which in the past year have generated 
violent demonstrations and social tensions. It can be argued that there 
is a political interest in showing that the issue of the ‘youth bulge’ and 
youth unemployment has been addressed with development pro-
grammes, considering that youth constitute a wide share of the elec-
torate. In particular, the public sector programme (Youth Livelihood 
Programme) was politically manipulated in several regions where it was 
implemented, with the scope of winning votes—as reported by my 
informants.
7.4.2 Agribusiness
The development discourse around youth clearly proposes agribusi-
ness as solution for unemployment. In development narratives, this 
was described as a win-win solution, as it would tackle unemployment 
and at the same time contribute to the modernisation of agriculture and 
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economic growth. In fact, the majority of youths in Uganda is already 
engaged in agriculture, although mostly subsistence agriculture. There 
is also little evidence that agribusiness would indeed be the best solu-
tion for youths’ employment and there is little evidence youth prefer 
this career path. On the contrary, among the youths I interviewed, only 
a minority saw agribusiness as voluntary career aspiration. 
Yet, agribusiness emerged in the recent trend in development, as 
promising strategy—in which the majority of youths could be employed. 
The youths themselves adopted this narrative and envisioned agribusi-
ness as a strategy to gain economic status and thereby adulthood. In 
this way, the discourse on agribusiness and the identity of youths as 
agripreneurs was adopted by all actors in development rather than 
being imposed. Agribusiness became, for youths in Uganda (and else-
where in the continent), what Scott (1998, p.83) refers as the “authori-
tative tune to which most population must dance”. 
However, in my study, it became clear that besides few pockets of 
success (in terms of economic improvement through agribusiness) 
the outcomes of programmes targeting youths’ engagement in agri-
business were variegated and limited. In particular, it was clear that 
besides few motivated entrepreneurs (who often had not even bene-
fitted from development schemes), the majority was going to be 
employed as contract-farmers rather than agripreneurs. The very neo-
liberal model of agribusiness which centralises power in the hands of 
few agripreneurs, would be able to absorb a limited number of youths—
leaving the majority to labour or at all excluded. Within the discourse 
stressing the responsibility of youths to adopt an agripreneurial mind-
set, those who served as contract farmers or simply continued as sub-
sistence farmers failed in the project. Ferguson (2014, p.19) considered 
the aspect of failure in development in the light of the Foucauldian 
study of the genealogy of the prison: 
The prison, Foucault shows, was created as a “correctional” in-
stitution. It was intended to imprint on the inmates the qualities 
of good citizenship…[but] prisons do not in fact “reform crim-
inals; that, on the contrary, they make nearly impossible that 
return to “normality” that they have always claimed to produce 
(…). While such a result must be conceived as a “failure” from 
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the point of view of the planners’ intentions, the result has quite 
a different character when apprehended as part of a different 
“strategy”. (…) the prison did end up serving as part of a sys-
tem of social control. (…) The point to be taken from the above 
argument is only that planned interventions may produce unin-
tended outcomes that end up, all the same, incorporated into 
anonymous constellations of control –authorless “strategies”, 
in Foucault’s sense– that turn out in the end to have a kind of 
political intelligibility. 
Within the context of failure of development cooperation, Ferguson 
focuses on the ‘unintended outcomes’ rather than on the actual 
effectiveness of the programmes: whether development works or 
does not, is only relevant to some extent. Within the Foucauldian 
paradigm, Ferguson considers the effect of development “strate-
gies” of social control. The prison may fail to reform criminals, but it 
instils a peculiar concept of illegality in the minds of others; again, 
while prisons fail to eliminate crime, they produce delinquents as 
“pathologized subjects”. In the realm of development studies, Fergu-
son transposes the unintended effects of failures of development 
programmes as de-politicization of issues of poverty and pathologi-
zation of development beneficiaries. In the case of the trend around 
youth in agribusiness in Uganda, the imposition of ‘agribusiness’ in 
the development discourse is a normative strategy that as a conse-
quence pathologizes unsuccessful agripreneurs and subsistence 
farmers. 
7.4.3 Heterogeneity and Gaps 
A recurrent theme in my study was ‘heterogeneity’—of the theories of 
change, of the programmes, of the outcomes and of the youths. Such 
heterogeneity emerged from the data and invited me to problematise 
my approach to development. While scholars in critical development 
studies (Scott J., 1998; Escobar, 2012; Ferguson, 2014; Murray Li, 
2007) examined development as a negotiated, resisted or oppressing 
relation between the development apparatus and its beneficiaries, the 
messiness of the reality I examined on the ground invited to look 
beyond this binary contraposition. Development programmes changed 
over time for a variety of reasons: regional disparities jeopardized or 
required changes in approaches; there were negotiations and/or 
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conflicting incentives among stakeholders implementing the pro-
grammes; programs were forced to adapt to the heterogeneous reality 
of youths across the country; there were tensions between youths and 
local authorities or development practitioners, as well as tensions 
among the youths for the management of group decisions. 
The observation of the processes of implementation of the pro-
grammes highlighted the complex reality of development: far mess-
ier than a unilateral enactment of policies into practices. Power rela-
tions articulated within besides between groups of development 
practitioners and youths. This result reinforces the argument of Fou-
cault that “power circulates” (1976, p.29) and is thus to be analysed 
beyond the dualistic model of domination/resistance between a top 
and bottom. 
Moreover, through my analysis, it becomes clear that however ‘good’ 
development policies are, it is a range of different practices, engag-
ing a variety of actors, that will determine the success of these poli-
cies. At the same time, it is hard to evaluate the success of pro-
grammes because of their transient nature and the disparate 
definitions of success within the various agencies. In line with Mosse 
(2004, p.663), “policy models are poor guides to understanding the 
practices, events and effects of development actors, which are 
shaped by the relationships and interests and cultures of specific 
organisational settings”. 
Overcoming the contraposition between ‘top’ and ‘bottom’, problem-
atises the classic development question of the gap between policies 
and practices. In fact, I have argued that programmes change, adapt or 
even fail because of relations on the ground, power relations and con-
flicting incentives. In my research, I have identified tensions at all lev-
els, within as much as between groups of social actors, abstract poli-
cies and actual implementation practices and outcomes. Consequently 
to these tensions, gaps emerged at different levels: between the nar-
ratives of youths on their identity, which was substantially different 
across the country and between genders; between governmental and 
international agencies on the best approach to tackle agribusiness; 
between the policies and the practices through which they were 
implemented; between narratives of development practitioners on 
YOUTH AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA326
how they intended the programmes and how they were perceived by 
youths. Therefore, it is necessary to re-frame the focus of analysis and 
investigate tensions in development beyond the classic question of 
‘development policies and practices’. The gaps emerging from my 
analysis show that development is more than the enactment of policies 
into practices. In this way, I add to the conclusion of Mosse (2004) that 
(good) development policy is unimplementable: not only because of 
the internal incentives of development agencies, but because the real-
ity of development enactment is more heterogeneous and messy than 
the dual paradigm of policies and practices. 
7.5 Discussion
This study meant to investigate a trend in development as a discursive 
process, using a Foucauldian approach. The ethnographic approach 
allowed me to study power as something that circulates rather than 
being imposed, through the examination of narratives and practices of 
social actors in development. As Mosse (2004, p.663) argues, with ref-
erence to Scott: “The ‘public transcripts’ of development are sustained 
by the powerful and the subordinate, both of whose interests lead 
them to ‘tactically conspire to misrepresent’ (Scott, 1990: 2). In devel-
opment, we cannot speak of policy controlling or disciplining, being 
resisted or subverted.” With this in mind, my research suggests the 
need to remove development from the dualistic logic of domination and 
resistance, top and bottom. Capitalizing on an ethnographic approach 
is one way to do this: 
An ethnography of policy in the making focuses on both poli-
cy practice and performance and brings out the actual behav-
ioural, unofficial, and unintended aspects of policy-making. 
More ethnographic and anthropological work could permit us 
to deepen our understanding of the performative and imagina-
tive dimensions of policy-making. Actual observation in the flow 
of events could help to understand policy better as an ongoing 
process of representation to mobilise support. It would reveal 
that this takes place through a variety of social and material 
practices, means, and events. (Rap, 2006, p.1319)
In fact, ‘the observation in the flow of events’ inherent to ethnography 
allows us to study development as a process—its construction through 
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narratives and practices. Perhaps even more importantly, this method-
ological approach –which pivots on inductive research– accounts for 
‘unintended effects’ of development. 
As with any study, however, there are limitations in my analysis. First, 
I have not collected empirical data on the applicability of my results 
in other African countries. As I have argued in chapter 3, there is lit-
tle reason to believe the construction of the recent trend in develop-
ment around youth in agribusiness has followed substantially differ-
ent paths in regards to narratives and practices in other countries. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that many of the trends I dis-
cussed in this dissertation are applicable in other contexts. Addi-
tionally, empirical research in other country contexts, however, would 
need to verify this. Second, by carrying out multi-sited research, I 
did not have the opportunity of delving into in-depth ethnographic 
analysis of one location or group of social actors. This limitation pre-
vented me from collecting exhaustive data on the identity and agri-
business experience of youths. Nevertheless, it allowed for gathering 
an overview of youths’ heterogeneous narratives and practises across 
the country. Third, being a white lady and not speaking the local lan-
guages, I incurred the risk of misunderstanding or being misunder-
stood. I have taken several steps to limit such misunderstandings, but 
these are to some degree inevitable in research of this type. Four, the 
ethnographic nature of my research, together with time constraints, 
only allowed the sampling of a limited number of youths. To help limit 
internal validity concerns, in both the sampling of youth and develop-
ment agencies, I tried to be as representative as possible and ultimate-
ly interviewed over 130 persons for this research. In addition, whenev-
er possible, I validated the narratives of development practitioners by 
confronting them with their agencies’ policy briefs. 
7.6 Policy advice171
Since the topic of this study was directly relevant to development 
171 The policy advice presented in this section is based on a working 
paper (Turolla, Swedlund, Schut, Muchunguzi, & Jassogne, 2018) that was 
distributed to the majority of the development practitioners I worked with, 
during the third field trip to Uganda in 2018. With this working paper, I was 
able to give feedback to organisations that requested to be informed on 
the outcomes of my study. Moreover, I was able to validate the results of 
my study by presenting them to my informants. Dr. Haley Swedlund and 
IITA staff members collaborated in the elaboration of this text. 
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stakeholders, during my fieldwork I was often asked to report back 
my results. For development practitioners the main question is often 
‘what works and what doesn’t’—not only in terms of efficiency of 
programmes, but also in terms of strategy for future approaches. In 
this section, I will therefore focus on two main practice-oriented 
results of my research. First, the feasibility and assumptions under-
lying the theories of change of development organisations; second, 
how to take youths’ heterogeneity into account when addressing 
their engagement in agribusiness, by considering their diverse iden-
tity and constraints.
I will conclude this section with a broader consideration on the impli-
cations of my study for conflict prevention, given that youth studies 
often link the youth bulge to unemployment.
7.6.1 Feasibility and assumptions of theories of change
In general, the trend around youth engagement in agribusiness 
relies on the assumption that engaging youths in agribusiness will 
result in a decrease in youth unemployment and a general economic 
growth and agricultural productivity. Narrowing down to the specific 
development approaches, I have shown how the main goals and out-
comes of two approaches at the extremes of the spectrum are often 
incongruous. The main public sector programme (YLP) supporting 
youths in agribusiness was set out to foster youth employment in agri-
business, but through its approach it ends up stimulating informal 
entrepreneurship along the agri-food value chains. On the other hand, 
the private sector approach aims at stimulating agripreneurship, but 
through the popular contract farming schemes it ends up fostering a 
paid-labour type of employment. Neither of the two outcomes are to 
be considered failures, but rather unforeseen results of the ‘pathway 
to change’ they had chosen. However, it is important for the effective-
ness of the programmes, to understand whether there is a logical cor-
relation between the three steps of the theory of change. 
A deeper understanding of the organisations’ or programmes’ theo-
ries of change allows us to set feasible and consequent objectives. 
Defining the programme’s success and vision upfront should also 
define the pathway to change. For example, if the aim is youths’ 
employment, it will be necessary to develop the specific agri-skills 
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necessary for fulfilling their duties in the out-grower scheme—while 
if the aim is entrepreneurship and spill-over of enterprises, it will be 
necessary to train them in agri-skills for the ownership of the agri-
business enterprise.
Moreover, I have seen how programmes’ definitions of success were 
also a guiding principle for the choice of a development approach 
over another. Different development agencies have different defini-
tions of success, including: repayment of the loans, employment 
and/or training of youths, boosting of agribusiness production, spill-
over effect. For instance, the majority of bilateral development pro-
grammes for youths were eventually held accountable for the num-
ber of youths trained or employed in an agribusiness firm. As a 
result, the incentives to achieve such organisations’ targets were 
much stronger for development practitioners implementing pro-
grammes than their theory of change. Moreover, it can be concluded 
that success is relative and depends on theories of change, assump-
tions, and incentives and targets. Depending on their own definitions 
of success, their programmes can be set up and evaluated differently. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the success of the development 
programmes depends, among others, on three main factors: 1) on the 
feasibility of the underlying theory of change; 2) on the definition of 
success; 3) on the extent to which youths’ heterogeneity and specifici-
ties are accounted for. In the following section I will explore the latter 
factor impacting programmes efficiency. 
7.6.2 How to account for youth heterogeneity
As I have shown in chapter 5, youths are a heterogeneous social 
group. Capacities, constraints and aspirations of youths in agribusi-
ness vary significantly and require different types of support 
depending on three dimensions: territorial, socio-cultural and value 
chain embedding). Such heterogeneity results indiverse agribusi-
ness cultures. Uganda is an extremely diverse country, both in terms 
of ecosystem and socio-cultural environments as in terms of region-
al disparities of development (markets, infrastructures, education 
etc.). Youths agribusiness enterprises incubated in development 
schemes kick-off better where the programme are embedded in 
local networks and value chains. Therefore, it is crucial to address 
youth engagement in agribusiness within their specific context. 
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Considering the heterogeneity of socio-cultural and economic back-
grounds of youths should encourage a tailor-made programme design, 
accounting for at least three factors: a) the age- specific aspirations 
and abilities; b) their gender based-capacities and constraints; c) their 
local, culture-bond values and norms around agriculture.
Besides these factors of diversity, gender is probably the most 
crosscutting indication that youth means different things, and that 
youths’ ability to engage in agribusiness is not equally distributed. 
Women in agribusiness have a harder time then male counterparts. 
In particular, they face discrimination in two main ways: first, acces-
sibility to assets such as land—which is almost exclusively inherited 
by men; and, second household relations, which don’t allow them to 
earn and retain an income (especially if higher than their husbands’). 
Development programmes accounting for gender disparities with 
quotas of female participants are thus not enough. Household 
approaches are more successful in empowering female participation 
in agribusiness as they tackle the cultural environment generating dis-
crimination. Considering the youth-specific challenges for agribusi-
ness (mainly access to finance and land), it is important to engage the 
whole household when involving youths in development schemes: in 
this way, they have more chances of counting on family support for 
starting up an agribusiness enterprise. This is particularly important 
for women, where the family and/or spouse’s support is crucial.
7.6.3 the control of social conflict around the ‘Youth bulge’
From the analysis of the theories of change, emerged a conceptual-
isation of the development problem that relates youth unemploy-
ment to issues of social security and political stability. This concern 
was particularly strong among public sector development practition-
ers. In their narratives, the ‘youth bulge’ was described as a destabiliz-
ing factor, assuming unemployed youths would either steal or join 
social protests organised by the opposition. There was a clear gender 
bias in these postulations, whereby the actual threat was constituted 
by males. Sommers (2015) confirms that also the concerns in interna-
tional development cooperation are particularly focusing on young 
males. Moreover, Sommers (ibid) also problematises the link between 
youth unemployment and conflict, arguing that there is no direct 
correlation. 
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My study shows that development practitioners had little evidence 
on the actual issues, capacities and constraints of youths at the time 
they targeted them with development programmes. Moreover, as 
shown by Sommers (2015), there is little scientific evidence that con-
firms a causal correlation between youth unemployment and conflict 
(in Uganda and elsewhere). Even assuming a connection between 
youth unemployment and instability and insecurity, I question the 
effectiveness of development programmes for youth in agribusiness 
as counter-measures. As argued above (section 7.4.2), there is little 
evidence that shows that the engagement of youths in agribusiness 
will reduce youths unemployment, let alone halt social insecurity and 
conflict. It is hard to imagine an effective approach to secure securi-
ty and political stability, without a clear understanding of who the 
youths are, what their issues are and what would trigger youth-led 
instability and insecurity. The studied development trend was more 
efficient in the construction of the social category of youth and a 
development discourse for their engagement in agribusiness, then 
in securing the stability of the country from the ‘ticking time bomb’172 
of the ‘youth bulge’.
In fact, as argued in chapter 5 (section 5.4.2), in 2017 and 2018 social 
unrest took over the streets of the capital, Kampala. Under the lead 
of Bobi Wine, a singer turned politician, now MP of the opposition, 
youths called for political change. Bobi Wine has often argued that 
the current president should give way to a new generation of lead-
ers. His songs voiced youths discontent and called for political 
action of youths (the majority of the Ugandan population) across the 
country. Yet, as I have shown in my study, one of the ‘unintended 
outcomes’ (Ferguson, 2014) of the recent trend for youths in agribusi-
ness was that of creating a social category of ‘youth’ perceived by the 
youths themselves as a-political. Absorbing youths in the development 
discourse of agribusiness had the effect of framing their success (in 
entering adulthood) in agripreneurial terms. 
Rather than addressing the (potential) sources of social conflict 
172 Ugandan Monitor, article from 7/04/2012, ac-
cessed on 29/10/2018: http://www.monitor.co.ug/
SpecialReports/688342—1381200—ara4ho/index.html
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related to the disproportionate demographic dividend and unemploy-
ment, this development trend has (partially) achieved the ‘unintended 
outcomes’ of social control through the political manipulation of devel-
opment policies addressing youth unemployment (see sections 7.4.2 
and 7.4.3). Nevertheless, recently, (urban) youths have started to 
respond to Bobi Wine’s call for political action: “When the going gets 
tough, the tough must get going, especially when our leaders have 
become misleaders and mentors have become tormentors, when 
freedom of expression becomes a target of suppression opposition 
becomes our position.”
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Empowerment is still, in short, a relationship of power.
(Murray Li, 2007, p.275)
YOUTH AGRIBUSINESS IN UGANDA334
CHAPTER 7—CONCLUSION 335
Image 20. Kids waving goodbye after they gave directions to the driver, on the 
slopes of Mount Elgon, eastern Uganda, 2017. Picture taken by author.
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Appendix 
List of interviews with development practitioners 
# Interview Place Date Gender Organisation
ws750034 Kampala July 2016 male Embassy NL
ws750040 Kampala 17.01.2017 male + female AfDB
ws750043 Kampala 19.01.2017 male young farmers coalition of 
Uganda
ws750044 Kampala 19.01.2017 male + male AKORION
ws750045 Kampala 19.01.2017 male USAID CPM
ws750046 + 
ws750047
Kampala 20.01.2017 male Ministry of Gender, Labour 
and Social Development
ws750048 Kampala 20.01.2017 male FAO
ws750049 Kampala 23.01.2017 female ICCO
ws750050 Gayaza 23.01.2017 male CURAD
ws750051 Kampala 25.01.2017 male Makerere
ws750052 Kampala 25.01.2017 male ZOA
ws750053 Entebbe 27.01.2017 female Ministry of Agriculture Ani-
mal Industry and Fisheries
ws750054 Kampala 2.02.2017 male USAID YLA
ws750055 Kampala 2.02.2017 male YOFCHAN
ws750056 Entebbe 6.02.2017 male + male Ministry of Agriculture Ani-
mal Industry and Fisheries
ws750061 Kampala 13.02.2017 male Ministry of Gender, Labour 
and Social Development
ws750063 Mbale 16.02.2017 male Ministry of Gender, Labour 
and Social Development
voice001 Kampala 21.0.2017 male Agriprofocus
ws750064 Kampala 7.03.2017 male BRAC
ws750066 Kampala 9.03.2017 female Goal - DYNAMIC
ws750070 Kampala 13.03.2017 male AVSI
voice007 Gulu 5.04.2017 male Gulu District Authority
ws750113 Kampala 10.04.2017 male Ministry of Gender, Labour 
and Social Development
Table 20. List of interviews with development practitioners
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List of interviews with youths 
# Interview Place Sub-Region Date Name Gender Group
ws750058
Gulu north 7.02.2017 Group discus-
sion: Annette, 
Irene, Leah, Di-
das, Marcos
male + 
female
private
ws750085
Koch 
Goma
north 29.03.2017 Denis male private
ws750086
Parabongo north 30.03.2017 Robert + 
Clementine
male + 
female
private
ws750087
Parabongo north 30.03.2017 Carlos + 
Scovia
male + 
female
private
ws750088
Parabongo north 30.03.2017 Molly + Irene female + 
female
private
ws750089
Parabongo north 30.03.2017 Michael + 
Harriet
male + 
female
private
ws750091 
+ 92
Atiak north 3.04.2017 Patrick male control
Atiak north 3.04.2017 focus group 
discussion
males control
ws750094 Atiak north 3.04.2017 Matooke male control
ws750095 Atiak north 3.04.2017 Charles Nyako male control
ws750096 Atiak north 3.04.2017 Lasco Odoch male control
ws750097 Atiak north 3.04.2017 Charles Onaka male control
ws750098 Atiak north 3.04.2017 Geoffrey Akena male control
ws750099
Atiak north 3.04.2017 Geoffrey Ko-
makech
male control
ws750100
Odek north 4.04.2017 focus group 
discussion
males public
ws750101 Odek north 4.04.2017 Patrick Okello male public
ws750102 
+ 103 + 
voice005
Odek north 4.04.2017 Pasca Akello female public
voice006 Odek north 4.04.2017 Lucy female public
voice007 Gulu north 5.04.2017 anonymous male public
ws750105
Atiak north 6.04.2017 Pierina + Lu-
cilina
female + 
female
control
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Parabongo north 7.04.2017 Clementina + 
focus group 
discussion
male + 
female
private
ws750108
Odek north 8.04.2017 theatre drama 
play
male + 
female
public
ws750109 Odek north 8.04.2017 Patrick male public
ws750110 Odek north 8.04.2017 Geoffrey male public
ws750111 Odek north 8.04.2017 Nancy female public
ws750112 Odek north 8.04.2017 Kenneth Banya male public
ws750065 Kampala Kampala 8.03.2017 anonymous female control
ws750067 
+ 68
Kampala central 9.03.2017 Cathy female control
ws750069 Kampala central 10.03.2017 Joyce Atuhaire female control
ws750071 Kampala central 15.03.2017 Joyce female control
uber driver Kampala centra 15.03.2017 uber driver male control
ws750072 
+ Sjaak 
part2
Gayaza central 16.03.2017 anonymous male private
ws750073 
+ christin-
exclusive
Gayaza central 16.03.2017 anonymous female private
ws750074 
+ 75
Gayaza central 16.03.2017 anonymous female private
ws750076 
+ 77
Gayaza central 17.03.2017 anonymous female private
ws750078 Gayaza central 17.03.2017 anonymous male private
ws750079 Gayaza central 22.03.2017 anonymous female private
ws750080 Gayaza central 22.03.2017 Walter male private
ws750081 Gayaza central 22.03.2017 Harriet female private
ws750082 Gayaza central 22.03.2017 anonymous female private
ws750114
Kampala central 4.05.2017 Focus group 
discussion: 
Dorah, David, 
Abbey
male + 
female
public
ws750115
Kampala central 4.05.2017 Dorah, Henry male + 
female
public
ws750116 Kampala central 5.05.2017 Gaster male control
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ws750117 Kampala central 5.05.2017 Alex male control
sheema 
piggery 
YLPt
Sheema western 23.05.2017 Zeriba male public
ws750118 Sheema western 24.05.2017 Ashiraf male control
ws750119 Sheema western 24.05.2017 Abby female private
ws750120 Sheema western 24.05.2017 Rachel female private
ws750121
Sheema western 24.05.2017 Nixon, Cres-
cent
male+-
male
private
ws750122 Sheema western 24.05.2017 Allan male control
ws750123
Sheema western 25.05.2017 Ambrose + 
David
male + 
male
NA
ws750124
Sheema western 25.05.2017 Joas + Davis 
+ Pius
male + 
male
control
ws750125 Sheema western 25.05.2017 Sura male control
ws750126 Sheema western 26.05.2017 Alson male control
ws750127 Sheema western 26.05.2017 Mofi male private
ws750128 Sheema western 27.05.2017 Julius male public
ws750129 Sheema western 27.05.2017 Joy female control
ws750130 Sheema western 29.05.2017 Auntie Janet female control
ws750131 
songs
Sheema western 29.05.2017 mamma Rose female control
ws750132 
+ 133
Sheema western 30.05.2017 Jeremiah male control
ws750134 
+ 135
Kiruhura western 30.05.2017 Peter + Alice 
+ Isaac
male + 
female
private
ws750136 
+ 137 
songs
Sheema western 30.05.2017 mamma Rose 
+ auntie
female + 
female
control
ws750138 Bushenyi western 31.05.2017 Emmanuel male private
ws750139 Ntungamo western 31.05.2017 Elinathan male private
ws750140 Kiruhura western 1.06.2017 Edward male private
ws750141 Kiruhura western 1.06.2017 Simon male private
ws750142 Kiruhura western 1.06.2017 Amanya male private
ws750143 Kiruhura western 1.06.2017 Stephen male private
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ws750144 Kiruhura western 2.06.2017 Margaret (old) female control
ws750062
Kamu eastern 16.02.2017 Charles + fam-
ily + Gerald
male + 
female
control
ws750146 Mbale eastern 12.06.2017 Baker Mwanta male public
ws750147 Mbale eastern 13.06.2017 Masala Fred male control
ws750148
Mbale eastern 13.06.2017 Amidu + Amir male + 
male
control
ws750149
Mbale eastern 14.06.2017 group discus-
sion
male + 
male
public
ws750150 Mbale eastern 14.06.2017 Wachi male public
ws750151 Mbale eastern 14.06.2017 Yussuf male public
Mbale eastern 14.06.2017 Hassan male public
ws750153
Mbale eastern 14.06.2017 Adjala + Lucia female + 
female
control
ws750154 Mbale eastern 14.06.2017 Eriasa male public
ws750155 Mbale eastern 14.06.2017 anonymous male public
ws750156 Mbale eastern 15.06.2017 Pius male private
ws750157 Mbale eastern 15.06.2017 Wilber male private
ws750158 Mbale eastern 15.06.2017 Richard male private
ws750159 Mbale eastern 21.06.2017 Lydia female private
ws750160 Mbale eastern 21.06.2017 Cathy female private
ws750161
Mbale eastern 22.06.2017 group discus-
sion
male + 
female
private
ws750162 Mbale eastern 22.06.2017 Fred male private
ws750163 Mbale eastern 22.06.2017 Lorna female private
ws750164 Mbale eastern 22.06.2017 Ivan male private
ws750165 
+ 166
Mbale eastern 22.06.2017 Reverend 
(anonymous)
male private
ws750167 Mbale eastern 23.06.2017 Moses male control
 + 
Mbale eastern 23.06.2017 Gerald & Kiria male + 
male
control
 + 
voice010
Mbale eastern 23.06.2017 Garita female control
voice011 Mbale eastern 23.06.2017 Robina female control
Table 21. List of interviews with youths
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Appendix to chapter 4
section 4.9 Conceptualisation of development problem
International
Food Security Demography Unemployment Stability Other
Food and 
Agriculture 
Organisation
x
African Devel-
opment Bank x x
Embassy of 
the Kingdom 
of the 
Netherlands
x
USAID x x x
AgriProFocus x
AVSI x x
ICCO x
ZOA x
MasterCard 
Foundation—
DYNAMIC 
project
x
Triodos Bank—
BRAC 
programme
x
2/10 = 20% 7/10 = 70% 4/10 = 40% 1/10 = 10% 0%
Table 22. Data—Conceptualisation of development problem (International)
National
Food security Demography Unemployment Stability Other
AKORION x
Young Farm-
ers Coalition 
of Uganda
x
Young 
Farmers 
Champions 
Network
x x x
CURAD x
Food security Demography Unemployment Stability Other
Makerere 
University 
Kampala
x x x
Ugandan 
Ministry of 
Agriculture, 
Animal In-
dustries and 
Fisheries
x x x x
Ugandan 
Ministry of 
Gender, 
Labor and 
Social De-
velopment
x x
RESULTS 3/7 = 42,8% 1/7 = 14,3% 7/7 = 100% 3/7 = 
42,8%
1/7 = 
14,3%
Table 23. Data—Conceptualisation of development problem (National)
All development organisations (17)
Food security Demography Unemployment Stability Other
5/17 = 29,4% 8/17 = 47% 11/17 = 64,7% 4/17= 23,5% 1/17 = 5,9%
Table 24. Data—Conceptualisation of development problem (All)
4.9b Conceptualisation of pathway to change 
International
Funding Capacity 
building
Organising Mindset 
change
Market 
linkages
Ag. inputs
Food and 
Agriculture Or-
ganisation
x
African Develop-
ment Bank x x
Embassy of the 
Kingdom of the 
Netherlands
x x x x
USAID x x x x
AgriProFocus x x x x
AVSI x x
ICCO x x x
RESULTS 0% 7/10 = 
70%
3/10 = 
30%
7/10 = 
70%
6/10 = 
60%
4/10 = 
40%
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Funding Capacity 
building
Organising Mindset 
change
Market 
linkages
Ag. inputs
ZOA x
MasterCard 
Foundation—DY-
NAMIC project x x x
Triodos 
Bank—BRAC 
programme
x x x
RESULTS 0% 7/10 = 
70%
3/10 = 
30%
7/10 = 
70%
6/10 = 
60%
4/10 = 
40%
Table 25. Data—Conceptualisation of pathway to change (International)
Targeting 
International 
Targeting BLANKET Targeting SELECTED
Food and Agriculture Or-
ganisation x
African Development Bank x
Embassy of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands x
USAID x
AgriProFocus x
AVSI x
ICCO x
ZOA x
MasterCard Foundation—
DYNAMIC project x
Triodos Bank—BRAC pro-
gramme x
RESULTS 0% 10/10 = 100%
Table 26. Data—Targeting (International)
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National 
Funding Capacity 
building
Organising Mindset 
change
Market 
linkages
Ag. 
inputs
AKORION x x x x
Young Farmers Coa-
lition of Uganda x x x x
Young Farmers 
Champions 
Network
x x x x x
CURAD x x x x
Makerere University 
Kampala x x x
Ugandan Ministry of 
Agriculture, Animal 
Industries and Fis-
heries
x x x x x
Ugandan Ministry of 
Gender, Labor and 
Social Development
x x x x
RESULTS 2/7= 
28.6%
7/7= 
100%
5/7= 
71.4%
7/7= 
100%
4/7= 
57%
4/7 = 
57%
Table 27. Data—Conceptualisation of pathway to change (National)
Targeting
National
Targeting ALL Targeting SELECTED
AKORION x
Young Farmers Coalition 
of Uganda x
Young Farmers Champi-
ons Network x
CURAD x
Makerere University Kam-
pala x
Ugandan Ministry of Agri-
culture, Animal Industries 
and Fisheries
x
Ugandan Ministry of 
Gender, Labor and Social 
Development
x
RESULTS 4/7 = 57% 3/7 = 43%
Table 28. Data—Targeting (National)
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Conceptualisation of pathway to change 
All 
Funding Capacity building Organising 
Mindset 
change
Market 
linkages Ag. inputs
2/17 = 11.8% 14/17 = 
82.3%
8/17 = 
47.1%
14/17 = 
82.3%
10/17 = 
58.8%
8/17 = 47.1%
Table 29. Data—Conceptualisation of pathway to change (All)
Targeting 
All
Targeting ALL Targeting SELECTED
4/17 = 23.5% 13/17 =76.5%
Table 30. Data—Targeting (All)
4.9c Clustering of development organisations by approaches
Private sector Type
AKORION National
BRAC International
DYNAMIC International
AVSI International
USAID International
Embassy of the Netherlands International
6/17 development organisations = 35,3% 1/6 national - 5/6 international = 16,7% - 
83,3%
Table 31. Clustering of development organisations by approaches (Private sector)
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Public sector Type
MUK National
MAAIF National
MGLSD National
AfDB International
FAO International
5/17 development organisations = 29,2% 3/5 national - 2/5 international = 60% - 
40%
Table 32. Clustering of development organisations by approaches (Public)
Other Type
YOFCU National
YOFCHAN National
CURAD National
ICCO International
ZOA International
AgriProFocus International
6/17 development organisations = 35.3/ 3/6 national, 3/6 international = 50% - 
50% 
Table 33. Clustering of development organisations by approaches (Other)
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“Jeugd is maar een woord”, schreef Bourdieu (1993), verwijzend naar 
de willekeurige en contextuele definities van deze sociale categorie. 
Als een fase tussen jeugd en volwassenheid is ‘jeugd’ een toestand 
van overgang, marginaal en van voorbijgaande aard. Ondanks de 
schijnbare marginaliteit van deze sociale categorie, speelt het con-
cept ‘jeugd’ sinds kort een prominente rol in openbare debatten 
over ontwikkeling in Afrika. Met een mediane leeftijd die de helft is 
van die van de Europese bevolking, wordt verwacht dat de Afri-
kaanse bevolking tegen 2050 zal zijn verdubbeld - wat een ‘youth 
bulge’ oplevert. Onlangs heeft de explosieve demografische groei, 
en de daaruit voortvloeiende uitdaging die werkloosheid in de nabi-
je toekomst zal stellen, geleid tot een focus op ‘jeugd’. In de afge-
lopen jaren hebben ontwikkelingsorganisaties al Afrikaanse jonger-
en onder de aandacht gebracht, alhoewel ‘jeugd’ meestal 
gedefinieerd wordt simpelweg als een leeftijdscategorie. Ondanks 
de onzekerheid en wazigheid die de definities ervan kenmerken 
(Sommers, 2015), is ‘jeugd’ de focus geworden van ontwikkeling-
sprogramma’s waarin miljoenen om gaan. Aangezien de meerder-
heid van de bevolking werkzaam is in de zelfvoorzienende land-
bouw, zijn programma’s opgezet om agribusiness te ontwikkelen. 
Bovendien hebben de demografische en economische zorgen een 
relatief nieuwe trend in de ontwikkeling van het beleid gestimuleerd, 
die erop gericht is om jeugd meer in de agribusiness te betrekken. 
Deze studie onderzoekt het ontstaan van een dergelijke trend in 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking en daarnaast de achterliggende rede-
nen en impact van deze trend. De vraagstelling van dit proefschrift 
luidt dan ook:
Hoe heeft de sociale categorie van jeugd een nieuwe trend in 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking rond agribusiness gedreven en wat is 
de impact tot nu toe geweest?
Deze studie richt zich op de casus van Oeganda. Oeganda is één 
van de 47 minst ontwikkelde landen ter wereld en het land met de 
op één na jongste populatie op het continent (in termen van medi-
ane leeftijd). Net als in andere landen in heel Afrika is de afgelopen 
jaren steeds meer aandacht besteed aan en zijn budgetten vrijge-
maakt voor het betrekken van jongeren bij agribusiness. Hoewel 
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Oeganda in veel opzichten uniek is, vormt het een ‘typical case 
study’ (Gerring, 2008). Oeganda’s relatie met de (internationale) 
gemeenschap heeft daarbij vrij gemiddelde patronen vertoond, niet 
alleen als hulpontvanger maar ook als deelnemer aan de ontwikke-
lingstrend gericht op jongeren in de agribusiness.
In de geschiedenis van het ontwikkelingsbeleid voor Afrika, wat ook 
voor Oeganda geldt, zijn er veel grote veranderingen geweest bin-
nen de thema’s en kwesties die de aandacht van regeringen en 
donoren hebben gekregen. Verschillende benaderingen van de 
ontwikkelingsproblematiek, slingerend van structurele aanpassin-
gen naar marktliberalisaties, hebben zich in de afgelopen decennia 
achtereenvolgend geconcentreerd op milieukwesties, democra-
tisering, gezondheid (HIV/AIDS) en genderkwesties. Tegenwoordig 
is de aandacht verschoven naar de demografische, economische en 
politieke knelpunten. Deze geven aanleiding tot nieuwe trends in het 
ontwikkelen van ontwikkelingsbeleid en budgettering—hetgeen ik 
in dit proefschrift zal aanduiden als ‘ontwikkelingstrends’. 
Vooraanstaande wetenschappers binnen ontwikkelingssamenwerk-
ing(Ferguson, Scott, Escobar, Mosse) gebruiken hiervoor een Fou-
caultiaans paradigma. Ondanks individuele verschillen in de aanpak 
van dit paradigma, ligt de focus in hun werk op de machtsdynamiek-
en, zowel top-down als bottom-up, tussen ontwikkelingsdeskundi-
gen en ontvangers. Vanuit deze theoretische aanzet, tracht dit 
proefschrift inzicht te verschaffen in de vraag hoe het demografisch 
fenomeen van de ‘youth bulge’ in Oeganda heeft geleid tot een 
nieuwe beleidstrend en wat de impact tot nu toe is geweest.
De opkomst van de ontwikkelingstrend voor jongeren in de agribusi-
ness heb ik bestudeerd vanuit twee invalshoeken: enerzijds heb ik 
etnografisch onderzoek uitgevoerd onder 24 ontwikkelingsdeskundi-
gen op het gebied van de agribusiness, en onder 110 jongeren in vier 
regio’s binnen Oeganda. Ik heb zowel de top-down ontwikkelings-
samenwerking processen bestudeerd, als de bottom-up agribusiness 
uitvoering van jongeren die zowel binnen als buiten ontwikkelingspro-
jecten werkten. Daarnaast heb ik participerende observaties gedaan 
waarbij ik aansloot bij ontwikkelingsdeskundigen die op veldbezoeken 
gingen, en heb bijeenkomsten op beleidsniveau bijgewoond. Verder 
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heb ik de interacties van jongeren tijdens hun agribusiness-activiteiten 
op de markten en in de landbouwvelden geobserveerd en ik heb hun 
huishoudens bezocht.
De resultaten van mijn onderzoek zijn verdeeld in drie empirische 
hoofdstukken: eerst analyseerde ik de narratieven van ontwikkelings-
deskundigen, daarna de narratieven van jongeren, en als laatste de 
beoogde, maar ook niet beoogde, impact van ontwikkelingsprogram-
ma’s. Uit mijn onderzoek bleek dat ontwikkelingsdeskundigen een scala 
aan ‘theories of change’ hebben met betrekking tot jeugd in agribusi-
ness. Een belangrijk verschil in visie was dat sommige ontwikkelings-
bureaus een aanpak in de publieke sector hanteerden, terwijl andere 
een door de particuliere sector gestuurde aanpak voorstonden. Hier-
door waren de uitvoering en impact van deze programma’s zeer divers 
in het hele land en hingen zij vooral af van de geografische locatie en de 
gekozen aanpak. Uit mijn interviews met jongeren bleek ook dat de 
sociaal geconstrueerde categorie ‘jeugd’ erg heterogeen was. De 
diversiteit die deze groep kenmerkt, heeft een sterke impact op de uit-
voering van de programma’s. De meest succesvolle programma’s 
waren die waarbij rekening werd gehouden met de heterogeniteit en 
geografische bijzonderheden van jongeren.
Mijn proefschrift heeft bijgedragen op twee niveaus: sociaal en the-
oretisch. Voor de sociale relevantie, beargumenteer ik dat de sociale 
categorie van jeugd te vaag is gedefinieerd om ontwikkelingspro-
gramma’s effectief uit te voeren. Ontwikkelingsprogramma’s veran-
derden aanzienlijk in de tijd van mijn onderzoek, van het moment van 
uitwerken van ‘theories of change’ tot de uitvoering van de program-
ma’s. Dit kwam onder andere vanwege het feit dat programma’s 
weinig rekening hielden met de heterogeniteit van jongeren. Boven-
dien vereisten de politieke agenda’s en prikkels van de ontwikke-
lingsorganisaties zware onderhandelingen en aanpassingen. Met 
andere woorden, naast de kloof tussen ontwikkelingsbeleid en 
feitelijke praktijken op het terrein, zijn er lacunes tussen en ook bin-
nen de narratieven en praktijken van beide groepen ontwikkelings-
actoren (deskundigen en jongeren). Er is op alle niveaus sprake van 
betwisting, wat grote gevolgen heeft voor de resultaten van de pro-
gramma’s. Vanuit theoretisch oogpunt concludeert mijn onderzoek 
dat de ontwikkeling en implementatie van een ontwikkelingstrend 
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zoals jeugd in de agribusiness moet worden begrepen en bes-
tudeerd als een complex proces waarin sociale actoren machts-
mechanismen afdwingen, in plaats van als de implementatie van 
beleid in praktijken. Bovendien, het formuleren van programma’s 
voor jongeren, zonder nadere problematisering van hun heterogenite-
it, heeft als implicatie het opbouwen van een maatschappelijke cate-
gorie –‘jeugd’– die gereduceerd is tot een leeftijdsgroep. Dit is een 
voorbeeld, in foucaultiaanse begrip, van de kracht van narrativen (over 
jongeren) die structuren van macht ondersteunen (in dit geval, het ver-
delen en beleggen van ontwikkelingsgeld en programma’s). 
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